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Guidelines

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Military Support for Public Order Management in Peacekeeping Missions

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**DPKO/DFS Guidelines on
Military Support for Public Order Management in Peacekeeping Missions**

ANNEXES

A. PURPOSE

1. This document provides guidance to UN Military units tasked with Public Order Management. This guidance applies to UN Headquarters staff at DPKO, DFS and all field Mission personnel. The guidelines herein are complementary and consistent with UN policy on Command and Control, Formed Police Units (FPUs) and the Use of Force.

B. SCOPE

2. These guidelines provide an overview of UN Mission military involvement in Public Order Management when employed either alone or in conjunction with UN Police, FPUs or host nation police. Key topics covered include lead agency responsibilities and command and control, particularly with respect to operations conducted with UN Police and FPUs. UN Headquarters responsibilities for planning and force generation are discussed, as are military tasks in Public Order Management. Mutually supporting operations[1] with UN Police, the importance of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) are also discussed. At the tactical level, use of force principles, levels, and authorization are reviewed. Public Order Management control tactics, riot control techniques, After Action Review procedures and in-Mission training are emphasized. Additional in-depth guidelines are provided on assessing the local situation, selected Mission-level roles and responsibilities, and principle considerations in the use of UN Military in Public Order Management operations at Annexes A, B, and C, respectively.

C. RATIONALE

3. Public Order Management is primarily a UN Police/FPU responsibility. However, under the extreme circumstances described below, UN Military units may be called upon to support or conduct Public Order Management tasks and operations. Under these critical circumstances, UN Military units must be familiar with their roles and responsibilities in Public Order Management.

D. GUIDELINES

D.1 **Strategic Level Guidelines**

D.1.1 **Overview**

4. Public Order Management reconciles the rights to peaceful assembly, life and physical security with the requirement to prevent grave harm to public safety. It focuses on facilitation of peaceful assemblies, prevention and de-escalation of violence, while eschewing unnecessary confrontation. Peacekeeping forces must never violate basic human rights when responding to Public Order Management incidents. While most public demonstrations may be peaceful, UN Military Commanders must nonetheless remain vigilant to the possibility that some individuals or groups within an organized or spontaneous demonstration may have the intent to cause unlawful disruptions, incite violence or destroy private or public property, including UN assets.

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[1] The term "mutually supporting," as in exercises or operations, has replaced the term "joint" exercises or operations in recognition of the fact that military and police/FPU personnel and units are not interchangeable.

D.1.2 **Lead Agency Responsibility**

5.   UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the Security Council. Host nation police and security authorities have primary responsibility for Public Order Management as they have the legitimate authority to enforce their laws. However, these authorities may require support from the UN Mission. Within the Mission, UN Police have lead agency responsibility for Public Order Management. Public Order Management tasks, including crowd and riot control, are a primary function of UN Police and FPUs, often acting in support of host nation police. In extreme cases when UN Military are located in remote areas and UN Police and FPUs are not available, or the public disturbance is caused by an armed group whose level of violence exceeds the capacity of police or FPUs, UN Military units may be given the Public Order Management task, acting either alone or in conjuction with UN Police, FPUs or host nation police.

D.1.3 **Command and Control**[2]

6.   The Head of Mission (HOM), through the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC), is responsible for ensuring that necessary command and control arrangements are developed between military and police components at the start of a peacekeeping Mission. UN Military and the Police Component report through their own chains of command. Generally speaking, personnel and units from one uniformed UN component are not placed under the direct technical supervision or tactical control of another component. However, based on the intensity of a crisis situation, a unit of one component may be placed temporarily or on a rotation basis under the command of the other component, such as in MINUSCA Bangui Task Force. Under specific conditions and with the approval of the SRSG, police and military personnel may serve under a unified and centralized structure commanded by a senior United Nations police officer designated by the HOPC or a military officer designated by the HOMC. The task force commander will be responsible for leading the joint task force's daily operations and operational control in a given geographic area. This type of command structure may only be changed by the SRSG and would not apply to the operational control of police or military units outside of the given geographic area[3]. Section D.2.2 below discusses the transfer of Lead Agency/Command and Control during a Public Order Management incident. Depending on the type of crowd and threat level, and the presence or absence of UN Police or an FPU, the most senior military or police officer/FPU commander at the site of an incident will exercise overall command depending on which component has Lead Agency/Command and Control primacy as illustrated in the following diagram:

**Typical Lead Agency
Command and Control Primacy in Public Order Management**

Crowd Type & Threat Level		Lead Agency/ Command and Control Primacy
Armed	Military Nature	Military
Armed	Non-Military Nature	Police/FPU or Military
Un-Armed	Violent	Police/FPU
Un-Armed	Uncertain	Police/FPU
	Non-Violent	Police/FPU

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[2] The details of UN Military and police/FPU command and control are described in the UN policy on *Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* (paragraphs 97-101), 15 February 2008; and UN Policy (Revised) on *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* (paragraphs 63-70), 1 March 2010.

[3]   DPKO Guidelines on Police Command in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Mission, ref.2015 .14, 01 January 2016

D.1.4 **UN Headquarters Planning and Force Generation**

7. Conditions that may generate a requirement for UN Military contingents to serve in a Public Order Management role can include, but are not limited to, the:

- Absence or lack of law enforcement authority in the host country.

- Presence of hostile armed elements and/or other potentially violent actors.

- Existence of a UN Mission executive authority[4] role (either total or partial).

- Capacity limitations on the part of UNPOL/FPUs.

8. Military contingents and FPUs are not interchangeable entities. Their purpose, training, equipment, capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures are very different. Therefore, UN Headquarters planners in DPKO and DFS must ensure that sufficient UN Police and/or FPUs are generated to meet Mission requirements to avoid the unnecessary use of UN Military in a Public Order Management role. Nonetheless, if Mission military are given a Public Order Management role, they and UN Police/FPUs must be given specific, complementary tasks making the best use of each component's unique skills and capabilities.

9. When developing Statements of Unit Requirement (SUR) to meet specific Mission needs, and when generating forces to comply with the SUR, UN Headquarters planners should refer to the chapters on generic military unit capabilities and tasks in DPKO's UN Military Unit Manual series. It is particularly important that planners ensure that UN Military units generated for Public Order Management in a specific Mission are properly trained and equipped for Public Order Management operations before they arrive in the Mission area. Upon arrival in the mission area, further training with FPUs in order to improve coordination is recommended.

10. Ideally, all units should be capable of public order management. Failing that, planners should assign military crowd control tasks to at least one sub-unit within each unit. The objective is to have Public Order Management-trained companies that are capable of being readily deployed anywhere in the Mission area when required. This capability should be designated in the Mission start-up phase and should have clearly described tasks in the SUR and MOU.

D.2 **Operational Level Guidelines**

D.2.1 **Military Tasks in Public Order Management**

11. When developing a CONOPS that includes military involvement in Public Order Management, planners should clearly task military units to provide that support in coordination with UN Police/FPUs. The following tasks are fundamentally UN Police/FPU tasks in crowd control operations. However, these tasks may be executed by UN Military contingents on an exceptional basis, particularly in the event that FPUs are not on location at the time of a Public Order Management incident; or when FPU capacity is insufficient:

- Disperse assemblies that are violent or may be for other reasons considered unlawful in light of international standards.

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[4] In Mission areas where there is a near complete vacuum in local civil authority, the Security Council may mandate a United Nations peace operation to carry out a transitional administration, including the UN Police component being authorized to exercise "executive authority" for law enforcement. When so authorized, the UN Police will be accountable for the full range of law enforcement functions comparable to those performed by the police services of Member States until such time as the local police services are able to assume responsibility for law enforcement. See DPKO/Training and Evaluation Service publication, *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines (2000), pages 4-5.*

- Patrol disturbed areas to prevent unlawful acts.

- Conduct a show of force, set up roadblocks and cordon off areas when required to avoid a clear and present danger of imminent violence.

- Engage with crowds and their representatives in order to deescalate potentially violent situations

- Serve as a Public Order Management security force or reserve.

- Initiate needed relief operations.

D.2.2 **Mutually Supporting Operations**

12.   The nature of mutually supporting operations between UN Military and Police/FPUs is complicated. Under this concept, military and police operate separately in their own areas of tactical operations, but together in a mutually supporting fashion. While their tactics, techniques and procedures are different, they still share a unifying operational goal and their activites should be closely coordinated.

13.   A police tactical area of operations and the surrounding military security support zone are typically established to define their respective areas of responsibility. Police operations are conducted under the tactical control of the designated police commander on location in the inner tactical area of operation. The police will not transfer primary responsibility for resolving public order incidents to the Military Component unless the Head of the Police Component's representative at the incident site decides that the threat has reached a level that is beyond police capacity. The transfer of authority between UN Police and Military should be described in a relevant SOP and planned in advance and authorized by the Head of Mission.

14.   The military commander cooperates to the fullest extent with UN Police/FPUs and local authorities and whenever possible, honors requests for help from UN Police/FPUs. The military commander may direct elements of his/her command to assist UN Police/FPUs, but does not normally place military personnel under police command. This does not preclude such measures as having mutually supporting patrols and "jointly-manned" fixed posts. When conducting mutually supporting operations, an Incident Control Point should be established where military and police crowd control/Public Order Management operations are monitored and coordinated by the UN Military and Police.

Example: BLUE BOX

Military Forces

Military Forces

TARGET

FPU AOR

Military Forces

Possible Military Units TACON (Tactical Control) to FPU

Incident Control point

D.2.3 **Standard Operating Procedures**

15. The development of Public Order Management Mission SOPs is central to achieving mutually supporting operations. Information sharing at all levels between military and police components is required to meet common objectives, avoid duplication of effort and facilitate operational synergy. A Public Order Management SOP must be part of the Mission SOP developed during the Mission start-up phase. The SOP is intended to minimize the potential for personal injury and property damage during Public Order Management incidents, unrest and riots. The Public Order Management SOP should include likely Mission-specific senarios, and define how to assess[5] and manage the incident under the direction of the Head of Mission (HOM) and Senior Management Team. The Mission SOP for Public Order Management should include, but is not limited to:

- Roles and responsibilities of the main Mission actors including Mission Headquarters (Head of Mission, Senior Management Team, Head of Military Component, Head of Police Component/Formed Police Unit, Joint Operations Center, Joint Mission Analysis Center, UN Security Coordinator), down to Sector and/or Battalion level.

- A clear listing of the chain of command and delegated authorities on the use of force.

- Reporting and communications links within the Mission and to UN Headquarters.

- A clear statement of Mission ROE, including their interpretation, dissemination and training for specific types of incidents.

- Authorization,restrictions and detailed instructions on the use of force and weapons, especially also less-lethal weapons that might not ordinarily be used by military units.

- Procedures for threat and risk assessment, mutually supporting planning and operations during the course of responding to Public Order Management incidents.

- Procedures for engagement with crowds and potentially violent elements therein, including on communication and de-escalation strategies

- The procedures and criteria of transfer of authority between UN Military and Police Components.

- Process of relocation/evacuation of personnel from UN facilities in the event of attack. In any civil disturbance, UN Mission Headquarters, UN Agency buildings and UN Logistics Bases are recommended as the principle concentration points for UN personnel.

- Steps and procedures for After Action Reviews and debriefings.

16. In public order management operations, especially those involving the use of force and/or the dispersal of assemblies, uniformed components should consult closely with human rights components and other relevant civilian mission components to ensure that they are conducted in compliance with international standards and that they do not contribute to host state violations of the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression or other rights.

17. All UN Missions should review their SOPs to ensure their Public Order Management procedures comply with these guidelines.

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[5] See Annex A.

D.2.4 **Rules of Engagement**[6]

18.   The ROE clarify the maximum levels and use of force and their required authorizations.[7] Mission-specific ROE are developed by military planners at UN Headquarters responding to Security Council resolutions and mandates. Clearly stated ROE should be published before the Mission starts and TCCs are committed, which clearly distinguish ROE for public order management from other situations. Restrictions on the use of force prohibit the use of force to execute or enforce local laws except as authorized by the Mission's ROE. All Mission uniformed personnel regardless of rank must have a clear understanding of the ROE since, in any confrontation, ROE decisions made by individual soldiers can have strategic political implications. It is therefore vital that leaders and soldiers have a common understanding of when, how, and to what degree force is to be used. This understanding requires extensive training.

D.3   **Tactical Level Guidelines**

D.3.1 **Use of Force - Principles**

19.   The use of force is authorized for self-defense and defense of the Mission's mandate, and is generally applied under the UN law enforcement principles of necessity, proportionality, accountability and legality.[8]   Decisions concerning the military use of force must also consider a combination of factors amplifying these principles including: Preventing Unfavorable Outcomes, Minimum and Proportional Use of Force, Acceptability and Accountability, and Perceptions of Using the Military in Public Order Management roles.[9]

D.3.2 **Use of Force in the Context of Public Order Management**

20.   Force may be used to disperse assemblies that are violent or for other reasons unlawful (in light of international standards e.g. a demonstration that incites violence or deliberately blocks access to essential services such as a hospital) and to assist with the related restoration and maintenance of public order and safety through the provision of operational support to the host nation's police or UN Police/FPUs. However, dispersal of an assembly should be resorted to only when strictly unavoidable and should be decided upon by high ranking officials or government authorities. Participants in an assembly should be clearly informed of a decision to disperse and should be given reasonable time to do so voluntarily.[10] The authorized level of force is used to control armed or unarmed crowds/riots.

21.   Appropriate levels of force for a given situation are shown in the following chart. The term "lethal force," refers to the level of force that is intended, or is likely, to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results. "Minimum force" can be deadly force, but refers to the minimum degree of force necessary and reasonable under the circumstances to achieve the authorized objective. The minimum degree of force necessary must be used first whenever force is applied. Firearms set on automatic fire must never be used in public order management.

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[6] See also DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2016.

[7] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines 2008, p.35.

[8] The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms were adopted at the a 1990 UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders. They build on the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the General Assembly in 1979..

[9] These principle military considerations are more fully discussed at Annex B.

[10] U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Assembly and Summary Executions, (A/HRC/31/66, par 62 and 63)

Levels of Force in Public Order Management

Crowd Type & Threat Level		Level of Force	Use of Weapons
Armed	Military Nature	Armed force, including deadly force	Up to and including lethal weapons
Armed	Non-Military Nature	Minimum force, with deadly force only in defence of life	Less-lethal (warning shot & tear gas)
Un-Armed	Violent	Minimum force, excluding deadly force	Non-deadly (warning shots & tear gas)
Un-Armed	Uncertain	x	x
	Non-Violent	x	x

D.3.3 **Levels and Uses of Force Authorization**

22.   The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation has political implications that can give rise to unintended consequences. Therefore, judgements concerning the use of force must be made at the appropriate Mission-level, guided by UN principles governing the use of force and a combination of considerations at the tactical level. The following chart depicts a typical authorization arrangement for the various levels and uses of force:

Levels and Uses of Force Authorization in Public Order Situations

Levels and Uses of Force	Lowest Release Authority[11]	Lowest Level of Delegation[12]	Approval Authority
Use of force, up to and including lethal force	Force Commander	Brigade/Sector Commander	Head of Mission
Use of force, excluding lethal force	Brigade/Sector Commander	Company Commander	Head of Military Component
Use of riot control agents	Battalion Commander	Company Commander	Head of Military Component
Warning on the use of force, with warning shots as a last reposrt	Battalion Commander	Highest Commander on the site	
Cordon and search	Brigade/Sector Commander	Battalion Commander	

   Note: Individuals on the ground always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise self-defence in response to an imminent hostile act/intent and use the necessary force in rapidly escalated situations, in accordance to the respective Rules of Engagement.

D.3.4 **Public Order Management Control Tactics**

23.   When tasked with crowd control, military forces must keep in mind that all persons in a crowd have human rights, including disruptive and violent persons among them. These rights must be respected while maintaining public order. Military forces must therefore display fair and impartial treatment using tactics adhering to the principle of using only necessary and proportionate force, with minimum impediment to the rights of those who legitimately exercise their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression.   These tactics include Monitoring, Proactive De-escalation, Blocking, Containment and Dispersing.   Commanders and staff should contact DPKO's Integrated

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[11] Typically, relevant authority would be given for a particular operation and/or time period as opposed to an individual incident.
[12] Ibid.

Training Service for Specialized Training Materials to assist in training their units on these tactics.

24. **Monitoring.**   Monitoring an assembled crowd is a continuous activity and involves gathering the necessary information to determine the crowd's progress and development. Without timely information, an inappropriate UN response could cause the situation to escalate out of control, or create a UN response that is inappropriate to the situation.

25. **Proactive de-escalation**. De-escalation tactics based on communication, negotiation and engagement can be very effective in preventing violence. The mission should ensure there is an accessible point of contact within the organization before, during and after an assembly. The point of contact should be trained in communication and conflict management skills and respond to security issues and police conduct as well as to substantive demands and views expressed by the participants. The liaison function should be separate from other policing functions. The assembly organizers should be encouraged, but not required to designate stewards to guide the assembly, liaise with the national authorities and the mission and convey relevant instructions and orders. Stewards should be clearly identifiable and should receive appropriate training and briefings. Intrusive anticipatory measures should not be used in or around an assembly. Participants on their way to an assembly should not be stopped, searched or arrested unless there is a clear and present danger of imminent violence.

26. **Blocking**. Protests and demonstrations against the UN commonly occur outside the main entrance to UN installations. Blocking is the physical denial of a crowd's advance on a facility or area. Safeguarding human life and the sensitive nature of equipment and information found at UN installations makes blocking operations very effective. Crowd control formations, particularly line formations and barricades, can be used to block advancing crowds.[13]

27. **Containment**. Containment is the process of limiting a crowd or parts thereof to a designated area. It is an exceptional measure. Crowd must be prevented from spreading to surrounding areas and communities. Additionally, it prevents those outside the already assembled crowd from joining the gathering. Containment is useful. Riot control formations (see paragraphs 32-36 below), perimeter patrols and barriers are effective methods to accomplish containment. Containment should target only potentially violent elements in a crowd and not be carried out longer than necessary. Those contained should be continuously informed about the reasons for their containment and the expected release. Those contained must have access to essential needs such as water and provisions must be made to extract vulnerable, sick or injured persons from the contained crowd.

28. **Dispersing.** Dispersing is taking deliberate action to fragment an assembled crowd in order to prevent risks of injuries or the destruction of property emanating from this crowd. Dispersing can be effective against smaller crowds in congested urban environments. Crowd dispersal may require arrest of small groups still active in the area. Clear instructions to disperse within a reasonable time, subsequent warnings, shows of force, crowd control formations and, when required, the use of tear gas, stun grenades, etc., can disperse crowds and riots. Peaceful intentions of demonstrators should be presumed, and acts of sporadic violence by some individuals should not lead to the automatic dispersal of the assembly. Dispersal of an assembly is a measure of last resort, when it is not possible to contain, arrest or otherwise control violent individuals in the assembly, while allowing peaceful participants in the assembly to continue exercising their right. Those ordered to disperse should receive clear instructions on how to disperse, enough time to disperse and be directed to easily accessible exit routes.

29. **Targeted Arrests**. Targeted arrests of violent participants may be used as a tactic for crowd control and protection, including arrests of persons in the crowd with a history of committing violent acts. Targeted arrests can, however, be highly problematic under international

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[13] Barricades of vehicles, concertina wire, and water-filled barrels are sometimes used to block or channel the movement of the crowd.

human rights law, particularly due to the risk of infringing on rights to privacy, liberty and due process. Every arrest requires a legal ground that must be communicated to the person concerned and subsequent compliance with the detainee's due process rights and conditions of detention standard. The temporary preventive detention of persons with a prior history of engaging in violence can only be used restrictively where a clear and present danger actually exists.

30.   Crowd control options are often combined. Military commanders, working in close consultation with police components, the human rights component and other relevant civilian components, should choose their options based on an evaluation of the particular crowd, its distinct parts and its location. Commanders may select any combination of control techniques and force options they think will best mitigate risks of violence, while upholding the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression as much as possible. Military commanders should strive to choose a response that can be reasonably expected to reduce the intensity of a situation.

D.3.5 **Riot Control Techniques**

31.   When a crowd's behaviour has the potential to descend into a riot, other control techniques may be required including apprehension, search and detention; the use of riot shields and batons; riot control weapons and formations; and the use of military vehicles.

32.   **Arrest, Search and Detention**.   During the course of a public disturbance, some members of the crowd may take part in unlawful activities such as looting and assault. This will require the local authorities to apprehend, search, and detain suspects of such activities who are participating in the demonstration. The unfolding situation may at some point require military forces to be called upon to search, take custody of and detain people who are violating the law. Search, arrest, and detention operations are conducted to halt and deter these violations[14] subject to mandate authorizations.

33.   **Riot Shield and Baton**.   A soldier may be required to participate in a riot control formation where the soldier's only protection and primary weapon are a riot shield and baton. Both shield and baton in the hands of a well-trained soldier are versatile, effective and invaluable instruments, and may be appropriate in a riot control situation. The mission should provide clear instructions on how batons are to be used in order to avoid causing deaths or serious injury. Soldiers should be regularly trained accordingly. Batons should only be used where necessary and proportional to contain violence.

34.   **Other Riot Control Weapons**.   The use of conventional firearms (or the threat of their use) is rarely an appropriate solution to a potential riot/riot situation. Better, a show of force using weapons and munitions may cause crowds to disperse, separate, or leave the area with minimal casualties. Force is that force necessary to compel compliance or dissuade belligerents displaying passive or aggressive resistance, that is neither likely nor intended to cause death. Employment of riot control measures such as tear gas, stun grenades, smoke grenades, rubber bullets/soft kinetic projectiles[15] and/or other less-lethal measures can be used if the situation deteriorates, subject to authorization and clear instructions on how they are to be used. Units and individuals must be equipped and trained in the application of 'less-lethal' force techniques, and maintain the necessary refresher training.

35.   **Riot Control Formations**. Crowd control formations, when properly employed and executed, are some of the most practical methods of Public Order Management. There are many variations of riot control formations and all must be practised and rehearsed before they are used in a public disturbance. The decision to use any particular formation is based on the nature of the crowd and location of the disturbance. TCCs should provide expert crowd/riot control training to fully explain and train their military units on these formations during the pre-deployment phase.

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[14] DPKO/DFS Interim SOP on Detention in United Nations Peace Operations (January 2010).
[15] Rubber bullets will be phased out by 31 Dec 2016 and replaced by UN-approved soft kinetic projectiles.

Example of Public Order Management Unit Formation

36. **Military Vehicles in Public Order Management**.   Military vehicles can be particularly useful when a large, unruly crowd is on hand. Military armoured and multipurpose wheeled vehicles can serve as barriers and are adaptable for roadblock operations. They provide protection for the soldiers inside the vehicle and, due to their accessibility, provide protection for those outside manning the roadblocks. Armoured vehicles can also serve as mobile command posts providing security, communications and mobility. In some situations, it may be prudent to keep military vehicles initially out of sight in order not to escalate tensions.

Example of vehicle use in public order management

Example of vehicle use in public order management

D.3.6 **Medical**

37.   **Medical Support.** UN military units conducting Public Order Management operations typically deploy with their own integral Level 1 Medical Facility.[16] Higher levels of medical support are a Mission responsibility provided through Casualty Evacuation/Medical Evacuation CASEVAC/MEDEVAC.[17] Each UN military unit (company or battalion equivalent) must deploy elements within the Mission area with an attached and dedicated medical team consistent with its operational requirement. Each medical team must have at least one Medical Officer with the necessary medical staff, equipment and ambulance.

38.   **CASEVAC/MEDEVAC Planning and Training.** During the planning phase of each operation, special attention must be given to interoperability with UN Police and local security forces, particularly with regard to available Force and Mission CASEVAC/MEDEVAC capabilities, procedures and coordination with the appropriate staff officers at Sector or Force/Mission Headquarters. Medical attention must be given to injured staff members as well as assembly participants, even those who engaged in violent activities. UN Mission MEDEVAC/CASEVAC assets and Mission Medical Facilities will provide additional transportation/medical support and should train with military units designated for Public Order Management roles. Each unit is responsible for the provision of a "10 minute" initial response/"buddy first aid" to their personnel. Training is to be conducted as part of pre-deployment preparations in the home country. CASEVAC/MEDEVAC training is aimed at interoperability with enablers, including medical, aviation, transportation and other Force elements such as the Quick Reaction Force. When aerial CASEVAC/MEDEVAC assets are not available or appropriate, alternate CASEVAC/MEDEVAC may be arranged using their own or Mission assets and Mission SOPs. UN CASEVAC/MEDEVAC typically involves UN military units making use of all available Sector, Force and Mission capabilities.

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[16] For comprehensive guidance on medical operational, logistical and administrative guidelines for Member States, UN Headquarters and field Missions, consult the Medical Support Manual for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, can be found at Policy and Practice Database , accessible only to UN staff on the UN network (including field Missions) at http://ppdb.un.org/Nav%20Pages/PolicyFramework_Default.aspx or "Resource Hub", developed for Member States at http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community

[17] Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) entails the evacuation (by air or land) of a casualty from the site of injury to the closest medical facility. This category of patient transfer shall be conducted within 1 hour of injury. Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) entails the evacuation of a casualty between two medical facilities; either within the Mission area (in-theatre) or out of Mission area. MEDEVAC should be conducted depending on the medical urgency. See the newly-revised UN Medical Support Manual, 2015, Chapter 10, paragraphs 9.a. and b.

D.3.7 **Gathering and Preserving Evidence**

39.   Evidence must be gathered and compiled during all stages of a Public Order Management operation. Military commanders should keep records in chronological order before, during and after the event. Written records, photography and videography are typically used to preserve evidence. Monitoring and surveillance results should be reported to the UN component with command or tasking authority. The use of recording devices should strive to minimize intrusiveness and impact on the local population. Data storage should abide by UN guidelines and regulations. In light of the right to privacy, assembly participants should be informed by appropriate means (e.g. temporary signage along the assembly route) if their activities are being recorded[18]. All persons taking part or observing an assembly should be allowed to exercise their right to observe, monitor and collect information[19].

40.   Photographic and video evidence gathering is an extremely effective means of securing the conviction of offenders during public disorder incidents, including of any national authorities and mission personnel that resort to excessive force. The establishment of event records in public order management operations is considered essential in support of civil authorities on subsequent enquiries. Optical evidence gathering can visually record:

- The scene before disorder occurs.

- The nature of events unfolding to prove the level of disorder.

- Persons in the area before the disorder unfolded, thus enabling a comparison with visual records obtained during and after the disorder.

- Offenders and witnesses, allowing them to be identified in the midst of events.

- Damage done to property and vehicles.

- Injuries to UN military, police, assembly participants or bystanders.

- Physical evidence recovered.

- The conduct of prisoners when they have been arrested.

- The prisoner with the arresting officer.

D.3.8 **Communications**

41.   Effective communications are critical to command and control and situational awareness, both with higher command, within/amongst public order management units and also with assembly leaders and participants. The establishment of liaison between UN military, UN police and host nation security components facilitates understanding, common procedures and communications effectiveness. Proficiency in technological and non-technological communications permits UN military and police/FPUs to exercise command and control and maintain situational awareness under the most demanding public disorder circumstances.

42.   Communications training must include competency in various means of communication, such as voice commands by military or commercial radio, public telephones and visual signals.   Indeed, on-scene public order management commands are typically given by visual signals as voice commands cannot be relied upon during the noise of a public disorder situation.   Commanders must therefore plan to use commonly-understood hand-and-arm signals to assure communications with the various public order elements. As an alternative/secondary means of communications, radio equipment used by UN military and police/FPUs must be compatible and practiced during public order management training

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[18] U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Assembly and Summary Executions, (A/HRC/31/66, para. 78(a)).
[19] A/HRC/31/66, Para 68

between UN military and police components. When vehicles are part of the formation, vehicle-borne radios frequently become a key method of relaying commands.

43. Appropriate contact points and channels of communication should be established, ideally before the assembly, with the assembly organizers in order to convey instructions, orders and relevant information, for participants to report problems in public order management and to de-escalate tensions between assembly participants and those maintaining public order.

D.3.9 After-Action Reviews and Investigations

44. Once a public disturbance has been brought under control and the situation has returned to normal, the manner in which all UN components (including the military) responded should be reviewed along with an evaluation of the Public Order Management SOP and crisis management plan. Methods of conducting the evaluation include:

- After-Action Reports involving each participating UN organization.

- Interviews of the persons affected by the disturbances.

- Debriefings on lessons learned.

45. Lessons Learned and After-Action Reports on Public Order Management incidents and training exercises should be shared between the UN Police/FPUs and the Military Component; and sent to the Office of Military Affairs at DPKO with recommendations for changes to UN guidance. Input from relevant civilian components and assembly participants should be sought. Information and statistics on when and against whom force was used by the mission should be easily accessible to the public.

D.3.10 In-Mission Training

46. In-Mission training builds upon national training already provided by TCCs before deployment. In-Mission training must address the necessary public relations sensitivities inherent in highly visible Public Order Management operations. Training for crowd control management should provide both theoretical and practical tactics, techniques and procedures. These skills require periodic reinforcement and include, but are not limited to:

- Information gathering, sharing and threat assessment (including terrain analysis).

- Public information activities including photography and video.

- Mutually supporting (joint) planning exercises between UN Military and Police Components.

- Scenario-based, mutually supporting (joint) operational rehearsals on the use of force.

- On-site handover of responsibility for Public Order Management incidents.

- Extraction of hostages and persons at risk from violent crowds using a combination of on-foot tactics and armoured vehicle manoeuvres.

- Squad, platoon and company-level force formations according to Mission-specific scenarios.

- Self-defence, shield/baton and apprehension techniques.

- Riot control equipment training (including firearms training and tear gas launching).

47. Force Commanders are responsible for refresher training of their units, including with the Mission's UN Police/FPU to ensure mutually supporting capability and readiness. Force Commanders should have their staff contact the Integrated Training Service at UN Headquarters for Special Training Materials that can assist in their Public Order Management training.

E.   TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Public Order Management: Includes preventive activities such as high-visibility patrolling and public confidence-building, as well as crowd and riot control. In accordance with mandated tasks, this may include protection of public and private property.

Public Disturbance: An act that constitutes a breach of the peace, or any assembly of persons where there is imminent danger of collective violence, destruction of property or other unlawful acts.

Riot: A violent disturbance of the peace by a crowd or any unauthorized or illegal gathering that results in violent behavior towards the UN or host country.

Force: The use of, or threat to use, physical means to achieve an authorized objective.

Armed Force: The use of weapons, including firearms and bayonets.

Deadly Force: The level of force that is intended or is likely to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results.

Intentional use of deadly force: The level of force that is intended or is likely to cause death regardless of whether death actually results. This is the ultimate degree of force.The use of deadly force is a last resort, but nonetheless available when done in accordance with Mission-specific ROE. Peacekeepers may use intentional deadly force only where strictly necessary to protect life against imminent threat.

Potentially deadly Force. The level of force carries a likely risk of causing death, even if such deaths are not intended. Any use of firearms other than warning shots, would have to be regarded at least as potentially deadly. Potentially deadly force may be used only where necessary to engage in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting the authority of peacekeepers, or to prevent the person's escape.

Non Deadly Force: Force is that force necessary to compel compliance or dissuade belligerents displaying passive or aggressive resistance that is neither likely nor intended to cause death. Employment of riot control measures such as tear gas, stun grenades, smoke grenades, rubber bullets/soft kinetic projectiles[20] and/or other less lethal crowd control toolscan be used (when authorized) if the situation deteriorates. Units and individuals must be equipped and trained in the application of techniques using less-lethal force, as well as maintain the necessary refresher training. Before resorting to any use of force, the military commander should always attempt to resolve the situation in peaceful ways with the key belligerent leaders. Actions in the Force category may also require the demonstration of tactical strength to show a significantly stronger capability to gain control over or cooperation from belligerents or demonstrators. Therefore, troop reinforcement and a show of force by other available Mission assets (such as aviation) may be required.

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[20] Rubber bullets will be phased out by 31 Dec 2016 and replaced by UN-approved soft kinetic projectiles.

Minimum Force: The minimum degree of authorized force that is necessary and reasonable under the circumstances to achieve the objective. The minimum degree of force applicable whenever force is used. Minimum force can be Deadly Force if appropriate.

Unarmed Force: The use of physical force, short of the use of "Armed Force."

Human Rights: Human rights mandates are a regular feature of UN peacekeeping operations. UN doctrine expects military personnel to uphold human rights and contribute to the implementation of human rights mandates through their operations according to the modalities specified in DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions. Force Headquarters plays a critical role in supporting human rights integration into UN Military planning, tasking and operations. Effective human rights integration into UN Military work is, in turn, a critical enabler in implementing mandates to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

F.   REFERENCES

Normative or Superior References

DPKO/DFS *Policy on Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations,* 15 February 2008.

United Nations Security Management System (Security Policy Manual), 04 Februrary 2011.

United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, August 2012.

Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual, 2011).

Related Policies, Guidelines or Procedures

DPKO/DFS *Policy (Revised) on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* 1 March 2010.

DPKO/DFS *Policy on Support to Military and Police Pre-Deployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations,* 1 October 2009.

DPKO/DFS *Guidelines on the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* (2016).

DPKO/DFS *Standard Operating Procedures on Assessment of Operational Capability of Formed Police Units for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* 1 September 2012.

DPKO/DFS Interim Standard Operating Procedures on *Detention in United Nations Peace Operations*, 25 January 2010.

DPKO/Training and Evaluation Service publication, *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines,* 2000.

Other associated reference policy and guidance material is available at the following link on the DPKO/DFS Guidance Framework:

http://ppdb.un.org/Nav%20Pages/PolicyFramework_Default.aspx

G. CONTACT

44. The DPKO point of contact for these guidelines is the Policy and Doctrine Team in the Office of Military Affairs.

H. HISTORY

45. These guidelines are the first to be issued on this subject. These guidelines shall be reviewed not later than July 2018.

APPROVAL SIGNATURES:

Hervé Ladsous
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DATE OF APPROVAL: AUG 2 3 2016

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Under-Secretary-General
Department of Field Support

DATE OF APPROVAL: AUG 2 3 2016

Annex A

Assessing the Local Situation

Purpose

In order to prevent and/or respond to situations that pose a threat to public safety, UN Military units must be able to assess their local situation. The following guidelines increase that awareness from a Public Order Management perspective.

Sources of Information

Understanding how to consult with locals depends in great part on a fuller understanding of the local situation, including history, customs, current concerns and threats. Information is the key to developing threat analysis and assessments for Public Order Management plans and operations. The Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) and Force Headquarters U2 are good information hubs. They use information collected by UN Military and Police, amongst other sources, to produce threat analysis and assessments for all Mission operations including Public Order Management.

Information obtained by both Police and Military Components is critical. UN Police actively and passively collect information of a criminal or law and order nature. Military units collect information for force protection, the Protection of Civilians and to meet mandated tasks including the requirement to maintain freedom of movement.

Obtaining information from multiple sources helps confirm the truth and eliminate bias. In addition to UN Military and Police sources, useful information for Public Order Management can come from other UN actors and open sources. Open sources can be the most productive sources of valuable information. Primary sources of information in peacekeeping Missions include:

- Open sources (Internet, local newspapers, radio and television, government records).

- UN agencies in the field.

- UN and local police.

- Civilian components, especially human rights components.

- Subordinate military unit information from patrols.

- Partner organizations.

- Liaison with local officials and population.

Analysis and Assessment

Threat analysis and assessment is a continuous process fed by new information and Public Order Management operational requirements. In addition to the JMAC, military intelligence officers (Headquarters U-2) use all available information, databases and products to analyse threats, closely coordinating with JMAC and UN Police intelligence staff to help commanders visualize relevant threat information that may affect their operations. For more details on the method of threat analysis and assessment, consult the security risk management process in the UN Security Policy Manual.[21]

Priority Information Requirements (PIR)

Analysis and assessments produce a clearer picture of threats to UN peacekeepers and civilians. But analysis and assessments also reveal the gaps between what is known and

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[21] United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) Security Policy Manual, Chapter IV, Security Management (20 April 2009).

what needs to be known in order to take action. Commanders, supported by their planners, decide what information gaps need resolution and designate those as Priority Information Requirements. Priority Information Requirements for Public Order Management operations typically include:

- Identity of persons, groups, or organizations that have threatened to cause or are causing disturbances.

- Ring leaders; where they reside; their connections and motivations.

- Estimated number of people who will be or are involved in the disturbance.

- Most likely times and locations of disturbances.

- Group structure and types of activities the group can conduct.

- Kinds of communications and control methods used by participants and organizers.

- Sources, types, and locations of arms, equipment, and supplies available to the group.

- Goals of the groups that are likely to cause public disturbance.

- Causes of disturbances.

- Attitude of the general population toward groups causing public disturbances, toward law enforcement authorities, and toward UN intervention.

- Exit routes for persons wanting to disperse.

<div align="right">**Annex B**</div>

**Principle Considerations
in the Use of UN Military
for Public Order Management Operations**

Principle considerations in the use of UN Military in Public Order Management operations include Preventing Unfavorable Outcomes, Minimum and Proportional Use of Force, Acceptability and Accountability and Perceptions of Using the Military.

Preventing Unfavorable Outcomes

Crowd behaviour can be unpredictable. Military presence can generate or even exaggerate crowd resistance. These risks can be reduced through prior consultation with crowd organizers to reach a common understanding of their right to protest and the peaceful actions required by all parties. However, agitators and criminals may infiltrate the crowd with the intent of fomenting violence. Military units should therefore avoid inciting or increasing crowd violence when using Public Order Management tactics, techniques and procedures. Communication with local protest organizers and a minimum and proportional use of force can prevent unfavorable outcomes.

Minimum and Proportional Use of Force

The use of force must be graduated and commensurate with the level of threat, with being always limited to the minium level of force required to overcome resistance or perceived threats. Any use of force by the military in public order management must be limited in intensity and duration to that which is necessary and reasonable to achieve the authorized objective. Where appropriate, commanders should consider alternatives to physical force such as mediation, military tactical posture and other non-violent means that may also include the deployment or maneuver of larger forces in order to demonstrate UN resolve and intent. This can also include non-action. All use of force must be in compliance with the relevant Rules of Engagement that must be themselves be compliant with international standards.

Acceptability and Accountability

Military units involved in Public Order Management will find themselves operating under difficult circumstances. Groups that perceive themselves as oppressed may eagerly seek victimhood in an effort to gain the support of public opinion. Military units must therefore ensure they have the legitimate authority to conduct Public Order Management operations and must be properly trained and equiped to execute their tasks. Whenever the use of force in public order management leads to deaths, serious injuries and/or the use of firarms, an effective, prompt, transparent, impartial and sufficiently independent investigation into the incident must be carried out. Military contingent member found to have engaged in or ordered the use of excessive force must be held accountable and their cases referred for criminal prosecution, where warranted. Ensuring accountability in this way will project a more favorable, acceptable image to the local population.

Perceptions of Using the Military

Regardless of compliance with international standards of legality, legitimate aims, necessity, proportionality and accountability, using military units in a Public Order Management role may nonetheless generate negative public perceptions of the UN and its Military Component. Military forces, with their weapons, organization and heavy equipment, generally convey the ultimate image of power to compel compliance. A UN Military presence may be perceived as an overly coercive means to obtain objectives in Public Order Management, particularly if they are seen as legitimizing oppressive police actions of the host state. These potentially negative perceptions require thoughtfull consideration in terms of short term benefits and long term objectives. More extensive consultation with local leaders before and after Public

Order Management actions may be required to ensure that negative perceptions are prevented, mitigated or eliminated.