Statement to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts |
Mr. Chairman designate,
1) A rapid entry into force and implementation of Protocol V, 2) Further regulation of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines, and 3) Measures to stop the humanitarian and development impact of cluster munitions and their accompanying sub-munitions.
I would like to direct my remarks to each of these three areas.
Protocol V The accumulated experience of UN humanitarian operations is that ERW in post conflict settings are injuring, and just as often killing, civilians long after wars are over. The provisions of Protocol V will not be effective if this protocol does not enter into force. At present, only five states have ratified the protocol, with others in the process of completing the legal steps required for ratification. We urge all states to ratify as soon as possible. It would be useful to hear later today from States when they expect to be able to do so. In this connection the UN is ready to provide any technical assistance required by states to assist in this process. We have already asked our experts in ERW-affected states to begin addressing issues involved in ratification of the protocol, and compliance with its provisions. We will also encourage these States to prepare appeals for funding of clearance operations under Article 7.
MOTAPM A common UN position has already been presented to this forum regarding MOTAPM in March 2004. I would like to take this opportunity to recall some key elements of that position:
The impact of MOTAPM in humanitarian settings is well documented – in research carried out by the UN and other entities. It is clear to us that their use is currently resulting in unnecessary harm to civilians, both directly and indirectly – directly when a civilian bus in Angola detonates a mine causing multiple deaths and horrific injuries, and indirectly when humanitarian agencies are prevented from delivering essential aid because roads cannot be used. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that delivery of food aid to 2 million people in Sudan has been compromised by mined roads. If we have not yet convinced all States Parties here today that the humanitarian consequences of MOTAPM require regulation of their use, then I am afraid we have not been effectively communicating the evidence that we have seen. We urge States Parties to take the steps needed to develop an instrument that will keep MOTAPM out of the hands of irresponsible users.
Cluster Munitions
At previous meetings the UN has spoken of the casualties sustained among civilian populations during and after cluster munitions strikes. The clearance of unexploded sub-munitions is always hazardous for demining personnel, and their presence constitutes an obstacle to post-conflict humanitarian and development operations. In Kosovo , Afghanistan , Iraq and now Sudan we have seen that this class of weapons has presented particular humanitarian problems.
For clarity’s sake, UNMAS has defined cluster munitions to pertain to “containers designed to disperse or release multiple sub-munitions” and has defined sub-munitions as “any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition”. This definition and its accompanying technical notes will be provided in a Working Paper to be circulated separately. The definitions refer both to air-dropped, as well as to artillery-delivered systems.
UN agencies are concerned with the hazards that cluster munitions pose as ERW, but also with the immediate threat posed to the lives of civilians during cluster munition-strikes. In cases when this area weapon is used within or near populated areas, the inability to target it accurately can result in an unacceptable toll in civilian casualties, as well as destruction of basic infrastructure.
In this context, I wish to reiterate the call for a freeze on the use of cluster munitions, first made by the Inter Agency Standing Committee to the Meeting of States Parties to the CCW in November 2003.
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