Inter-Agency Assessment Mission Report, Belarus

United Nations Mine Action Service

Mine Action Assessment Mission Report

THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

31 July - 4 August 2000

BELARUS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT

List of Acronyms

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. BACKGROUND

II. OBSERVATIONS

II.1 Historical Context and Current Environment

II.1.a. Historical Overview
II.1.b. Environmental Conditions
II.1.c. National Environment
II.1.d. Regional Environment
II.1.e. International Environment
II.1.f. Socio-economic Environment

II.2 The Landmine/UXO Threat

II.2.a. Origins of the Mines/UXO
II.2.b. Current Situation

II.3 The Consequences of the Presence of Mines/UXO

II.3.a. Mine/UXO Accidents
II.3.b. Socio-economic Impact

II.4 Capacities and Current Activities

II.4.a. General Status of Donor Support
II.4.b. Detection and Clearance Capacities
II.4.c. Capacities for Stockpile Destruction
II.4.d. Mine/UXO Information Management
II.4.e. Mine Awareness
II.4.f. Victim Assistance
II.4.g. International Conventions
II.4.h. Management and Institutional Arrangements

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

III.1. Conclusions

III.1.a. General
III.1.b. Detection and clearance
III.1.c. Stockpiles and Stockpile Destruction
III.1.d. Mine Awareness
III.1.e. Victim Assistance
III.1.f. International Conventions
III.1.g. Coordination and Management

III.2. Recommendations

III.2.a. General
III.2.b. Detection and clearance
III.2.c. Stockpiles and Stockpile Destruction
III.2.d. Mine Awareness
III.2.e. Victim Assistance
III.2.f. International Conventions
III.2.g. Coordination and Management

Annex A: Assessment Mission - Terms of Reference
Annex B: Assessment Mission - Visit Agenda

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The Republic of Belarus is faced with two distinct and unrelated mine/UXO problems. First, Belarus continues to live with the legacy of the First and Second World Wars, during which extensive fighting took place throughout the country. Second, Belarus has also to deal with a more recent legacy involving the substantial stockpiles of anti-personnel mines it inherited upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The nature of the first problem, primarily caused by UXO, is in many ways similar to that of other European countries which have been involved in past World Wars. The socio-economic impact on the country as a whole is limited; however, there continues to be a residual threat to local populations. Official statistics record an average of ten victims a year, over the past ten years. The dangerous areas are neither fenced nor marked, and there is little information available to indicate the potential density of contamination.

To address the threat local capacities have been developed, although these are limited and under-resourced. The Belarus Armed Forces have a professional mine clearance capacity of 44 EOD teams from a total of 200 trained and qualified personnel, supplemented by an additional EOD team from the Ministry of the Interior. However, they all lack modern detection and personal protective equipment, sophisticated demolition techniques and appropriate training to international humanitarian mine clearance standards. The mine awareness and victim assistance aspects of Belarus mine action are less developed, but relevant institutions are working to enhance and improve conditions, and have displayed a willingness to work in partnership with the international community to build upon this potential. With regard to planning and coordination, Belarus has yet to develop proper mechanisms to ensure that all mine action activities are integrated, and that priorities are established based on a clear picture of national socio-economic requirements.

The second problem, that of stockpiles, is in many ways more challenging for Belarus than the threat posed by un-cleared mines and UXO. The scope of this problem is, however, well defined. According to the Ministry of Defence, Belarus has 4.5 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines, of which 3.6 million are of the PFM-1 and PFM-1S type. While the non-PFM-1/1S mines can be destroyed by open burning or open detonation, these destruction techniques cannot be applied to the PFM-1/1S mines out of ecological concerns. In fact, the destruction of stockpiled PFM-1/1S mines is still the object of a number of technical questions, to which the international community as a whole needs to find answers. Under these circumstances, there is no doubt that Belarus will require international assistance to deal with its stockpiles.

The responsive nature of the mechanism currently in place by Belarus authorities to deal with clearance activities seems appropriate, but needs to be strengthened through the provision of modern detection and personal equipment, and improved training for EOD personnel. Clearance activities also need to be complemented by mine awareness and marking activities, which should be developed in parallel.

With regard to Belarus` substantial stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, the PFM-1/1S type is of primary concern. Combustion and detonation trials should be conducted on the PFM-1/1S series of APM, and the actual chemical formulae for the liquid explosive contained in this mine should be identified. In addition to obtaining an estimate of the degree of pollution caused by open burning and open detonation techniques applied to this type of APM, a regional approach to the problem should also be considered.

The Government of Belarus has indicated that, in the absence of international assistance, it is not in a position to comply with the terms of the Ottawa Convention, and therefore to sign it. For the same reason, Belarus has ratified the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, but has not yet deposited its instrument of ratification.

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The Republic of Belarus saw heavy fighting take place on its territory during both World Wars, and there is an unknown number of German and Soviet mines and UXO still scattered about old battlefields, the Vitebsk, Gomel and Minsk regions being particularly affected. A more contemporary legacy with which Belarus also continues to grapple involves the substantial stockpiles of mines it inherited upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In June 1999, Belarus requested UN assistance to deal with its mine and UXO problem (see Annex A and B: Request for Assistance and Terms of Reference). In response to this request and in accordance with the UN mine action policy, the United Nations offered to organise an assessment mission. The aim of the UNMAS-led multi-disciplinary and inter-agency mission was to assess the scope of the landmine/UXO problem in the country, to evaluate its humanitarian and socio-economic impact and to identify possible requirements for UN and international assistance.

The mission to Belarus took place from 31 July - 4 August 2000, and was led by Mr. Stéphane Vigié, Programme Officer, UNMAS. It included the following team members: Mr. Wolfgang Hirsch, GICHD Study Officer; Mr. Adrian Wilkinson, UNDP consultant; and Mr. Steven Feller, Coordination Officer, UNMAS.

Full co-operation and hospitality was extended to the team by the authorities of the Government of Belarus, who made every endeavour to facilitate all requests for information and access to personnel and materials, often at very short notice. These efforts to ensure transparency and full consultation are recognised and appreciated by the assessment team.

The assessment team also acknowledges the excellent support provided by the UN Resident Coordinator and his staff throughout both the planning and the execution of the mission, and would like to express its gratitude for their assistance.

This report presents the main findings of the inter-agency mine action assessment mission as a result of its intensive consultations carried out while in the Republic of Belarus, as well as its key conclusions and recommendations.

 

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Belarus was formally created in 1919 as the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, which, three years later, became one of the four founding republics of the USSR. During the Second World War, Belarus was invaded and occupied by German forces. By the war`s end, some 25% of its population had perished and much of the country had been devastated. In July 1990, a wide-ranging Declaration of Sovereignty was adopted by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, and full independence was declared in August 1991.

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Belarus covers a total area of 207,600 km2, the terrain of which is predominantly flat and includes many lakes and marshlands such as the extensive Pripet marshes in the south. Forest covers approximately one-third of the country. The climate is continental, with corresponding implications during the winter months of snow and freezing temperatures impeding the conduct of clearance operations.

As of 1 January 1998, some 257,000 hectares was contaminated with dangerous levels of radiation as a result of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. This legacy has resulted in the formulation of robust legislation aimed at improving the environmental situation in Belarus, some of which is also applicable to demilitarisation operations, including the Law On Environmental Protection (1992), the Law On Industrial and Consumer Waste (1993) and the Law On Atmospheric Protection (1997). Such legislation effectively prohibits the destruction of the PFM-1 stocks by open burning/open detonation, pending instrumented trial results on the products of combustion or detonation proving that resultant emissions are, in fact, at an acceptable level.

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Belarus is a Presidential Republic. The Executive consists of a Council of Ministers, chaired by a Prime Minister who is appointed by the President. The President also has the power to dissolve the Legislature, a bi-cameral National Assembly consisting of a 110-member Chamber of Representatives and a 64-member Council of the Republic. The current government is dominated by the Party of Communists of Belarus and the Agrarian Party.

President Alexander Lukashenko came to power in the first presidential election in July 1994, and has since accumulated substantial personal power. In November 1996, constitutional amendments were adopted in a referendum. These amendments increased the President`s powers at the expense of the Parliament and the Judiciary, and was the climax of several months of increasing political tension in the country. Parliamentary elections have been scheduled for 15 October 2000.

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In December 1991, Belarus helped found the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and establish CIS headquarters in the Belarus capital, Minsk. In March 1996, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic signed a common market and customs agreement. One month later, Belarus signed the Union Treaty with Russia, followed in May 1997 by the Union Charter which included commitments to co-ordinate economic and foreign affairs and defence. Belarus` foreign policy orientation towards Russia was further reinforced by the signing of a declaration on further unification in December 1999. Although this document envisions the creation of a union-state with joint supranational bodies enjoying wide powers in economic affairs, foreign policy, defence and security, it also reconfirms the continued sovereignty of both states.

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Relations with international organisations and Western countries have suffered since 1996, when concern was expressed by the European Union and a majority of OSCE member states over constitutional amendments adopted in a 1996 referendum. In September 1997, the OSCE established an Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus to assist the authorities in promoting democratic institutions, and in complying with other OSCE commitments. The perceived lack of acceptance of President Lukashenko`s regime by Western governments and human rights organisations has brought with it an increasingly antagonistic stance being taken towards the West. More recently, this position has somewhat mellowed with recognition of Belarus` continued need for multilateral assistance.

Belarus is a member of approximately 50 international organisations. Belarus joined NATO`s Partnership for Peace programme in early 1995.

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Although predominantly a rural economy until the Second World War, Belarus rapidly developed a strong industrial base in the post-war years. Large manufacturing plants and specialised collective farms helped Belarus achieve relative prosperity during this period. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus experienced a deep recession between 1990 and 1995, including an annual decline in real output of more than 10% of GDP in all three years between 1993 and 1995. The Belarus economy remains extremely weak, and subject to tight government control. A hesitant start was made towards reform in 1993, but this process has stalled.

Large and centrally controlled industrial enterprises continue to dominate the economy, while production in the agricultural sector has suffered from a combination of recent bad weather and an ongoing need for restructuring. Collective and state farms remain the dominant forms of agricultural production, and cultivated land accounts for 29% of the country`s land use. Despite the fact that Belarus possesses valuable stands of forest, the industry remains underdeveloped.

Belarus` trade remains overwhelmingly focused on CIS member states, particularly Russia. Belarus continues to rely heavily on energy imports, including 93% of its oil, 98% of its gas and 100% of its coal. Electricity is imported from Russia and Lithuania, with Russia also serving as the main supplier of oil and gas and for which Belarus has regularly received preferential treatment. At the same time, however, economic turmoil in Russia significantly affects the Belarusian economy`s own growth policy based on increasing exports to Russia. The Belarus economy remains vulnerable to a combination of domestic-currency price increases for imports from non-CIS countries on the one hand, and disappearing export markets on the other.

The Government continues to prioritise real wage and pension growth. It also maintains full employment, with official unemployment in 1999 being reported as only slightly above 2% of the workforce. Year-end inflation in 1999 was approximately 250%, while the rubel lost 67% of its nominal value.

Living standards in Belarus traditionally exceeded those in other parts of the Soviet Union. Since 1990, however, the country has seen a dramatic fall in the standard of living for the majority of the population. Wages have been distributed erratically, and have not kept pace with rising costs. Health care in Belarus is state operated, and is provided free of charge. At the same time, however, the system remains under-equipped and lacking pharmaceuticals and vaccines, despite continued focused efforts resulting from the 1986 Chernobyl` disaster. Infectious diseases are common, and all major health indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality have worsened.

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Belarus saw heavy fighting take place on its territory during both World Wars, and continues to have particular problems with landmines and UXO dating, in particular, from the Second World War. More recently, Belarus inherited a substantial stockpile of mines when the Soviet Union collapsed and Belarus became independent in 1991.

World War II: Belarus was the scene of heavy fighting over a three-year (1941-1944) period, and there remains an unknown number of German and Soviet mines and UXO still scattered about old battlefields. Unexploded ordnance constitutes a more serious threat than landmines, the most dangerous areas being those where trench battles took place. A substantial amount of contamination has been found in the Brest, Gomel, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk regions, with the Vitebsk region being particularly affected. On a field visit to the Doubrovitsa area, it was apparent to the team that some battlefield area clearance operations had previously taken place, most probably by Soviet Army units and German prisoners-of-war in the immediate post-war period. There are, however, no available records or apocryphal knowledge of the degree, extent or quality of these clearance operations.

Stockpiles: The Belarus stockpile of anti-personnel mines is a legacy of the massive production of APMs which took place under Soviet auspices.

 

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Landmines/UXO: Since 1945, some 26 million items of UXO have been cleared. Mobile engineer teams from the Belarus Armed Forces continue to respond to requests from the local population for mine/UXO clearance. The scale of the problem can be illustrated by the following UXO/mine clearance statistics provided by the Belarus Armed Forces:

	TYPE	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
1	AP Mines	28	1,220	347	50	182	108	250	289
2	UXO	18,733	57,443	84,985	7,527	10,521	6,396	4,704	10,437
	TOTALS	18,761	58,663	85,332	7,577	10,703	6,504	4,954	10,726

 

The above figures reflect a total cleared area of 350 Ha2, most of which could not previously be used for agricultural or other economic purposes. The cleared areas were in the Krupsky district, the Minsk region, the Dubrovensky district, the Vitebsk region, the Baranovichi district and the Brest region. As can be discerned, UXO accounts for the vast majority of all recovered ordnance.

The Belarus Armed Forces have also indicated that the following areas, listed in priority order, remain to be cleared:

	REGION	DISTRICT	AREA (KM2)
1	VITEBSK	DOKSHITSY	2.00
2		DOUBROVITSA	172.00
3		VERKHNEDVINSK	2.00
4		ORSHA	6.35
5		SENNENSK	9.58
6	GRODNE		0.00
7	BREST	BARANOVICHI	0.07
8		BREST CITY	0.70
9		KOBRIN	0.01
10		LUNINETS	1.88
11		LIAKHOVICHINE	17.70
12	GOMEL	CHECHERSK	1.50
13		ZHLOBIN	0.50
14		SVETLOGORSK	0.70
15		OCTIABRSK	5.00
16		RECHITSA	2.00
17		LOYEVSK	24.00
18		KALINKOVICHI	2.00
19	MOGILVE	CHAUSY	12.00
20		DRIBINSK	24.00
21		BELINICHI	3.00
22		KLICHEVSK	10.00
23		BOBRUISK	1.00
24		SLAVGOROD	36.00
25		OSIPOVICHI	4.00
26	MINSK	SLUTSK	12.25
27		STARIYE DOROGI	0.02
28		KLETSK	3.14
	TOTAL		353.41

The majority of this contaminated area is in agricultural land and forests. None of the areas contaminated with mines or UXO are marked or fenced, and there is little information available to indicate the potential density of contamination.

Stockpiles: The Government of the Republic of Belarus provided the following details of its stockpile of anti-personnel mines. In reviewing these figures, it should be recognised that the disclosure of this information is a major step forward towards greater transparency, and provides an indication of Belarus` commitment to eliminate the problem it faces.

	TYPE	QUANTITY	REMARKS
1	MON-50	55,449	Directional
2	MON-90	37,438	Directional
3	MON-100	39,187	Directional
4	MON-200	18,216	Directional
5	OZM-72	300,185	Bounding
6	PMN	54,096	Blast
7	PMN-2	300,158	Blast
8	POM-2	70,680	Fragmentation
9	POMZ-2M	94,392	Fragmentation
10	PRM-1 and 1S	3,635,152	Blast
	TOTAL	4,584,953

Except for the PFM-1/1S type, Belarus` anti-personnel mines can technically be destroyed by open burning, or open detonation (OBOD). In this context, Belarus Government authorities have stated that they regard destruction of APMs by detonation as being environmentally unsound. Belarus has already declared to the international community the destruction, by detonation, of 6,939 shelf life expired anti-personnel mines of all types, while an additional 1,208 PMN-type mines have also been destroyed.

The majority of Belarus` stockpiled anti-personnel mines are concentrated in the Gomel region, although there are approximately ten small stockpiles of APMs at other ammunition storage locations throughout the country. The storage conditions shown to the team were assessed to be safe, secure and adequate. The mines were well protected from climatic conditions, and diurnal cycling is minimised. The depot which was shown to the team was alarmed, had adequate fire-fighting precautions and capabilities, and was isolated to a sufficient degree from the local population.

As with Ukraine, the substantial stocks of the PFM-series which Belarus possesses pose a particular and unique destruction challenge. For a number of technical reasons, the more conventional open burning/open detonation destruction technique cannot be applied to this type of mine. It is thought that doing so could result in the evolution of hydrocyanic acid, aluminium oxide and lead pollution. Methodology developed by the Russian Federation suggests that destruction by OBOD of ten boxes of PFM-1 mines will result in air pollution, in a downwind hazard area, of between 0.92 to 21.6 km.

 

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Landmine and UXO victims in Belarus can be divided into three groups. The first group comprises civilians who were affected by landmines/UXO during the Second World War when they were children. The second group comprises former military personnel affected by landmines during the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The third group includes civilians affected by UXO left over from the Second World War.

For the period from 1944-1999, there were 5,997 mine and UXO casualties, including 3,375 maimed and 2,622 killed. The following figures on numbers and types of more recent casualties were provided by Belarus authorities:

	DATE	FATALITIES		INJURIES		TOTAL
		ADULTS	CHILDREN	ADULTS	CHILDREN
1	1990	0	0	1	4	5
2	1991	1	1	0	2	4
3	1992	1	3	1	6	11
4	1993	0	1	1	0	2
5	1994	3	2	1	7	13
6	1995	1	4	2	3	10
7	1996	1	5	3	6	15
8	1997	1	2	9	2	14
9	1998	0	2	6	0	8
10	1999	3	3	2	2	10
	TOTAL	11	23	26	32	92
	ANNUAL MEAN VICTIMS					9.20

 

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Compared to Belarus` entire population of some ten million people, the presence of landmines and UXO has a limited impact in terms of casualties. The threat posed by mines/UXO is not popularly recognised by the general public, whilst representatives from UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR were similarly unaware of any mine-related problems in Belarus. In those areas which are contaminated by mines/UXO, the local population were aware of the dangers and had informal mechanisms in place to minimise the risk of accidents in their respective communities.

The socio-economic impact of mines/UXO on the country as a whole is similarly limited. Notwithstanding the fact that contaminated land is not being used for agricultural purposes and logging operations in affected forests remain difficult to conduct safely, it should be recognised that the benefits resulting from the clearance of this land would be minimal. Only a small amount of the total land available for productive agricultural use is contaminated.

 

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There is currently no direct UN-facilitated donor support directed to mine action projects within Belarus. With regard to potential future assistance, the assessment mission team was able to meet with selected donor representatives. Subsequent discussions indicated that the international community did not appear to be aware of the full extent of the problem in Belarus, or had received only limited information on the issue.

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The Government of Belarus has been actively committed to overcoming the landmine/UXO problem it faces, and has devoted a substantial amount of resources to carry out clearance operations. The results achieved to date have been substantial, recognising the complexity of the problem posed and the myriad of other important issues competing for limited resources.

Mine and UXO clearance operations were undertaken in Belarus in the immediate post-war period by Soviet Army Engineers and German prisoners-of-war. Since then, mobile engineer teams from the Belarus Armed Forces continue to respond to requests, and have previously conducted "blanket clearance operations". The Belarus MoD states that they have sufficient numbers of experienced and qualified experts to carry out these tasks. Requests for EOD action are made by local authorities to the Armed Forces, which is capable of deploying 44 EOD teams from a total of 200 trained and qualified personnel. These teams are allocated areas of responsibility within Belarus` 22 Military Districts, with each district having two teams earmarked for its own requirements.

Recognising the significant amount of mines and UXO cleared in Belarus since 1945, it can be presumed that there exists a significant amount of relevant corporate technical knowledge in the Belarus Armed Forces. However, formal training standards appear to be based on old Soviet standards, and do not comply with international standards for mine action. Interviews with representatives of the Armed Forces` Engineer Group suggested that recruits had three months` recruit training as combat engineers, followed by ten days of EOD specialist training. The extent of this training, however, was limited only to mine clearance techniques and the excavation of detected UXO. The only available instruction on render-safe procedures was that of destruction by detonation in situ. Training for these teams is provided at the Engineer School located near Minsk.

Individual EOD teams consist of five personnel, including one officer, one driver and three combat engineers. The non-commissioned officer and soldier component of these teams are conscripts, who receive some training, serve for fourteen months and are replaced by new conscripts. Team members receive "danger pay" for their work. The provision of refresher training for reservists remains problematic. In calling up reservists for training purposes, the Belarus MoD is obligated to pay reservists a rate equivalent to their civil job incomes -- an inordinately expensive state-of-affairs which is beyond current financial resources.

In addition to the Ministry of Defence EOD teams, the Belarus Ministry of the Interior has a separate EOD team of ten to fifteen people. The MoI team is trained to deal with aircraft bombs using non-explosive render safe procedures. Training provided to personnel carrying out these particular procedures, however, dates from the Soviet era. There is no training school in Belarus which can provide expert instruction in carrying out these activities and, as a result, training for new members of this team is limited to that which can be taught whilst actually carrying out EOD activities.

The Belarus Armed Forces possess some mechanical means of mine clearance based on the T-72 armoured fighting vehicle, in addition to a limited explosive detection dog capability. The Armed Forces are, however, short of suitable detection and individual personal protection equipment (PPE). Belarus authorities cite an estimated requirement for 200 additional and complete sets of PPE, whilst acknowledging that the personal protection equipment currently being issued to clearance teams consists only of combat body armour and helmet. Similarly, detection equipment being employed is based on dated, Soviet-era technology, with an effective detection depth of 300mm. The Belarus Armed Forces also suffer from a shortage of suitable vehicles and fuel available for dedicated use in mine/UXO clearance operations. Thus, the provision of logistic support for demining operations is a major concern, and must be an integral component of any future assistance programme for mine action in Belarus.

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The Ministry of Defence has stated that Belarus has the capacity to destroy, with no additional international assistance required, all but the PFM-series of mines in its possession. It was estimated by the Belarus Armed Forces that some 1.5 million of its stockpiled APMs (with the exception of the PFM series) could be destroyed by OBOD, at a cost of approximately US$ 1 per mine (no detailed financial estimates were produced to substantiate this calculation). A number of these mines could also be destroyed by breakdown, with the recovered explosive content being recycled for commercial use. In this regard, there are two industrial ammunition demilitarisation facilities in Belarus that are currently recycling artillery shells.

The Belarus Armed Forces have stated that all of the 3.6 million PFM-1/1S mines should be destroyed as a priority due to deterioration in the mines` storage and the expiration of their safe shelf life. The mines` liquid explosive content continues to react with the weapon`s hermetic seals, leading to the detonator. Failure of these seals will allow the liquid explosive to come into contact with the detonator, with detonation resulting. There is no capability to inspect the PFM-1 series in detail to try and identify the current state of the seals. Regardless, even if such a capacity did exist, the design of this type of APM is such that this inspection process would be excessively hazardous.

Belarus has asked for international assistance in its efforts to dispose of the PFM-series of anti-personnel mines it has in stocks. In order to avoid anticipated damage to the environment with the release of toxic products resulting from detonation and combustion, specialised destruction techniques - which Belarus currently does not have - need to be utilised.

 

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Current information management procedures amongst government entities in Belarus are at an initial stage of co-ordination, with the need to strengthen current positive aspects and incorporate the potential for provision of an integrated data collection and dissemination process. Such a process would greatly assist, at a national level, in prioritisation and planning efforts. The general lack of modern computer hardware and shortage of requisite expertise in Belarus effectively precludes the immediate introduction of an electronic database or information management system.

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Mine awareness education is undertaken by the Belarus Armed Forces for its mine clearance personnel, although the assessment mission team was not able to ascertain the extent, content or manner of conduct of this training. Mine awareness education is also provided to the civilian population in affected areas prior to the commencement of clearance operations by EOD teams. Training is conducted by individual EOD team officers, with no standard script or materials available, based only on the officer`s personal experience with the issues.

Films depicting the EOD clearance task in the Grodno region have been shown on national television. Mine awareness training for schools is also being developed by the Belarus Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Education, with support from non-governmental organisations such as the Support Centre for Associations and Foundations (SCAF) and the Belarus Campaign to Ban Landmines (BCBL). It is planned to incorporate this initiative in the national secondary education curriculum.

Mine awareness training already available remains locally developed, and there have not yet been any efforts to specifically target the provision of mine awareness training. UNICEF has not had any involvement with mine awareness issues in Belarus, and none of the current or proposed mine awareness training initiatives currently underway is based on the International Guidelines for Landmine and UXO Awareness Education.

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As previously outlined in section II.3.a, available information suggests that the number of accidents within Belarus has been relatively limited, although the figures provided must be considered with caution in the absence of a comprehensive nation-wide monitoring and analysis system to collect the relevant data. Similarly, accurate information relating to the current efforts to assist, rehabilitate and reintegrate mine casualties is not comprehensive, with impressions gathered during visits to a number of facilities not necessarily reflecting the true nature of Belarus` capacities for victim assistance throughout the country.

With regard to military personnel engaged in clearance operations, all EOD team members receive limited first aid training but do not carry shock/trauma equipment whilst on operations. The treatment and evacuation of casualties is the same as for civilian casualties; apocryphal evidence suggests that the majority of mine/UXO victims reach a surgical facility within 1½ to 3 hours.

Medical, surgical, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available through the Ministry of Health network of hospitals and health-care institutions. There are 170 rehabilitation departments in outpatient clinics, twenty inpatient clinics, fifteen specialised rehabilitation centres and 26 sanatoriums in Belarus. The military hospital in Minsk acts as a central treatment facility for all shock/trauma victims, which includes landmine/UXO casualties. Staff working at this facility provides an advisory and medical consultancy service to other medical facilities around the country. A centre for medical and social rehabilitation of the disabled was also recently opened, while individual rehabilitation programmes are being developed for veterans of the war in Afghanistan by a private agency, "La Makhe".

The Belarus Prosthetic Rehabilitation Centre is the main supplier and producer of prosthetics in the country. The centre has an annual capacity of 3,108 wheelchairs and 14,640 prosthetic devices, which are distributed through the regional and local social welfare departments. There is a potential to increase the production of mobility and prosthetic devices for export to other countries.

There are no specific programmes in Belarus available to mine victims. There is a system of state insurance against social risks available, funded by regular contributions from an individual`s salary and in accordance with the state budget for the current year and the appropriate legislation. The World Health Organisation (WHO) does not have any programmes relating to mine/UXO victims, while the Belarus Red Cross has an aspiration to support a mine victim programme, pending availability of funding. As an interim measure, the Belarus Red Cross is supplementing the meagre state pension for disabled citizens with food and items of clothing.

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According to high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Defence, Belarus has never produced, is not producing and will not produce or modernise APMs or their components, including Claymore-type mines or any other mines, in the future. It was also stated that Belarus is not conducting research on any munitions which might function like anti-personnel mines, or on any potential alternatives to APMs.

Government officials say that Belarus is not exporting AP mines nor has it exported them in the past. In 1995, President Lukashenko announced a moratorium on the export of all types of landmines, to last from 1 September until the end of 1997. In late 1997, this moratorium was extended until the end of 1999. The moratorium has since been extended until the end of 2002. In a similar effort, in early 1998 a decree was passed which banned the transit of APMs and certain other goods through the territory of the Republic of Belarus.

On 7 October 1996, Belarus ratified the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. It has not yet, however, deposited its instrument of ratification because of financial constraints on its implementation. Belarus participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in Geneva in December 1999, while its Armed Forces have studied the provisions of Amended Protocol II and have started their implementation.

Belarus voted for the 1997, 1998 and December 1999 UN General Assembly resolutions supporting the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, but it has not yet acceded to the Convention itself. Government authorities have cited a number of concerns in this regard, including a lack of funding needed for destruction of existing APM stockpiles and mine clearance operations. On several occasions, Belarus authorities have reiterated their full support of and willingness to accede to the Convention if adequate resources were made available to ensure that Belarus could successfully carry out its treaty obligations, particularly with regard to destruction of stockpiles. The Government remains wary of premature commitment, particularly given its earlier negative experience when, under European arms reduction agreements then negotiated, it was obliged to destroy ten percent of its conventional force structure with marginal assistance received in its efforts. Recognising this, it is worth noting that Belarus officials have made it clear that this implementation concern is the only obstacle to Belarus joining the Convention. Belarus` position on the issue is not contingent, in particular, upon Russia`s position on this matter.

Belarus is a regular participant in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in discussions relating to the landmines issue, and has actively contributed to consultations in this and other fora that deal with the issue. Belarus hosted an "International Workshop on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination" in Minsk on 6-7 March 2000, and attended the Ottawa Convention inter-sessional Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meetings in Geneva in December 1999 and May 2000.

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There is no national programme on humanitarian mine action or clearance priorities in Belarus. The Department of Engineer Forces co-ordinates mine clearance with the Ministry of Defence, and there are a set of Standing Operating Procedures for the planning and conduct of clearance operations at the operational level. At the strategic level, however, Belarus has no co-ordinated national mine action plan. In this context, the Belarus MoD has stated that future implementation of a plan and prospective clearance operations are dependent on the availability of international financial support.

The need for a comprehensive national or regional mine action plan or a mechanism for consultative priority setting was identified. Such an entity would ensure promotion of an integrated mine action approach that includes elements such as awareness education and victim assistance. The lack of information collection and sharing facilities may have hindered the development of a clearer picture of the landmine/UXO threat.

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• The problem identified is primarily one of UXO left over from World War I and World War II, and of stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines left over from the former USSR.
• Based on the information available, landmines and UXO do not constitute a humanitarian emergency in Belarus.
• Belarus has demonstrated a willingness and commitment to resolve its mine and UXO problems, and has already developed capacities to deal with the problem, although these capacities are limited and under-resourced.
• Government authorities have indicated that, in the absence of international assistance, they would not be in a position to comply with the terms of the Ottawa Convention and, therefore, to join it in the immediate future.
  

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• Mobile Army Engineer teams continue to respond to requests for mine/UXO clearance from the local population. These teams respond to approximately 1,500 EOD incidents per annum.
• The Belarus Ministry of Defence EOD teams require additional training and equipment, in particular modern personal protection and modern detection equipment. They also require training to international humanitarian mine standards, particularly in the area of survey.
• Current shortfalls in equipment and training standards have resulted in clearance operations not being adequately supported by an appropriate level of planning and quality assurance.
  

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• The storage conditions of stockpiled mines were assessed to be safe, secure and adequate.
• Belarus has declared to the UN team that it has 4.5 million stockpiled anti-personnel landmines, of which 3.6 million are of the PFM-1/1S type.
• Belarus has the capacity to destroy approximately 1.1 million of their APM stockpile by Open Burning and Open Detonation.
• However, standard destruction techniques (i.e. OBOD) cannot be applied to stockpiled PFM-1/1S mines, as this could result in the production of toxic substances. This problem remains particularly critical since the safe shelf life of all of the 3.6 million PFM-1/1S mines has expired.
  

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• Currently, the population has limited general knowledge about the mine/UXO situation in Belarus.
• The international community, too, has a limited understanding of the scope, extent and impact of the landmine/UXO and stockpile problem within Belarus.
• The Ministry of Defence provides mine awareness education in mine- and UXO-affected areas through their mobile engineer groups prior to the commencement of clearance operations, but the processes and materials used are inadequate.
• Current marking of mine suspected areas is insufficient, with no easily recognisable warning signs visible from access routes and inadequate - if any - fencing of known areas.
• None of the current or proposed mine awareness training is based on the International Guidelines for Landmine and UXO Awareness Education.
• Willingness exists both within the Government of Belarus and local civil society to improve the mine awareness mechanisms within the country.
  

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• According to Government statistics, 3,375 persons have been wounded and 2,622 killed by mines and UXO between 1944 and 1999. This corresponds to an average of about ten victims per year over the past ten years.
• However, information on mine/UXO accidents is limited, and there is no systematic data collection, collation and analysis system in place.
• Belarus has a reasonably good public health system in place to deal with mine victims through the network of central, regional and local hospitals and other health care institutions co-ordinated by the Ministry of Health.
• Physiotherapy and psycho-social rehabilitation resources appear to be very limited. Reintegration of victims appears problematic, although companies are requested to engage handicapped people. There are limited social security and pension benefits available to handicapped persons.
  

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• With regard to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Belarus has ratified the 1996 Amended Protocol II on mines. However, it has not deposited the instruments of ratification, arguing that it needs international assistance to fully comply with the provisions of the protocol. For the same reasons, Belarus has not signed the 1997 Ottawa Convention.

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• The primary responsibility for addressing the landmine and UXO problem remains with the MoD. There is limited inter-action with other Government Ministries on the issue.
• An overall integrated national policy and strategy for mine action should be expanded to a level of effective implementation.
  

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• It is thought that the nature of the problem posed in former battlefield areas in Belarus does not differ significantly from that of many other European countries, such as Russia, Germany, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom.
• With regard to clearance activities, the responsive nature of the mechanism currently in place by Belarus authorities therefore seems appropriate, but needs to be strengthened through the provision of modern detection and personal equipment and improved training for EOD personnel. Clearance activities also need to be complemented by mine awareness and marking activities, which should be developed in parallel.
• Belarus` substantial stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, particularly of the PFM-1/1S type, is of primary concern and will require international assistance to deal with. There remains a requirement for further analysis and studies to be conducted before an optimum solution is developed.
• UNMAS should promote the needs of the Government of Belarus for assistance in mine action within the international donor community.

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• The socio-economic needs of all sectors of society should be considered in the planning process for mine clearance prioritisation. A mechanism should be established to ensure joint planning and coordination of mine action activities at the operational level.
• The available clearance capacity is thought to be sufficient to deal with existing concerns.
• The Government should continue to utilise the proven capabilities of the Corps of Engineers for mine/UXO clearance operations.
• The international community should consider provision of donor support for further expansion of existing capacity, including modern detection and personal protective equipment. Training in the use of such equipment to international humanitarian mine clearance standards should also be provided to Armed Forces EOD personnel.
• Marking of suspected mined areas needs to be urgently undertaken, where practicable, to ensure that inhabitants are aware of the danger areas.
• All available information detailing areas suspected to be contaminated by mines and UXO should be collected and consolidated. Relevant maps and minefield records in the possession of other countries should be made available to Belarus.
  

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PFM-1/1S Anti-personnel Landmines

• The full release of detailed information about stockpiled APMs by Belarus authorities should be noted and recognised by the international community as a substantial and positive indication of the Government`s preparedness to deal with the problem.
• Belarus` substantial stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, particularly of the PFM-1/1S type, is of primary concern and will require international assistance to deal with. Unless action is taken in the short-term, there is a risk that PFM-1/1S type mines will spontaneously combust during storage, resulting in an undesirable explosive event.
• The actual chemical formulae for the VS-6D liquid explosive contained in this mine should be identified, thus enabling an estimate of the degree of pollution caused by open burning and open detonation techniques applied to this type of APM to be made.
• Combustion and detonation trials should be conducted on the PFM-1/1S series of APM in an enclosed chamber with on-line monitoring. This would give the best indication of the real evolved products.
• A regional approach to the problem should be considered. The current Canadian/Ukraine PFM-1/1S destruction project, in particular, should be taken into account, with the feasibility of a transportable capability examined.
• In an effort to determine if there is any transferable technology, appropriate authorities in the Russian Federation should be approached to see how they are destroying their own expired shelf-life stockpile of PFM-1/1S type mines.

  Other Anti-personnel Landmines

• The MoD has indicated that Belarus does not need international assistance to destroy its other stockpiles of APM. These stocks can be destroyed utilising open burning/open detonation, or reverse engineering techniques. The complete destruction of these stocks would further demonstrate to the international community Belarus` commitment to the objectives of the Ottawa Convention.
• A move from the Belarus Armed Forces to adjust current military doctrine to reflect the fact that anti-personnel landmines should no longer be used would be another indication of Belarus intentions.
• Training in multi-item demolition and logistic disposal techniques could be offered to the Belarus Armed Forces by a donor nation possessing this expertise.
  

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• Mine awareness education programmes should be targeted to affected communities. These programmes should be developed by the Ministry of Education in cooperation with UNICEF and with the involvement of other government and NGOs. They should utilise a community-based, long-term and sustainable approach involving both the government and civil society in their implementation.
• Collaborative efforts with the SCAF and the Belarus Campaign to Ban Landmines to promote the issue of mines and undertake mine awareness education should continue.
  

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• Assistance to mine victims should be addressed as part of the strengthening of the health sector in general. Existing health capacities in Belarus should be supported primarily through the provision of appropriate equipment and drugs, with secondary emphasis placed on provision of technical assistance.
• Existing rehabilitation services should be strengthened to provide services throughout the rehabilitative process.
  

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• Belarus should be encouraged to accede to the Ottawa Convention at the earliest opportunity.

• It is thought that the UXO legacy from World War I and World War II is not an obstacle to Belarus joining the Ottawa Convention. Further clarification on this issue should be sought from States Parties to the Convention.

• The requirement to destroy APM stockpiles remains a serious concern under the terms of the Ottawa Convention, and international assistance should be provided to Belarus in an effort to destroy stocks of PFM-1/1S type mines.

• The Government of Belarus should be encouraged to continue to take steps to eliminate all anti-personnel landmines within its territory.

• Consideration should be given to providing financial support to ensure Belarus` submission of its instrument of ratification of the CCW Amended Protocol II, and participation in relevant mine-related international meetings and fora.
  

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• All interested government departments should cooperate and assume full responsibility for the relevant core component of mine action in their particular area of expertise.
• Regular meetings (e.g. on a bi-annual basis) should be organised by the Belarus MoD as a means to discuss mine-related issues of common concern with such ministries as the Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Health, Education, Environmental Protection, and the Ministry of Emergencies, as well as with appropriate representatives from civil society.
• Similarly, consideration should be given to having UNDP facilitate a regular dialogue with the donor community on international assistance in mine action.
• The schedule and outputs of all meetings relating to mine action should be regularised and transparent.
  

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