Inter-Agency Assessment Mission Report, Ecuador

List of Acronyms

Executive Summary

I. Background

II. Observations

II.1 Current Environment

II.1.a. International environment: the Ecuador – Peru relation

II.1.b. International environment: The Western Hemisphere as an Antipersonnel-Landmine-Free Zone

II.1.c. Socio-economic environment

II.2 The landmine/UXO threat

II.2.a. Locations of Mine/UXO

II.2.b. Types of Mine/UXO

II.2.c. Environmental Conditions

II.3 The consequences of the presence of Mines/UXO

II.3.a. Mine/UXO accidents

II.3.b. Socio-economic impact

II.4 Capacities and current activities that deal with the problem

II.4.a. Detection and clearance capacities: Current and Planned

II.4.b. Priorities and Achievements

II.4.c. Mine/UXO Information Management

II.4.d. Donor Support Provided

II.4.e. Mine awareness

II.4.f. Victim assistance

II.4.g. Advocacy and international conventions

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

III.1. Conclusions

III.1.a. General

III.1.b. Detection and clearance

III.1.c. Mine awareness

III.1.d. Victim assistance

III.1.e. Ban on landmines

III.1.f National Mine-action Structure

III.2. Recommendations

III.2.a. General

III.2.b. Detection and clearance

III.2.c. Mine awareness

III.2.d. Victim assistance

III.2.e. Ban on landmines

III.2.f. National Mine-action Structure

 

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As a result of a long lasting border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, the most recent manifestation of which was a brief but intense military conflict in 1995, some areas on the border between these two countries are mine/UXO infested.

Further to the1998 peace agreement and the completion of the on-site marking of the common land boundary in the area formerly under dispute, and following consultations with other UN partners and international agencies, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) organised and led a multi-disciplinary and inter-agency mission to both Ecuador and Peru. The objective was to assess the scope of the landmine/UXO problem in both countries, and to identify any requirement for international assistance.

In Ecuador, the most significant mine/UXO threat exists in the Cordillera del Condor, an extremely bio-diverse area in the Amazonian basin. A lessor threat exists in the Southern provinces of Loja and El Oro, which border on Peru. The mine threat is almost entirely anti-personnel. An unquantified UXO threat also exists.

The Cordillera del Condor is sparsely populated and has, so far, undergone very little socio-economic development. Consequently, the mine and UXO impact on Ecuador as a whole is limited. The number of non-combatant landmine casualties is small. It may increase, however, as the border areas undergo planned development and as the indigenous people return to their traditional habitat in the Cordillera del Condor region.

The indigenous people, who traditionally inhabit this region, the Shuar and Achuar, as well as some mestisos, have been displaced by the conflict and their ability to return to their traditional way of life in this area is now constrained by the landmine/UXO contamination. In this regard, their human rights have been infringed upon.

The national motivation to address the mine/UXO problem stems primarily from the peace process. The immediate need to fully demarcate the borderline and the medium term intentions to open the border areas for development makes mine action a national priority. The government is also cognisant of its obligations vis a vis the Ottawa Treaty which it has ratified.

Ecuador is developing a capability to deal with mine action, based so far on the military and focused primarily on mine clearance. This capability needs to be expanded and provided with better equipment and training. A National Demining Commission is being established. It should have representation from all of the relevant actors, including the international community.

More emphasis needs to be placed on mine awareness targeted specifically at the affected populations and developed in consultation with all relevant actors, including the military, the Ministries of Education and Health, NGOs, local authorities and, most importantly, the affected communities. External technical expertise may be appropriate in order to derive experience from other country programs.

The peace process has initiated a Bi-national Development Plan aimed at fostering bi-national co-operation and the joint development of the hitherto underdeveloped border regions. The Mine/UXO threat will pose an obstacle to some planned projects and consequently should be addressed as part of the process. The Bi-national Development Plan will require significant investment, including international monies, for its implementation. It is recommended that some monies be allocated towards mine action.

Continued international support for mine action in Ecuador is recommended. So far, support has been provided on a bilateral basis, with the potential for duplication of effort and a less than optimum use of limited donor resources. Without prejudice to bilateral efforts, it is recommended that multilateral co-ordination of the support be considered. The OAS is prepared to provide this and should be encouraged to do so. The UN could play a complementary, supporting role. Details need to be worked out in consultation with the Government and the OAS.

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As a result of what had been a long lasting border dispute, finally settled in October 1998, a landmine and UXO problem exists along both sides of the Ecuador-Peru border in the Cordillera del Condor area. In addition, a limited number of barrier minefields remain in the Ecuadorian provinces of El Oro and Loja.

Further to the 1998 agreement and the completion of the demarcation process in the border area formerly under dispute, and following consultations with other UN partners and international agencies, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) organised and led a multi-disciplinary and inter-agency mission to both Ecuador and Peru. The objective was to assess the scope of the landmine/UXO problem in both countries, and to identify any requirement for UN assistance.

The Ecuador mission, which took place from 23 –27 August 1999, was led by Mr. Jim Prudhomme, UNMAS Programme Officer responsible for Ecuador. It included the following team members: Mr. Stephan Vigie, Policy Advisor, UNMAS; Mr. Leon Terblanche, Senior Mine Action Advisor, UNDP; Ms. Maria Teresa Gago, Consultant, PAHO/WHO; Dr. Armando Vasquez, Regional Advisor on Rehabilitation Medicine, PAHO/WHO (Managua); and, Mrs. Sunah Kim, Project Officer, UNICEF(Quito). The Organization of American States (OAS) was invited to participate but was unable to do so. It did, however, conduct a separate mission and later shared its findings with the UN team.

The team met in Quito with Government representatives who included: Ambassador Alejandro Suarez, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; General Norton Narvaez, Director of Operations, Commando Conjuncto de las Fuerzas Armadas; Colonel Robert Tandazo, Chief of the Estado Mayor de la Brigada de Ingenieros #23; Dr Rosengela Adum, from the Ministry of Education; Mr. Miguel Carvajal, from the Ministry of Environment; and Drs. Edgar Rodas Andrade and Cesar Hermida, from the Ministry of Public Health. The team also met with representatives from the embassies of Brazil, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States. In addition, it consulted with various UN agencies, and national or international organizations operating in Ecuador, including inter alia, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the World Bank (WB), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Fundacion Natura, the Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF), the Latin-American Human Rights Association (ALDHU), and the Organizacion de Indigenas de la Cuenca Amazonica (COICA). The team visited the military hospital in Quito. It visited the Engineer School at the Brigada de Ingenieros #23 del Ejercito where mine clearance training is conducted. Part of the team paid a field visit to Macas where they met with the Prefecto, the Council of the Province of Morona Santiago, the Regional Health Director, and with representatives of the Federacion Shuar-Achuar. They also visited the Brigada del Ejercito #21 in Patuca.

The assessment team was joined by a PAHO/WHO country representative for the trip to Macas and Patuca. PAHO/WHO plays a dual role in the region of the Americas. It is the specialized health agency of the Inter-American System and the regional office for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Health Organization with representation in each of the countries of the Americas. In this latter role it provides the UN with significant capacities to identify and implement technical cooperation activities related to health.

The assessment team would like to acknowledge the outstanding support provided by the UN Resident Coordinator and her staff throughout both the planning and the execution of the mission and to express its gratitude for their assistance. Full co-operation was also extended to the team by the authorities of Ecuador. In this regard, special thanks should go to Ambassador Alejandro Suarez and General Norton Narvaez, and their staff, whose efforts were instrumental to the success of the mission and were greatly appreciated by the assessment team.

This report presents the main findings of the inter-agency mine action assessment mission as a result of its intensive consultations in the field, as well as its key conclusions and recommendations.

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II.1.a. International environment: the Ecuador – Peru relation

The dispute between Ecuador and Peru over territories north of the Amazon River dates back some 170 years to the period following their independence from Spain. It escalated to the point where, in 1941, a serious armed conflict broke out.

On 29 January 1942, the two parties signed the Rio de Janeiro Protocol on Peace, Friendship and Boundaries, which established the borders on the basis of the status quo line. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States also signed the agreement as guarantors.

In accordance with the terms of the Rio Protocol, Peru and Ecuador together placed boundary markers from 1942 to 1950 along the borderline. However, arguments led to the suspension of the demarcation process, with 78 kilometres being left unmarked in the Cordillera del Condor area. Brief but fierce military incidents took place in January 1995 around the Cenepa river headwaters in the eastern slopes of the Cordillera del Condor.

On 31 January 1995, Ecuador and Peru agreed to a cease-fire. By the joint Declaration of Itamaraty, they also agreed to the formation of a Military Observers Mission (MOMEP) by the four guarantor countries of the Rio protocol to monitor the cease-fire and the demilitarisation of the conflict area. It took three additional years of talks to settle the dispute.

On 26 October, 1998, Ecuador and Peru signed the Presidential Act of Brasilia ending their long-standing dispute over the border. The agreement called for the on-site marking of the common land boundary. A total of 27 border markers, or "Hitos", were installed accordingly in a combined effort by the Peruvian and Ecuadorian militaries, involving mine clearance operations. The completion of this exercise was celebrated on 13 May 1999 by President Mahuad and President Fujimori and formally triggered the entry into force of the agreement.

In addition to the settling of the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, the agreement:

• calls for the establishment of an ecological Peace Park in the Cenepa River region, of two contiguous areas on both sides of the border;
• grants Ecuador, as private property, free and perpetual rights to a one square kilometre area known as "Tiwinza" located on the Peruvian side of the border;
• grants Ecuador the right to free navigation on the rivers that constitute the northern area of the Amazon basin. In this regard, two "trade and navigation" centres will be established on Peruvian territory;
• commits the two countries to a number of co-operative initiatives aimed at jointly developing the border area and bringing about a lasting peace;
• creates a permanent Bi-national Commission on Mutual Measures and Security to eliminate distrust and foster understanding and co-operation between the Armed Forces of both nations.

II.1.b. International environment: The Western Hemisphere as an Antipersonnel-landmine-free Zone

The international community has been extremely supportive of the Ecuador – Peru peace process. This support continues to be particularly active in the area of mine-clearance, rightly seen as an integral component of the bilateral peace-building endeavour. Canada, Japan, Spain and the United States have each provided either training, equipment, or financial assistance for demining activities in both countries.

International support to mine action in Ecuador and Peru was most recently firmly reaffirmed by the General Assembly of the Organisation of the American States (OAS) in its Resolution 1644 dated 7 June 1999. In its Operative paragraph 12, the Resolution urges

The international assistance called for by the OAS in this Resolution is required not only to support peace building in Ecuador and Peru, but also to achieve the goals (constantly reaffirmed by the OAS since 1996), of the global elimination of AP landmines, and the conversion of the Western Hemisphere into an AP landmine-free zone.

II.1.c. Socio-economic environment

Despite substantial oil and agricultural resources, Ecuador is currently facing very serious socio-economic problems, with the GDP growth rate dropping from 3.4 percent in 1997 to 0.6 percent in 1998, with further contractions anticipated (GDP was US$19.7 billion for 1998). These problems have their roots in the early 1980’s when the economy was hit with a number of adverse shocks, in particular declining world oil prices. Efforts were made to stabilise and structurally reform the economy at this time, with measures being taken as part of the 1980’s Latin American debt-restructuring plans. This included the use of the Brady Bond scheme, in which previously defaulted loans were repackaged as bonds (generally backed by US Treasury bonds). As recently as October of 1999, Ecuador has however indicated that it will default on at least one class of these bonds ($1.4 billion-worth of "discount" bonds), seriously undermining international investor confidence in the area. This has also caused the technical default on another $4.5 billion-worth of Brady bonds issued for Ecuador, as well as $500 million-worth of Eurobonds, all of which are linked through cross-default provisions.

Current international actors such as the International Monetary Fund and neighbouring countries have been restrained in their efforts to support the Ecuador economy at this time, with many indicating that they are waiting for further reform on fiscal and bank restructuring issues. It is however anticipated that once suitable measures are taken, standby loans may be forthcoming, which along with an anticipated 9 percent growth in oil revenues and reduced imports, may restrict current trends.

Ecuador’s current foreign debt is in excess of $13 billion USD, with the currency sitting at 16,800 Sucre to the USD (down from 6,825 Sucre at the end of 1998). In 1999, the inflation rate is listed as 50.39 % (with a rise of 37.36 % in the year to date) despite a reduction on inflationary pressure instigated by the freezing of all domestic bank assets in the spring of 1999. This has in effect blocked domestic holder access to their accounts, making them unable to withdraw their money. Ongoing strikes, internal dissension about appropriate fiscal policy and the impact of El Nino floods as well as recent large volcanic eruptions have all contributed to shrinkage in various sectors of the economy, which is expected to contract 7 percent by years end.

The country is also hampered by an official unemployment rate of 14 percent, with 22 percent of the country’s 12.7 million people living below the poverty line. These conditions have led to a number of general strikes in protest about policy impact on the poorer sectors, with recent statements also being made by the Ecuador military as to dissatisfaction with the current economic and social policies, which have been reported in the international press.

The situation is even more difficult in the border regions of Ecuador where extraction activities (mining and forestry), subsistence agriculture and low-tech cattle raising dominate the economy. These regions have only limited access to market mechanisms, and have never been industrialised like the rest of the country. Their development has been further constrained by the long lasting border dispute with Peru, which, by creating a tense security environment, has curtailed private investment. In the provinces of Loja and Zamora-Chinchipe, for example, barely 50% of the homes are connected to the power grid, compared to 90% in the Province of Pichinca (Quito). In response to their isolation and marginalization, local populations in coastal, mountain and jungle regions have developed their own lifestyles, with a host of environmental, social and ethno-cultural particularities. Their practical response to an unprivileged economic environment includes illegal cross border commerce, deforestation, shifting cultivation, and spot mining. There has also been considerable and ongoing movement of rural populations (especially male) into the urban environment.

Health issues are also paramount throughout Ecuador, with particular problems being found in the border and highland areas among the indigenous population due to their limited access to appropriate infrastructure. It is estimated that 76 percent of children in the Amazon area are affected by poverty, while infant mortality rates are as high as 1 in 10. Overall, 13.2 percent of the population is estimated to suffer from some form of disability, with the link between disability and poor living conditions, low income, and difficult access to health services indicating the incidence of disabilities is greater in marginal urban areas and in rural areas. Similarly, the leading causes of death and disease in the indigenous population are those related to poverty: acute respiratory infections, acute diarrheal diseases, and malnutrition. Hypoxia and complications of delivery and the puerperium are the leading causes of infant and maternal death, respectively. Chronic malnutrition in children under 5 years of age reached 69% in some of these areas, compared with the national figure of 49.4%.

Accurate information on health care spending is not very recent, reliable, or complete, especially as far as the private sector is concerned. The data available indicates that public spending on health as a percentage of total government expenditure fell from 5.5% in 1992 to 4.6% in 1996. Distribution of this money is also considered inequitable and with most utilisation being inefficient and centralised. Throughout the 1990’s international organisations including the World Bank, IDB, USAID and other national and non-governmental actors have instigated support for health-care programmes for in-need areas, but quantifiable impact data of these projects is currently limited.

In further recognition of the need to address the disparity that exists in terms of health and development with respect to the border regions, both Peru and Ecuador, as part of the Global Peace Accord, have approved a "Bi-national Border Development Plan". The overall objective of the plan is to increase the standard of living of the local population in the southern and eastern areas of Ecuador and in the north and north-western parts of Peru. The plan provides for the implementation of projects in four broad areas, aiming at:

• building a bi-national social and productive infrastructure;
• improving the productive infrastructure on both sides of the border;
• building and improving social infrastructure and enhancing the environment in each country; and
• promoting private investment.

This plan is expected to cost $ 3 billion ($1.5 billion to each country) over a 10 year period and will require public, private and international financing. The international financing will be sought through, inter alia, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Corporacion Andina de Fomento. A major donor meeting is scheduled to take place in Paris, in November 1999.

Preliminary planning has commenced on a variety of projects including infrastructure (rural access roads, river landing facilities, irrigation and electricity projects), social (community and small business projects, health and sanitation, schools, etc) and environmental projects (ecological equilibrium and sustainable use of natural resources). Full implementation of the Bi-national Border Development Plan, however, is likely to be constrained by the landmine/UXO threat in the border regions.

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II.2.a. Location of the Landmine/UXO Threat

The landmine/UXO problem in Ecuador is exclusively related to the Peru-Ecuador border dispute, and the threat is therefore confined to the border areas.

The most acute threat is that of the anti-personnel minefields located in the contested area known as the Cordillera del Condor, where the 1995 conflict broke out, along 78 kilometers of the previously unmarked border. After a cease-fire agreement was reached, and while discussions for the definitive settlement of the dispute were ongoing, the armies of both countries maintained a constant state of readiness, with their military forces deployed along the border area on high alert. . The Latin American Association for Human Rights (ALDHU) informed the United Nations in December 1996 that mine-laying activities were still ongoing in the contested area and that an estimated 10,000 landmines had been laid since the cease-fire of February 1995. According to ALDHU, some 130,000 to 150,000 antipersonnel mines have been laid in the conflict area by both parties.

The ALDHU figures do not contradict information received by the assessment team from the Ecuadorian military who now estimate the number of mines on the Ecuadorian side of the border in the Cordillera del Condor region to be in excess of 90,000. Ecuador contends that mines were laid by both parties, although Peru maintains that it has not laid any mines during the conflict.

The mines in Cordillera del Condor are located in the vicinity of military installations of both countries and in those areas favorable to enemy infiltration. Ecuadorian military minefield records were provided to MOMEP but were not made public for security reasons. The majority of the mines are believed to be located in the headwaters of Cenepa and Coangos Rivers, in an area of approximately 80 square kilometers.

There are also a limited number of minefields in the southern provinces of El Oro and Loja, along the borderline. The Ecuadorians laid these minefields in 1995 as barrier minefields. They are reported by the military to have been well marked and fenced and, as such, to pose a limited threat to the civilian population. Nonetheless, the military acknowledge that there has been some significant displacement of mines due to the heavy flooding resulting from El Nino.

There were a limited number of mines laid along the Peru-Ecuador border north of the Cordillera del Condor, between the Cusumasa-Bumbuiza border markers and the Yaupi-Santiago river area and in the Largartococha area. These have reportedly been cleared.

Finally, while the Ecuadorian forces state that they have not laid mines along the Columbian border, they did raise the possibility that guerilla forces, who are known to have used these areas, may have laid mines there.

II.2.b. Types of Landmines/UXO

According to the military, the vast majority of the mines are anti-personnel, although some anti-tank mines have been used. The list below provides the types of mines reported by Ecuadorian Engineers:

T-AB-1 (both AP and AT)

M18A1

MAPP 78 F-2

MGP30

MGP31 (AT)

P-4-B

MOH-50

PMD-6M

PRB-M35

PRB-M409

TS/50

VS-50

MP-APVL F4 (AT)

TC6 (AT)

According to the military, the most frequently encountered mines are the P-4-B, PRB M409, PRB M35 and PMD-6M.

Unexploded ordnance of the type produced in intense jungle warfare (including small arms ammunition, grenades, mortar and artillery rounds and air delivered bombs) is anticipated in the battle and patrol areas in the Cordillera del Condor conflict zone. The military were unable to quantify this threat but regard it as a lesser problem than the mine contamination.

II.2.c Environmental Conditions

Mine clearance operations will be faced with extremely challenging environmental conditions. The minefields are sited in extremely inaccessible and difficult terrain. High temperatures and humidity, heavy jungle vegetation, frequent rainfall and steep gradients make manual mine clearance extremely difficult and slow. Such conditions will severely limit the usefulness of dogs. Some mechanical mine clearance equipment, specifically vegetation cutting machines, may be effective in enhancing manual clearance. The high mineral content in the soils makes detection using metallic mine detectors problematic.

As previously noted, steep slopes and heavy rainfall in the Cordillera del Condor region have apparently caused significant mine displacements making current minefield records of limited value, while floods caused by El Nino have resulted in displacements to mines in the El Oro and Loja areas.

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II.3.a. Mine/UXO accidents

It was difficult to collect precise information about the number of landmine victims or even the size of the affected populations in mine contaminated areas as there is no systematic data gathering mechanism for landmine accidents. As a result, the accident figures varied from one interviewed institution to another.

According to the military, since the end of the conflict in 1995, there have been some 34 landmine related accidents involving soldiers, including 7 deaths. The military authorities in Patuca also reported 5 civilians injured by landmines in the area in 1995. The Achuar representative in Macas reported 4 landmine victims amongst their people in 1997, one of which was a fatality.

The ALDHU report claims 11 Shuar and 7 military deaths due to landmines since 1995. Unfortunately, the report does not provide statistics on non-fatal injuries.

According to the military, there have been no reports of accidents with children or women, while ALDHU estimates that there were 8 or 9 accidents with children from Ecuador and Peru from April 1995 through April 1999, all from indigenous communities. They were not able to give a precise information about the children of Ecuador only, but also stated that there were 4 accidents involving Peruvian and Ecuadorian indigenous women during the same time period.

Finally, the assessment team was also told of a recent accident involving a civilian in an area (near Mirado) that had reportedly been declared "demined."

The above figures suggest that so far the impact of the mine/UXO threat in Ecuador has been relatively small in terms of non-combatant casualties. The majority of the reported accidents have been military who have been operating in high-risk areas, and the number of civilian accidents has been remarkably low. It should be emphasized, however, that for many years access to the mine infested areas has been restricted to the military. As these areas become opened to civilian activity, the likelihood is that landmine accidents involving civilians will increase.

II.3.b. Socio-economic impact

Given that the problem is confined to the sparsely populated border areas whose effect on the overall Ecuadorian economy is relatively small, the socio-economic impact of the landmine/UXO problem is necessarily limited.

Local to the affected border areas, the problem is however significant. The border disputes have retarded the socio-economic development in these areas for years, particularly in the region of the Cordillera del Condor,where according to ALDHU, more than 25,000 people are currently living.

On the Ecuadorian side, there are some 13,000 inhabitants, including 7,000 indigenous people of the Shuar and Achuar tribes living in some 60 Shuar centres between the valleys of the Zamora and Nangaritza Rivers, and some 6,000 colonos mestizos (mixed settlers). They occupy an area of 300 square kilometres, with most of them living on the slopes of the mountains, between 500 and 1,200 meters. However, 7 Shuar centres are located at the headwaters of the Coangos River, and several families are also living in the upper Cenepa River, very close to military installations.

The Shuar and Achuar make their living from traditional slash-and-burn agriculture, cattle grazing, hunting, fishing and limited logging. The mestizos engage in the same activities in addition to some small-scale gold mining.

These inhabitants are directly affected by the presence or suspected presence of uncleared mines, which prevent them from accessing large tracts of their traditional farming and hunting grounds. In November 1998, the "Families Shuar and Achuar of the Frontier" issued a joint declaration to the international community, asking for the government of both countries to demine the border. On 5 December 1998, the Ecuadorian Indian Confederation of the Amazon (CIOCA in Spanish) demanded the clearance of the landmines along the border area.

Given the relatively small numbers of people involved, and in the absence of confirmed mine accident reports, the present impact of landmine contamination can be said to be very limited. That said, the problem is considered as a "Human Rights" issue by a people who have been displaced from their traditional homeland by a conflict not of their making and who are now unable to resume their normal way of life due to the threat posed by landmines and UXO.

Now that peace exists between Ecuador and Peru, it is expected that a portion of the Shuar and Achuar displaced by the conflict will wish to return to the mine infested areas. Also, their close family ties with the Aguaruna and Huambisa people in Peru will lead to more frequent cross border movement in this area.

Ecologically, the Cordillera del Condor is also considered significant. It is a mountain range straddling the border between Ecuador and Peru, and is a key element of the complex hydrological cycle of the Amazon basin and the Andes mountains. It also contains an immensely rich biological and floral ecosystem that may well be without equal anywhere else in the world.

The Cordillera del Condor also contains important mineral deposits. Since the mid-1980`s intense gold and other mineral exploration programs have been carried out in this area by multinational companies. With the border dispute now settled, it is likely that mineral exploration will increase significantly and may expand into the mine/UXO threatened areas.

In the future, the landmines and UXO will certainly pose a threat to some of the projects that are foreseen in the peace agreement or the Bi-National Development Plan. Specifically:

• the war memorial at Tiwinza, which is to be erected on the Peruvian side, on a 1 square kilometre site that has been assigned to Ecuador in perpetuity. This was the site of the fiercest fighting during 1995 and is known to be heavily mine and UXO infested. Ecuador is responsible for demining the area and building the monument, while Peru is responsible for construction and demining of the access road.
• the ecological Peace Park, to be sighted in the Cenepa River region, spanning both sides of the border. The Ecuadorian side of the Peace Park is to comprise some 20 square kilometres of an area that may be mine/UXO infested. This Park will undoubtedly be subjected to scientific exploration and, eventually, tourism.
• A number of developmental projects providing for social and productive infrastructure may be located in mine/UXO threatened areas.

It should be noted that while significant funds, including international monies, are being mobilised in support of the Bi-national Development Plan, there are as yet no developmental funds being set aside for mine action.

In the provinces of El Oro and Loja, given the significantly higher population densities, the landmines pose an even greater potential problem, notwithstanding the absence of reported accidents so far. Flooding during the El Nino period has disrupted the minefields that had been marked by fencing and signed as off limits to the local population. Consequently, some mines have been displaced downstream and now pose a threat to an unsuspecting local population.

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II.4.a. Detection and clearance capacities: Current and planned

The current mine clearance capability is based on the 23^rd Cenepa Engineer Brigade which has a 95-man company consisting of six 15-man demining teams. The teams are experienced in battle clearance operations and up until very recently their training focus has been in this direction. As of 1998, they are undergoing conversion training for humanitarian mine clearance operations. They are aware of the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance and have, as a result of this mission and thanks to the OAS, been provided with a Spanish translation of the standards.

The majority of the current mine clearance equipment was intended for battle clearance operations, not for humanitarian demining. Some humanitarian equipment has been provided through bilateral agreements, but more is required and there is a need for standardisation of equipment. The current mine detectors are also limited in their ability to locate low metallic mines in highly mineralised (laterite) soils.

The Army Engineers hope to increase their mine/UXO clearance capacity by at least another 95-man company in 2000 subject to receiving international support. This and even further expansion is definitely justified given the amount of work envisaged in the coming years (See below) with the major challenge being sustainability. In this regard, they have provided to various donors a list of their requirements which include equipment, training assistance and expendable logistics supplies such as fuel, rations, medical supplies, etc. They have also requested indemnification (accident insurance) for the military deminers.

They are also considering the possibility of using dogs in the El Oro and Loja provinces. A small dog trial will be conducted this year, funds permitting.

II.4.b. Priorities and Achievements

The responsibility for mine clearance rests with the Army Engineers. The Engineers, like the rest of the Army, are professional, well trained and generally well equipped. They traditionally have a good, trust based relationship with the local population.

They have developed, in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a plan for clearance of all mines from Ecuador by the year 2008. The plan has been based on the following principles: respect for human rights, fulfilment of international treaty obligations (specifically the Ottawa Treaty), preservation of the ecosystem and personnel and equipment safety.

The priorities for mine clearance are closely connected to current political motivations, with the highest priorities being those relating to the peace plan - the associated border demarcation and development.

The first priority, already concluded, was the demining of the sites for the border markers. Ecuador cleared 12 of 23 sites in the Cordillera del Condor using an innovative but somewhat risky technique that was developed to deal with the extremely difficult terrain -virtually inaccessible except by helicopter. The procedure involved lowering from a helicopter a two man demining team on a blast-protected platform into the mine-infested area. The two-man team, using a combination of prodding and metal detection, cleared a sufficiently large area for a full 15-man team to deploy. The full team using traditional prodding and metal detection techniques, as well as explosive breaching, continued to clear an area of 50 by 50 metres. In many cases, mines were disarmed and recovered rather than blown in place.

The follow-on priorities are (See maps Annex D):

Phase I - the demining of Tiwinza.

Phase II - the Ecuadorian portion of the ecological Peace Park.

Phase III - the minefields in El Oro Province

Phase IV - the minefields in Loja Province

Phase V - the remainder of the Cordillera del Condor

II.2.c. Donor Support Provided

To date a number of donors have provided or offered assistance to Ecuador on a bilateral basis in support of the border demarcation activities and future demining plans. This quick reaction by the donors following the peace agreement is commendable and has certainly been a factor in the success of the "border marker" mine clearance operations.

Canada has provided equipment, including blast protection clothing, and has pledged funds (some $150,000 Cdn for Ecuador) to the OAS Trust fund for the Demarcation of the Peru-Ecuador Border.

Spain has provided some $ 350,000 in equipment (mine detectors, protective clothing, etc.) and has provided training instructors for basic demining, explosives ordnance disposal and instructors courses.

The United States has provided more than 1 million US dollars in equipment and training assistance in 1999 and is hoping to provide even more in 2000. The funds will be used to continue training assistance and to provide support in the following areas: mine awareness materials, specialty equipment (boots, suits, special explosives, etc), vehicles, fuel, lubricants, rations, medical supplies, etc. The training assistance included a 20 day humanitarian demining course given by U.S. Special Forces which focused on "hands on" and "train the trainer" techniques and is in accord with the International Standards. It included instruction in medical, communications, demolitions, map reading, detector and clearance techniques.

Japan has offered to provide financial assistance.

Brazil has offered technical assistance.

Other countries may have offered assistance already or are considering doing so.

Donors are generally supportive of the mine action plan and see it as an important component of the peace process, with a desire to see a co-ordinated, multilateral approach to international community assistance. Some donors, in particular Canada and the United States, have indicated that they wish to see the OAS take a lead role in the coordination of mine action assistance from the international community.

II.4.d. Mine/UXO Information Management

The mine information database maintained by the Army Engineers is fairly rudimentary, being neither automated nor GIS referenced. The locations of the mine/UXO contaminated areas are not fully known, and some minefield records have been rendered less useful as a result of mine displacements. The information is not presently shared by the Ministry of Defence with other ministries, primarily because there has been no need to due to the mine infested areas being restricted to the military. The Corps of Engineers advised that it has provided to MOMEP all available information on its minefields and showed the assessment team a copy of the relevant MOMEP map.

The development of a computerised GIS-based mine information system would be extremely useful. A technical survey could be considered in the El Oro and Loja provinces where minefields are close to population centres, especially now that some of these minefields have been disrupted/displaced. A survey in the Cordillera del Condor is problematic due to the lack of local sources of information; however the Shuar and Achuar trackers may be able to provide valuable information on mine locations.

II.4.e. Mine awareness

To date limited mine awareness education has been was undertaken. The military psychological operations branch has recently produced and distributed some mine awareness posters and folders with prevention messages. There has been no participation by the mine-affected communities in the design and development of the mine awareness messages. The military indicated that in the areas of Loja and El Oro, where populations live very near the mined areas, some mine awareness education has taken place with the help of the local schools.

In the area of Cordillera del Condor, there exists a certain basic level of mine awareness amongst the Shuar and Achuar populations. A number of young Shuar/Achuar men were used by the military as scouts during the conflict and they are conceivably the most knowledgeable of all concerning locations of mined areas. Apparently they pass this information on to their communities, alerting them about mined areas and how to avoid accidents. While this very informal and unsystematic approach to mine awareness education is better than nothing, it cannot substitute for a properly designed program.

The Shuar and Achuar are well-organized communities with good coordination mechanisms in place. In the Amazon region, there is a Federation of Shuar and Ashuar that has some authority over activities undertaken in their territory, where many of the contaminated areas are located. They also have a good relationship with the local government and the military. All of these are enabling elements for the Shuar and Achuar to have a positive and effective role in any initiatives on mine awareness. They also have radio diffusion in their own language. To date, no efforts have been made to introduce mine awareness either into indigenous communication mechanisms or into the education system, although there is a national bilingual education project in place.

Both the military and the Minister of Education expressed a strong willingness to carry out mine awareness activities. The military recognize that while they have certain capabilities for message production and dissemination, they do not have much experience in the development of effective and systematic mine awareness programs. One of their strengths, however, is their public image. In general, the Ecuadorian people consider the military to be highly professional and trustworthy. In a climate of political, social and economic crisis, this is an important factor to consider in any advocacy, communication and education processes, including mine awareness.

The military have expressed willingness to receive technical assistance, including funding, for setting up administrative and technical structures for systematic mine awareness activities. Their scope of action is so far limited to those border areas involved in the peace process. The Ministry of Education, on the other hand, has administrative and technical capacities that could be considered and possibly strengthened. The scope of their action is however at the national level.

The limited mine-awareness activities carried out up until this time have been funded by the national military budget with some bilateral assistance from the U.S. military. The international community has so far focused its efforts on providing equipment and training for mine clearance, but several donors (Japan in particular) have indicated an interest in supporting mine awareness activities.

II.4.f. Victim assistance

The military has a well-structured and responsive health care system that provides an integral level of care to military landmine victims. Each demining team has a qualified medic, and the military logistics system provides rapid evacuation of casualties to military hospitals capable of providing full medical treatment.

The military hospital in Quito offers an integrated approach to rehabilitation that includes physical, psychological, professional and vocational programs. The hospital also has a rehabilitation center for outpatient treatment and is well equipped, providing high levels of rehabilitative care to injured soldiers. Military personnel receive full coverage from these services.

However, civilians injured by landmines do not receive the same level of attention and are not provided with adequate services. This reflects the gaps and weaknesses of the current health system that is particularly acute in the remote and relatively inaccessible border region where the landmines are a threat.

Currently, the installed infrastructure for rehabilitation services is not uniform. Greater development can be seen at the second and third levels of care with 60% of services established in level II, 35% of services in level III and only 5% found in level I ^*. Individuals who live in remote areas must rely on small hospital outposts with only a basic infrastructure to receive immediate attention. If greater levels of attention are needed then the individual must be transferred to one of the major hospitals in Quito.

In order to support sustainable victim assistance programs it is fundamental to strengthen the current capacity of health services and existing programs to encompass an integrated approach towards rehabilitation. Special attention needs to be given to reinforcing health services to address psychosocial issues and their management, especially for families and communities who have been affected by armed conflict. There is also a need to establish National Programs for Rehabilitation that would equitably extend and establish rehabilitation services to all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) and should be included within the medical information systems framework. Another component that should be considered is the development guidelines and standards for a comprehensive approach towards rehabilitation; creating a national registry of disabilities to monitor and control the causes of disabilities; disseminate and exchange of information with regards to disabilities as well as create a referral system for prevention, treatment and activities in order to achieve an integrated approach towards rehabilitation. It is essential to improve the quality of care to guarantee universality, equity, and efficiency of rehabilitation services by creating national coordinating committees for rehabilitation, comprising of representatives from communities, labor, education and organizations of disabled persons to follow up on lines of action.

Other areas of extreme importance include the training of human resources, by increasing the current capacity of existing rehabilitation services. Training in rehabilitation should be carried out at the specialized level as well as the unspecialized levels of care in order to fulfill a multidisciplinary approach in rehabilitation. This should ensure adequate provision of services, establishment of uniform standards and the incorporation of families, communities and persons with disabilities in the decision making process.

II.4.g. Advocacy and international conventions

Ecuador signed the Ottawa Convention on 4 December 1997. Its instruments of ratification were subsequently deposited with the United Nations on 29 April 1999. Accordingly, the main benchmarks for implementation will be the following:

1 Oct 1999: entry into force of the convention in Ecuador (art. 17)

28 Mar 2000: deadline for 1st annual report to the UN Secretary General (art. 7)

1 Oct 2003: deadline for destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines (art. 4)

1 Oct 2009: deadline for destruction of antipersonnel landmines in mined areas (art. 5)

While Ecuador has yet to develop an integrated mine action plan that will cover, inter alia, issues related to treaty implementation, military officials have indicated that they have made plans to gather stockpiles and to destroy 110,000 AP mines, 9,000 AT mines and 4,000 assorted munitions in the year 2000.

Ecuador is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and it has accepted the original Protocol II on landmines. However, it has not yet accepted the Amended Protocol II.

II.4.h. Management and Institutional Arrangements

Staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and General Narvaez, Director of Joint Operations of the Armed Forces, described a holistic approach to the mine problem in Ecuador. The problem is recognized as national and not just military. An inter-ministerial National Demining Commission is envisaged to deal with policy aspects and resource mobilization and, at the time of this assessment mission, staffing was underway to obtain a Presidential decree for this Commission. (The United Nations has since been advised that the Ecuadorian Mine Clearance Centre was officially established on 22 Sep 99, by Executive Decree No. 1297, signed by the President of the Republic of Ecuador. See Annex D).

General Narvaez, as Director of Operations of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, supported by Col Tandazo, of 23^rd Engineer Brigade, deals with the technical aspects of mine action. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Director of Operations were interested in receiving international assistance in dealing with the follow-on phases of the mine clearance, as well as for other mine action components.

Those government officials encountered by the assessment team, who were outside of the immediate "mine action" group in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, were not fully aware of the mine problem, nor were they addressing it in their planning. For example, the minister charged with the Bi-national Development Plan was not aware of potential problems relating to mines and UXO in the Cordillera del Condor. This is understandable given the relatively early state of planning and the still somewhat classified nature of mine/UXO information.

The civilian population, including those in the affected areas, are not yet involved in a mine action planning and prioritization process.

Donors are exchanging information and views on an ad-hoc basis and have no formal mechanism for interaction with the mine action planning process. A national mine action plan does not yet exist to guide donors regarding funding requirements, priorities, and accomplishments. Also, no mechanism exists for donors to determine which needs have been satisfied through contributions or funding.

The UN Resident Coordinator system is well established, with representation from UNDP, UNICEF, PAHO/WHO and others. The UN group has not yet responded in a synchronized

way to the mine issue, but indicated its preparedness to do so and provided the mission with useful guidelines. The UNDP Resident Representative is actively involved in both national and bi-national development planning processes and this linkage could be used to address mine action issues. The UNDP Resident Representative confirmed that the Government had requested UN assistance in mine action early in 1999. The UNDP Resident Representative is willing and able to provide assistance in a number of areas, including inter-agency coordination, capacity building and resource mobilization. The UNICEF Resident Representative and the PAHO/WHO indicated their preparedness to assist in their areas of responsibility.

The OAS has offered to assist both Ecuador and Peru in dealing with the landmine issue. It had just concluded a visit to Ecuador prior to the UN assessment mission, and is in the process of developing a formal proposal for mine action. The assessment team met with the OAS representative in Quito and later with the Unit for Promotion of Democracy (the OAS office in Washington responsible for mine action) to confirm their intentions.

It is clear that the OAS is prepared to take the lead in coordinating international support for mine action in both countries. It has already established a trust fund "to support the mine-clearing associated with demarcation of the border between Peru and Ecuador." It is in the process of developing a proposal to each country offering mine action assistance programs similar to those that have been established in Central America but tailored to meet the country’s specific needs. In each case, the assistance would provide fundraising and technical assistance aimed at the doubling of the current mine clearance capacity and sustainment of a mine action program over a two year period. The OAS would plan to set up in each country a small program office complete with a National Coordinator and a small number of local staff. It would continue to rely on technical support being provided through the Inter American Defense Board (IADB) and from US Special Forces of Southern Command. The OAS programs are reported to address mine action in an integrated fashion including mine clearance, mine awareness, victim assistance/rehabilitation and support to economic development. The OAS would also, within the limits of its capabilities, assist in compliance with the Ottawa Treaty obligations.

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III.1.a General

• The mine and UXO threat in Ecuador is a direct result of the border conflict with Peru. The most affected area is the formally disputed Cordillera del Condor. Lesser mine contamination exists along the Southern border in the provinces of Loja and El Oro.
• The Cordillera del Condor is sparsely populated and has, so far, undergone very little socio-economic development. Consequently, the mine and UXO impact on the population is very limited. The number of non-combatant landmine casualties is very small. It will increase, however, as the border area undergoes planned development and when the indigenous people return to their traditional habitat in the Cordillera del Condor region.
• The indigenous peoples who traditionally inhabit this region, the Shuar and Achuar, are the most affected. They have already been displaced by the conflict, and their ability to return to their traditional way of life in this area is constrained by the landmine/UXO contamination. In this regard, their human rights have been infringed upon.
• The national motivation to address the mine/UXO problem stems primarily from the peace process. The immediate need to fully demarcate the borderline and the medium term intentions to open the border areas for development makes mine action a national priority.
• Ecuador is developing a capability to deal with mine action, but the focus so far is on mine clearance.
• The military has and will continue to play a key role in addressing the mine/UXO problem. In this regard, its traditionally good relationship with the population is seen as a positive factor. The military’s standing is enhanced by its involvement in many community projects – it provides education, infrastructure and health facilities in many marginal communities, especially in the Amazon region. It is likely that the military will retain an important role in Ecuador with an involvement in society that could facilitate the development of a truly integrated mine action programme bringing together all concerned ministries and partners.
• The process of bi-national co-operation and co-ordination is already underway. Mine action is, and should continue to be, addressed as part of this process.
• In the mine-affected areas, the ability to address mine action in a comprehensive fashion is hampered by the lack of health, education, and physical infrastructure.
• Major donors, including the OAS, are supportive of mine action activities in Ecuador. Several donors, most notably, Canada, Spain and USA, have already provided support, primarily in the area of demining training, advice and equipment. Others, like Brazil and Japan, have offered technical or financial assistance. Still others like the Netherlands are awaiting definition of the problem and the needs. The OAS has established a trust fund to which Canada has already contributed.
• The OAS has passed a resolution urging its member states to provide assistance for the national mine-clearing programs carried out by Ecuador and Peru, through the OAS or bilaterally.
• The government appears committed to eliminating the threat. In this regard both the peace process and the Ottawa Treaty are motivating factors. The recent decision to establish a National Demining Centre is significant.

III.1.b Detection and clearance

• A small but quite professional mine clearance capacity already exists within the Army Engineers. A larger capacity will be required. Additional equipment and training support is required.
• Ecuador has made good use of the military capacity, particularly the Corps of Engineers. However, it is recognized that mine action is no longer a military issue but a national one.
• The current information management system is rudimentary and does not provide the complete picture of the mine/UXO problem. Minefield records exist but have lost some value where rains and floods have caused mine displacements. The information is still classified and not yet shared by the Ministry of Defence with other ministries.
• A mine clearance plan has been developed and priorities have been established. The immediate emphasis is on the political commitments resulting from the peace process-in e.g. Tiwinza and the Peace Park.
• The harsh terrain and climatic extremes pose a challenge for survey, marking and clearance operations and these will require extensive logistic support. Road access is possible relatively close to the frontier area; however, effective, safe operations and support are dependent on helicopters for final access and movement. Operations will be relatively slow, even with air support, and consequently will be costly.
• Socio-economic impact surveys of the type now carried out by the Survey Action Center would be of limited utility. In the case of the Cordillera del Condor area it would be problematic given the inaccessibility, the difficult terrain, and the extremely limited number of information sources (sparse population). In the El Oro and Loja provinces the problem is to determine where the mines have been displaced to, and a classical level 1 survey as described in the international standards, followed by level 2 (technical) surveys, would be more appropriate.
• SOPs will have to be adapted for the mountainous, jungle conditions. Given the challenges, deminers’ safety could easily be jeopardized. Mechanical means of clearance will probably have limited use; however, small, compact vegetation cutters could dramatically speed up the clearance process and improve the safety of deminers. Such machines should be tested and deployed along with a proper environmental management plan to ensure quick recovery, prevention of erosion etc.
• The Ecuadorian mine clearance methodologies demonstrated appear workable, however, the introduction of additional technologies (use of dogs, new generation mine detectors, vegetation cutting machines) and better methodologies (proper site layout, more spacing between deminers, quality management, information collection and management) would ensure faster, safer and more cost effective operations.
• Bilateral technical advice and training assistance, if un-coordinated, can easily lead to duplicated, or at worst , conflicting information. Ecuador would derive more value from a co-ordinated training approach. Management and control of comprehensive programs are also vital aspects requiring training.

III.1.c Mine Awareness

• To date, mine awareness has not been a high priority in the mine action undertaken by the Ecuadorian Government. There is an expression of need, but it has yet to be reflected in a systematic and strategic approach to mine awareness.
• The responsibility for mine awareness has been assumed by the military. There has been no participation from other national institutions e.g. Ministry of Education, or from NGOs. The local communities may have been involved, but only in a very informal way.
• Given the localization of the threat and the small number of mine accidents, the current level of mine awareness can be said to be "adequate" for the present situation. There is no need for a nation wide mine awareness campaign. However, there is no systematic mine awareness program in place in the affected areas and this will be required when these areas are opened up, either through return of displaced populations or through development.
• A mine awareness program needs to be put in place in the Loja and El Oro provinces to warn the local population of the danger of displaced mines.
• With the exception of the U.S. Special Forces, there has been no international assistance, either technical or financial, for mine awareness education. This is an area where the international community can offer significant expertise based on previous experience. Assistance is recommended.
• The relevant government authorities were not aware of the existence of UNICEF’s Mine Awareness Guidelines. They have been given copies.

III.1.d Victim Assistance

• The majority of landmine casualties are military and are well attended to by the military health care system, receiving an integrated level of care. Civilians injured by landmines do not receive the same level of attention and are not provided with adequate services. This reflects the current weakness of the health system in general, which is a particularly acute situation in the mine/UXO-affected areas.

III.1.e Ban on Landmines

• Ecuador has signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention. Under article 7 of the treaty, it will have to submit its first annual report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by 28 March 2000.
• The officials met by the assessment team seemed committed to fully implement the Convention. They referred to plans already under development for stockpile destruction. However, a comprehensive implementation plan remains to be developed.

III.2.a General

• Ecuador needs additional international support to address the mine/UXO problem. Given the country’s weak economic situation, donors are encouraged to further support the Ecuadorian investment in mine action.
• The unique role that the OAS plays in this region should be recognized. Its preparedness to take the lead in co-ordinating international support in mine action should be fully supported.
• The UN could also play a supportive and complementary role, if required. Future implementation specifics should be decided in further consultations at the country level, with the OAS and the Government.
• The development plan for Ecuador amounts to $1,500 million, with at least some projects affected by mines, for example, the Tiwinza memorial and the Peace Park. Consideration should be given to using a portion of the development funds assigned to these and other affected projects to cover the associated mine clearance costs.
• The bi-national nature of the problem should be recognized. The peace and bi-national development processes should be mechanisms for addressing it. A full and continuous exchange of information between Peru and Ecuador on the mine/UXO problem, including information on types and locations of mines, is strongly recommended.

III.2.b Detection and clearance

• A systematic approach to mine/UXO information management is required, from surveys and data collection through to certification of cleared land. The information should be a national asset, and centrally managed, for the benefit of all concerned groups . Information should be declassified, exchanged bi-nationally and on an inter-ministerial basis. The UN has information management software and expertise to offer.
• Socio-economic impact surveys of the type carried out by the Survey Action Center are not likely to be feasible or cost effective. It will be more effective to focus on technical surveys using military resources to confirm, define and mark suspected mined areas.
• There is a need to continue the transition to humanitarian mine clearance techniques. All operations should respect the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance.
• Experienced staff could assist the Corp of Engineers with the modification of SOPs to satisfy international standards for humanitarian mine clearance within the context of Ecuador’s challenging jungle and mountain environment. The safety of deminers should not be jeopardized unless fully justifiable and, even then, only in exceptional circumstances. Ecuador could also draw on experience gained in similar jungle areas such as Mozambique, Cambodia and Laos, and exchange experience and best methods with Peru.
• It should be noted that all technologies have limitations. Dogs might be suitable but their utility should be determined through test and evaluation under Ecuadorian field conditions. Also, the effectiveness of the "explosive breaching" method, employed during the border marker clearance operation, should be confirmed through scientific testing (optimal height, effect of branches shielding the blast wave, effective clearance width given a certain amount of explosives, cost-benefit analysis compared to other methods, etc) to ensure planners use safe and cost-effective ways of clearing the mines.

III.2.c Mine awareness

• The military should strengthen coordination with and seek assistance from other crucial actors in mine awareness education. These include the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the church, NGOs, local authorities and, most importantly, the affected communities. Targeted mine awareness actions should be carried out in cooperation with all these institutions.
• An analysis should be done on the capacity of various institutions to carry out mine awareness activities. Options include the church, local government, the military, the local education system or the community.
• A strategic framework for mine awareness should be established. Technical assistance in designing such a framework, establishing systematic mine awareness actions and monitoring would add value to the process actually underway in Ecuador, no matter the scope of the activities that need to be carried out.
• Mine awareness education should be focused on the population living in mine affected areas. Since indigenous people predominantly occupy these areas, their participation is essential for the design of any mine awareness strategy and that strategy must take into consideration their cultural environment.
• Mine awareness activities should be implemented in support of future development projects and migration of populations into the contaminated areas. Workers and visitors to the affected areas should be targeted as well. Any institution that will carry out mine awareness activities should be part of the overall coordination effort at a national or local level.
• Further discussions between UNICEF, UN Resident Coordinator, OAS and the Government of Ecuador is required to determine exactly how external technical assistance could be provided and whether UN involvement is appropriate.

III.2.d Victim assistance

• It is not advisable to develop a vertical program for mine victims. Assistance to mine victims should be integrated into an overall injury prevention and control program.
• Mine Action activities should be done in parallel. The demining operations in remote areas should be seen as an opportunity to enhance coordination activities between the Ministry of Health and the military. The intention would be to strengthen and extend existing health services to excluded populations in the affected areas, with an emphasis on prevention.
• A coordination mechanism needs to be established within the National Demining Commission to deal with mine victim assistance. The mechanism should involve the Ministry of Health and the military, as well as other relevant governmental organizations, the concerned UN agencies (PAHO/WHO) and NGOs.
• The military provides an integrated approach to rehabilitation for military landmine victims. Given the limited number of civilians affected by landmine injuries, it is recommended that the military, with its well-established infrastructure, cover these individuals as well. A suitable financial mechanism for providing this support needs to be further explored with both the military and the Ministry of Health.
• The development of an integrated mine action plan should provide an opportunity to reinvigorate all existing agreements between the Military and Civilian health care system. This should provide an impetus to improve health care facilities in rural areas. These areas of improvement include strengthening first aid services, acquisition of proper equipment and supplies for the health infrastructure, as well as training of existing health care workers in treating mine injuries that must include all aspects of rehabilitation. In this regard, a memorandum of understanding between the Ministries of Defence and Health may be appropriate.
• The health and disability information systems should be strengthened as part of the overall national health information system, and they should encompass landmine injuries.
• Training is a very important part of national capacity building and continuing education courses should be available to all those involved with pre-surgery through rehabilitative care. Strong linkages are required between the surgical procedures and new technologies regarding prosthetics.

III.2.e Ban on landmines

• Ecuador, at the earliest opportunity, should inform the international community of any assistance it might require to implement the Ottawa Convention.
• Ecuador needs to develop an integrated plan for mine action covering, inter alia, treaty-related issues. It should, in particular, consider the requirement for national implementation measures under article 9 of the Convention.

III.2.f National Mine-action Structure

• The National Demining Commission should be established as soon as possible and supported at the highest level. It should include representation by all involved ministries and provide for the appropriate controls, coordination and priority setting mechanisms. It should include a formal mechanism for donor input.
• There is a need for the government authorities to address the mine problem in a holistic fashion, addressing not only mine clearance, but also mine awareness, victim assistance and rehabilitation, advocacy and capacity building.
• Development projects that are impacted by the mine/UXO threat should provide, in their budgets, funding for mine action.
• International support should be better coordinated. Funding mechanisms for channelling mine action support to Ecuador should be considered in the light of the roles, capabilities and future intentions of the involved organizations. Various funding mechanisms are already available for donor contributions, notably the OAS trust fund, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) managed Voluntary Trust Fund, in-country UN cost-sharing agreements and bi-lateral agreements.
• The OAS is prepared to play a vital co-ordination role, and could encourage a bi-national approach by Ecuador and Peru. The UN should not try to duplicate what the OAS can provide, but is available to provide supplementary services, which would be determined through further discussions.