


**REPORT FROM THE INTER-AGENCY  
MINE ACTION ASSESSMENT MISSION TO UGANDA**



JULY 2004

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	- 1 -
1. BACKGROUND .....	- 3 -
2. OBSERVATIONS .....	- 4 -
2.1 Current environment .....	- 4 -
2.1.1 National political and security environment .....	- 4 -
2.1.2 International environment (relationship and treaties with other countries) .....	- 5 -
2.1.3 Socio-economic environment .....	- 6 -
2.2 The mine/UXO threat.....	- 7 -
2.2.1 Location of mines/UXO .....	- 7 -
2.2.2 Types of mines/UXO .....	- 9 -
2.2.3 Environmental Conditions .....	- 10 -
2.3 The consequences of the presence of mines/UXO.....	- 10 -
2.3.1 Mine and UXO Accidents.....	- 10 -
2.3.2 Socio-economic impact.....	- 11 -
2.4 Capacities and current activities that deal with the problem .....	- 12 -
2.4.1 Detection and clearance capacities .....	- 12 -
2.4.2 Mine risk reduction education .....	- 13 -
2.4.3 Victim assistance.....	- 14 -
2.4.4 Advocacy and international conventions .....	- 14 -
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	- 15 -
3.1 Conclusions .....	- 15 -
3.1.1 General.....	- 15 -
3.1.2 Detection and clearance .....	- 16 -
3.1.3 Mine risk education.....	- 16 -
3.1.4 Victim assistance.....	- 17 -
3.1.5 Ban on mines.....	- 17 -
3.1.6 National mine-action structure.....	- 17 -
3.2 Recommendations .....	- 18 -
3.2.1 General.....	- 18 -
3.2.2 Detection and clearance .....	- 18 -
3.2.3 Mine risk education.....	- 18 -
3.2.4 Victim assistance.....	- 19 -
3.2.5 Ban on mines.....	- 19 -
3.2.6 National mine-action structure.....	- 20 -
3.2.7 Implementation arrangements.....	- 20 -
Annex 1- Terms of Reference .....	- 21 -
Annex 2- Schedule of meetings .....	- 24 -
Annex 3- Note provided to UN Country Team during visit .....	- 25 -

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. There are three areas reporting mine/UXO contamination in Uganda. Firstly, the Luwero district north of Kampala, also referred to as the “Luwero Triangle,” is reportedly affected by UXO as a result of fighting in the early Eighties between government forces and members of the National Resistance Army (NRA). Contamination also exists in the western Rwenzori Mountains as a result of infiltration in the late Nineties by the United Democratic Forces (UDF). Finally, for the past 18 years the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), headed by Joseph Kony, has waged an armed struggle against the Ugandan government in the northern districts, often from bases in southern Sudan, resulting in mine and UXO contamination that spiked in 1996/97 and in 2002.
2. While Uganda was an original signatory of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and ratified it on 25 February 1999, it suffered allegations of continued use, production and collaboration with known users after the treaty entered into force on 1 August 1999. The Ugandan authorities have made significant progress since 2000 in conforming to the norms of the treaty. The sole mine producing factory at Nakasongola was decommissioned and inspected by resident foreign military advisors in July 2001. Uganda submitted its first report required under Article 7 of the treaty on 24 May 2002. In July 2003 in advance of its treaty obligation, Uganda destroyed over 4000 anti-personnel mines of its stockpile, with 2,400 or less retained for training purposes. Since funds became available through the Sponsorship Programme administered by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the authorities have participated in all intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties. The government is not a state party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).
3. No central coordination mechanism for mine action exists at the national level. Activities or interest fall under five government bodies; Office of the Prime Minister/Disaster Management, Ministry of Internal Affairs/focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Ministry of Health/Disability Office, Ministry of Defense/UPDF Engineering Section and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Disarmament Office. At the district level, under Uganda’s decentralized governmental structure, no formal coordination related to the landmine problem exists and the roles of the elected District Local Councilor (LC5) and the Resident District Commissioner, representing the President, are unclear.
4. The nature of contamination in the different regions of Uganda varies significantly. The extent of the mine problem that exists primarily in the north is unclear due to the sporadic nature of mine usage by the LRA and the overall security environment. An estimated 80% of the population in the northern districts are confined to camps to protect them from the LRA, which further limits the knowledge and exposure of local inhabitants for the time being. Systematic mine clearance in the north is not possible due to the sporadic, spot nature of LRA mine usage. *Ad hoc* clearance is carried out by the Ugandan People’s Defense

Force (UPDF) engineers, though with inadequate procedures and equipment. UXO are the main problem in the western region and, to a lesser degree, in the center of the country. Due to insufficient surveillance mechanisms, it is unclear how many victims of UXO have occurred in the West though anecdotal evidence is plentiful and UXO now impede the return of IDPs to their homes.

5. Mine risk education (MRE) is offered in both the north and the west by non-governmental organizations working with district officials and the UPDF, and in coordination with the Ministry of Health in the north. Activities began as a preventative measure in response to growing numbers of victims. These efforts have taken place mostly in isolation without reference to existing international standards, drawing on local capacities in a manner reminiscent of early mine action efforts in other mine-affected countries.
6. The surveillance of mine victims is not comprehensive. Reporting of deaths is limited and no central data gathering method or repository exists. Available statistics in the north show 385 people suffered amputations as a result of mine or UXO accidents between 1999 and 2003, the largest single recorded cause of disability in the region. While some emergency medical and physical rehabilitation assistance exists, coverage is limited and little follow-on vocational or psycho-social care is available.
7. In response, the assessment mission makes the following recommendations:

To the Government of Uganda:

- Form bodies at the policy and executive levels to coordinate and regulate mine action in Uganda,
- Seek bi-lateral support for mine clearance capacity building for the UPDF by another Member State,
- Establish a uniform information collection system and centralized database for accidents and victims,
- Institute legislation as required under its Treaty obligations.

To the United Nations system:

- Offer the assistance of a mine action technical advisor to assist the government in the establishment of the programme,
- Facilitate a coordinated Government, UN and NGO resource mobilization strategy for mine action in Uganda using the *Portfolio* process,
- Assist in the establishment of a central database, potentially to be hosted by OCHA's proposed information system.

## 1. BACKGROUND

8. As the result of internal conflict and external unrest in the region, Uganda has a landmine and UXO problem, as documented in two previous NGO assessment reports by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the Mine Awareness Trust (MAT), in at least three of its four regions, but no survey has ever been conducted. Following discussions with the UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator/Representative, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) fielded an inter-agency and multi-disciplinary assessment mission to Uganda from 30 March to 7 April 2004. Mr. Justin Brady, UNMAS Programme Officer, led the mission. Mr. Michel Verreault, Consultant for the Mine Action Team of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) participated in the mission.
9. In accordance with the terms of reference of the mission, the objective of the assessment team was to 'define the scope and nature of the landmine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem in Uganda, to identify constraints and opportunities relating to the development of mine action initiatives, and to make recommendations for a comprehensive response.' Thus, the mission met with military officials, as well as relevant government representatives from a wide range of Ministries (at capital or district level), including: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Health, and the office of the Prime Minister. In addition, the team met with the UN Country Team, which includes representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Volunteers (UNV). The team also conducted two field visits: one to Kasese in the Rwenzori Mountains and a visit to Gulu in the north. Furthermore, the mission met with local and international non-governmental organizations and volunteer organizations operating in the country including: Uganda Red Cross, Anti Mine Network- Rwenzori (AMNET-R), CEDOVIP/Raising Voices, Landmine Survivors Association, Aid for Rural Development (ARUDEC), Good Hope Foundation, Kitende Land Mines Project, ICRC, Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), Mine awareness Trust (MAT) and Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR). Finally, the assessment team visited two vocational centres for persons with disabilities. The mission was unable to arrange meetings with donor nations while in Kampala due to scheduling problems.
10. The following report includes the findings of the mission, as well as conclusions reached and recommendations for future action.

## 2. OBSERVATIONS

### 2.1 Current environment

#### 2.1.1 National political and security environment

11. Uganda gained independence from the United Kingdom on 9 October 1962. Until 1966, tension existed between those that supported a strong central government and those that preferred a looser federalist approach with the traditional kingdoms at its base. The Prime Minister, Milton Obote, formed an alliance with the military and one officer in particular, Idi Amin Dada, to ensure their loyalty, and subsequently to increase his own power. Uganda became militarily involved in the conflict in the Congo and when it appeared the intervention in the Congo was being used for the personal gain of Obote and other officials, the opposition used it to hold a no confidence vote on the Prime Minister. Obote, with the assistance of Amin and the military, seized power, suspend the constitution and remove the president and vice president. The following year a new constitution was introduced that declared Uganda a republic with a strong central executive, while abolishing the kingdoms.
12. Obote continued to rely on Amin until the relationship soured and two attempts on Obote's life in late 1969 and early 1970, caused Obote to order the arrest of Amin and his supporters. Amin became aware of the arrest order and seized power. He began executing Obote loyalists, mostly from northern ethnic groups. Obote was granted refuge and support to organize resistance against Amin by neighbouring Tanzania.
13. Amin's rule was marked by erratic decision making and paranoia. Tens of thousands of people went missing as Amin sought to further secure his rule from perceived enemies and Obote sympathisers. Amin continued to exploit ethnic tension as well as religious tension, expanding contacts with the Islamic world through his rediscovered Muslim roots and breaking ties with Uganda's former ally Israel. Amin eventually ordered the invasion of Tanzania in November 1978 in response to what he saw as an undeclared war on his regime by Tanzanian President Nyerere. The attack solidified the exiled Ugandan fighters in Tanzania under the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), which along with the Tanzanian Army turned back Amin's forces into Uganda and caused Amin to go into exile.
14. In the aftermath of the Amin regime and the shaky interim fixtures that came, Obote was able to resume power, this time through a December 1980 election. Obote's victory sparked a lengthy and often bloody opposition struggle led by Yoweri Museveni at the head of the National Resistance Army (NRA). Fighting that took place in the centre of the country that resulted in the forced removal of almost 750,000 people from Luwero district into camps to eliminate rural support for the NRA. Fighting also took place in North Western Uganda where

government soldiers took vengeance on the inhabitants of the West Nile District from which Amin hailed. Obote returned to the ways of his previous tenure, marked by increased government control. Eventually he was forced out in July 1985 resulting in the military rule of General Tito Okello. Okello's time was limited however, as the war weary troops he had left were unable to match the continued pressure of Museveni, who moved on the capital in January 1986 where he was greeted by enthusiastic crowds.

15. Since Museveni took power, the government has maintained a strict "no party" political system meant to prevent internal conflict. The government has faced challenges from rebel groups based in the Congo and Sudan. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has operated for the past 18 years in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. The conflict has seen increased government military pressure and cooperation with Sudan that began in 2002, but no resolution to the conflict appears at hand. In 1996, the United Democratic Forces (UDF) launched attacks against the government from the Congo into Western Uganda. While the government was able to defeat the UDF by the first years of the new decade, involvement in Congo became more complicated as described below.

#### *2.1.2 International environment (relationship and treaties with other countries)*


16. Uganda shares a border with Sudan (to the North), Kenya (to the East), Tanzania (to the South), Rwanda (to the South) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (to the West). The five countries are States Parties to the ***Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*** (also known as the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) or the Ottawa Convention).
17. Uganda signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention on 3 December 1997, ratified on 25 February 1999 and became a State Party to the Convention on 1 August 1999.
18. Sudan has a landmine problem that stems from the long-running civil war between the Khartoum based Government and the southern SPLM rebel group. According to UNHCR, the majority of the approximate 200,000 refugees in Uganda are from Sudan. Uganda has accused Sudan of supporting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) including the supply of landmines. Sudan has denied the accusations and recently began allowing the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) to operate in southern Sudan to attack LRA bases. The peace process in Sudan between north and south is nearing a formal agreement, though hostilities have ignited in the Western Darfur region between militia and local rebel groups. The Government signed the Convention on 4 December 1997 but did not ratify until on 13 October 2003. Sudan is being assisted by an UNMAS lead mine action programme working with government and SPLM officials. UNDP also has a mine action STA present to assist with capacity building.

19. Kenya signed the treaty on 5 December 1997 and ratified on 23 January 2001. Kenya reportedly has a minor problem with mines in the north of the country. Kenyan military deminers are currently working under the auspices of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) on humanitarian demining tasks related to the UNMEE mandate. Nairobi is to host the first review conference for the Ottawa Convention starting 29 November 2004.
20. Tanzania also signed the APMBC on 3 December 1997, and ratified on 13 November 2000. According to the report the authorities submitted under Article 7 of the Convention, Tanzania is not mine-affected.
21. Rwanda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 June 2000. The treaty entered into force for Rwanda on 1 December 2000. Rwanda is mine affected dating back to insurgents in the early 1990's and conflict in the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide. Rwanda established a mine action office in 1995. Rwanda's 2003 Article VII report states there are 18 minefields in the provinces of Byumba, Gisenyi, Kigali and Ruhengeri covering almost 1 square kilometre. In 2002, Rwanda was accused of using anti-personnel mines and supporting the DRC-Goma rebels that also used mines inside the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
22. Finally, the DRC acceded to the Convention on 2 May 2002. DRC has experienced internal conflict since the unrest in Rwanda and Burundi caused a wave of refugees into the country in 1994. The overthrow of President Mobutu by Laurent Kabila, which was initially supported by Uganda, led to a regional war that pitted Uganda and Rwanda along with rebel groups against the Kabila Government which was backed by Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sudan and Namibia. Unrest continues in the East of the country. DRC is host to a UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, which includes an UNMAS managed mine action programme.

### *2.1.3 Socio-economic environment*

23. Uganda has four regions—Central, Northern, Western and Eastern composed of 56 districts. According to a 2003 estimate, Uganda has a population of 25.6 million with an estimated 2.8% population growth rate. 80% of the population lives in rural areas.
24. In the southern half of the country, rich soil and rainfall permit extensive agriculture and, in the drier and less fertile northern areas, pastoral economies are common. Approximately 21 percent of the land is cultivated and 45 percent is woodland and grassland, some of which has been cleared for roads, settlements and farmlands in the south. Approximately 13 percent of the land is set aside as national parks, forests and game reserves. Population density is heaviest in the South of the country.

**Population Density of UGANDA (Inhab./km<sup>2</sup>)**



25. Uganda has a per capita GDP of almost \$1200. 35% of the population live below the poverty line. Approximately 39% of the children under 5 years of age suffer from stunting and 23% are underweight. Life expectancy is 44.8 years, a drop of more than three years since 1990. 21.5% of males and 39.6% of females over the age of 15 are illiterate.
26. Uganda was one of the first nations to take a proactive approach to containing the spread of HIV/AIDS. The national adult HIV prevalence, once one of the highest in Africa, is currently estimated at 10%. In 2001, AIDS accounted for an estimated 84,000 deaths.
27. Uganda is ranked 150 out of 162 countries on the Human Development Index, 67 out of 90 countries on the Human Poverty Index and 125 out of 146 on the Gender-related Development Index.

## **2.2 The mine/UXO threat**


### *2.2.1 Location of mines/UXO*

28. During the internal political violence of the late 1970's through the mid-1980's, the area north and west of Kampala, the "Luwero Triangle" was the scene of heavy fighting. The area is contaminated with UXO, though the exact extent of the contamination is not well known. Units from the Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (PATU), which has a limited explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity,

generally responds to UXO reports or investigates prior to construction in this area.

29. During the late 1990's, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Ugandan rebels based across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), waged an insurgency against the government. The need to route out rebel bases was the rationale of the Ugandan military involvement inside the DRC. The Rwenzori Mountain area, referred to as "The Mountains of the Moon" and officially designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site, is now contaminated with a limited mine problem and a significant UXO problem. Mines were reportedly used in small quantities to disrupt movement as combatants retreated. The UXO problem is a far greater threat consisting of various munitions, though M79 sub-munitions stand out as a particular concern.
  
30. Finally, the 18 years of conflict between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the northern districts has created a mine and UXO problem. The UPDF explains that the LRA plants mines to protect its bases. They collect the mines if they move on to re-use at their next installation, but the mines are abandoned if the UPDF engages an LRA base. During such engagements, the LRA also is known to use mines as they retreat. This has created an area along the Uganda-Sudan border in the Dingotona mountains, described by the UPDF as an area 79 kilometres by 2 kilometres, of "potential threat" from mines. Within Uganda, the irregular nature of LRA activities that are executed with no logistical support (no trucks or vehicles of any kind) mean the LRA only travels with what it and its forced labour can manage. This translates into only a few landmines, anti-personnel and/or anti-tank, with each small unit. These are utilized similar to the manner described above for protecting bases. The LRA also uses mines as a weapon of terror against the civilian population. Mines have been found in villages near homes, water sources and along paths. The LRA targeting of the local Acholi people has resulted in relocation of 80% of the civilian population in the three northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader to IDP camps. This has limited the understanding of the extent of mine and UXO contamination in the region. When the civilian population is again allowed to return to their homes, we can expect to see the full extent of the contamination.

**MAP 2 Distribution of Mine Accidents in Northern Districts**  
 (Data on high incident areas [Red shading 7-49 accidents] has yet to be disaggregated)



31. For its part, the UPDF is not known to have used mines as part of its prosecution of the war against the LRA. UPDF minefields around the military base in Gulu were reportedly lifted in 2002. The UPDF does have artillery delivered cluster munitions as part of its arsenal in the north. Stray rounds at a UPDF range in Gulu reportedly resulted in UXO contamination in civilian areas. The UPDF has shared information it has on locations with NGO partners in MRE and with the assessment team, though under the heading “Restricted.”

### 2.2.2 Types of mines/UXO

32. There is no centralized system within the country to collect or manage information about mines or UXO. Most reports prepared by the UPDF refer to number of items, but not types.

33. In the West, landmines constitute a minor portion of the threat as compared to UXO. The Mine Awareness Trust report contains the following anti-personnel mines: No. 4, PMN 2, Type 72, POMZ, PROM 1, Mon 100/200. The report states that there have been reports of anti-tank mines, though no specific evidence exists. UXO include M79 sub-munitions, RKG grenades and ‘Porcupine’ hand grenades.
34. In the North, the UPDF reports anti-personnel mines outnumber anti-tank by a wide margin. The difference was 21:1 in 2002, the most recent spike in mine usage. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) report of 2001 reports the following mines:

**Table 1: Mines/UXO reported in Northern Uganda**

<b>TYPE</b>	<b>CATEGORY</b>
PRB-M3	Anti-Tank
TM-46	Anti-Tank
Type 72	Anti-Tank
No.4 (copy with booster)	Anti-Personnel
Type 69	Anti-Personnel
T-79	Anti-Personnel

35. There are no specific reports on the type of UXO encountered in the center of the country in the Luwero Triangle.

### *2.2.3 Environmental Conditions*

36. Contamination in the West is concentrated in villages on the upper slopes of the mountains in rugged terrain. Access is difficult throughout the year, though heavy rains can make some areas completely inaccessible.
37. Contamination in the North ranges from areas of dense vegetation in the southern portions of the districts changing to shrub and brush vegetation before reaching drier conditions near the Sudan border. During rains, roads become difficult to negotiate and some areas may become inaccessible.

## **2.3 The consequences of the presence of mines/UXO**


### *2.3.1 Mine and UXO Accidents*

38. There is no systematic data collection in any part of Uganda, though some efforts are underway to improve existing health or MRE related structures. In the West, reports are limited in coverage and have only centred on deaths or amputations

with no record of those with other injuries. There are three districts that are considered contaminated at a dangerous level: Kasese, Bundibugjo and Kabarole. Rough estimates collected by a local NGO since 1998 report some 400 amputees and 425 deaths.

39. There is a more systematic data collection system in the North where mines and UXO are the main cause of disability in the districts of Kitgum, Gulu and Pader. Records still concentrate on deaths and amputees. Based on statistics collected by the Italian NGO AVSI, mine accidents are the most frequent cause of disability in the three Northern districts. The numbers must be taken in the context of 80% of the population confined to IDP camps limiting exposure to other common causes such as road traffic accidents.

**Chart 1 Causes of Disability in Northern Districts**



40. The high rate of mine accidents in relation to other causes is what initially motivated the ministry of Health to become involved with AVSI and the UPDF to initiate an MRE project to try and stem the number of victims.

### 2.3.2 Socio-economic impact

41. The impact in the Western region has been the confinement of IDPs from villages on the upper slopes to host communities lower down the mountains. Reports of those that did venture back only to experience a mine accident has deterred others from making the same journey. This situation has created a burden on host communities and an inability of IDPs to provide for themselves.

42. The socioeconomic impact in the North is somewhat muted due to the high percentage of people housed in IDP camps, reportedly 80% of the population of the three northern districts. It is expected that when the local population is able to move outside the camps more freely or return home completely, there will be an increase in accidents.



44. UPDF also has responsibility for clearance in the West, though the majority of engineers are concentrated in the North where the threat is higher. Detection and clearance capacities in Western Uganda do not compare with the North. Landmines were not used extensively and they can be found only in strategic areas. UXOs are however a major concern. UPDF in the West lacks the necessary capacity and equipment to undertake effective clearance.
45. In the centre of the country the Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (PATU) handles UXO reports and does pre-construction investigations. PATU was formed and gained EOD training after a series of improvised explosive devices were used in Kampala in the past. PATU has only about 15 trained operators and reportedly has problems obtaining explosives to carry out tasks.
46. The UXO problem and the UXO like nature of mine contamination (isolated, spot tasks) in Uganda means there is little planning of demining or EOD tasks. Clearance is usually done on an *ad hoc* basis when reported, though the UPDF engineers do conduct some search drills as part of their reconnaissance activities in the North. The only planned survey activities that are conducted relate to pre-construction searches by PATU in areas where UXO contamination is likely in the centre of the country. Likewise, there is no known official marking of suspected areas.

#### 2.4.2 Mine risk reduction education

47. Mine risk reduction education (MRE) is the most developed aspect of mine action in both the North and West. Projects in both areas were started as local initiatives that have gained little recognition or input from the outside. No national coordination exists and the two locations are only vaguely aware of the other's activities.
48. In the North, the Core MRE Group is made up of the District Rehabilitation Officer (DRO) an agent of the ministry of Health, the Coordinator of the Italian NGO AVSI and the Head of the UPDF Engineers, 4<sup>th</sup> Division, Gulu. The effort was initiated with the Ministry of Health's Disability Desk in Kampala and a workshop was organized in 2000.
49. Subsequently, a Training of Trainers (ToT) was organized. In total 60 ToT took place where over 2000 trainers received instruction. The majority were teachers, though local political, religious and youth leaders also took part. The approach uses presentations and relies on booklets, posters and mine models. The booklet comes in two versions, one for adults and one for children. The booklets and the posters are produced in the local language. UNICEF assisted in financing the production of the materials.
50. MRE in the West was initiated by the local NGO Anti-Mines Network- Rwenzori (AMNET-R). AMNET-R is a volunteer organization initiated by mine survivors

and schoolteachers in the late 1990's. In 2003, the British NGO MAT (Mine Awareness Trust) began providing technical and financial assistance to AMNET-R to improve their capacity.

51. The organization started with direct presentations to communities and later developed local focal points that are responsible for MRE in their own communities. With support provided by MAT, AMNET-R began expanding its capacity and coverage in early 2004
52. Currently, close to 200,000 refugees from DRC and Sudan are located in Uganda in Refugee settlements. While no schedule exists for repatriation, it appears that no planning has been done to determine the MRE requirements for the refugee population.

#### *2.4.3 Victim assistance*

53. The provision of assistance to mine victims and survivors in Uganda is weighted towards medical/physical care with fewer opportunities for follow on support. What services are available are limited to larger towns and district centres with access issues for those residing in more rural areas. There are only seven orthopaedic surgeons in the country, none of whom are situated in affected areas.
54. Services in the North are limited to Gulu where an orthopaedic centre is supported by AVSI. Through the workshop and the District Rehabilitation Office some community outreach and psycho-social care does take place. It is, however, insufficient to reach the entire affected populace.
55. In the West, a rehabilitation Centre is located at Fort Portal though the rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure mean the most affected areas to the south have difficulty reaching the centre. The increase in AMNET-R capacity in victim support as well as MRE should assist to some extent especially in terms of transport dedicated to assist victims to bring their products to market.
56. There are three additional large orthopaedic facilities and seven smaller ones that are removed from the most affected areas and victims do not generally have the means to access these facilities.

#### *2.4.4 Advocacy and international conventions*

57. Uganda was an active member in the run up to the Anti-Personnel (AP) Mine Ban Convention, having endorsed the Brussels declaration and participating in the Oslo negotiations. Uganda was an original signatory of the AP Mine Ban Convention and ratified it on 25 February 1999, with the treaty entering into force on 1 August 1999. Uganda participated in all Meetings of States Parties in except for the second meeting. It attended both the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden

conference on landmines in Djibouti in November 2000 and the Bamako, Mali Seminar on Universalization and Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in Africa held in February 2001 as well as the Intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the AP Mine Ban Convention in May of that year.

58. At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, Government representatives denied allegations of anti-personnel mine use by its forces in the DRC in 2000. Uganda participated in the Intersessionals in Geneva in January and May 2002 where it again denied accusations of AP mine usage in the DRC.
59. The Ugandan authorities were meant to submit their first report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention on 28 January 2000. The first report was not received until 24 May 2002 covering the previous two year period. The government has provided subsequent updates.
60. Uganda has reported that implementation legislation is being considered for several years including a report in 2002 that the “1997 Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Bill 2002” was introduced before parliament, though it was to later be referred to the Ministry of Justice for further consideration. To date, the legislation remains in draft form.
61. Uganda destroyed its stock of anti-personnel mines in July 2003 with support from UNDP. The UPDF reportedly destroyed over 4,000 mines. Two thousand four hundred mines were reportedly retained for training, of which 2,000 are Type 72 model and 400 are TM 200 explosive blocks that can be fitted with fuses to become anti-personnel mines. Ugandan officials explain that any additions to the numbers of AP mines reported and subsequently destroyed related to additional AP mines captured from rebel forces.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **3.1 Conclusions**

##### *3.1.1 General*

According to information obtained by the team, There are three areas reporting mine/UXO contamination in Uganda. Firstly, the Luwero district north of Kampala, also referred to as the “Luwero Triangle,” is reportedly affected by UXO as a result of fighting in the early Eighties between government forces and members of the National Resistance Army (NRA) loyal to future President Museveni, who came to power in 1986. Contamination also exists in the western Rwenzori Mountains as a result of infiltration in the late Nineties by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Ugandan rebels based across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Finally, for the past 18 years the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), headed by Joseph Kony, has waged an armed struggle

against the Museveni government in the northern districts, often from bases in southern Sudan, resulting in mine and UXO contamination that spiked in 1996/97 and in 2002.

### *3.1.2 Detection and clearance*

62. Uganda does not have a coordinated information gathering and storage system that could adequately monitor the situation and initiate action should trends of mine usage and accidents change.
63. The potential for systematic survey in the North is limited due to the security situation and nature of the mine problem. The situation in the West is more UXO related and is limiting access to villages by IDPs. The clearance of contaminated areas as they are identified has limited the requirement for any marking.
64. The number of mine/UXO related accidents reported is significant given the overall cause of disability, especially in the North. It is clear that the relegation of people in the North to IDP camps has limited their exposure to mines and UXO as well as local knowledge on location. Mines in the North are used to terrorize local populations and disrupt any remaining pattern of normal life.
65. The lack of capacity for mine and UXO clearance within Uganda relates to procedures that are not IMAS compliant as well as outdated equipment that is not well suited to the environment. Given the security situation in the North, UPDF will remain the sole mine clearance capacity for the foreseeable future. The situation in the West is calmer and there is a possibility for a non-governmental EOD capacity to be built.

### *3.1.3 Mine risk education*

66. Current MRE mechanisms have grown out of locally identified needs and capacity. The Ministry of Health has taken the lead in encouraging MRE in the North as a preventative measure. Activities in the West are more outdated, though the assistance they are now receiving from an international NGO will do much to develop their capacity.
67. While current efforts are laudable, there is a need to apply MRE standards to the work in both regions to ensure beneficiaries are receiving accurate, safe information that will not put them at further risk.
68. No plan exists for the provision of MRE to refugee populations, estimated at around 200,000, from Sudan and DRC currently residing in Uganda.
69. The UN is offering a form of landmine safety training to its staff, which is also open to NGO staff. Currently there is no systematic training for government workers operating in affected areas.

#### *3.1.4 Victim assistance*

70. The information regarding mine/UXO victims is incomplete. There is no accurate casualty surveillance system.
71. The number of mine/UXO victims in the North will most likely increase when IDPs leave camps, though that is not expected to happen in the near future. Existing victims in the North are severely disadvantaged living in camps where their ability to obtain and protect resources are limited. In the West, pressure to return home already exposes IDPs to the dangers of UXO.
72. The existing facilities for physical rehabilitation are not fully sufficient to address the need but access is the major concern that limits the treatment of possibly hundreds of victims. Vocational and psycho-social care for mine victims or other victims of conflict in both regions is very limited.
73. The number of UPDF mine victims is unknown, though their inclusion into any victim assistance programme could alter the requirements both geographically and in terms of services.
74. The existing survivor organizations are poorly organized and unable to constructively advocate for themselves.

#### *3.1.5 Ban on mines*

75. The Ugandan authorities received accusations, which they have denied, of both use and production while under Treaty obligations in the past. Since then, the government has made good progress in adhering to its obligations, including the decommissioning of the Nakasongola factory that produced mines, which was verified in July 2001, participation in meetings related to the convention, submission of Article VII transparency reports and the destruction of stockpiled mines in July 2003. Based on interviews, there is some lingering apprehension with the terms of the Treaty by some government officials, though it was a minority.

#### *3.1.6 National mine-action structure*

76. Uganda currently has no national structure to deal with mine action. Depending on the context, landmines and UXO are handled by a number of different government bodies including Defense/UPDF, Health, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and potentially the Office of the Prime Ministers. This lack of coordination is an overarching concern in terms of properly monitoring the problem and generating a timely and effective response as trends change.

## **3.2 Recommendations**

### *3.2.1 General*

77. In order to develop an effective response and comply with its obligations under the Convention, Uganda has to define a national framework for coordination and execution of mine action activities with an initial emphasis on information gathering and dissemination. The appropriate mechanism/body for coordination needs to be determined by the government. Given the decentralized nature of government in Uganda, District level coordination must also be developed within the same framework.
78. The programme requires a centralized information management system that can allow for the proper monitoring of mine and UXO accidents and mine action activities. While current activity levels do not warrant the deployment of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), collaboration with OCHA with its proposed information system would meet the current requirement.

### *3.2.2 Detection and clearance*

79. Uganda should seek the assistance of a bilateral partner to assist with the training and financing of mine clearance and EOD capacity through the UPDF. The capacity of the police anti-terrorism unit (PATU), especially in terms of EOD, must be analyzed and developed for areas where the UPDF does not have an active presence.
80. Due to the sporadic nature of both mine and UXO contamination in Uganda, teams should be mobile in nature and have the ability to carry out survey and clearance.
81. Analysis should be done on the feasibility of Mine Detection Dog (MDD) capacity to assist with the eventual resettlement of displaced populations in the North to abandoned villages that may have been sporadically contaminated during the course of LRA operations.
82. All operation should be in accordance to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)

### *3.2.3 Mine risk education*

83. An evaluation of existing capacity and activities should take place at a national level to determine the strengths and weaknesses of current activities. The evaluation should lead to a defined set of requirements for improving the quality of MRE in Uganda and, where required, expanding the coverage to include all at risk groups.

84. While repatriation is still not scheduled, UNMAS along with UNHCR should determine the MRE needs for refugees from Sudan and DRC residing in Uganda.
85. The landmine safety briefings conducted by UNSECCORD should integrate Landmine Safety Project materials. Efforts should be made to expand the coverage to government workers operating in affected areas.

#### *3.2.4 Victim assistance*

86. The Ministry of Health and relevant agencies working in the health sector should conduct a comprehensive survey to determine the number of survivors and their associated needs. The information should translate into a strategy to expand capacity and access to universalize victim support within the overall plan for assistance to people with disability, including victims in the UPDF.
87. Immediate steps should be taken to address the requirements of camp based victims in the North who have a disability and are at a disadvantage compared to other camp residents.
88. The Ministry of Health along with partner organizations should foster the development of existing survivor organizations to increase their ability to advocate for their rights and conduct self-help activities within their communities.

#### *3.2.5 Ban on mines*

89. The Ugandan authorities should take an active role in the upcoming Nairobi Review Conference for the AP Mine Ban convention to begin in November. They should continue to provide information on their mine/UXO problem, their plans to address it, the progress achieved and their priorities for donor support.
90. The Government should provide detailed reports in accordance with Article 7 of the APMBC on time. These reports should include information on victim assistance in Form J.
91. Uganda should pass into law implementation legislation as required by the Treaty. If necessary, the existing draft legislation should be amended to encompass small arms to expand the appeal of the law for MPs.
92. Uganda, with encouragement from the international community, should continue to sensitize government and UPDF officials on the requirements of Ottawa and the benefits gained by being a faithful adherent to the Treaty.

### *3.2.6 National mine-action structure*

93. The government should convene a mine action committee under an appropriate government body, to be determined in consultation with the UN, to implement a tangible system of coordination for survey, clearance, MRE, victim Assistance and Advocacy.
94. The meeting and outputs of the National Mine Action Committee should be regularized and transparent. The committee should consider ways in which donor and international organizations, civil society organizations and individuals can contribute to the national mine action effort.
95. A separate executive body should be given the responsibility of ensuring accreditation and adherence to standards of mine action operators in the country.

### *3.2.7 Implementation arrangements*

96. UNDP should deploy a mine action generalist for a limited period, perhaps 6-9 months, to address the following:
  - assist in the creation of an appropriate coordination mechanism
  - assist in the development of an information gathering system
  - assist in the development of an oversight capacity that ensures the adherence of implementers to IMAS
  - assist in the completion of Ottawa Treaty related requirements
  - determine future requirements for assistance

The location of the generalist will be determined once the government, in consultation with the UN, designs a coordination mechanism.

97. UPDF clearance, and perhaps PATU clearance activities, should be developed under a bilateral agreement with a donor nation. If the need is identified, a non-governmental UXO clearance organization could begin work in the West of the country.
98. A uniform data gathering system on mine accidents, victims and clearance conducted should be developed and implemented nationwide with assistance from OCHA.
99. At the end of the Generalists assignment, a recommendation should be made regarding prolonging the assignment if justified, or the programme should be backstopped by regional officers from UNDP and UNICEF to be based in Nairobi.

## **Annex 1- Terms of Reference**

### **ASSESSMENT MISSION TO UGANDA**

#### **BACKGROUND**

1. Uganda signed the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention on 4 December 1997, ratified on 13 August 1998, and the Convention entered into force on 1 March 1999. Uganda has never submitted a report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as required under Article 7 of the Convention. However, Uganda does not manufacture, transfer, use or stockpile anti-personnel mines. According to some estimates, the 1,000 km bordering area between Uganda and Mozambique is suspected of being mined as a result of a spill over from a neighbouring country, but no survey has ever been conducted. Following a request from the Government of Uganda, and in consultation with other UN partners, the United Nations Mine Action Service has offered to field a multi-disciplinary and inter-agency mission to assess the requirements for UN assistance.

2. The conduct of the assessment mission is in line with Resolution 52/26 of the UN General Assembly on “Assistance in mine action”, which emphasises the important role of the United Nations in the effective coordination of mine-action activities, emphasises also the importance of further multisectoral assessments, and urges Member States, regional organisations, governmental and non-governmental organisations and foundations to continue to extend full assistance and cooperation to the Secretary-General.

3. The conduct of the assessment mission is also in line with the UN policy on mine action and effective coordination as outlined by the Secretary-General in annex II to his report A/53/496 on “Assistance in mine clearance”.

#### **OBJECTIVE OF THE MISSION**

4. The objective of the assessment team will be to define the scope and nature of the landmine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem in Uganda, to identify constraints and opportunities relating to the development of mine action initiatives, and to make recommendations for a comprehensive response, including institutional arrangements for the coordination and implementation of mine action activities.<sup>1</sup>

5. To achieve this overall objective, the assessment team will gather information on:

- the scope of the landmine/UXO problem (location and number of mines/UXOs);
- the implications of the landmine/UXO problem;

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<sup>1</sup> **In cases where the country of concern is a signatory or party to the Ottawa Convention, the mission will also seek to assist the country in reporting under article 7 of the Convention.**

- the in-country capacities available to deal with the landmine/UXO problem and the mine-action activities already initiated;
- the political and security situation and its potential impact on a mine-action programme.

6. The assessment team will produce a report to highlight its findings; present its recommendations regarding the feasibility, scope and institutional form of a potential mine-action programme; and establish priorities to deal with both short-term emergency requirements and long-term capacity building requirements.

## **SCOPE OF THE MISSION**

7. The assessment mission will look at the requirements associated with each component of a comprehensive and integrated mine action plan: mine awareness / mine risk education; information gathering / surveying / mine marking; UXO/mine clearance; victim assistance and rehabilitation; training and quality management; treaty implementation; capacity-building.

8. The assessment mission will focus on the contaminated areas of the country where the humanitarian impact of landmines and UXOs is the most serious and where the security/political situation allows assistance to be provided. It will conduct its mission with neutrality, impartiality and humanity as required to achieve the objectives assigned.

9. The mission will be conducted in cooperation with the UN Resident Coordinators in Uganda. It will consult with the local civilian and military authorities, with UN agencies (in particular UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO), with local and international NGOs and the Red Cross movement, and with diplomatic missions and representatives, as required. The assessment team will make sure that it does not duplicate existing studies where they exist, but rather that it builds upon the information already available.

## **DETAILED INFORMATION REQUIRED**

10. Information on the scope of the landmine problem will include the following:

- types of mines/UXOs used;
- mine laying and mine marking techniques used;
- areas known or suspected to be mined, records available;
- statistical data (when applicable).

11. Information on the impact of the landmine problem will take into consideration the following (when applicable):

- national reconciliation;
- the repatriation of refugees;
- the resettlement of IDPs;
- the delivery of humanitarian aid;
- settled populations (casualties);
- reconstruction and socio-economic development;
- health services.

12. Information on the local capacities available and the mine-action activities already initiated will include the following (when applicable):

- local / national administrative structures;
- information management initiatives and capacities;
- mine-clearance initiatives and capacities (including surveying, marking and training initiatives and capacities);
- mine awareness initiatives and capacities;
- victim assistance initiatives, and medical / paramedical capacities to assist and rehabilitate landmine victims.

13. Information on the political/security situation will include the following:

- position of Uganda vis-à-vis the Ottawa Convention and the amended protocol II to the CCW Convention;
- commitment of the various parties involved to supporting mine action actively, and to desisting from producing, stockpiling, using, and transferring antipersonnel landmines.
- position of the donor community;
- potential impact of the security situation on a mine-action programme;
- points of contact.

#### **TIME FRAME**

14. Tentative time frame:

15. A report is to be submitted within two months after the completion of the field mission.

## Annex 2- Schedule of meetings

DATE	TIME		PERSON/OFFICIAL TO MEET	VENUE
Tue 30/03/04	2:30pm	Justin	**DRR (Dan Temu) &ARR (Haruna Kyamanywa)	RR's side room
Tue 30/3/04	3:30	Justin	OCHA Head of Office-Elaine Duthoit	OCHA Offices
Wed 31/03/04	9:00 am	Full Team	**Patron AMNET-R, Researcher-small arms Dr. Edson Mworozii	UNDP
Wed 31/03/04	10:00am		**FSO-UNDP-Mr. John Crawford	FSO's Office
Wed 31/03/04	12:30 am	Full Team	**Rebecca Symington-Child Protection Officer-UNICEF	Fairway hotel
Wed 31/03/04	2:30pm	Full Team	PS-Office of the Prime Minister Mr. Max Odwedo	Prime Minister's Office
Wed 31/03/04	4:00pm	Full Team	**WFP head- Mr. Davis Ken-met Jacob Mikkelsen and Kallon	WFP
Thur 1/04/04	9:00am	Full Team	Coordinator-National Focal Point -Small arms Mr. Richard Nabudere, Ms Dorah Kutesa (Foreign Affairs, Captain Kagoro Asingura (Defence) & PS-Internal Affairs.	Min. of Internal Affairs
Thur 1/04/04	10:00am		Field Security Officer-UNDP	FSO's office
Thur 1/04/04	12:00pm	Full team	**UNDP Resident Representative-Daouda Toure	UNDP offices (RR's side room)
Thur 1/04/04	2:00pm		**Heads of AVSI (Philipo Ciantia), ICRC (Connod Pierre, Ug Red Cross (Patric Wandawa-representative)	UNDP Offices (Conference room)
Thur 1/04/04	3:30pm	Full Team	Army Chief Of Staff Brig. Joshua Masaba	Bombo Head quarters
<b>UPCOUNTRY PROGRAMME FOR TEAM I (GULU)</b>				
Fri. 2/04/04	5:00am	Team 1	**Travel to Gulu	
Frid. 2/04/04	11:00am	Team 1	Meet LC 5 Gulu. Mr. Paul O. Kerobino (Vice Chairman)	
Fri 2/04/04	12:00 am		**Meet NGOs in Gulu (AVSI, CPAR, World Vision, ICRC, Save the Children, UNICEF, GUSCO), Mr. Albert Onyuta-Community Services	Gulu-Community Service Boardroom
	2:00pm			
Fri 2/04/04	2:45	Team 1	Prosthetics Clinic	
Fri 2/04/04	3:00 pm	Team I	Deputy RDC-Gulu	Gulu
Fri 2/04/04	4:00pm	Team I	Colonel Mugisha, 4 <sup>th</sup> Division Commander and Capt. Wilson Kabera UPDF 4 <sup>th</sup> Div. Engineer	Gulu
Frid02/04/04	5:00pm	Team 1	Core team on Mine Risk Education i.e. DRO ( Benard Ocen , Captain Kabera Wilson and AVSI (Naigge Davide)	Gulu
Sat 3/04/04	9:00 am	Team I	**Meet landmine survivors with Mr. Anjelo Okling	Gulu
<b>UPCOUNTRY PROGRAMME FOR TEAM II</b>				
Fri 2/04/04	6:00 am	Team II	**Travel to Kasese	
Fri 2/04/04	12:00pm	Team II	Meet NGOs in Kasese if possible. AMNET-R, ARUDEC, AMNESTY, Good Hope Foundation and the District Rehabilitation Officer and MAT	
Fri 2/04/04	2:00pm	Team II		
Fri 2/04/04	3:00 pm	Team II	RDC-Kasese	Kasese
Fri 2/04/04	4:00 pm	Team II	4 <sup>th</sup> Division Commander-Colonel Mukasa -Kasese	Kasese
Sat 3/04/04	9:00 am	Team II		Kasese
<b>APPOINTMENTS FOR KAMPALA</b>				
Mon. 5/04/04	2:00 pm		UNHCR-Security Officer	UNHCR
Tue 6/4/04		Full Team	Dr. Alice Nganwa-Officer in charge of disability and rehabilitation-Min. of Health	Min. of Health
Wed 7/4/04	09:00am	Full Team	**Debrief-UN Heads of Agencies	UNDP
Wed 7/4/04	11:00am	Full Team	Debrief-Government officials	UNDP

**Annex 3- Note provided to UN Country Team during visit**

**UN Inter-Agency Assessment Mission on Landmines and UXO in  
Uganda  
30 March-7 April 2004**

1. Mine Action and the role of the UN- A detailed explanation of mine action and the role of individual UN partners can be found in the attached policy paper. In particular, the responsibilities of each actor is elaborated in Section V, para.29-39.

UNMAS	Focal point within the UN system. Establish priorities for assessment missions, coordinate partners, resource mobilization and maintains mine action standards. Manages field programmes, including the UN Rapid Response Plan, in support of peacekeeping missions or in complex emergencies.
UNDP	Addresses socio-economic impact of mines and UXO by supporting country programmes in development settings through national capacity building. Facilitates training.
UNICEF	Focal point for mine risk education (MRE). Where appropriate will be responsible for victim assistance. Continues advocacy work for the elimination of landmines and ratification and adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty.
OCHA	Responsible for effective information sharing on mines and UXO as part of the overall humanitarian programme. Will advocate for a total ban on landmines and work closely with UNMAS on resource mobilization through the CERF and CAP mechanisms.
UNOPS	Implements or assists in implementing programmes on behalf of UNMAS and UNDP. Has roster of qualified technical advisors, expertise for the procurement of technical equipment and management of international commercial contractors.
WHO	Responsible for the development of guidelines for victim assistance and support to victims through development of capacity with national ministries of health.
UNHCR	Responsible for ensuring the mine action needs of refugees and displaced populations are met.
WFP	Concerned with the clearance of routes for food distribution, clearance of land for resettlement of displaced populations and clearance of crop land. Has separate MOU with the Swiss Demining Federation (FSD) for demining services.
FAO	Involved with mine action in relation to humanitarian agricultural relief programmes in complex emergencies
DDA	Will work to support the Secretariats role in the Mine Ban Treaty, specifically on articles related to transparency and compliance.
World Bank	Responsible for supporting mine action as part of overall development strategies in pursuit of long-term solutions to the problem.

2. Best practices from past experience- While numerous lessons learned and best practices exist from 16 years of humanitarian mine action, the following have particular relevance for the situation in Uganda. They are:

- a) Mine Action Standards- The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) as the basis for a national programme is a requirement for UN support.
  - b) Structure- To ensure transparency and accountability, division of responsibilities within programmes should be divided into Policy, Executive and Implementation levels.
    - i. The Policy level should be an inter-ministerial body headed by a civilian authority that provides the overall direction and priorities for the programme, ensuring that it is integrated into nation-wide development and poverty alleviation plans.
    - ii. The Executive (often referred to as the Mine Action Coordination Centre or MACC) should coordinate the implementation of the programme with the responsibility of formulating and enforcing national standards through an accreditation system and the execution of quality assurance and control of operators. Tasking will be based on Policy level prioritization.
    - iii. Implementing agencies, should they be governmental or non-governmental, work under the supervision of the Executive and according to its tasking orders.
  - c) Use of Military- Besides the limitations on UN support to the military, the UN encourages countries to approach the mine and UXO problem from a humanitarian and development standpoint with programmes anchored within civilian ministries using civilian contractors or NGOs. In those instances where militaries are involved in mine action, the UN encourages bi-lateral support in the form of military to military cooperation or commercial training assistance to support the activities of the military. While receiving material and technical support from outside the mine action programme, the military still operates within the prioritization, tasking and quality assurance of the programme Executive.
3. UN Support to National Programmes- According to the responsibilities of UN actors elaborated in the attached policy document, the UN has supplied the following support to national programmes:
- a) Technical Advisors for operations and support functions either on contract or as gift-in-kind donations
  - b) Resource mobilization assistance with the Portfolio of Mine Action Related Projects serving as the principle tool for UN and NGO projects
  - c) Procurement of specialized mine action equipment
  - d) Management of international contracts for project related services
  - e) Training of national programme staff in country and at international for a
  - f) Information Management through the Information Management system for Mine Action (IMSMA)
  - g) Assistance with reporting obligations for the Mine Ban Treaty