United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and Department of Field Support

Joint Mission Analysis Centre
Field Handbook

United Nations

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Joint Mission Analysis Centre Field Handbook

Compilation of best practices, tips, methodologies, models, templates and case studies

This handbook introduces United Nations JMAC officers to and guides them on the implementation of all aspects of the core role of integrated analysis

United Nations

Contents

Foreword

The JMACs play a key role in mission leadership decision-making and in enhancing the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Their analyses and insight, mapping, profiles, and backgrounders are extremely important to us, as they facilitate leadership's contextual and analytical understanding, and give us the tools we need to make informed and balanced decisions in fast-changing environments.

Like United Nations peacekeeping itself, JMACs have evolved to meet what was identified as a very real and specific need: analysis to inform planning and decision-making that goes beyond basic military and operational information. Since their creation in 2006, JMACs have been established in 12 missions, allowing for considerable experience and lessons learned across a wide range of field operations.

The threats faced by United Nations peacekeeping are evolving rapidly. Security Council mandates have become more complex, and operating environments are ever more challenging. Better and more systematic practices in intelligence gathering, management and analysis are required, particularly in high-tempo, complex and dangerous operating environments. To meet these challenges, DPKO and DFS are working to transform peacekeeping into an innovative and technologically advanced enterprise. As requirements continue to grow, and the tools deployed to the field evolve, there is a need to strengthen the preparation and professionalization of our staff, to enhance their skills and to standardize methodologies and products.

It is to this end that we are pleased to introduce this handbook, which contains a wealth of information borne out of vast experience. We are certain it will prove invaluable not only to new recruits to mission JMACs, but also to those who lead and manage these important entities.

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Under-Secretary-General

For Peacekeeping Operations

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Acknowledgements

Part I:
Understanding the context
for JMAC work

Chapter 1.   Introduction

1.1.   General aim and output of the *JMAC Handbook*

This handbook is meant for Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) officers. It is designed to introduce them to and guide them on the implementation of all aspects of the core role of integrated analysis. This handbook is a compilation of policy, guidelines, best practices, tips, methodologies, models, templates and case studies. It provides an introduction to JMAC work for new staff members and is meant as a reference guide for more experienced personnel. The handbook is designed as a self-study tool. The content draws on existing expertise within the JMACs as well as on lessons identified by other actors, including research institutes and academia. JMACs play a central role in conducting integrated analysis for United Nations missions. The handbook strives to clarify conflict analysis methodology and disseminate best practices. It aims to hone the relevance and utility of senior mission decision-making, strategic reviews and planning. Strengthened analytical structures and improved information flow within missions enhance the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers.

1.2.   Need for the handbook

This handbook is intended to be used for both pre-deployment and on-site training of JMAC analysts. It incorporates broadly accepted principles of United Nations intelligence, which should be observed by all United Nations peacekeeping operations. Each peacekeeping operation has a unique mandate, various resources, and is confronted by different challenges relative to information analysis in a variety of settings. In providing a methodological and training tool for a wide range of operations, the field handbook remains generic. Accordingly, it must be supplemented and reviewed according to the specific mandate and context in which each peacekeeping mission operates, and must be done so in light of the judgement of its leadership.

An intelligence cycle and information management (flow of information and coordination of information sharing) are also implemented in each peacekeeping operation. While the present handbook provides advice as to how JMACs should work to best support the implementation of the mandates, it is to be used in complement to standard operating procedures (SOP) and policies specific to each mission.

1.3.   Target audience

The handbook is primarily addressed to JMAC staff and their chiefs. It should also be useful to clarify the role of a JMAC and of its personnel to other components of the peacekeeping missions. The target audience includes the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), Force Commander, Police

Commissioner and Chief of Staff (CoS). It should also be of interest to heads of the main sub-stantive components and divisions as well as other units such as, but not limited to, the Joint Operation Centre (JOC), the Security Information and Operations Centre (SIOC), Chief Security Adviser (CSA), Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Military Intelligence Unit (U2). It additionally aims to inform United Nations Headquarters entities such as Office of Operations and Force Generation Service officers.

This handbook will thus be fulfilling different purposes for the following audiences.

Table 1.1.

JMAC Field Handbook **objectives and audiences**

Audience	Offices/units	Use of handbook
Senior leadership	SRSG, DSRSG, CoS, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Documents Management Section	Describe the use of JMACs in identifying challenges and opportunities for the implementation of the mandate
		Present the range and scope of JMAC products
		Clarify how to task the JMAC to optimize its role and contribution to mandate implementation
Analysis, information and intelligence counterparts	JMAC chief and staff, JOC, U2, SIOC, Chief Security Adviser/ Officer, United Nations Police Criminal Intelligence Unit	Identify coordination and information-sharing mechanisms
		Specify distinct role of JMAC vis-à-vis the mission
		Highlight JMAC-specific products
United Nations staff		Present the objective and functions of JMAC
		Clarify JMAC practices
		Highlight JMAC range of products

1.4. Objectives

The handbook aims at contributing to the professional development of JMAC officers. The main objectives of the handbook are threefold:

1. To present the JMAC and provide guidance for both analysts and chiefs;

2. To provide information on the intelligence cycle relevant to United Nations operations;

3. To list JMAC tools and products.

Accordingly, this handbook offers an overview of the policy and guidelines of JMACs. It presents the JMAC, its origins and current context and challenges. It highlights the preparatory work for new JMAC information analysts. It also provides guidance on managing and leading a JMAC. It details the different steps of the intelligence cycle (tasking/direction, acquisition, collation, evaluation, analysis and dissemination of analytical products). It provides the list of JMAC prod-ucts and tools and presents templates and samples. Finally, it clarifies the measures to be taken

when leaving a JMAC or closing down a JMAC section at the end of a mission. Throughout the handbook, tips and testimonies are put forward to help analysts. Ultimately, this handbook supersedes the 2015 JMAC Guidelines.

1.5.   Sources

This handbook draws from the following documents: the DPKO/DFS Policy on JMACs (March 2015);[1] the DPKO-DFS JMAC Guidelines (March 2015);[2] the Outcome Document of the JMAC chiefs Workshop (May 2016); the DPKO-DFS Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy (May 2017).[3]

The handbook is also based on visits and interviews made in five JMACs in the following peacekeeping missions: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) over 2016–2017. It is based on over 120 interviews with United Nations JMAC information analysts from all ranks and status (P5, P4, P3, P2, United Nations volunteers (UNV), national political officers (NPO) and administrative assistants). Interviews were also conducted with senior leadership (two SRSGs, four DSRSGs and four chiefs of staff). Members of other United Nations units and agencies working with JMAC analysts and using JMAC products, with United Nations staff working in JOC, Political Affairs, Force and its Military Intelligence Unit, Human Rights section, Civil Affairs section, Protection of Civilians, United Nations Police, Force Commander, Force Chief of Staff, Strategic Planning and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Representatives of all the groups were interviewed in order to better grasp the use and appreciation of various JMACs inputs and outputs in the missions and between the mission and the different United Nations agencies also working in the field.

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[1]   United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC)", 1 March 2015, PK/G/2015.03.

[2]   United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) Guidelines", 1 March 2015, PK/G/2015.04.

[3]   United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy", 2 May 2017, PK/G/2017.07.

Chapter 2. Understanding the JMAC context

2.1. Origins of JMAC

The JMAC was designed to enhance mission-specific integrated analytical support. Joint Mission Analysis Centres were conceived as key mission asset, providing integrated information and predictive assessment to support critical senior-level decision-making and strategic planning processes.

The table below summarizes the establishment of information analysis entities at the United Nations (in the field and at the Headquarters).

Table 2.1.

Evolution of intelligence entities at the United Nations

	Field	Headquarters
1960	Military Information Branch (ONUC)	
1987		Office for Research and the Collection of Information
1993		Peacekeeping Situation Centre including its Information and Research Unit (IRU)
1995		Humanitarian Early Warning System
1996		ReliefWeb
1998		United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action
		Department of Political Affairs Prevention Team
2000		Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS)
2001		UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery Early Warning Team
		IASC Sub-Working Group on Preparedness
2003	Humanitarian Information Centres	Department of Safety and Security (DSS)
2006	Joint Operation Centres (JOC)	
	Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC)	
2008		Strategic Military Cell (SMC)—J2
		Office of Military Affairs, Assessment Team
2013		United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC)
2015	United Nations Country Teams	Analysis and Planning Team in EOSG

The first United Nations Secretaries-General, Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant, acknowledged the lack of knowledge, understanding and anticipation of the environment in which the United Nations was operating as a significant impediment to the activities of the organizations.[4] The term "intelligence" was first employed as part of the 1960 peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC) with the creation of a Military Information Branch (MIB), designed to collect information through message interception, aerial surveillance, and detainee interrogation. For successive peace missions, intelligence remained in the military realm, mostly kept within the prerogative of specific national contingents. Whereas the need for intelligence was acknowledged as a need at and for the United Nations, the challenge was in the establishment of intelligence structures that would reconcile the "multilateral and transparent nature" of United Nations peace operations.[5]

Thirty-three years after the MIB, in 1993, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali established within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations a Situation Centre to link the civilian, police and military flow of information.

Through the 1990s, two intelligence-oriented offices, the Office for Research and Collection of Information and the Information and Research Unit, were created and then dismantled due to suspicions by Member States that information collected could be used outside of United Nations missions.[6]

In 2000, The Brahimi Report reiterated the need for comprehensive information gathering and analysis and recommended the creation of the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat at the Headquarters level. Less than three years later, the Baghdad bombing[7] confirmed the necessity of having information centres that could provide integrated analysis at the operational level.

In 2005, the JMAC concept was first implemented as an ad hoc response to gaps in United Nations missions in Liberia, Afghanistan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Haiti. In 2006, JMACs were officially declared by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) as entities meant to provide mission-wide analysis to support the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of peacekeeping missions. The first official

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[4] Haidi Willmot, *Improving UN Situational Awareness: Enhancing the UN's ability to Prevent and Respond to Mass Human Suffering and to Ensure the Safety and Security of Its Personnel* (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2017), p. 14. Willmot states that "The United Nations's second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, viewed the absence of a situational awareness system as a 'serious handicap'" and that his successor, Secretary-General U Thant, "was of the view that the lack of authoritative information, without which the Secretary-General cannot speak […] was one of the two 'insuperable obstacles' he faced during his tenure".

[5] Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of United Nations and EU Intelligence Structures", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 18, No. 4 (2001), pp. 454–467.

[6] A. Walter Dorn, "Intelligence at United Nations Headquarters? The Information and Research Unit and the Intervention in Eastern Zaire 1996," *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 440–465.

[7] United Nations, "Report on The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel in Iraq", 2003, www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf.

guidance on JMACs was the Joint Operation Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres policy directives promulgated in 2005. The policy was subsequently revised in 2010 and divided into two separate policies for the JOC and JMAC. By 2015, JMACs had been established in twelve peacekeeping missions and JMAC-like entities, and in six political missions.[8]

Created in 2013, the UNOCC resulted from the gathering of the Peacekeeping Situation Centre, the DSS Communication Centre and staff from DPA, DPI, OCHA, OHCR and UNDP. It is the centre responsible for the support and follow-up policy for the JMACs.

In 2015, the "Future of Peace Operations" report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations recommended "more effective information management and significantly enhanced analytical capacities". According to this report "an effective system for the acquisition, analysis and operationalization of information for peace operations in complex environments [was] lacking".[9] In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations confirmed the need for "a more cohesive and integrated United Nations system for situational awareness that stretches from the field to the Headquarters".[10]

In May 2017, the first Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy was approved by the USGs of DPKO and DFS in consultation with the Member States.

Twelve years after JMAC official implementation, comprehensive forward-looking analysis is still highlighted as a dire need for the implementation of peacekeeping missions' mandate.

2.2.   Purposes, objectives and challenges

2.2.1.   Purposes and objectives

JMACs are meant to collect and analyse multi-source information to produce integrated and forward-looking analysis support mission planning and decision-making. The 2015 JMAC Policy identifies a list of criteria justifying the establishment of an integrated analysis cell in a Peacekeeping mission.[11]

If the mission already exists, the decision to establish a JMAC lies with United Nations Headquarters (UNOCC and the Integrated Operational Team of DPKO-DFS) and the mission leadership (SRSG, DSRSG, Chief of Staff). If the mission is to be established, the consultation is done between the Integrated Operational Team of DPKO-DFS and the UNOCC.

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[8]   In six other peace operations, there are similar analysis structures that fulfil JMACs functions: The Integrated Analysis Team in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the Joint Analysis and Reporting Unit in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the Joint Analysis Unit in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, in Columbia, in UNOWAS, as well as in Libya.

[9]   "The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations", 2 September 2015, A/70/357–S/2015/682.

[10]   "Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations", 15 March 2016, A/70/19.

[11]   "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03.

> **Parameters to establish a JMAC**
>
> - Expected mandate of the mission (e.g. Executive Authority; Protection of Civilians (PoC); Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR); Security Sector Reform (SSR))
> - Unstable/volatile political and security environment
> - Poor cooperation with host government
> - Presence of hostile international forces and/or other international actors
> - Regional armed conflict
> - Internal armed conflict
> - Robust military and/or police mandate

2.2.2.   Challenges

JMAC cells and JMAC analysts face challenges linked to their work environment and associated complex tasking, the disparate understanding and practices linked to information management, and limited resources.

Difficult work environments and complex tasking

JMACs are deployed in complex and challenging environments, which may differ widely from one operation to another. Some are set in United Nations missions in countries with extreme seasonal weather conditions with a wide territory to cover, lack of infrastructure, limited access to remote areas and few staff (MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, UNAMID). Others are set in a smaller territory dealing with highly sensitive and difficult mandates (UNMIK, UNIFIL, UNTSO, UNFICYP, UNDOF). JMACs operate in exacting security settings characterized by numerous asymmetric threats to the implementation of encompassing mandates, including contexts of ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism. JMAC analysts work under pressure to understand the risks to the fulfilment of broad mission mandates. They are expected to conduct analysis by tracking holistic trends in protracted and dynamic conflict environments characterized by a flow of international, regional, national and local actors, changing alliances and allegiances, and evolving drivers and triggers to crises.

JMAC analysts face challenging expectations regarding the rigor of their methodology and the clarity of their products. Their work requires providing forward-looking analysis while keeping up-to-date with current events, identifying issues, patterns and trends that can affect the implementation of the mission's mandate among a wide array of incidents, "alternative facts" etc. Analysts must brief the senior leadership amid multiple emergencies. They must be able to acquire information while making sure their sources remain protected.

Disparate information management, understanding and practices

The situational awareness and analysis architectures at the United Nations present three main challenges for JMACs: (1) receiving clear tasking form the senior leadership; (2) lack of standardization of intelligence/information analysis set-ups across missions; (3) diverse approaches to intelligence cycles and objectives within each mission.

Each mission has a specific information management flow and coordination. Each strives to fit to the specificities of the environment in which it operates. The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy was established to provide a standardized and coordinated model of an intelligence cycle across all peacekeeping missions.[12]

Until the implementation of the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy, it is up to each mission and each JMAC to adapt and make the most of its role and contribution to mandate implementation. This means that each JMAC must invent and carve its place in the mission.

In sum, within each mission, challenges are related to:

- Obtaining clear tasking from the SRSG and the mission senior leadership;

- Acquiring a common vision/understanding and/or practice of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle within each mission: making sure to avoid duplication of work, circular reporting, turf wars, etc.;

- Having information management support, particularly supportive senior management that privileges an information-led approach;

- Ensuring proper training of staff;

- Establishing clear, coherent and productive reporting processes across the mission;

- Setting a common, secure and useful information-sharing process and/or stocking information;

- Tailoring JMAC's activities to the mandate, such as being ready to align JMAC activities to inform implementation of the PoC priority mandate by determining whether the JMAC should, if the mandate emphasizes early warning, also concentrate on that (are the priority information requirements (PIRs) adapted to the priority mandate? Is PoC mainstreamed in all JMAC products?).

Limited resources

JMACs must function with significantly limited financial, material and human resources as well as a lack of psychological support. Resources are limited and analysts must make the most with limited budget and administrative support: limited training and travel funds, limited material means.

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[12] "Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy", PK/G/2017.07.

Challenges related to staff consistency and work efficiency flow from the lengthy recruitment process and the short assignment periods of uniformed JMAC staff as well as from the regular rest and recuperation (R&R) periods. The quasi-constant induction and training of incoming personnel creates extra workload and pressure on members of the team, who must constantly compensate and adapt. These turnovers thus impact the efficiency of the JMAC work.

Mental and physical risks

JMAC analysts, like other field staff, work in an environment challenging for both their mental and physical health.

They deal with issues pertaining to conflicts and hence often with hard subject matters related to human rights abuses and atrocities. Analysts may be subject to either witnessing or acquiring sensitive information sometimes containing traumatic testimonies or evidence. Analysts are also under extreme pressure to protect their sources and to avoid harm to the personnel working with them in the field. A first challenge is to find the mechanisms to maintain psychological well-being while dealing with exceptionally difficult issues and complex situations.

Most JMACs are established in non-family duty stations. JMAC analysts thus perform in a high-stress environment epitomized by tight deadlines, constant security risks, threats and hazards, all while being away from family. Managing distance and personal relationships abroad is yet another challenge that factors into the stress levels of analysts and thus on their general well-being.

The setting is also characterized by high occurrences of severe tropical diseases, the most common being malaria. JMAC analysts are thus likely to experience severe sickness, which might temporarily or chronically impact both their physical health and their work productivity.

Chapter 3.   JMACs within the United Nations and diversity of JMACs

3.1.   JMAC and Headquarters

At the Headquarters level, JMAC is under the responsibility of the United Nations Operations Crisis Centre (UNOCC). UNOCC is itself part of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General[13] yet the backstopping of the JMAC falls under the responsibility of the UNOCC vis a vis DPKO-DFS. The UNOCC was established in 2013 with a broad situational awareness mandate, intended to support decision-makers across the spectrum of United Nations operational departments and agencies.[14] It is composed of a watch room, divided geographically and in contact 24/7 with the peacekeeping missions' Joint Operation Centres. UNOCC also gathers information made available by focal points of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The JMAC main point of contact at the UNOCC is the Research and Liaison Unit, UNOCC analysis team. The UNOCC produces a peace-keeping briefing note and a restricted UNOCC daily while also providing alerts on critical events between reporting cycles. It provides briefings to senior managers several times a week, and ad hoc briefings upon request, maintains constant situation displays, and continuously monitors events using maps, statistics, and political, security and humanitarian information.[15] JMAC products can be shared (with the SRSG's and CoS's approvals) with the UNOCC and other relevant United Nations Headquarters analysis capacities to support situational awareness and analysis requirements of United Nations leadership at Headquarters. The graphs on the next page illustrate two structures of information flow. The first one, the most common, is non-integrated. The second one, the ideal one, illustrates an optimal information flow.

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[13]   UNOCC reported to the Department of Peacekeeping Operation-Department of Field Support unit before January 2017.

[14]   The United Nations Operation Crisis Centre regroups staff from Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Security and Safety, the Department of Public Information, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development Programme.

[15]   Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff, *Demystifying Peacekeeping Intelligence: Toward an Organizational Doctrine* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016).

Figure 3.1.
Non-integrated information flow

Figure 3.2.
Integrated information flow

3.2. JMAC within peacekeeping missions

Joint Mission Analysis Centres are meant to gather multi-source information from within and outside the mission to produce forward-looking integrated analysis "in support of mission leadership decision-making, strategic, operational and contingency planning, crisis management, and identifying threats and challenges to the mission mandate".[16]

The table below identifies which entity is working with the JMAC and for what purpose. Each entity listed in the table assesses threats to the mandate from their own perspective and to fulfil their own task.

Table 3.1.

JMAC work with mission entities on challenges to the mandate

Coordination[5] with	Challenge assessment to the mandate
Force Commander and Military Intelligence Unit (U2)	Military intelligence gathering and short-term analysis for the purposes of military operations
Department Security and Safety in mission (DSS) • Security Information and Operations Centre (SIOC) • Security Information Coordination Unit (SICU)	Regional and country-specific threat assessments to support field duty stations and ensure the safety and security of all civilian personnel
United Nations Police (UNPOL)	Criminal intelligence units and intelligence Police officers within formed police units
Joint Operations Centre (JOC)	Day-to-day situational awareness and crisis management
• Political Affairs • Civil Affairs • Rule of Law • Human Rights, Humanitarian • Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Security Sector Reform	Political, security, human rights, development, rule-of-law and humanitarian perspectives
United Nations Country Team (UNCT)	Assessment of United Nations Development Assistance Framework
Geographic Information System (GIS)	Supports in geographic and imagery information
Protection of Civilians (PoC)[6]	Identify trends of violence against civilian communities, assessing the intentions and capabilities of perpetrators of violence against civilians, and analysing conflict dynamics to predict how civilians might come under threat

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[16] "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03.

[17] UNIFIL created a JMAC-coordinated "information community" or information architecture, where they coordinate information gathering and processing. It includes mainly but not exclusively the JOC, Political and Civil Affairs, J2/U2 and the SICU of DSS. See for reference examples of standard operating procedures in annexes VIII and IX.

[18] In missions with a PoC mandate, and in support of the mission's strategic-level PoC coordination forum, JMACs and PoC advisers will work jointly to integrate inputs from, and share PoC analysis as required with

3.3.   Diversity

As early 2017, JMACs with different sizes and compositions were existing in thirteen peacekeeping missions: MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNOCI, UNMISS, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

Six Special Political Missions (United Nations Office for West Africa, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, United Nations in Columbia) have also analytical and reporting units that fulfil JMAC-like functions. The JMAC-like structures in Special Political Missions (SPM) vary between the larger, more operational presences (e.g., in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Colombia) and smaller mediation office (e.g. in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Israel, etc.).

Large political missions have established integrated information hubs (IIH) and integrated analysis hubs (IAH) to fulfil JOC like and JMAC like functions.

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strategic, operational or tactical-level PoC coordination fora, the Humanitarian Country Team, the Protection Cluster (and its sub-Clusters on Child Protection and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence), OCHA CIMCOORD and any other relevant external partner or source. PoC analysis may be inserted in or encompass a wide range of JMAC products. The mission's PoC strategy and specific plans per PoC threat or risk should for instance include a strategic PoC assessment, PoC trend analysis or conflict and risk mapping, aligned with the Mission Threat Assessment. Strategic decision-making on PoC will build upon profiles of group and individual perpetrators or communities at risk, but also other (protection) actors. Forward-looking or predictive PoC assessments, including PoC scenario papers, or more immediate PoC situation, incident or early warning assessment and notes may also be useful, alongside weekly or monthly forward-looking PoC outlook papers, to inform and trigger decision making and response.

Map 3.1.

JMAC and IAU deployment as of September 2017

JMAC and IAU Staffing
as of September 2017

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

*Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan.

The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

UNFICYP
5x MSO

UNMIK
6x PS
3x MSO
1x NPO
3x GL
2x UNV
7x TOTAL

UNIFIL
7x MSO
13x TOTAL

UNDOF
7x MSO

UNAMI
6x PS
5x NPO
11x TOTAL

UNSMIL
1x PS
4x NPO
2x UNPOL
1x GL
5x UNV
2x TOTAL

MINUJUSTH
1x PS
1x NPO
1x UNPOL
1x UNV
4x TOTAL

MINUSMA
4x PS
1x UNPOL
23x TOTAL

UNOWAS
2x PS
1x GL
3x TOTAL

Colombia
1x PS
2x NPO
1x GL
4x TOTAL

UNTSO
5x PS
8x MSO
2x NPO
15x TOTAL

UNAMID
6x PS
3x MSO
3x NPO
1x UNPOL
1x GL
9x UNV
23x TOTAL

MINUSCA
1x MSO

UNMISS
1x PS
4x MSO
5x NPO
1x UNPOL
41 TOTAL

UNAMA
4x PS
1x MSO
1x NPO
4x GL
10x TOTAL

UNMIL
1x PS
3x MSO
1x NPO
4x UNPOL
1x GL
6x UNV
16x TOTAL

UNSOM
6x PS
2x MSO
1x NPO
9x TOTAL

MONUSCO
9x PS
4x MSO
4x NPO
2x UNPOL
2x GL
2x UNV
23x TOTAL

• JMAC - 12 Offices
• IAU - 6 Offices

JMAC & IAU Staffing by Category

17 General Service
14 UNPOL
39 National Professional Officers
31 United Nations Volunteers
Professional Staff 75
Military Service Officers 45

0   1000   2000   3000 km
0   1000   2000 mi

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Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Chapter III | JMAC within the United Nations Organization and diversity of JMACs

Chapter 4. Principles, policy and guidelines

4.1. JMAC and United Nations peacekeeping intelligence policy

In May 2017, a first United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy was established. It offers both a definition of peacekeeping intelligence in the United Nations context and explains the process by which peacekeeping intelligence should be done, organized and used within the organization. This document should be considered in conjunction with the two key documents defining the roles of JMACs: JMAC Policy and JMAC Guidelines.[19]

The JMAC policy lays out the overarching principles to guide the establishment and basic functions of JMACs. The former JMAC Guidelines were built on the Policy and provided generic set of practical procedures. These are now replaced by the current handbook.

The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy defines peacekeeping intelligence as "the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate".[20] The primary purposes of the use of peacekeeping intelligence should be safety and security of uniformed personnel and protection of civilian. The policy identifies five main principles to be followed, outlined on the next page.

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[19] These documents are to be considered in conjunction with the "Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning", 9 April 2013, PK/G/22159, and relevant DPKO-DFS crisis management and integrated reporting guidance.

[20] "Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy", PK/G/2017.07.

Table 4.1.

Five principles of peacekeeping intelligence policy

Under rules	Intelligence activities in line with the Security Council mandates
	No clandestine activities
	Regular training, education, regular audit and oversight
Within mandates	Acquisition and management of intelligence is conducted exclusively in support of the implementation of missions' mandates
Independence	Intelligence activities are fully autonomous from and independent of any national intelligence systems/other operations
	Intelligence activities will maintain their exclusively international character
	Missions may liaise with non-mission entities provided they do so under conditions and within the parameters of the United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy
Accountability, capability and authority	Those that are given the authority to make decisions in regard to peacekeeping intelligence activities must have the proper capabilities to execute these functions.
	Accountable for the effective execution of these responsibilities within their respective chains of command to the Head of Mission and ultimately to the Secretary-General
	The Head of Mission is responsible for ensuring effective governance, training and practices are in place for personnel engaged with or using peacekeeping intelligence products
Security and confidentiality	Peacekeeping intelligence shall be stored and shared in a secure manner
	Confidential peacekeeping intelligence products shall be shared and disseminated on the basis of the "need to know" and "need to share" concepts
	Missions will seek to establish and maintain a high degree of confidence among all of their interlocutors in their ability to appropriately acquire, protect and manage peacekeeping intelligence

The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy for the JMAC is twofold:

1. It outlines the **whole-of-mission approach**,[21] reinforcing the integrated analysis practices. It sets guidelines that ensure a consistent and principled approach to intelligence,[22] and describes "overarching principles, processes and parameters to manage the intelligence needs of United Nations peacekeeping operations".[23]

2. It specifies the implementation of a **mission intelligence coordination structure**,[24] which may be chaired by the JMAC Chief, if designated by the Head of Mission (HoM).[25]

The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy describes the process of the intelligence cycle explaining how in the mission, **"**peacekeeping intelligence is acquired, examined/collated, analysed and

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[21] Something similar was already put in place in UNIFIL in 2010 with the UNIFIL information community. See annexes VIII and IX.

[22] The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy lays out the "overarching principles, processes and parameters to manage the intelligence needs of United Nations peacekeeping operations". See PK/G/2017.07, p. 2.

[23] Ibid.

[24] These labels can vary mission from one mission to another (e.g. Joint Coordination Board).

[25] "Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy", PK/G/2017.07.

disseminated based on clearly identified intelligence requirements. Standards, tools, techniques and procedures for the effective and efficient completion of each stage of the cycle by individual mission components are the subjects of subordinate operational guidance".[26]

The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy is established in a whole-of-mission approach, guiding the coordination of substantive units. It thus identifies the mechanisms to ensure a "consistent and principled" integrated approach intelligence.

The policy might be implemented through a "mission intelligence coordination structure" that integrates and coordinates a JMAC as follows.

1. Decision requirements, tasking and direction;

2. From JMAC collection plan to mission acquisition plan;

3. Requirements through mission intelligence coordination structure;

4. The Head of Mission can appoint the JMAC Chief as chair of the mission intelligence coordination structure. In this case, the JMAC Chief will report to the Head of Mission.

The figure below illustrates the peacekeeping intelligence cycle.

Figure 4.1.
Peacekeeping intelligence cycle

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
[26] Ibid.

4.2.   Policy and guidelines

The JMAC Policy "provides guidance on the establishment and functioning of Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) in DPKO-led operations to ensure that missions have in place an entity capable of collecting and analysing multi-source information to produce integrated analysis and predictive assessments in support of mission planning and decision-making". JMAC supports strategic, operational and contingency planning, and it contributes to overall crisis management through the provision of integrated threat assessments and other analytical products and services. The five guiding principles for JMAC are listed below.

Table 4.2.

Five guiding principles for JMAC in processing the information[27]

Accuracy, objectivity and timeliness	JMAC products should be accurate, objective and sound and used to inform the work of relevant policy and planning units in a timely manner.
Utilization of multiple sources	JMACs should allow for a comprehensive product that supports mission management decision-making, planning and mandate implementation processes.
Client-focused products	JMAC tasking should be based on clear priority information requirements set by the HoM in consultation with mission senior management.
Forward-looking	JMAC should provide forecasting and contextual information enabling the HoM and SMT to take timely decisions aimed at identifying opportunities and averting threats to mission mandate implementation.
Human relations	Effective working relationships are required across three levels of interaction (joint, integrated and external) • with other mission components (joint level) • with the UNCT (integrated level) • with external actors or organizations (host country, embassies, NGOs, individuals, etc.) At all levels, it is important for the JMAC to explain its role and focus, and ensure that there is a clear and constructive demarcation of roles and responsibilities with other offices and entities within and external to the mission.

The JMAC Guidelines detail the organization and coordination of the unit. The document states that the JMAC fulfils its functions in accordance with mission-wide information priorities identified by the Head of Mission and senior management team (SMT). It may also support individual mission components to enhance their decision-making capabilities.

The Policy and Guidelines specify that the JMAC is responsible for:

• Management of information requirements from the HoM and SMT, including through the development of an information collection plan to support mission leadership decision-making;

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[27] "JMAC Guidelines", PK/G/2015.04.

- Acquisition and analysis of multi-source information, including intelligence-related material; preparation of integrated analysis and predictive assessments that are timely, accurate, comprehensive and relevant to support decision-making; mission strategic, operational and contingency planning; and crisis management;

- Identification of threats and challenges to mandate implementation.

4.3. JMAC organization

4.3.1. Staff and structure

JMAC is an integrated structure, as it is composed of civilian, military and police personnel.

The JMAC has a set of fixed, permanently assigned positions, although the number varies depending on peace operation's mandate, size, composition, operational requirements and available partner organizations.[28]

As a rule, the more complex the mission environment and the larger the area of operation, the more staff is assigned to a JMAC.

Notwithstanding the mission size and mandate, at its core, a JMAC has:

- A chief, a deputy chief and posts filled by civilian and uniformed (both military and police) personnel to cover the collection and analysis requirements of the Centre;

- Information management specialist as well as a cartographic specialist (GIS) and an administrative support officer who attends to JMAC-specific requirements and can be shared with the JOC.

Additional personnel can be hired to provide specialty skills useful in the context of the mission through either temporary assignment of personnel from other mission components or through the recruitment of dedicated staff or consultants, national staff and/or DSS integrated personnel.

The JMAC Chief position is filled through a civilian recruitment process. As a general practice, the post of JMAC Deputy Chief is filled by a civilian. There are some exceptions in the cases of UNIFIL, UNMISS, UNDOF, UNTSO and UNFICYP. The decision on the nature of the position of Deputy Chief rests with mission leadership in consultation with the UNOCC and the relevant DPKO/IOT at United Nations Headquarters.

Uniformed and civilian staff in JMAC occupy the position of Associate Information Analyst (P2), Information Analyst (P3 and P4). Only civilian staff can have the position of Senior Information Analyst (P5/JMAC Chief).

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[28] Ibid. for how to determine the adequate size and staffing framework of JMACs.

Figure 4.2.

JMAC in mission intelligence architecture

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                    ┌─────────┐
                    │   HoM   │
                    └────┬────┘
                         │
              ┌──────────┴──────────┐
              │ Mission intelligence │
              │     architecture    │
              │   including JMAC    │
              └──────────┬──────────┘
                         │
           ┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
           │                           │
      ┌─────────┐              ┌──────────────┐
      │  JMAC   │              │    Other     │
      │ Policy  │              │ substantive  │
      └────┬────┘              │    units     │
           │                   └──────────────┘
           │
      ┌─────────┐
      │   SOP   │
      └─────────┘
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
Figure 4.3.

Substantial JMAC staff structure

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              ┌──────────────────┐
              │ JMAC Chief (PS)  │
              └────────┬─────────┘
                       │
          ┌────────────┴────────────┐
          │      Deputy Chief        │
          │ (P4/Lt. Col./Maj./UNV)   │
          └────────────┬────────────┘
                       │
          ┌────────────┴────────────┐
          │   Information analyst    │
          │ (P3/Maj./Capt./UNV/NPO)  │
          └────────────┬────────────┘
                       │
              ┌─────────┴──────────┐
              │  Associate Analyst │
              │   (P2/UNV/NPO)     │
              └────────────────────┘
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
Staff assigned to the JMAC are under the day-to-day supervision and tasking authority of the JMAC Chief. The JMAC Chief may delegate a supervisory role and authority to a P4 and/or P3 in his or her section.

The following tables detail the task requests of staff recruited in a JMAC as stated in the JMAC Guidelines laid out in March 2015.[29] Details on the requisite professional and educational background associated to each position are in the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy.[30]

Military and police personnel assigned to the JMAC meet specific job descriptions issued jointly by the UNOCC, the Force Generation Service and Police Division in United Nations Headquarters, respectively. Uniformed personnel assigned to the JMAC are deployed for a period of six to twelve months.

Table 4.3.

Civilian personnel described tasks

Civilian positions within JMAC		
Position	**Rank**	**Task**
Senior Information Analyst/ JMAC Chief	P5	Manage daily functions of the integrated JMAC team of civilian and uniformed personnel
		Provide overall strategic direction to JMAC personnel in alignment with the mission mandate
		Oversee the monitoring, collection and evaluation of information relevant for the implementation of the mission mandate from a variety of sources, including mission civilian/military/police components, the UNCT, national military/civilian authorities, NGOs, media and other key stakeholders
		Ensure the timely generation, consistency and quality of JMAC's integrated analytical products (trend/incident analysis, threat assessment, warning, scenario, profiling and risk mapping)
		Provide the SMT with an incisive understanding of issues and trends, their implications and potential developments, as well as assessments of cross-cutting issues and threats that may affect mandate implementation
		Support planning and decision-making by the SMT
		Discuss and revise, in consultation with the HoM/SMT, JMAC's tasking orders (requests for information, priority information requirements and information requirements) and oversee the development of collection plans to detail the scope of the analytical product, priority, sources, deadlines, dissemination, etc.
		Identify other areas meriting analysis
		Ensure appropriate level of confidentiality of information and oversee dissemination of final products

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[29] PK/G/2015.04.

[30] PK/G/2017.07.

Chapter IV | JMAC principles, policy and guidelines

Civilian positions within JMAC		
Position	Rank	Task
Senior Information Analyst/ JMAC Chief (continued)	P5	Ensure maintenance and quality of relevant information databases
		Provide ad hoc and routine briefings
		Develop and maintain effective working relationships and foster collaboration with mission components, the UNCT, other JMACs, external actors and organizations in the country and the region, as well as with the SitCen/RLU at United Nations Headquarters
		Develop and implement standard operating procedures and other relevant guidance and good practices for the work of a JMAC
Information Analyst	P4	In consultation with the JMAC Chief, identify potential research and analysis topics
		Collate, evaluate and analyse information related to developments/ events relevant for the implementation of the mission mandate, using a variety of sources, including mission civilian/military/police components, the UNCT, national military/civilian authorities, the international community, NGOs, media and other key stakeholders
		Develop effective working relationships with mission components, the UNCT and relevant external actors and organizations.
		In consultation with the JMAC Chief and other relevant mission components, ensure the development and application of JMAC tools, such as priority information requirements and collection plans
		Produce accurate and timely integrated analysis, assessments, maps and other JMAC products, which support decision-making, policy development and planning by SMT
		Assist the JMAC Chief in overseeing the timely production of quality JMAC products, priority information requirements, and in ensuring information security as well as proper dissemination
		Provide briefings to the SMT, senior United Nations staff and visiting delegations and represent the JMAC in meetings as required
		Support the JMAC Chief in the supervision and management of a diverse, integrated JMAC team (recruitment, staff development, training, evaluation etc.)
		Oversee a system for classifying and storing confidential information, in consultation with information management/technology experts
		Assist the JMAC Chief in his or her duties as required
Information Analyst	P3	Maintain understanding of developments/events relevant for the implementation of the mission mandate through monitoring and collection of data/information from multiple sources, including mission civilian/military/police components, the UNCT, national military/civilian authorities, NGOs, media and other key stakeholders
		Classify, manage, store and transfer information by using JMAC information management processes and computerised information management systems
		Organize, analyse and synthesize information for the identification of trends, production of forecasts and assessments

Civilian positions within JMAC		
Position	**Rank**	**Task**
Information Analyst (continued)	P3	Produce accurate and timely JMAC analytical products and briefings, in coordination with other mission components and sources
		Assist in the development and coordination of JMAC tools, such as information requirements, in consultation with all relevant information collection components of the mission
		Contribute to effective working relationships within the JMAC and other United Nations mission components, the UNCT and relevant external actors and organizations
		Maintain a system for classifying and storing confidential information, in consultation with information management/technology experts
Associate Information Analyst	P2	Maintain knowledge of developments/events relevant to the implementation of the mission mandate through monitoring and collection of data/information from multiple sources, including mission civilian/military/police components, the UNCT, national military/civilian authorities, NGOs, media and other key stakeholders
		Classify, manage, store and transfer information by using JMAC information management processes and computerised information management systems
		Organize, analyse and synthesize information to support the production of accurate and timely JMAC analytical products and briefings, in coordination with other mission component and sources
		Assist in the development coordination of JMAC tools, such as priority information requirements, in consultation with all relevant information collection components of the mission
		Contribute to effective working relationships within the JMAC and with other mission components, the UNCT and relevant external actors and organizations
Administrative support staff	Preferably internationally recruited staff member	Prepare product registry, assist the JMAC Chief and deputy in their day-to-day interaction with the administration and support services of the mission as pertains to movements, allocation of cars, personnel; log the staff absence and leave; etc.

Table 4.4.

Civilian and uniformed personnel described tasks

Uniformed personnel within JMAC		
Position	**Rank**	**Task**
Senior Information Analyst (Staff Officer)	Lieutenant Colonel/ Major	Under the overall direction of the Chief Joint Mission Analysis Cell (C-JMAC), the analyst: • Processes data into useful information including collating, evaluating and interpreting information • Maintains up-to-date knowledge of events or actions that may affect the implementation of the mission's mandate • Maintains and coordinates priority information requirements with all relevant information collection units of the mission • Monitors and reads daily situation reports from all components of the mission, local news, and verbal reports to contribute to updates of threat assessments • Prepares plans and requests for information-gathering activities, in consultation with the Senior Collection Officer • Provides medium- and long-term analyses of information in support of the decision-making processes of the SMT • Prepares and disseminates information in the form of estimates, summaries, periodical reports, analyses and situation maps
Information Analyst (Staff Officer)	Major/Captain	Reporting to the Senior Information Analyst and under the overall direction of the C-JMAC, the analyst: • Monitors and reads daily situation reports from all components of the mission, local news, and verbal reports to update threat assessment • Maintains up-to-date knowledge of events or actions that may affect the implementation of the mission's mandate • Processes data into useful information including collating, evaluating and interpreting information • Coordinates priority information requirements with all relevant information collection units of the mission • Provides medium- and long-term analysis of information in support of the decision-making processes of the SMT • Prepares and disseminates information in the form of estimates, summaries, periodical reports, analyses and situation maps
Senior Collection Officer	Lieutenant Colonel/ Major	Under the overall direction of the C-JMAC, the officer: • Collects data/information for use of JMAC officers, in line with priority information requirements and in consultation with the Senior Information Analyst • Maintains close liaison with other United Nations entities, including the JOC, allocated national and host nation intelligence and security elements to facilitate timely collections • Maintains close liaison with governmental and non-governmental organizations • Monitors, amends and re-tasks collection assets to meet emerging requirements

Uniformed personnel within JMAC		
Position	**Rank**	**Task**
Senior Collection Officer (continued)	Lieutenant Colonel/ Major	• Develops and maintains collection management worksheet, tasking and reporting mechanisms • Develops cohesive collection matrix incorporating redundancies of collection assets; • As directed by the JMAC Chief, prepares and disseminates information in the form of estimates, summaries, periodical report and situation maps
Collection Officer	Major/Captain	• Collects data/information for use of JMAC officers, in line with priority information requirements • Maintains close liaison with other United Nations entities, including the JOC, allocated national and host nation intelligence and security elements to facilitate timely collections • Maintains close liaison with governmental and non-governmental organizations • Develops and maintains collection management worksheet, tasking and reporting mechanisms • Develops cohesive collection matrix incorporating redundancies of collection assets • As directed by the Senior Collection Officer, prepares and disseminates information in the form of estimates, summaries, periodical report and situation maps • Prepares daily and weekly reports and briefing notes for the Senior Collection Officer
Information Database Officer	Major	• Collects, analyses and validates IT operational requirements • Plans, designs, develops and implements complex information technology projects, systems or upgrades based on functional and operational requirements • Develops IT strategies and approaches to meet operational and functional requirements of the JMAC • Promotes and coordinates the integration of information technology initiatives managed by other units and sections to prevent redundancy while ensuring that required tactical and strategic information is available in a timely and concise manner • Develops new strategies and approaches to optimize the delivery of IT support services and drafts SOPs for approval by the chief of the unit • Designs, develops, distributes and manages various database and software packages for the collection, collation and distribution of analytical information • Maintains data integrity throughout the system by identifying and resolving shortfalls • Defines procedures and trains personnel in the operation and utilization of the JMAC database system and other required automated tools • Determines and coordinates schedules for system maintenance, modifications and maintenance checks • Advises JMAC members on all aspects of data processing procedures and requirements

Uniformed personnel within JMAC		
Position	Rank	Task
Information and Collection Officer	UNPOL	• Manages human sources (human intelligence) • Meets with sources on a daily basis and daily attends different sites • Acquires, collects and validates information of interest for senior mission management • Engages in field reconnaissance missions and investigative activities in order to respond to critical information requirements communicated from the senior mission management • Proactively and confidentially collects, verifies and investigates information relevant to major crime events, activities of illegal armed groups and groups involved in illicit activities (trafficking) taking place in the country and in the most sensitive security areas • Analyses events and targets of critical interest • Establishes a network of reliable contacts to support the gathering of intelligence • Produces analytical products from data derived from routine collection activities • Monitors daily situation reports from military, United Nations Police, Civil Affairs, Political Affairs, Human Rights, Public Information Office, local and international media, news, etc. • Liaises on a regular basis with UNPOL component • Produces link-analysis on civil unrest, violent events (riots), criminal/armed groups and other target entities jeopardizing mission mandate, United Nations staff and programs • Produces topic analyses and briefings for the JMAC Chief and mission leadership • Provides intelligence support and analysis to MIL, UNPOL • Produces country-wide threat analysis and undertake extensive field visits • Produces summaries on target groups and individuals • Prepares threat assessments on VIP and dignitary visits • Ensures up-to-date knowledge of events/actions that may affect the implementation of the mission's mandate • Prepares and disseminates information in the form of estimates, summaries, periodical reports, analysis and situation maps • Manages confidential information provided by different resources and sources • Develops descriptive, interpretative and prospective criminal analysis products, including: threat assessments, warning notes, intelligence briefings, topic and incident analyses, trend analyses, scenario papers, incident maps, risk maps, profiles, etc.

4.3.2. Links with United Nations Headquarters

At the Headquarters level, JMAC works most closely with UNOCC and the Integrated Operation Team (IOT), in accordance with the specific guidelines of the mission leadership. UNOCC supports and guides JMAC: it works with missions and Headquarters offices to produce policy, guidelines and products for the establishment and management of JMACs.

The IOT within the Office of Operations of DPKO provides integrated political and operational guidance and support to field missions on day-to-day mission-specific issues that cut across specialist functional areas. The IOT provides oversight in mission design and planning requirements and, in consultation with the UNOCC, is responsible for mission's requests for establishing, staffing and resourcing missions' JMACs.

4.3.3. Reporting lines in missions

JMACs are integrated entities established at mission headquarters level and are usually part of the Office of the Head of Mission (HoM). The JMAC Chief ultimately reports to the HoM even though often, a reporting line is established through the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Head of Mission.

The HoM works in line with the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy and ultimately has tasking authority over the JMAC, itself part of the mission intelligence coordination structure. It is responsible for guiding its work through priority information requirements.

The HoM, through the chief of staff, is responsible for ensuring that all mission components support the JMAC in fulfilling its mandate. The JMAC Chief should also make sure that mechanisms and protocols are put in place for effective and timely sharing of analysis with relevant mission components and the Security Management Team.

The HoM, through the CoS, is responsible for ensuring that the JMAC has sufficient resources to fulfil the functions:

- Appropriate staffing requirement;

- Operational expenses;

- Information management;

- Communications technology infrastructure.

The HoM should also make sure that the JMAC and relevant UNCT entities have established methods for sharing information, and have agreed on the nature of participation of UNCT and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) members in any regular JMAC consultation fora, or if a staff member should be seconded to the JMAC.

HoM has a responsibility with regards to information sharing with the UNCT/HCT, but also with the mission components with the JMAC.[31]

It is also expected that heads of mission components are responsible for ensuring that their staff shares relevant information with the JMAC in a timely manner through established protocols.

It is the responsibility of the heads of components to appoint liaison officers and/or focal points, where applicable, to the JMAC for enhanced information flow and collaboration.

Heads of components are also expected to work with the JMAC Chief to identify types of products and analyses that the JMAC may produce and/or share for the benefit of their specific component.[32]

Figure 4.4.
Reporting line in the peacekeeping mission

4.3.4. Reporting lines for field offices

Mission field staff, and the head of office in particular, will often have the in-depth or specific information and understanding of particular incidents and/or situations in their areas of responsibility. Heads of field offices are thus responsible, within their delegated authority, for supporting the work of the JMAC through the provision of relevant and timely information and for supporting any JMAC collection efforts being undertaken in their areas of responsibility.

As a general practice, if a JMAC staff member is deployed to a field office on an ongoing or temporary basis, then he or she shall remain under the tasking authority of the JMAC Chief but his or her activities shall be coordinated with the head of the field office. However, there are exceptions, such as the reporting lines for field offices at the MINUSCA. In this case, the mission established that the Head of Sector has authority over the JMAC staff deployed in his or her area of responsibility. The Head of Sector, through the Head of Office, has the authority to task JMAC in close consultation with the JMAC Chief.

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[31] "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03, paras. 13 and 36.

[32] As a matter of principle, JMAC should share their analyses; not raw data or information.

Joint Mission Analysis Centres Handbook

Figure 4.5.

Example of a JMAC reporting line in a regional office (if JMAC staff deployed in regions)

4.4. Working with non-United Nations entities

4.4.1. Working with NGOs: international, national, humanitarian and think tanks

JMACs are mandated to engage with mission staff, country team staff, and non-United Nations entities.[33]

Through its work, the JMAC must be able to effectively incorporate political, civil affairs, protection of civilians, military, police, security, rule of law, DDR, electoral, gender, humanitarian, development, human rights, and any other mandate-related perspectives in mission-wide information collection and analysis. For example, to meet with NGOs, think tanks and national counterparts such as local authorities, mayors, journalists, military and police officials, social and HR activists, academics, politicians.

It must thus be current practice to engage regularly with other components, as there is a high risk of exhaustion of sources (and circular information), as many United Nations components might use the same sources of information. The JMAC staff must be aware of that risk and must be tactful with their counterparts outside the United Nations, international or national. Ideally, (informal) key leader engagement (KLE) matrices should be prepared to ensure the most effective use of such engagement (including sharing information obtained from the latter) for the benefit of the mission.

> "I receive a number of requests from […] either the ambassador or the deputy head of mission or […] an arrangement of people who will come and knock the door and say 'can we talk about this', and then we discuss one-on-one, which I have the clearance from the SRSG to do […] as long as I keep the mission informed […] We have an open-door policy with the embassies […], whoever wants to reach out to us they do: the international NGOs and local NGOs, local stakeholders like members of civil society, of the church, or the imams, depending on whatever topic we have to discuss. And then neighboring countries, notably other United Nations mission, through other JMAC and also regional stakeholders. This is on a specific guidance of the SRSG and in support of the mission mandate."
>
> Sebastian Fasanello,
> Chief, JMAC MONUSCO

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[33] "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03.

JMAC components

United Nations Country Team and Humanitarian Country Team

The UNCT is the United Nations's highest level inter-agency coordination and decision-making body in a country. It is led by the United Nations Resident Coordinator (RC), the designated representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in a country.

The UNCT drives activities at the country level and allows for all United Nations entities with activities in the country to work as a team in formulating common positions on strategic issues, ensuring coherence in action and advocacy. The UNCT comprises heads of all resident United Nations funds, programmes and specialised agencies. The IMF and World Bank are also members. Each UNCT agency is responsible for responding to the national development plans, as formulated by the government, to guide their own agency programmes.

The HCT is a strategic and operational decision-making and oversight forum established and led by the Humanitarian Coordinator. It includes representatives from the United Nations, IOM, international NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Agencies that are also designated cluster leads should represent the clusters as well as their respective organizations. The HCT is responsible for agreeing on common strategic issues related to humanitarian action.

The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)

The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) is responsible for assessing whether or not an international response to crisis is warranted and for ensuring the humanitarian response efforts, if needed, are well-organized. The HC is accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator. HCs lead the HCT in deciding the most appropriate coordination solutions for their countries, taking into account the local situation. Agreement must be reached on which clusters to establish, and which organizations are to lead them.

In the absence of a designated HC, and in case of a humanitarian emergency in the country (natural disaster or civil conflict) the RC is responsible for setting up and regularly convening a HCT, inclusive of all operationally relevant actors, including non-United Nations organizations. Otherwise, in a humanitarian crisis, the HCT is the lead strategic and operational decision-making body, in close collaboration and consultation with the host government. If a crisis occurs in a country without an HCT, one will be formed. Until it is formed, the UNCT will coordinate with the host government.

The difference between the UNCT and HCT

The UNCT comprises all heads of United Nations agencies and IOM, whereas the HCT includes only relevant heads of United Nations agencies as well as non-United Nations humanitarian actors. The HCT addresses strategic issues of the wider humanitarian community whereas the UNCT focuses on United Nations concerns. The HCT and the UNCT coexist and do not replace each other.

Very often the UNCT or HCT pre-exist the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, and it is highly advisable for the first JMAC Chief in the mission and his or her staff to liaise and get a proper briefing on the country's situation and challenges, as the UNCT and HCT tend to have a greater knowledge, particularly of who is who at the national and international institutional level. Then, the JMAC Chief should maintain regular relationship with the UNCT in particular the RC/HC and put in place regular exchange of information and products. In addition, the JMAC Chief should also try to reach the UNCTs in the neighbouring countries of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in order to cultivate the JMAC's regional network and acquire a regional perspective to add to regular assessments.

4.4.2.   Working with the diplomatic community

The JMAC Chief should retain the sole responsibility, acting in accordance with the guidance of HoM/SRSG, to delegate meetings with members of the diplomatic community to JMAC staff. JMACs set and attend meetings under strict rules of reporting, behaviour and work ethics previously discussed and agreed upon with the JMAC Chief. The JMAC Chief is kept informed of meetings that his or her staff is undertaking with diplomats or any other international or national officials. It should always be clear to all participants that JMAC personnel are not official mission spokespersons, and that all information sharing should be conducted under the "Chatham House Rule".[34]

The JMAC Chief should also retain the capacity to meet higher-ranked diplomats and allow his or her staff to meet with their same-level counterparts.

Relationships with non-United Nations entities need to be carefully managed and regularly reassessed. JMACs must remain aware of the risks of sharing information that may be misused, including in support of the perpetration of human rights abuses.

4.4.3.   Working with national authorities

In some cases, the mission leadership might decide for specific analysis to be conducted jointly with the host country, which opens access to unique information and assessment.[35] Such cooperation might be key for JMACs to gain a detailed and nuanced understanding of local situations.[36]

Work with national authorities should be coordinated by the mission. Other components, such as UNPOL, might also collaborate with host government security authorities and hence have a mandate to work with the same officials on various elements pertaining to the implementation of the United Nations mandate.

4.4.4.   Working with regional actors

Regional perspective should be provided by members of special political missions, other UNCTs, JMACs in neighbouring countries and other situational-awareness entities. Synthesizing regional perspectives deepens the understanding of individual missions and provides Headquarters with an overarching perspective. Regional cooperation among JMACs and other United Nations analysis capacities can be optimized by including sharing of information and products, collaboration on the production of products and staff exchanges.

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[34] www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule.

[35] In this case, the document but should not be marked as JMAC/mission product. When analysis undertaken or information passed is not done so officially, it should not bear United Nations markings.

[36] See section on security for measures to be taken when acquiring or sharing information.

Part II:
Preparing for
and overseeing
JMAC work

Chapter 5.   Arriving in a JMAC

A new JMAC analyst should seek to familiarize him or herself with (1) the United Nations, (2) the mission, (3) the JMAC and (4) the country.

5.1.   Getting to know the United Nations and the mission

5.1.1.   Understanding the United Nations: key committees and units

The new analyst should familiarize him or herself with the United Nations, its structure, hierarchy, status and ranks. This can be facilitated by a (pre-)deployment information package compiled by the JMAC. The new information analyst should understand the composition and structure of the organization. He or she should also make sure to understand the respective roles of key units with which he or she will be working. At the Headquarters level with the UNOCC, DPKO, DPA, DSS, OCHA and within the field mission. JOC, PoC,[37] SIOC, military intelligence (U2, U9), UNPOL, Political Affairs, Disarmament, Demobilization Reintegration/Community Violence Reduction (DDR/CVR), Rule of Law, Civil Affairs, Military Observers are examples of key United Nations field divisions and sections with which the JMAC information analyst should be familiar in order to optimize understanding and collaboration. The importance of ranks and status within the United Nations should also be clearly understood. The JMAC analyst should make sure to respect etiquette in their communication with colleagues, peers and managers.

5.1.2.   Understanding the mission: mandate and Member States

Understanding the mandate is the first step for a JMAC analyst. It is key, as all analysis produced by the JMAC must be mandate-relevant. As mandates differ from one mission to another, so do the resources and the means to implement them. The analyst must familiarize him or herself with the specific objectives and challenges of the mission for which he or she will work. This includes:

- United Nations documents (mission mandate, Security Council resolutions, etc.);
- UNSC resolution establishing the mission;
- The rules of engagement of the force of the mission;
- The Police Concept of Operations (CONOPS);
- Previous UNSG reports to the UNSC;
- SOP of substantive and other relevant mission components;
- Reports from the panel of experts established for the concerned country, as well as independent reports.

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[37] For missions with a PoC mandate.

Table 5.1.

Preparatory questions for JMAC chiefs

What to ask
What is the priority of the mandate?
What Member States are involved in the mission? In what capacity?
Which countries contribute to which troops, when and how?
What are likely to be the most important challenges to the implementation of the mandate?

5.2.   Getting to know the JMAC and its products

Each JMAC has its own SOP and work plan, as well as its own sets of written and unwritten guide-lines. The challenge for a new JMAC information analyst is to make the most of his or her unique set of knowledge, skills and experience while maintaining the integrity of the JMAC analytic line, and maximizing its functioning and in/output in the mission. Hence, to optimize his or her role in the JMAC, the new analysts must understand the specific organizational context.

The new JMAC analyst should contact the JMAC Chief and his or her colleagues in the team, making sure to:

- Familiarize him or herself with the subject matter, within and outside the mission, including identifying what aspects of the subject matter may have implications for mandate imple-mentation;
- Identify the JMAC's clients: their needs and expectations with regard to JMAC's products;
- Anticipate what question will be asked;
- Clarify the information to be sought;
- Determine the products to be provided;
- Know with whom the products will be shared;
- Confirm the chain of command that will be followed.

The following questions might help prepare the new analysts:

- How does your portfolio fit within the broader organization of your JMAC?
- How does that affect the scope of your analysis and production?
- How has your issue been covered by your predecessor, if any?
- What has your JMAC produced previously on this topic?
- How do earlier frames and factors fit the ones you are developing?

New analyst checklist[38]

As the new analyst starts his or her job, he or she should:

☑ Ask peers and the JMAC Chief for perspective and feedback on how his or her work fits into previous production

☑ Go through previous JMAC documents dealing with the subjects that he or she will now cover

☑ Seek a detailed handover from his or her predecessors

☑ Understand the information (i.e. analysis) requirements of the JMAC's clients

☑ Seek training and learning opportunities to expand and develop his or her cognitive frame

☑ Become familiar with peers and managers in other related units

☑ Understand the analytic competencies he or she is expected to exhibit in his or her work

☑ Clarify standards and other guidelines by which the qualities of his or her work will be judged

5.3.   Getting to know the context and the country

New information analyst should enquire about their new work/life environment. A JMAC analyst lives off information and he or she should strive to maximize (qualitatively and, to a lesser extent, quantitatively) his or her sources of information. Getting to know the country's language, idioms, expression helps establishing contact and gives a better grasp of the local reality. A new analyst should thus seek to practice the local languages as well as to familiarize him or herself with the local cultural habits and customs. The new JMAC analyst should seek to understand the historical, military, police, rule of law, social, political and economic context of the United Nations mission. It is key that the information analyst familiarizes him or herself with the all factors that may impact the implementation of the mandate, stakeholders and interests, etc. It is also essential to identify key leaders (de facto and de jure). Who are the opinion shapers? What is their influence?

Safety and security should be primary concerns for all JMAC information analysts. However, within the DSS rules, the analyst should seek to develop familiarity with diverse locations frequented by various social/economic classes and get to know their respective regular practices, daily activities (food, celebrations, sports, etc.).[39]

A newly recruited JMAC analyst should also be briefed by substantive sections.[40]

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[38] Adapted from Katherine Hibbs Pherson and Randolph H. Pherson, *Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence* (London: Sage, 2012), p. 27.

[39] Thomas J. Pepinsky, "Interview-Based Fieldwork: Questions and Answers for First-Timers", 2012, available from https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/tp253/docs/fieldwork_qs.pdf.

[40] With regards to DDR, the JMAC analyst should be briefed by DDR to get a thorough understanding of DDR/CVR programs and assess what might be of relevance, interest and use for JMAC analytical work and plan field visits of DDR/CVR projects.

Table 5.2.

Information to acquire[41]

General contextual country information
Regional and international dynamics affecting the country
History and conflict history , including trends and pattern of violence affecting civilians
Key dates (political, religious, historic, military, other celebrations and commemorations)
Geography, climate, topography
Demography (geographic distribution, age, race/ethnicity, language, education, religion, nationality—migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons—situation, perceptions and intent of civilian communities at risk)
Economy (resources, major economic indicators—GNP, unemployment, etc.)
Social infrastructure and basic services (education system, health system, etc.)
Government and politics (political system, party system, administrative divisions)
Influential actors (armed groups, NGOs, businesses, media). alliances (local, regional, international) and stakeholders
Situation of groups needing special attention (women, children, elderly, minorities, etc.)
Legislation and policies
Attitude toward the United Nations (history of cooperation, perception of local population through social media, etc.)
Culture and customs (traditional norms, customs, rituals, laws, beliefs, traditions)

Information on the country can be found through national reports, United Nations documents, the World Bank, NGOs as well as through various media listed below.

Table 5.3.

Sources of information on countries[42]

State reports (national human development reports, national Millennium Development Goals reports)
United Nations agencies' reports (CCA/UNDAF, UNDP development reports, World Bank country assistance strategies, OCHA risk analyses, civilian protection assessments by the Humanitarian Protection Cluster, ILO EIU reports, CIA Word Fact Book, etc.)
Press release by the mission's public information office
Organization charts or other explanations of the national and local administrative structures, ministries, police, justice, prison, army and other governmental structures
List of national and international NGOs and other civil society organizations dealing with civil, cultural, economic, political and social human rights issues (e.g., community-based organizations, academic institutions, trade unions)
List of organizations providing assistance to victims of human rights violations (for referral)
List of media (TV, radio, papers and online media) and relevant newspaper clippings
Social media: relevant bloggers, Twitter sites, etc.
Maps of the country and relevant areas, cities, provinces, etc.
Summaries of the contextual information on the country

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[41] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.01.XIV.2), pp. 8–11, available from www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training7Introen.pdf.

[42] Ibid.

Chapter 6.   Managing and leading a JMAC

Due to the sensitive and crucial importance of a JMAC's work, its Chief is both a manager and a leader. The JMAC Chief is a manager in planning, budgeting and tasking to optimize the resources available in the mission. The JMAC Chief is a leader in setting key relationships with the HoM, his or her staff, units within the mission and at the Headquarters, as well as with the diplomatic and humanitarian community, and with members of the host country. The JMAC Chief is also the JMAC's most senior information analyst.

6.1.   Recruiting a JMAC Chief

Once a mandate from the Security Council has been approved, planning officers should consult the relevant Integrated Operational Team and the UNOCC on the appropriate configuration, staffing and resource requirements for the establishment of the JMAC.

The JMAC Chief position is filled through a civilian recruitment process. The UNOCC and the Field Personnel Division, the Force Generation Service and the Police Division Selection and Recruitment Section shall work together to provide JMAC Chief with pre-deployment packages and guidance.

Main qualities of a JMAC Chief include the following:

- Strong professional knowledge of information and intelligence, including being fully conversant with principles, methods and processes;

- Strong inter-personal skills that enable him or her to engage and win the trust of senior mission leaders, members of the UNCT, members of the diplomatic community and other interlocutors;

- Strong communication skills that allow him or her to brief senior mission leaders persuasively. He or she must be able to explain complex situations in clear, concise language, both verbally and in writing. He or she must be strong enough to tell senior mission leaders what they need to hear, rather than what they want to hear;

- Strong leadership and management skills, in order to manage the JMAC effectively.

6.2.   Managing a JMAC

The JMAC Chief is responsible for planning, budgeting, recruitment, security and development of the standard operating procedures in his or her unit.

> Prior to tasking his or her team, the JMAC Chief should have a clear understanding of the RFIs, of the JMAC's clients and target audience and thus request his or her staff to create products accordingly.

✓ Checklist for new JMAC chiefs arriving in a new start-up mission[43]

Planning

☑ Establish a close relationship with the Chief of Staff

☑ Explain JMAC concept and demonstrate its potential utility for all mission components, especially SMT/SMG, to all stakeholders in the mission, emphasizing the unique, integrated analytical nature of JMAC, e

☑ Ensure JMAC inclusion in operational mission planning processes

☑ Ensure the work of the JMAC clearly outlined in the mission concept and directive

☑ Ensure co-location with JOC

☑ Develop section work plan, and provide clear terms of reference to all staff

☑ Taking into consideration JMAC Chief's proposals, the HoM/SMT will describe the analytical products they require of JMAC, which will then be recorded in the information requirement list. Once approved by the HoM/SMT, the list serves as the basis of the JMAC work plan. The IRs are kept constantly under review

☑ Establish working relationships with other mission components, such as the offices of the Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, military, police, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Security and with UNCT and humanitarian/development organizations

☑ Work closely with JOC, PAD, U2 and if applicable, MSC, and if offices are not co-located, devise procedures to develop synergy with them through close reporting channels and structures

☑ Work closely with PoC adviser or unit, and provide strategic PoC threat and risk assessments required by the strategic and operational planning cycles, or PoC early warning and predictive assessments to inform or trigger prevention and response actions

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[43] Adapted from United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "Mission Start-up Field Guide", 31 July 2010, PK/G/2010.1.

Planning

☑ Establish mechanisms for all mission components, in particular relevant analytical entities, to share information with JMAC on a regular and systematic basis, including through instituting the provision of information to JMAC in the reporting procedures of all mission components and the UNCT, where relevant, and identifying focal points or liaison officers to the JMAC in all relevant mission components

☑ Establish mechanisms to ensure JMAC products feed into their structures, including for PoC and early warning

☑ Put in place protocols/mechanisms to facilitate timely sharing of analysis with relevant head mission components and the security management team

☑ Seek participation in SMT, CMT and any senior policy-making body. While not explicitly included in current policy on JMAC, the JMAC Chief should also be included in SMT and other substantive decision-making bodies as adviser and observer, not as decision-maker

☑ In coordination with SRSG/HoM and CSA, seek early introduction to appropriate counterparts in host government and opposition movements to demonstrate transparency and explain the role of JMAC

☑ Seek to establish a network of contacts within the mission and UNCT

☑ Develop information/communication networks with groups in neighboring countries, such as the JMACs and mission counterparts in adjacent United Nations operations, UNCT and others

☑ Plan regular field visits by JMAC staff to DDR/CVR projects in the field that provide a local-level understanding of dynamics

Budgeting

☑ Ensure JMAC needs are reflected in the results-based budgeting framework, seeking guidance from Chief of Staff and the Director or Chief of Mission Support, as necessary

☑ Ensure certain JMAC-specific needs are budgeted for, such as specialized databases and other ICT software, secure computer local area network, high-end desktop computers (a limited number can be provided for data analysis), digital sender, network attached storage (for internal JMAC secure data storage), safe and secure communications (both wired and wireless) and lockable file cabinets

☑ Ensure access to enough vehicles and budgetary resources to allow travel within and outside mission area to establish contacts and for information acquisition and analysis purposes

☑ Seek budget provisions that allow for JMAC staff training

Recruitment

☑ Ensure recruitment plan for international civilians is devised

☑ Ensure appropriately-trained military and police personnel are seconded from respective components as early as possible

☑ Ensure recruited staff have expertise in mission's country and region, conflict/post-conflict situations and threat assessment, as well as language skills, field experience and drafting and writing skills

☑ Ensure qualified technicians recruited to establish/maintain critical ICT tools (e.g., databases, networking hardware and software)

☑ Ensure key posts are filled during start-up, including the JMAC Chief, Deputy or Senior Analyst, Chief of Information Collection Cell, database administrator and language assistants. At least 50 per cent of substantive civilian posts (both JMAC posts and seconded staff) and 50 per cent of uniformed substantive and support posts should be filled during the start-up phase. The Brindisi-based Standing Police Capacity is a resource worth engaging in this regard

☑ As JMAC policy calls for many JMAC staff to be seconded, ensure seconded staff members are being assigned full-time to JMAC, retaining only liaison links to their parent units

☑ Establish links to JMACs in neighboring missions and to UNCTs, NGOs, regional organizations, diplomatic community, other United Nations regional bodies (as applicable), think tanks and universities

Tasking

☑ Clarify with the HoM and SMT the analytical products required, record in the information requirement list

☑ Develop work plan based on the information requirement list and provide clear terms of reference to all staff accordingly

☑ Establish a collection plan

☑ Always work with/through the Chief of Staff

☑ In a mission with a PoC mandate, clarify with the designated PoC lead (SRSG, or DSRSG), the PoC adviser and the strategic PoC coordination forum, the PoC-specific products required, record these in the information requirement list

Security

☑ Establish an access matrix

☑ Establish a registry of incoming and outgoing products as well as the associated distribution list

☑ Promulgate the SOP for Information labelling, filing and clean-up

☑ Assign roles and responsibilities, including the designation of an information management focal point (IM FP)

☑ Ensure that all personnel are aware of their responsibilities vis-à-vis records management and handling of sensitive information

☑ Ensure access to sensitive information is controlled

☑ Ensure all staff complete mandatory training on information sensitivity and handling

☑ Authorize the disposal of records in accordance with the retention schedule

☑ Make sure that all records and files are permanently stored

☑ Make sure that any staff leaving the JMAC transfer documents, contacts and information in a secure manner

Database

☑ Initiate design and establishment of JMAC mission database as soon as possible, with consultations with the Headquarters-based UNOCC

☑ Establish working arrangement with the Director and Chief of Mission Support and Chief/JGIS unit that provide JMAC priority access to GIS data and mapping tools. Ideally, select JGIS staff will be co-located with JMAC as early as possible

☑ Ensure acquisition of specialized database and ICT software and licenses, including SQL database server, data analysis tools (e.g., i2inc, Crisis profiler), data encryption software, secure collaboration tools

6.2.1.   Planning: focusing on mandate-relevant decisions

The JMAC Chief is responsible for developing a work plan, a resource plan and an intelligence collection plan and ensuring that it and the JMAC activities are reflected in the mission's results-based budgeting (RBB) framework.

The vision and work plan developed by the JMAC Chief should be based on a clear understanding of (1) the mission's mandate, (2) resources at his or her disposal and (3) the needs of the HoM and the SLT and subsequently of the time constraints of the HoM and SLT.

The JMAC Chief should coordinate with other mission pillars and branches, for external contacts.

Table 6.1.

Various JMAC plans

Plans	Content and purpose
Work plan	Based on HoM and SMT information requirements
Resource plan	Planning resource requirements for the functioning of the JMAC
Collection plan	Directing the acquisition effort to ensure the analytical process is provided with the necessary information on time

6.2.2.   Understanding the needs and means of the Head of Mission

The JMAC Chief must lead and manage his or her JMAC to best serve the needs and means of the HoM in assisting him or her in strategic decision-making processes to implement the mandate of the mission at its best. It is the responsibility of the JMAC Chief to make sure the JMAC optimizes its relationship with the senior leadership team by making sure that it tailors its products to meet the team's needs. In addition to the mandate, the JMAC Chief must understand the realm of challenges facing the decision makers, in particular the HoM, in the mission. To maintain a thorough understanding of how to best assist the HoM in his or her decisions, the JMAC Chief must build and maintain a close working relationship with the SRSG and heads of sections to identify the best way of producing the most relevant analysis at every stage of the decision-making process. As the Head of Mission may wear many hats (including Designated Official for Security), the JMAC must collaborate and coordinate with other mission components at the working level to enable cohesive and coherent decision-making.

The JMAC Chief must keep abreast of the policy and operational discussion. The JMAC Chief thus need to anticipate senior leaderships' information needs so as to optimize the JMAC analytical input into the decision-making cycle.

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[44]   United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "Standard Operating Procedure: Information Labelling, Filing and Clean-up", 1 July 2016, PK/G/2016.20, p. 10.

6.2.3. Establishing an information exchange protocol

The Head of Mission, supported by the mission Chief of Staff and the JMAC Chief, enacts mission-wide instructions setting out the mandate of the JMAC and its relationship to other mission components. All guidance produced at the mission level relevant to JMAC work is shared

> "The first step is to understand the customer's responsibilities, problems, pressures and preferences as receivers of information."
>
> Pherson and Pherson, p. 3

and consulted where applicable with the support office at the Headquarters level: UNOCC.

The JMAC Chief is responsible for advising the Head of Mission and the Chief of Staff on the functioning of the Centre and in the development of mission-level guidance relevant to the implementation of the mandate.

The JMAC Chief works with mission components in establishing relevant information exchange protocols for the benefit of mission mandate implementation and oversees the development of the JMAC Collection Plan accordingly. Upon establishment of the JMAC and based on guidance provided by mission leadership (such as the mission reporting directive), all mission components, in particular relevant analytical entities, put in place mechanisms to share timely and accurate information with the JMAC to enable the production of its integrated analysis and predictive assessments. In this respect, the JMAC Chief should establish a close and complementary relationship with the JOC and the U2, the Criminal Intelligence Cell within the police component as well as the Security Information and Operation Cell (SIOC) of DSS, and also PAD and other potentially relevant mission components. The provision of routine information to the JMAC should be instituted in the reporting procedures of all mission components and coordination mechanisms (for instance, the tactical and operational level groups on PoC, in missions with a PoC mandate), and if integrated with the UNCT, where relevant. Focal points or liaison officers to the JMAC shall be identified for all relevant mission components.

The JMAC Chief establishes protocols through which JMAC can provide information and share relevant products with mission components and, where applicable, with the UNCT.

Where there are missions in neighbouring countries, JMAC chiefs, with the support of UNOCC, establishes mechanisms for the regular safe exchange of information and sharing of best practices among them as well regional meetings, including through VTC.

Timeliness is crucial in the use of any analysis. A challenge for the JMAC Chief is thus to be acutely aware of the SRSG and SLT's timeline, to identify and exploit windows of opportunity, noting:

- What are the travel plans of their clients?
- What is their timing for the development of a strategy?
- What is their timing in the development of an action?
- In missions with a PoC mandate, is there a need to act rapidly on the information provided, i.e. is it an early warning assessment or has information come up that requires action to prevent?

✅ Analysis product checklist

☑ Will this product answer the question the customer asked?

☑ Did the client asks the right question? What should the answer be in a broader context to better frame the issue before addressing his or her particular concern?

☑ What is the most important message to give to the client?

☑ What added value are you providing with the response?

☑ How is the client expected to use this information?

☑ How much time does the client have to digest your product?

☑ What format would convey the information most effectively?

☑ Is it possible to capture the essence in one or a few key graphics?

☑ Does distribution of this document need to be restricted? What classification is most appropriate? Should you prepare different products at different levels of restriction?

☑ What is the client's level of interest in or tolerance for technical language and detail? Can you provide details in appendices or back up material, graphics or an annex?

☑ Would the client expect you to reach out to other experts to tap their expertise in this product? If so how would you flag the contribution of their experts in the products?

☑ To whom might the customer turn for other views on this topic? What data or analysis might others provide that could influence how the customer would react to what you will be preparing?

☑ What perspectives do other interested parties have on this issue? What are the responsibilities of the other parties?

6.2.4.   Budgeting

JMAC minimum budget requirements
- Staffing
- Travel
- Training
- IT

Under the direction of the CoS, the JMAC Chief is responsible for identifying the required resources for the Centre so as to ensure that these are taken into account in relevant budgeting and planning documents.

Travel

The JMAC Chief should make sure that his or her staff carry out the collection plan and fulfil travel requirements, whether internal to the mission area of operation or external travel for enhanced regional cooperation and understanding. The JMAC Chief should receive the appropriate funds to attend the biennial JMAC chiefs Workshop at Headquarters or any other analytical or intelligence regional workshops.

Training

Training funds should be allocated at mission level to allow personnel of the JMAC to receive advanced analytical training and take part in other JMAC-relevant United Nations training opportunities. At a minimum, the mission shall ensure that funds are allocated for at least one JMAC officer per year to attend the annual JMAC course organized by the UNOCC and NODEFIC. On a regular basis, the JMAC Chief should seek the knowledge of national sociologists or anthropologists present in the country or international researchers on the country also present locally to organize some briefing sessions on various topics with their staff.

Information and communications technology

A JMAC requires specialized up-to-date equipment to effectively carry out its required functions. It also uses satellite phones, dedicated server capacity, database management and analysis software to facilitate efficient information gathering/storage/access/analysis and visualization, laptop computers, open-source information, GIS platforms, secured Internet connection and encryption capabilities.

The JMAC Chief and his or her deputy shall seek the assistance of Geospatial Information Section (GIS) specialists.

Operational expenses

Operational expenses should relate to activities that facilitate information gathering such as (and not limited to):

- Access to non-marked United Nations vehicles;
- Funds for specific publications and online information subscriptions and/or software that are not easily incorporated into the UMOJA "business partner" category;
- Petty cash for purchase of pre-paid telephone cards.

Template for a JMAC standard operating procedure

A. Purpose

B. Scope

C. Authority

D. Procedures

- D.1. General
  - Organization
  - General principles and considerations
    - Accuracy and timeliness
    - Utilisation of multiple sources
    - Client-focused products
    - Forward-looking
    - Human relations
    - Coordination with DSS
    - Coordination with G2
    - Coordination with UNPOL
    - Clear division of responsibility between JMAC and JOC
    - JMAC role in crisis management
    - Organizational focus
  - Under the guidance of the HoM, JMAC will cooperate and share information with other JMACs at regional level, as appropriate

- D.2. Process
  - Intelligence cycle
  - Tasking
  - Collection/collation
  - Analysis
  - Dissemination and briefings

- D.3. Tools and Products
  - Tools
    - Work plan
    - RFI
    - Information management tool

- Products

- Weekly Threat Assessment

  - Warning note/immediate action request

  - Incident analysis

  - Trend analysis

  - Scenario paper

  - Profile

  - Risk mapping

  - Arms embargo analytical products

- Guidelines

D.4. Administration

- Budget

- Personnel

D.5. Interaction with other sections/organizations

E. References

- Normative or superior references

- Related procedures or guidelines

F. Contact

The contact point for this SOP is the JMAC Chief/OSRSG

G. History

Annexures

- JMAC SOP reporting lines

- JMAC SOP Work Plan and work distribution

- JMAC SOP sample forms of requests for information

6.2.5.   Recruitment

The JMAC Chief is responsible for recruiting P2, P3, P4, UNVs and administrative staff. Recruitment-related challenges are threefold: recruiting qualified candidates (1) with (regional) analytical experience and background, (2) with a personality fit for working in a hardship post and (3) in a timely manner. JMAC analysts should be recruited on the basis of their professional background and analytical capacity. The JMAC Chief should also pay particular attention to the personality of his or her future staff. The will and ability to work in a team, curiosity, creativity and rigor should be the basic qualities of any JMAC analyst.

Recruiting national staff

A JMAC Chief may recruit national staff. Depending on the staffing table, national staff can be administrative or professional officers. There should be particular scrutiny during the recruitment process in the vetting of national staff. National staff should be well-informed of the sensitive nature of their work and of its implications for the mission, the JMAC and their own security. Training should be provided to national staff to ensure continuity and consistence in their work. They are key members of the JMAC team, as they are able to provide unique contextualization of the social, political, economic and cultural dynamics. National staff have a unique knowledge and understanding of their country and of both past and current dynamics. They are key in providing perspective and otherwise intangible explanations of situations. Nonetheless, together with the Chief of Staff, the JMAC Chief should be aware of potential risks including biases, conflicts of interests, information leaks and manipulation by the host country. There are also important challenges related to the vetting of NPOs within the realm of United Nations recruitment rules.

Recruiting staff responsible for information management/database officer

There is also a need for a dedicated information management/database officer in each JMAC.

6.2.6.   Tasking: setting and managing expectations

When tasking, the JMAC Chief, assisted by his or her deputy, must be able to flag critical issues, clarify questions, provide context and refine the information requirement that analyst must strive to answer. The Chief must also manage the expectations of the SLT and of his or her teams. The JMAC Chief must clarify what is expected of each analyst (including a clear timeline and type of product). The JMAC Chief must also make sure the SLT clearly understands the role of the JMAC, the range of products it can deliver, the type of information it can share and the timing for each product/briefing.

The JMAC Guidelines specify that in determining an appropriate structure, consideration of the following established good practices is recommended:

- Separate analysis from collection and data management;
- Assign dedicated liaison personnel to manage the relationship with contributors;
- Organize analysts into thematic, geographic or operational categories.

Tasking according to geographic/theme/mandate

JMAC analytical resources can be organized according to geographical, thematic or mandate-related areas. This allows analysts to improve their in-depth understanding of a given area of a mission's interest.

A JMAC Chief should remain aware that tasking involves trade-offs. Tasking entails certain dilemmas between assigning task to those who are more knowledgeable about the country/

> "I assigned incoming staff in function of their respective skills, expertise and assets. For example, I assigned an Arabic speaking staff to a location as to facilitate communication with locals. I do the same for English/French speaking employees. I also remain mindful of their specialties and expertise in the topics they are asked to cover."
>
> Philippe Prévost, JMAC Chief, MINUSMA

theme/mandate and those with more intelligence experience. One the one hand, those with better knowledge of the country are deemed more capable of contextualizing a variety of events, on the other hand, they are also more likely to have set assumptions about the continuity and trends related to the country/theme/mandate.

Those who are not as knowledgeable about the national context/theme/mandate are likely to miss important contextual nuance. Yet they present the advantage of having less set assumptions and might be more likely to bring forward new angles of interpretation.

When tasking, the JMAC Chief should remind his or her staff to take into account regional aspects of a particular question in addition to issues at the country level.

Tasking according to rank and status

Each JMAC presents its own structure and task division following different logistics pertaining to the context and resources of each mission.

Some choose to dedicate P2 as the main information collectors and P3 as main analysts. Others mix the tasks between P2 and P3 as analysts while assigning the National Political Officers as main captors of information. For example, at MONUSCO, P3 are regional team leaders. The P4, in addition of being main support and deputy to the Chief, also fulfils various roles within JMAC.

Some challenges in the task assignation to JMAC staff:

1. When tasks are allocated by rank or by status (civilian/military/police), expertise should be taken into account (e.g. military or police having intelligence background can be included in articulating analysis).

2. A too-tight task division sometimes counter-intuitively creates duplication of work as analysts proceed independently on topics that often overlap.

Tasking according to the types of product

> "The academic background is important but for me, language skills and knowledge of the country are even more important. You can learn over time obviously, but when I recruit people, I try to see who has field experience also, because they need to work well under pressure and to be good team players."
>
> Sebastian Fasanello,
> Chief, JMAC MONUSCO

The JMAC Chief may choose to appoint a lead analyst to take responsibility for the delivery of a specific analytical product (e.g. in MONUSCO and in MINUSMA, one analyst is responsible for the weekly threat assessment). JMAC analysts work on products either alone or as part of a team composed of fellow JMAC staff. Ad hoc teams or task forces, including staff members from other integrated mission components, can be created for specific analytical products. This inclusive process has the twofold advantage of enhancing the scope of analytical products and fostering collaboration between units. It is always up to the JMAC Chief and his or her deputy to make the final judgment on content. Where mandated by the SRSG, JMAC may also share or conduct joint analysis with the host nation under specific confidentiality rules.

Tasking United Nations volunteers (UNVs)

United Nations volunteers have a wide range of professional backgrounds and experience as well as various depths of analytical expertise. Accordingly, JMAC chiefs delegate different roles and levels of responsibilities to the United Nations volunteers within their units. For example, given some UNVs key intelligence background and skills, at MINUSCA and MINUSMA, UNVs have played key roles.

6.2.7. Structuring a JMAC

On the next pages are examples of various structures of JMACs. The structures are functions of the resources at the disposal of the JMAC, of the territory to be covered and the issues to analyse.

In some JMACs, it is also possible to decentralize some staff in various parts of the area under the responsibility of JMACs. Often the main rationale is that the territory to be covered is very large with a variety of dynamics and a specific environment for each of the regional bureaus. Following the staffing tables are maps of staff deployment in Mali and in the Central African Republic.

Figure 6.1.

Staffing table of JMAC in MONUSCO

```
                        ┌─────────────────────┐
                        │     Chief (P5)      │
                        │    D/S Kinshasa     │
                        └─────────────────────┘
                                   │
        ┌──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┐
┌─────────────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────────────┐
│ Deputy Chief (P4),      │              │ Deputy Chief (P4),      │
│ analysis                │              │ collection              │
│ D/S Kinshasa            │              │ D/S Goma                │
└─────────────────────────┘              └─────────────────────────┘
                                              │
                                          ┌───────────────────────────┐
                                          │ Database administrator    │
                                          │ (P3)                      │
                                          ├───────────────────────────┤
                                          │ Information analyst (P2), │
                                          │ collection                │
                                          ├───────────────────────────┤
                                          │ Military analyst,         │
                                          │ collation                 │
                                          ├───────────────────────────┤
                                          │ UNPOL 2: arms embargo     │
                                          ├───────────────────────────┤
                                          │ Administrative assistant  │
                                          │ (GS)                      │
                                          └───────────────────────────┘
```

Kinshasa Team D/S Kinshasa	South-Eastern DRC Team D/S Bukavu	North-Eastern DRC Team D/S Goma
Information analyst (P3), analysis	Information analyst (P3), team leader	Information analyst (P3), team leader
Information analyst (P3, T/L), West DRC	Information analyst (UNV)	Information analyst (UNV)
Military analyst	Military analyst	Military analyst
Information analyst	Information analyst (NPO)	UNPOL 1
UNPOL 3	Information analyst (NPO)	Information analyst (NPO)
Administrative assistant (GS)		Information manager (GS)
		Language assistant (IC)

Figure 6.2.
Staffing table of JMAC in UNIFIL

Figure 6.3.
Staffing table of JMAC in UNMISS

Figure 6.4.
Staffing table of JMAC in UNAMID

Figure 6.5.

Staffing table of JMAC in MINUSMA

```
                        ┌──────────────────────┐
                        │      Chief (P5)       │
                        └──────────┬───────────┘
                                   │
                        ┌──────────┴───────────┐
                        │   Deputy Chief (P4)   │
                        └──────────┬───────────┘
                                   │
  ┌─────────────────────────┐     │
  │ Forecasting/reporting(P4)│     │
  │    Anticipation (P3)     ├─────┤
  │     Reporting (P3)       │     │       ┌───────────────────────────────┐
  └─────────────────────────┘     │       │  Database/administrative cell: │
                                   ├───────┤        Database (P2)          │
                                   │       │        Database (UNV)         │
                                   │       │  Administrative assistant(FS4)│
                                   │       └───────────────────────────────┘
```

Mopti cell
UNV—2

Timbuktu cell
P2—1
UNV—1
NPO—1

Gao cell
P2—1
UNV—1

Analysis cell 1:
Politics, Economy, MDSF
P3—1
NPO—1

Analysis cell 2:
Terrorism, Banditry, Trafficking
P3—1
NPO—1
UNPOL—1

Analysis cell 3:
Armed groups
P3—1
NPO—1
UNPOL—1

Chapter VI | Managing and leading a JMAC

Map 6.1.

Example of the JMAC deployment in MINUSCA

MINUSCA JMAC Staffing October 2017

JMAC 1x UNV
JMAC 1x NPO
JMAC 1x P3, 1x P2, 1x UNV, 1x Military
JMAC 1x UNV
JMAC 1x P5, 1x P4, 2x P3, 2x P2, 3x MSO, 2x NPO, 1x UNPOL, 1x GL, 7x UNV

Map No. 4576   UNITED NATIONS
October 2017

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Map 6.2.

Example of JMAC deployment in MINUSMA

MINUSMA JMAC Staffing October 2017

JMAC 1x P5, 2x P4, 5x P3, 1x P2, 3x NPO, 1x FS5, 2x UNPOL
JMAC 1x P2, 1x NPO, 1x UNV
JMAC 2x P2, 1x UNV
JMAC
JMAC 2x UNV

Map No. 4575   UNITED NATIONS
October 2017

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

62

6.3.　Security of information

The JMAC Chief is responsible for establishing procedures related to the acquisition, collation, handling, storing and dissemination of information (see section on security of data). The procedures should be developed in cooperation with the DSS and the Peacekeeping Information Management Unit.[45]

The JMAC Chief must make sure that his or her staff comply with the established security procedures and is responsible for crafting an access matrix as well as a registry to document the safe flow/circulation of information within the JMAC and between the JMAC and other mission components as well outside of the mission (to Headquarters or with non-United Nations entities). ST/SGB/2007/6 also emphasizes the individual responsibility of each staff member. Non-compliance with information security policy such that it leads to unauthorized disclosure is considered an incident of misconduct under Staff Rules. Greatest effort should be taken to ensure protection of sensitive information while also not over-classifying.

The JMAC Chief must ensure minimum protection standards are maintained in the handling of classified information received by or originating from organization units under their control (secure storage and transmission, the use and management of special registries and standard distribution lists, appropriate authorization for duplication and destruction).[46]

The JMAC Chief should thus be familiar with the below documents. Peacekeeping policies are available to all staff via the Policy and Practice Database (http://ppdb.un.org):

- Information sensitivity, classification and handling;[47]
- Policy on Records Management;[48]
- Standard Operating Procedure: Information Labelling, Filing and Clean-up;[49]
- Standard Operating Procedure: Access to Information;[50]
- Peacekeeping Information Sensitivity Toolkit.[51]

6.3.1.　Managing JMAC files

The JMAC Chief is accountable for the control of JMAC material: for the safekeeping of all evidence of work done, the secure distribution of material for active operational use, and the permanent hold of material for storage in the United Nations Archive. The JMAC Chief should

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[45] "JMAC Guidelines", PK/G/2015.04.

[46] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "Policy on Records Management", 1 July 2016, PK/G/2016.19.

[47] ST/SGB/2007/6.

[48] PK/G/2016.19.

[49] PK/G/2016.20

[50] PK/G/2010.36.

[51] PK/G/20385.

first establish a registry to ensure that all incoming and outgoing materials are recorded along with relevant information (e.g., timestamp, name of originating office). Please refer to the United Nations Metadata Standard for guidance.[52] Secure peacekeeping systems, such as Cosmos, have registry functions, and all required supportive features built into them simply need to be activated on behalf of the JMAC. After registration, materials should be integrated into JMAC filing systems.

The JMAC Chief must establish a central file for JMAC documents, authorize procedures for saving materials, and oversee the management of JMAC records considered to be the final versions. Electronic filing systems are required for all digital files and secure physical storage cabinets are required for paper files. Once established, the JMAC Chief must ensure that his or her work unit stores materials that they create (or receive from organizations external to the United Nations Secretariat) by saving them into secure filing systems that are compliant with the requirements defined under paragraph 11 of the policy. Compliant electronic filing systems, such as Cosmos, are available fully configured to requirement and would be activated by the JMAC Chief.

The JMAC Chief must impress upon his or her staff that they are required to store copies of all records that they create or receive from organizations external to the United Nations Secretariat into mission filing systems.[53] No files should be stored exclusively on individual staff computers. The JMAC Chief may further refer to the Standard Operating Procedure on Information Labelling, Filing and Clean-up (2016).[54] Regarding the close of the JMAC at end of mission, all JMAC materials are considered of permanent archival value and should be maintained in full. All records should be transferred to the United Nations Archives and copies maintained for access by the reporting Department.

Security and collection plan[55]

> "For optimal JMAC products, staff must operate in an environment in which they feel supported and in which they can thrive."
>
> Philippe Prévost, Chief, JMAC MINUSMA

The JMAC collection function carries potential sensitivities, and the JMAC Chief should verify that activities are consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and undertaken directly in support of the implementation of the mission mandate, to which the host nation has provided consent. The JMAC Chief must pay particular attention to the acquisition and verification of information in/from remote areas. Community liaison assistants (in place in MONUSCO and UNMIL) had assisted this effort and the model may be considered in other missions.

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[52] United Nations, "Standard on Recordkeeping Metadata", available from https://archives.un.org/sites/archives .un.org/files/files/Standards/ARMS_Standard_Recordkeeping_Metadata_Final.pdf.

[53] "Records Management", PK/G/2016.19.

[54] "Information Labelling, Filing and Clean-up", PK/G/2016.20.

[55] See annex IV for a template of a JMAC collection plan.

☑ **JMAC Chief checklist for securing records and data**

☑ Create procedure within JMAC following the SOP on Information Labelling, Filing and Clean-up, and any emerging guidance related to intelligence handling

☑ Assign roles and responsibilities, including the designation of an information management focal point (IMFP)

☑ Ensure that all personnel are aware of their responsibilities vis-à-vis records management and handling of sensitive information

☑ Approve the access rights plan and distribution lists for sensitive information

☑ Ensure access to sensitive information is controlled

☑ Ensure that all staff complete mandatory training on information sensitivity and on information security

☑ Authorize the archiving of all records of the JMAC for the permanent record and coordinate with UNHQ PKIMU and UNOCC to ensure continuity of the records[56]

☑ Ensure that all records and files are stored for permanent archives

☑ Ensure that all staff leaving the JMAC transfer the information they have and their access rights are removed from existing systems

6.3.2.   Access to and distribution of JMAC material[57]

To control the flow of materials regularly generated by the JMAC, JMAC chiefs should develop an access matrix. Access matrices are used to control the flow of many sets of documents to many recipients and establish a baseline of behaviour. Exceptions can always be made on a need-to-know basis, but an access matrix allows the JMAC Chief to maintain a primary standard to ensure protection of sensitive materials and guard against unauthorized disclosure, or leakage. For example, if there are five different reports that all go to a known and small set of staff, an access matrix can establish a baseline. In another example, if there are different levels of materials from an external party (e.g., UNICEF) that always need to go to certain recipients, the access matrix can ensure continuity of the flow in the absence of or rotation of the JMAC Chief.

In the development of the access matrix, relevant offices should be consulted, including the HoM. The final access matrix should be authorized by the JMAC Chief.

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[56]   "Information Labelling, Filing and Clean-up", PK/G/2016.20.

[57]   Ibid.

An access matrix would include:

1. An information inventory. This would include all regular reports;

2. Details of authorized users. This may specify individual officers (e.g., SRSG) or offices (e.g., O/FC);

3. And any additional restrictions. For example, if the material should go to some officers within a larger office, but not others.

6.4. Leading a JMAC

6.4.1. Fostering a collaborative environment within the team

With regards to his or her team, the JMAC Chief should strive to create an environment in which analysts can provide "frank and fearless assessment, and be able to 'speak truth to power' without fear of negative repercussion".[58] Such collaborative environment both improves the quality of the products and the retention of employees.

The JMAC Chief should guide and provide feedback to his or her team on their work and on the products, they develop. He or she should organize regular structured brainstorming sessions to optimize information sharing among the team and encourage group-oriented problem-solving techniques.

He or she should also convey the feedback from the HoM regarding the quality of the products developed by the team. He or she should set the example by integrating collaborative practices into his or her daily work practices and those of his or her staff.[59] The JMAC Chief should also be able to provide follow-ups on the actionable analysis presented to the HoM.

United Nations missions in general provides limited psychological support. Yet given the context and nature of their work, JMAC staff, like any other mission staff, might face difficult-to-overcome situations. For JMACs in non-family duty stations, despite R&R, the hardship of the work and of the environment adds to the distance from family and friends, which might trigger or exacerbate the possibility of emotional overreactions or burnout. The JMAC Chief has direct supervisory role over his or her team and should thus pay attention to signs of burnout and fatigue among the JMAC team and encourage his or her staff to get the necessary psychological support if needed. Regular debriefing with the staff can help diffuse some sources of tension and anxiety. It can also contribute to a better awareness of the emergence or presence of any personal/professional issues that might impact the work of his or her staff. The JMAC Chief should pay close attention to interactions between his or her staff and make sure that his or her

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[58] Haidi Willmot, *Improving UN Situational Awareness: Enhancing the UN's ability to Prevent and Respond to Mass Human Suffering and to Ensure the Safety and Security of Its Personnel* (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2017), p. 47.

[59] Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2015).

staff comply with the rules of the United Nations with regards to a balanced work environment free of harassment. Respectful and professional interactions with and within the team should be enforced at all time.

6.4.2.   Fostering a collaborative environment within the mission

The JMAC Chief should make sure to understand the interest of its main clients and of the main units contributing to the situational awareness of a mission. JMAC should develop a climate of collaboration with all relevant role players and focal points in the mission's sections. Collaboration can be both formal and informal, and can also take place on a topic-by-topic basis or through regular pre-planned topical meetings with different components.

The JMAC Chief should also make sure to provide top cover to the JMAC staff vis-à-vis the mission leadership to enable the JMAC analysts to speak freely and to provide confidently thorough predictive judgments.

6.5.   Gender dimension within the JMAC

JMAC should promote gender parity among its team as much as possible and foster a supportive working environment for both men and women. The JMAC Chief should pay close attention to gender-related work dynamics within his or her team. Gender should be taken into account when assigning JMAC staff to the field by discussing and devising strategies to overcome difficulties that could be associated with gender. Different attitudes can be witnessed toward men and women, which may impact the work of JMAC staff. These attitudes should never be an impediment for any JMAC staff in fulfilling his or her function. The JMAC Chief should assign his or her staff according to expertise and skill regardless of gender. Any difficulty related to gender matter should not be regarded as a "personal problem" but should be addressed as "a team responsibility through a team effort".[60]

JMAC should be a leader in gender equality so as to remain attuned with the goals and values of the United Nations. The gender aspect should be taken into account in products, especially considering conflict dynamics. JMACs need to consider this especially in products for PoC-mandated missions.

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[60]   OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring*, pp.18–19 (see footnote 41).

6.6. Setting up a calendar of systematically recurring events

Integrated and forward-looking analyses are based on a thorough understanding of the context and a sound grasp on what falls into the normality of actors' dynamics. As JMAC chiefs and JMAC staff spend more time in a mission and more generally in a region/country, they progressively gain this notion through their experience, which enables them to more easily detect signs of a deteriorating trend/situation. For new analysts, these notions might be harder to grasp. The recording of recurring phenomena may be a useful tool to help JMAC analysts to anticipate triggers, thresholds or windows of opportunity for shifting dynamics in a country.

Table 6.2.

Calendar of events to record for a specific context/country

Annual events to be recorded	Examples
Political/cultural/traditional/ historical religious events	These events might be linked to • Mass mobilization in a specific location • Mass long-distance movements toward a specific location linked to the event • An increase/decrease in various criminal activities prior/during/after the event (e.g. increase in predatory behaviors such as kidnapping, thievery, illegal taxing by various actors) E.g.: the commemoration of the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, carnival in Haiti, Ramadan in Somalia
Sporting events	Sporting events might become triggers for enhanced competition/ tensions between groups/communities E.g.: soccer/football matches
Season cycle	• Rainy/dry seasons impact movements on a territory and thereby influence activities of the concerned groups • Hurricane season might entail a range humanitarian challenges thereby creating security issues E.g.: transhumance in CAR, cattle raiding in South Sudan and Somalia
Elections	Elections might entail violence before, during and after. Elections can provide incentives for the use of violence to • Intimidate voters before the elections (e.g. to influence turnout) • To repress the population after the elections (e.g. to reduce the elected parties' credibility/dissolve public protest) Violence can be used by the incumbent leaders and/or by the opposition leaders/defeated parties.
International events	International events might have echoes in the region/country in which a mission operates; their outcomes might be closely monitored by local actors and used to trigger mobilization E.g.: conference donors; nomination of bishops by the Pope

Part III:
Implementing JMAC work

Chapter 7. Implementation of the intelligence cycle in a JMAC

JMAC analysts gather information and produce integrated analysis applying a methodology known as the intelligence cycle in order to support the decision makers of their missions in their knowledge, understanding and anticipation of events, incidents, developments, patterns and trends that may impact the implementation of the mission's mandate.

Figure 7.1.

Intelligence and operational cycle

7.1.   Direction, requirements and tasking

Direction refers to the process of identifying information gathering and analytical priorities by identifying questions that need to be answered.

7.1.1.   Information requirement (IR)[61]

The JMAC policy specifies that the Head of Mission, in consultation with the senior management team, is responsible for tasking the JMAC with information and analytical requirements (IRs).[62] The IR outlines the scope of the work of the JMAC and the types of analysis and products

> "The raison d'être for analysts and analytic organizations is to bring a broader range of information to bear on difficult questions, select that which is most significant, then tailor and package it for decision makers."
>
> Pherson and Pherson, p.3

it will generate. Information requirements define and prioritize JMAC analytical objectives. They

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[61]   See annex III.

[62]   "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03.

are used to establish the priorities upon which a JMAC bases its work, including a description of the scope of analysis required, deadlines, and dissemination. The IR informs the development of the JMAC collection plan.

Template for an information requirement table

Priority	Analytical tasks	Deadline	Dissemination
1	**Internal security** What are the threats, and what factors could trigger acts of terrorism and public disorder in country X (and particularly in town Y), and what are the associated risks to UNXXX assets?	dd/mm/yyyy (weekly)	HoM, SMT, DSS, X, Y, Z
2	**Crime** What are the major criminal threats throughout country X (and particularly town Y), and what are the security and safety implications for UNXXX assets?	dd/mm/yyyy (weekly)	SMT, DSS, X, Y, Z
3	**Regional instability** What regional factors (with neighbouring countries A, B and C) pose the greatest risk to the development and stability of country X, and what implications are there for the provision of UNXXX support to the local government and to UNYYY?	dd/mm/yyyy (monthly)	HoM, SMT, UNCT, X, Y, Z
4	**Security sector** Do the numbers, force disposition and operational capabilities of the developing components of national security capability fit them sufficiently to conduct possible tasks following the exit of UNXXX national security architecture?	dd/mm/yyyy (monthly)	DSS, PDSRSG

Table 7.1.

Information requirements and purpose

Scope: outline the scope of work for the JMAC
Products: specify types of analysis products required
Deadline: determine production deadline
Clients: disseminate to section for which the product is intended (targeted audience)
Collection plan: inform the development of the JMAC collection plan
Priorities: classify by order of priority

Information requirements can be generic or specific. Generic IRs are based on the mission's mandate and the HoM/SRSG's compact: the information necessary to implement the mission's mandate. Generic IRs are fixed for a longer time and should determine the daily activities (information gathering and analysis) of the JMAC's information analysts, without the need for specific questions. Specific IRs are those that are communicated through specific questions and tasking.

Commanders' critical information requirements (CCIR) are the SRSG's/HoM's (critical) information requirements are the key information the SRSG/HoM needs for his or her planning and decision-

making in order to implement the mission's mandate. Priority information requirements (PIR) are based on the CCIR. Ideally, the JMAC (U2, other members of the information community, JCB, mission intelligence coordination structure) will develop the PIR: the information/intelligence questions to which the SRSG/HoM needs answers in order to satisfy her/his CCIR. Specific information/intelligence requirement (SIR) will detail the general questions formulated in the PIR.

7.1.2.   Priority information requirement (PIR)

IRs should be classified by order of priority, and PIRs must be clearly identified. These decisions should be guided by the decision of the Head of Mission and the senior management team. They should be revised periodically.

7.1.3.   Request for information (RFI)

A JMAC client can also request information from a JMAC. This should be done through a request for information (RFI). A RFI can be an oral or written request for a specified piece of information or a question sent by any member of the senior leadership-client group to a JMAC Chief or by any individual to a source of information. Most of the time, RFIs are sent by email to the JMAC Chief, who then sends them on to a source of information. The JMAC Chief has the

RFIs:
- From the head of a component to the JMAC Chief.
- The JMAC Chief has the authority to accept or reject RFIs according to available resources and in light of existing IRs.
- Approved RFIs are incorporated into the IR list and are subject to review by the HoM and SMT in case these should be determined as PIRs.

authority to prioritize IRs. All IRs are monitored in a tasking list. All collection tasking is at least United Nations confidential and should be treated as such at all times.

Template for a request for information

Request for information (RFI)	
Date:	Originating date
From:	E.g.: component chief XXX
To:	Applicable section/department, etc.
Information requested:	The detailed description of information requested
Format for reporting:	Instructions on the method and media for reporting as well as the person or department which must receive the reply
Relation to mandated tasks:	E.g.: support DDR planning, input to draft report of the Secretary-General on…, etc.
General comments:	Any general instructions or comments
Required by/frequency:	Date/time/weekly/monthly, etc.
Security restrictions:	Any applicable security restrictions
Signed:	

7.1.4.   Tasks: anticipating and responding

JMACs operate in dynamic settings, and analysts are particularly well-positioned and informed to anticipate tasking by the HoM or even to suggest tasking based on the information acquired on the field. If JMAC analysts must comply to the tasking requirement, the JMAC Chief through his or her relation to the HoM can also put forward relevant tasks or information that could help the leadership in their strategic decision-making. It is thus also upon the JMAC to be forward-looking in identifying key mandate-relevant issues to be analysed. The direction comes from the leadership. Yet, in crafting the IR and PIR, the JMAC Chief should also make proposals to the HoM/SMT for analytical projects that he or she considers timely in the context of decisions that are due to be taken on mission-mandated tasks (explicit and implied) and the integrated strategic framework.

Taking into consideration the JMAC Chief's proposals, the HoM/SMT select the analytical products they require of the JMAC, which will then be recorded in the IR list. Once approved by the HoM/SMT, the IR serves as the basis of the JMAC work plan. IRs are kept constantly under review.

It is also upon the JMAC Chief and then upon each analyst to make sure to understand what information is requested by the HoM and his or her senior leadership team. Analysts should seek clarification from the JMAC Chief if a question appears overly broad or poorly formulated. If seeking clarification, the analyst should formulate a choice of questions to spur requesters' thinking. "Yes or no answers are much easier to elicit than waiting for customers to have time to work their way through the problems".[63] If direct clarification of the questions is not possible, then the JMAC analyst or the JMAC Chief's duty is to rephrase the question in a more meaningful way. At all times, the JMAC analyst should have a proactive approach: JMAC information analysts should not wait for a task to arrive, but have to adopt a proactive approach and notify the JMAC Chief of potentially relevant events, incidents, developments, patterns and trends before these develop potential implications for mandate implementation.

7.2.   Acquisition

Acquisition refers to the ways by which data and information are obtained. The JMAC collects and receives information from multiple sources to support the analytical process. Information can come from both within and outside the mission.[64] Information can be acquired *purposefully* (by proactively seeking information) or *fortuitously* (by being given the information or receiving it inadvertently). JMACs receive routine inputs, such as daily reporting from other sections of the mission, as well as ad hoc information. Acquisition can be achieved through numerous and various sources. All acquired information is subject to legal obligations.

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[63] Pherson and Pherson, *Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence.*

[64] See annex VIII.

7.2.1. Intelligence collection plan: JMAC internal intelligence management tool

The mission intelligence collection plan (ICP) is the guided intelligence acquisition process based on the mission's information requirements. The ICP is an internal JMAC intelligence management tool for directing the information acquisition effort to ensure an analytical process is provided with the necessary information on time. It is updated in light of changes to the PIR. A set of evolving collection sub-plans can also be produced on a narrower set of information requirements.

> "Helping clients frame their question to inform their decision-making is a key analytic task. If the analyst does not understand exactly what information is being sought by the customer and interprets the question too broadly, then substantial resources will be wasted and the customer will be disappointed with the response."
>
> Pherson and Pherson, p.15

Table 7.2.

Mission-wide collection plan[65]

Info Requirements Reference Number	Information Requirements	Possible Indicators	JMAC	SECTORS	QRF	FORCE RESERVE	MLT	UNMOs	UNPOL	SICU	CAS / PPPS	RRR / JIU	BIN	UN MISSION IN X HR	UN AGENCIES	SCSL	UNXXX	NSA	AFL	DynCorp	LNP	INGOs	NGOs	Population	Etc.	Etc.	Etc.
PIR 1. INTERNAL SECURITY																											
1.1	What activities are former warring factions or special units members likely to conduct? Why and where?	Meetings, watchwords	X	A II			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X					X	X			X
1.2	Do those former warring factions still have specific and identified task organizations? If so, who and what are they?	Verbal warnings, attitudes	X	A II			X	X	X	X			X					X						X			X
1.3	Is there any evidence of weapons within the community, particularly caches of arms and ammunition?	Watchwords	X	A II			X	X	X	X			X	X				X		X			X	X			X
1.5	Is the current economic situation, if worsening, likely to lead to civil unrest, violent outbursts or armed insurrection?	Social issues monitoring	X	A II	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X			X	X	X	X			X
1.6	What is the public assessment regarding security and especially the roles of the Govt. of Country K and UN MISSION IN X facing increasing rates of crimes or robberies?	SICU stats study	X	A II			X	X	X	X	X			X				X			X	X	X	X			X
1.7	Is there evidence of public resentment against UN MISSION IN X?	Public's acceptance of UN MISSION IN X presence	X	A II	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
1.8	What ethnic tensions can degenerate into violent acts, who are the designated 'scapegoats' and where are the likely trouble spots?	Media reports, attitudes of leaders	X	A II			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X			X										
1.9	What are the key political, sporting, religious and tribal events that are likely to cause planned or spontaneous demonstrations that might lead to unrest or violence?	Social issues monitoring, UNPOL and SICU reporting	X	A II	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X

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[65] See annex IV for a template of a JMAC collection plan and annex VIII for the SOP on the information community of UNIFIL.

7.2.2. Acquisition process

The processes of collection and analysis are interactive. The analyst will base his or her analysis on acquired information. Yet he or she should remain proactive in seeking missing data/information while crafting his or her analysis.

Source, information and data

A **source** is a place, publication, person or institution from which information is obtained. **Information** is knowledge obtained from investigation, study or instruction. **Data** are facts or information (such as measurements or statistics) for reference or analysis. Sources can provide different types of intelligence.

Table 7.3.
Intelligence sources

Human-source intelligence (HUMINT)	Intelligence gathered by interpersonal contact
Imagery intelligence (IMINT)	Intelligence gathered from satellite, aerial photography, mapping/terrain data. Includes geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)	Data collected from publicly available source
Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)	Intelligence gathered from data obtained from sensing instruments for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender, to facilitate the latter's measurement and identification
Signals intelligence (SIGINT)	Intelligence gathered from signals, whether communications between people (communications intelligence—abbreviated to COMINT) or from electronic signals not directly used in communication (electronic intelligence)
Financial intelligence (FININT)	Gathering of information about the financial affairs of entities of interest to understand their nature and capabilities and predict their intention
Cyber intelligence/digital network intelligence (CYBINT/DNINT)	Intelligence gathered from cyberspace—the notional environment in which communication over computer networks occurs

Format

Information collected should, where possible, use existing taxonomies, or agreed-to terminology used by entities with whom information must be exchanged.

Within missions, this standardization should be encouraged across components, particularly between the JOC, SIOC, DDR, Criminal Intelligence within UNPOL when in place, SSR and U2 sections.

Steps for an information gathering strategy

1. Check the information you already have: framework should identify what you know and what you do not know.

2. Identify types of sources needed to support your analytical process.

   Analysts should look at different sources to acquire different types of information. For example, an analyst might choose to survey social media (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) to get a better sense of on-the-ground data about an ongoing development.

3. Scan sources for a purpose. Source selection should be deliberate. Analyst need to understand who and what has directly observed the information being reported and whether reporting by an indirect source will be satisfactory.

4. Avoid satisficing: availability is not a criterion for solid source selection.

Sources should always be those with the most consistent and error-free information and with the highest credibility and legitimacy. Sources can be evaluated by their reliability, accuracy, relevancy, timeliness and precision. When information is gathered on particularly sensitive PIRs, three or more sources should be cultivated for verification and measurement of bias.[66] Analysts should also draw on experience already in the mission to help ascertain which sources are or can be reliable/useful.

7.2.3. Sources

The JMAC acquires and receives information from multiple sources, both within and outside the mission, to support the analytical process.

In addition to targeted/proactive collection, the JMAC receives inputs from routine information management processes, such as daily reporting from all sections of the mission to the JOC and media monitoring, among others. To ensure consistent exchange of information, the JMAC should establish protocols to ensure the flow of information. The various components in a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission represent a valuable network for collection.[67] It is the responsibility of the HoM, supported by the mission CoS, and the JMAC Chief to enact mission-wide instructions setting out the mandate of the JMAC and its relationship to other mission components. The standing directive from the HoM, in addition to the policy, should be part of briefings and induction materials to all mission personnel.[68]

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[66] A full list of source collection methods is noted in *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (United Nations publication, 2010), available from www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf.

[67] See also annex VIII for an example of structured, coherent and coordinated way to acquire information among various mission components.

[68] "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03, paras. 12 and 13.

Use of dedicated liaison officers is an established good practice for facilitating the gathering of information from other organizations, such as the UNCT, which have their own collection and analytical resources, but which do not assign staff to work in the JMAC. The liaison model is also helpful in providing two-way communication between the JMAC and its primary clients. Given the amount of available information, identifying the right sources can be a daunting process.[69] The analyst must thus remain creative and persistent in discovering and sifting appropriate information. The analyst should also remain mindful that each source has its own limits and thus entails its own trade-offs.

Open sources

Open sources refer to publicly available information. These include radio, television, video, newspaper, journals and Internet data. Along with mission reporting, open sources are usually the main source of information for peacekeeping operations. They are inexpensive and readily available through the public Information section of the mission, while covering a large scope. However, the quantity of information creates its own challenge, making it difficult to find the most useful data. Analyst must make sure to always verify the validity of their sources.

Social media data intelligence (SOCMINT) and crowdsourced[70] data

Publicly accessible social media data are a critical element of any collection plan that involves the Internet. In the past ten years, social media usage has expanded to virtually all countries, and the number of users now exceeds 2.5 billion people (out of a total of nearly 3.77 billion Internet users). This user base includes the countries where United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed and their respective diaspora. The analysis of social media data can enhance a mission's situational awareness, early warning and broader analytical needs such as network (link) analysis and trend analysis related to the public mood on key issues. Social media data, like all data, come with their own strengths and weaknesses that analysts should keep in mind when defining collection plans and integrating results into analyses of other data sources.

SOCMINT and crowdsourced data are key tools to complement and validate the accuracy of the information flow sourced from trusted and knowledgeable employees of the United Nations system or partner organizations.

Social media, cell phone cameras, text messages transform every individual in a potential hub of information providing real-time coverage of events likely to impact the implementation of the

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[69] Christopher B. Barrett and Jeffrey Cason, *Overseas Research II: A Practical Guide* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[70] Crowdsourcing refers to the gathering of information from a large group of users.

mandate (such as violent protest, natural disasters, etc.).[71] Crowdsourced data and SOCINT in general are useful for providing explanatory narratives to inform decision makers.

Crowdsourced data can be applied to a multitude of situations. From real-time security incident monitoring in traditional conflict settings (See CEWARN[72]), to reporting violence in electoral competition (See Uchaguzi Platform[73]) or in addressing a health crisis (see Sierra Leone and Ebola[74]). Data can come from multiple sources, from high-technology solutions such as geo-referencing event data collected via multiple sources (see aggregators like Ushaidi[75]) or low-technology solutions such as using human monitors (Umati project[76]).

Among the main advantages of blending crowdsourced data in the stream of work of a JMAC are:

- Improving information processing through recurrent and efficient systems of data collection that provides information even when the focus is shifted on other events;

- Developing a pattern-recognition structure to inform trend analysis;

- A continuous or automated stream of information facilitates a timely response;

- A connection with the author;

- Evidence supported by multimedia attachments;

- A broad understanding of the political temperature of a country;

- Social media data provide real-time or near-real-time access to news and developments in areas of operations. With the right tools (see below) and data access, JMAC analysts are able to monitor social media channels for emerging political or security developments in a way that traditional media do not always allow;

- Social media data also provide the opportunity to access historical data that can be used to create deeper and richer trend analyses or retroactive baselines that can augment other data sources, such as public opinion polls;

- Social media data can be employed as an additional data layer to validate or challenge data collected from other sources. This can be especially useful in understanding relationships between key actors or confirming single-source reports of events that cannot be confirmed through usual means, such as direct reporting by mission personnel.

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[71] Joseph G. Bock, *The Technology of Non-Violence: Social Media and Violence Prevention* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).

[72] Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) established by IGAD http://www.cewarn.org.

[73] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uchaguzi..

[74] http://odimpact.org/files/case-studies-sierra-leone.pdf.

[75] Ushaidi aim is to create a platform that any person or organization can use to set up their own way to collect and visualize information.

[76] https://preventviolentextremism.info/sites/default/files/Umati%20Final%20Report.pdf.

Nonetheless, it is important to highlight the potential risks of crowdsourced information, such as:

- Missing outlier events that do not follow patterns but could trigger violence on a broader scale;

- Issues with the verification of data collected;

- The overrepresentation of partisan political views;

- Partial information collected due to lack of access to technological instruments (cell towers);

- The challenges of validating or confirming accuracy;

- Social media data collection is a passive methodology, which means analysts have to work only with whatever content users have posted, either in the body of the message or in the user's profile. This means that it can be difficult to determine basic demographic details about users, including age, location and even gender;

- Many social media users do not post content under their real names, and many social media platforms do not compel users to reveal their identities.

Therefore, from a practical point of view, social networks can provide a critical amount of readily available information that can help build indicators or real-time dashboards.[77]

- Low-technology solutions include a passive monitoring of social contents for hate speech, information on events or disruptions of services, and a general understanding of the sentiment of a population against ethnic groups or political representatives (see "Social Media and Conflict in South Sudan").[78]

- High-technology solutions include, for example, the creation of an application programming interface (API) for social media data mining that monitors specific words in comments, posts or tweets that are associated with ethnic cleansing or another topic (see examples from the South Sudanese Facebook group with over 66 thousand users: "Democratic Politics and Anti-Tribalism in South Sudan", availble from www.facebook.com/groups/democratic politics2013).

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[77] See also: www.cfr.org/blog/ask-experts-social-media-and-conflict-prevention.

[78] www.peacetechlab.org/hate-speech-in-south-sudan.

Figure 7.2.

**Example of clear ethnic incitement—"We need to start eliminating them from every corner in SS."**

> **Santos Wad Lobonok**
> 14 April at 02:33
>
> Message to fellow Equatorians, if your still thinking that this war is btw opposition and the government i think your lost. This war is now clear btw DINKA and the 63 tribes of South Sudan. Dinka are now killing the non-dinka civilians in the name of the government. They are targeting government employees, university students, business people ,NGOs employee etc who are not Dinka. The choice is yours now either to pick a gun and defend urself and ur community from this heartless looters and criminals. All Dinkas are supporting there fail leader sultan kiir just because he is a Dinka. We need to start eliminating them from every corner in SS. We must lock all the roads to avoid them escaping from juba .We are tired of Dinka and there corrupt government. they don't want to admit that they have fail SS. If we all unite against Dinkas we will solve SS problem within two weeks. let us forget about our fellow brothers who are busy working with Dinka against there own people. like few opporturnist Equatorians like Wani Igga,Elia lomoro, and some Nuer Wew, and those of YUA YUA. Forget about them, and we the rest must save this country. All the agenda of Dinka is one, thy want to rule SS yet they are primitive to rule our country. Dont trust any Dinka even those who are in opposition. They are just pretending. We must do everything to push them away from us. Dinkas are poisonous. everywhere they go they will create a problem. Dinkas alone are fighting themselves. these people don't deserve to live with the rest of South Sudanese people.
>
> 👍❤ 53   77 Comments
>
> 👍 Like   💬 Comment

Figure 7.3.

Example of a message that could be useful to develop a better understanding of the foreign intervention in South Sudan

> **Aleu Wol Wol**
> 22 April at 12:42
>
> Breaking news!dear bros and sisters i would like to encourage you to denounce intervention of regional protection force bcoz this forces will organize themselves into fighting group and harm our citezen in addition to that they will loot our natural resources and properties.It is duty of each and every citezen of s.sudan regardless of tribalism and discrimination created by stupid Riek and many quack PHD holders who are trying to destroy and mobilize people in order to get position.Please dear bros and sisters let us leave those war creators alone and concentrate on national dialogue announce by H.E Gen Salva Kiir Mayardit.
>
> 👍 22   37 Comments
>
> 👍 Like   💬 Comment

Compliant tools

Tools

JMACs need to comply with United Nations regulations concerning the use of software tools on mission networks and hardware. Before designing collection plans that include social media data, check with CMS or CITS for the approved tools and processes.

When evaluating the utility of a collection/analytical tool, keep the following in mind:

- The collection scope in terms of the types and numbers of social media channels that the tool pulls from (do the channels match with the channels used by users in the area of operations?);

- The languages that the tool can collect and analyse automatically (how much of the analysis can be done automatically and how much will have to be done manually?);

- The time lag of the data (i.e. real-time or "near" real-time?);

- The attributes/variables that the tool can analyse.

Local context

An effective collection plan and analytical exercise involving social media will depend on the JMAC's understanding of the local social media context. This includes an understanding of:

- The estimated proportion of the local population that has Internet access and are social media users;

- The profile of the local online population (educational, economic, ethnic, religious, linguistic, gender, etc.);

- Popular local social media channels (these might include global mainstream channels such as Facebook and Twitter, but also local forums and groups);

- Use of reader comments sections of online versions of traditional media;

- Links between online groups/sites with political actors, traditional media, etc.;

- The role/influence of the country's diaspora on discussions and posting of news from the home country and the resident country that pertains to developments in the area of operations.

Figure 7.4.
Example of local media

Translation of the headlines:
"Solution is for foreign troops to leave the country";
"Emmanuel Macron, a conqueror visiting Mali"

Importance of validating open sources

Source analysis of open sources can be summarized in terms of the following broad categories of criteria:

- Time;
- Dependence;
- Authenticity;
- Bias;
- Reputation.

Like any source of information, open sources must be constantly evaluated and assessed. Here are some examples of source evaluation within an Internet search:

- Who has created the web page?
- What do the web page include?
- How is the knowledge connected?
- When were the pages created/updated?
- Why were the web pages created?

Open sources can give a better grasp on local perceptions. The newspaper clipping on the previous page is an example.

7.2.4.   Human information

HUMINT refers to information obtained from human sources: individuals who know, or have access to, information or people of interest to the United Nations. HUMINT mainly takes the form of direct interactions—conversations or exchanges of written correspondence—on a formal or informal basis. While acquiring information through human sources requires time, fieldwork enables analysts to contextualize information. It has the twofold advantage of enhancing their understanding of the environment and its dynamics, which is key in tasking the collector in a clearer and more informed manner. Human information can be acquired formally or informally. In both cases, a JMAC analyst must adopt a structured approach, as detailed in the interview section below (and in annex I) and put mechanisms in place to ensure that interviewees are not at risks for being in contact with the analyst. The JMAC analyst should take all the necessary measures to ensure that none of his or her information-acquisition activities (inadvertently) result in the torture or ill-treatment by national authorities or other third parties.[79]

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[79] www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Chapter14-56pp.pdf.

Table 7.4.

Human sources of information[80]

Community, indigenous, religious, tribal and other leaders
Lawyers, journalists and other professionals
Academic institutions, research centres, think tanks
Trusted government contacts at both local and national level
State officials
Non-state actors, including members of armed groups involved in the peace agreements
Domestic and international experts with a long history of analysing the country or the relevant national institutions
Humanitarian, development and other organizations present in the country, including members of the UNCT and HCT
Embassies with networks and insights about key decision makers
Bilateral and multilateral donor agencies present in the country
In conflict situations, negotiators engaged in dialogue with the armed parties

Developing contacts[81]

JMAC information analysts should foster productive working relationship with United Nations and non-United Nations entities including the diplomatic community, the latter based on the guidance of the JMAC Chief, thereby engaging in a fruitful reciprocal sharing of information. JMAC analysts should be aware that information exchanges can be used not only to gather knowledge but also to build trust.[82] JMAC information analysts must strive to con-

> "We have developed working relationships with many actors in the capital […] Because here in this country you need to see people, to talk to them. They don't talk over the phone […] I travelled the whole country. I know now all the provinces, all the main cities and many of the neighbouring countries."
>
> Sebastian Fasanello,
> Chief, JMAC MONUSCO

tinuously build their contact networks. Analysts must thus identify and cultivate their links with individuals, organizations, units within and outside the mission, always conscious of the potential pitfalls (e.g. potential negative impact on the mission's credibility and reputation of "unfit" contacts). As trust develops over time, analysts should seek to meet regularly with contacts and foster reciprocity within the boundaries of established United Nations guidance.

Each source of information can potentially provide the JMAC analysts with unique inputs and perspective. The JMAC analyst should however keep in mind the inclination specific to each group regarding the scope/focus of their knowledge, their understanding and interests, and

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[80]   Adapted from OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring* (see footnote 41).

[81]   Ibid.

[82]   JMAC workshop 2016.

assess the risks they take in providing information. The JMAC analyst should also be mindful of the utmost importance of source protection.[83]

National government bodies

JMAC analysts must seek to build rapport with national government bodies, including statistics offices. JMAC analysts should also develop their own peacekeeping data directory (P-CAT Data Source Catalogue).[84] **All** JMAC analysts should carefully review and follow the Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.[85] The JMAC shall also conduct a risk analysis before sharing any information with national authorities or regional peacekeeping forces, if provision of such information carries a real risk of human rights violations. An example would be revealing the whereabouts of a person if that person would be tortured upon capture or if information-sharing would trigger illegal targeting.

Civil society

JMAC analysts must also seek to build rapport with civil society groups, religious groups/organizations, unions, social movements, community-based organizations or multi-issue popular coalitions that are particularly well-informed, as they are involved in multidimensional aspects of the country.

Academics and experts

Academics and experts both within and outside the country can also be sources of information.

Academics and experts from outside the country can be key sources of information for developing a more nuanced analysis of the historical roots of a problem or situation, learning about the historical influences on a particular institution in the country (religious institutions/groups, trade unions, army, etc.), or understanding the complex links between a human rights problem and economic power, land tenure and international trade.

Local academics and experts can also recommend others with more specific or relevant skills, such as geographic, economic or military expertise. Their expertise and analysis are unique, and other local contacts may not be able to provide or do not possess the same depth of technical knowledge.

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[83] For detailed best practices, please consult OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring* (see footnote 41), available from www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Chapter14-56pp.pdf.

[84] Available from https://point.un.org/SitePages/pcat.aspx.

[85] A/67/775-S/2013/110.

International actors

JMAC analyst should also seek information by contacting international actors operating in a country. International actors include international NGOs[86] as well as staff at foreign embassies, in accordance with the guidance of the JMAC Chief, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNCT, and regional international organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[87] These institutions may have more personnel on the ground and have better access to local stakeholders. They sometimes operate in areas where is no United Nations presence, and can thus provide information that would otherwise be unavailable. This contributes to a better understanding of the context of a country, of the perception of the population toward the work of the United Nations and of the various challenges associated with the implementation of the mission's mandate.

Table 7.5.

JMAC types of contacts and value

Types of contacts	Added value
Civil society	Multi-dimensional knowledge
	Local perception and understanding
Academic and experts (local and international)	Analysis
	Specific/targeted knowledge
International actors	Access to data and analysis

Conducting interviews

Interviewing sources is a unique way to obtain specific information on the context, the intent and behaviour of the sources. In a JMAC context, interviewing should be understood as a structured interaction with a human source, whether it is done in a formal or informal context. See annex I for how to prepare and conduct interviews.

7.2.5.   Use of new technology

The Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in United Nations Peacekeeping published in June 2015[88] highlighted ways in which technology and innovation could be leveraged to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping. In the context of peace missions, the rising necessity of having unmanned systems to monitor vast geographical

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[86]   Some NGOs might be under specific policy limiting their interactions with peacekeeping missions' staff.

[87]   OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring*, p. 20 (see footnote 41).

[88]   Available from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/performance-peacekeeping_expert-panel-on-technology-and-innovation_report_2015.pdf.

areas as well as the boosting of cyber capabilities of peacekeeping operations have been identified as essential components of the successful implementation of United Nations mandates. Diverse communication systems and unmanned aerial vehicles can be used in a JMAC setting to gather information.

Acquisition of information based on physical evidence[89]

United Nations peace missions frequently operate in unstable settings where illicit flows of arms and ammunition feed the ability of armed actors to engage in violence. Likewise, various missions operate in countries in which the United Nations Security Council has established arms embargoes on certain actors. While few missions have a specific mandate to monitor the implementation of such an arms embargo,[90] Security Council resolution 2220 of May 2015 encourages United Nations missions to support Security Council-appointed groups/panels of experts on embargo monitoring, but to also be active in this area themselves.

The collection and analysis of information on evidence can provide important elements supporting the assessment of events, such as for the identification of the specific group that may have conducted an attack. On the basis of monitoring work and analysis of physical evidence, it is often possible to establish clear links between certain attacks (for example, certain ammunition or arms are known to be presently used by only specific groups).

The recovery of information on relevant materiel at sites of attack—e.g. ammunition of a specific calibre, producer, and year of production—can provide crucial elements in understanding which group conducted an attack.

The identification models/types, producers, years of production and the systematic recording of relevant information, including serial numbers/marks on arms and ammunition has allowed some missions to create baseline data against which any newly recovered materiel is compared. For example, this has enabled MINUSMA to be alerted to illicit shipments newly arriving in its area of operation. Where attacks took place in rural areas, it is often not possible to revisit the sites of attacks for information on evidence afterward without significant resource investments (ground protection, helicopter, etc.).

Imagery intelligence

Imagery intelligence refers to information acquired through image-forming sensors. It can be collected by the use of satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters, on digital cameras, etc. It provides a permanent register and allows for comparison between different sectors and areas. Measurements can also be done on imagery. The mission mandate will determine what kind of information can and ought to be gathered, and which tools can be used.

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[89]   JMAC analysts can acquire information based on physical evidence, yet they do not keep physical evidence as such (they do not acquire custody of physical evidence).

[90]   UNOCI was a notable exception and established an embargo-monitoring unit to this end.

Figure 7.5.

Imagery intelligence comparative advantages and disadvantages

> **Imagery intelligence (IMINT)** refers to information collected by image-forming sensors such as those found on unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters, and, most often, made available in handheld devices such as digital cameras.

Advantages of IMINT:

- Provides a permanent register
- An image is relatively objective and more difficult to disregard
- Images allow for comparisons to be made
- Measurements and scale can be obtained

Disadvantages of IMINT:

- Oftentimes an expensive and exclusive system requiring a specialized skill set
- Sensitivities associated with systems' deployments and capabilities
- Unable to provide insight on individuals' emotions or intentions

7.2.6. Selection and biases

JMAC analysts must select the most relevant sources from a considerable pool of information. In doing so, each analyst should be mindful of his or her selection process and biases: knowing that some information is sometimes unconsciously chosen or disregarded, misleading us into a wrong conclusion. The table below identifies the most common selection biases.

Table 7.6.

Most common selection biases[91]

Selection biases	Definition
Absence of evidence	Failure to consider the degree of completeness of information
Anchoring	Focusing on one piece of information
Availability	Confusing the frequency of events with how many times people have talked about them
Confirmation	Seeking information to confirm initial judgment
Conservatism	Preferring prior evidence over new information
Evidence acceptance	Preferring the coherence of data over the reliability of data
Pro innovation	Ignoring the limitations of innovation
Publication	Reporting information where there is none
Recency	Weighing recent events higher than past events
Salience or vividness	Focusing on the most easily recognizable data
Satisficing	Selecting the finding that looks "good enough"
Survivorship	Focusing only on positive examples

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[91] Adapted from Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*.

Chapter VII | Implementation of the intelligence cycle in a JMAC

Four mitigation strategies can be used: assessing the relevance, completeness, representativeness and comparability of data (usability of data); the expertise, reputation and objectivity of the source (reliability of sources); the weight of evidence supporting the conclusion (strength of evidence); or what information is missing and what it takes to get this information (measuring information gap).

7.3.   Examination, evaluation, collation and securing of data

Examination, evaluation and collation of the acquired data make up the third step of the intelligence cycle. Once examined and collated, the JMAC analyst must make sure to keep the data secured.

Information management tools

JMACs have a specific requirement for information management tools that will facilitate and secure collection, analysis, collation and dissemination of information, as well as enable secure collection, analysis, storage and network requirements. These tools include databases, confidential filing systems and tools enabling secure transfer of information. All tools shall be constructed to protect information to the highest security classification level of the content contained within.[92]

7.3.1.   Examination and evaluation

Examination and evaluation refers to the process of vetting the credibility of the information and reliability of the source.

It also includes assessing the accuracy, validity, relevance, completeness and meaning of information before collation and analysis are undertaken. The same rigorous vetting process should be applied to both internal and external sources.

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[92]   "JMAC Guidelines", PK/G/2015.04.

Table 7.7.
Classification of sources[93]

Grade	Classification	Comment
A	Consistently reliable	Accurate in an overwhelming number of cases. No person is completely reliable, whether as a result of corruption, ignorance or because they were deceived, but one could be considered "consistently" reliable. The Jane's series of books on weapon systems can however be considered an A source. National Geographic is another.
B	Usually reliable	Accurate in most cases. Informed and honest persons who are well-known can be given a B grading, as well as respected newspapers, etc.
C	Fairly reliable	This grade is used when unsure of the degree of reliability of the source but convinced that the source is not unreliable.
D	Not usually reliable	Information may still be accurate even if the source is not usually reliable. Caution should however be exercised.
E	Unreliable	Caution should be exercised when accepting information as accurate when the source has proven to be unreliable.
F	Reliability cannot be determined (or judged)	A new source may start out with this grading and then be upgraded later as reliability is demonstrated. Also used with sources of unknown origin.

Table 7.8.
Classification of information[94]

Grade	Classification	Comment
1	Confirmed by independent and reliable sources	The coupling of the information to another reliable source or physical evidence is the key.
2	Probably True	If not confirmed by other sources tasked but there is no reason to doubt its accuracy, information can be rated grade 2. Must still agree with known facts which do not come from the same source, or by physical evidence.
3	Possibly true	If unsure of the degree of truth but convinced that some elements of the information are true and are backed up by recent events or knowledge of the situation (or confirmed by at least one other independent source).
4	Doubtful	Unconfirmed information that does not appear to agree with current events but still cannot be proven incorrect or inaccurate.
5	Improbable	Unconfirmed information that contradicts current known facts or information.
6	Accuracy cannot be determined (or truth cannot be judged)	A piece of information may start out with this grading and then be upgraded later as accuracy is demonstrated. Also used for information proven false.

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[93]   United Nations, Department of Safety and Security, *Security Analysis Handbook,* Version 2.2 (2016).

[94]   Ibid.

Credibility and reliability

Credibility refers to the capability of being believed. More credible information is confirmed by other sources while least credible information contradicts other information.

- **Confirmed by other sources:** the information is supported by statements, policies, agendas or modi operandi for the refereed subject and is not contradicted by any other information.

- **Probably true:** the information is supported by statements, policies, agendas or modi operandi for the refereed subject and yet is contradicted in some details by other information.

- **Possibly true:** the information is only to a minor extent supported by statements, policies, agendas or modi operandi for the refereed subject and is contradicted in some details by other information.

- **Doubtful:** the information is only to a minor extent supported by statements, policies, agendas or modi operandi for the refereed subject and is contradicted in major parts by other information.

- **Improbable:** the information is not supported by statements, policies, agendas or modi operandi for the refereed subject and is completely contradicted by other information.

- **Truth cannot be judged:** the information cannot be verified or refers to new or previously unknown activity/behaviour.

Reliability refers to the trustworthiness of information. The most reliable information comes from a tried and trusted source. The least reliable information comes from a source known to have been deceptive.

- **Completely reliable:** the information comes from a tried and trusted source that can be depended upon with confidence.

- **Usually reliable:** the information comes from a source that has been successful in the past but for which there is still some element of doubt in a particular case.

- **Fairly reliable:** the information comes from a source that has occasionally been used in the past and upon which some degree of confidence can be based.

- **Not usually reliable:** the information comes from a source that has been used in the past but has proved more often than not unreliable.

- **Unreliable:** the information comes from a source which has been used in the past but has proved unworthy of any confidence.

- **Reliability cannot be judged:** the information comes from a source that has not been used in the past.

In assessing the reliability of a source, the JMAC analyst should consider the possibility of alteration of the information (and assess over time of how reliable a contact is in passing on original information without adding a personal interpretation) and also the motivation for providing the information.

JMAC analysts "should look for the reasons why the contact is sharing the information with them and be aware of any expectations the contact may have on the use of such data. This is crucial to ensure that contacts are not trying to further their own purposes in a way that may compromise the analysis and information gathering by the field presence". JMAC analysts "should be aware that there is always a risk that institutions and individuals across the political spectrum will try to manipulate the field presence through the information they pass on or withhold. Sometimes reports of human rights violations may be exaggerated because a group feels isolated and is acutely in need of support. In other cases, information from one organization or group may be intended to delegitimize another. The more nuanced the mapping that the field presence undertakes of the different actors and organizations and their objectives and motivations, the easier it will be to recognize attempts at manipulation and misinformation".[95]

As they operate in a cunning, ever-changing environment in which actors' interest evolve and change, JMAC analysts should regularly reassesses the reliably and credibly of sources. They should remain mindful to distinguish the reliability and credibility of sources as well as the validity of the information acquired. "Even a biased source may have important and relevant information, while a trusted source may unknowingly provide inaccurate information or a mistaken analysis". In the same way, "even a credible source can provide inaccurate information and vice versa".[96]

Table 7.9.

Example of scales for sources of information[97]

Word	Number	Remarks
Very high	100%	Alternative: complete, absolute
High	80%	
Moderate	60%	A sliding scale from 0% to 100% when using numbers is possible, but exercise with caution 50%
Low	40%	
Very low	20%	
No	0%	Alternative: none, zero

Accuracy, validity, relevance, completeness and meaning

Accuracy refers to the level of precision of information. The more precise the information is, the more accurate it is. In assessing the accuracy of information, the analyst should consider the

> "As the mission environment evolves, the position, interest, agenda and access to information of a specific source evolve with it. It is therefore of fundamental importance to regularly assess how ongoing dynamics might influence an analyst's interaction with a source."
>
> Giacomo Gabbrielli,
> UNV JMAC analyst, MINUSCA 2017

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[95] OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring.*

[96] Ibid.

[97] DSS, *Security Analysis Handbook* 2.2.

level of precision and the extent to which the contact is close to the source of information. The closer the origin of the information (vs. via a third party), the easier it is to assess its accuracy.

- **Completely accurate:** the information comes from a tried and trusted source that can be depended upon with confidence.

- **Usually accurate:** the information comes from a source that has been successful in the past but for which there is still some element of doubt in a particular case.

- **Fairly accurate:** the information comes from a source that has occasionally been used in the past and upon which some degree of confidence can be based.

- **Not usually accurate:** the information comes from a source that has been used in the past but has proven more often than not unreliable.

- **Inaccurate:** the information comes from a source that has been used in the past but has proven unworthy of any confidence.

- **Accuracy cannot be judged:** the information comes from a source that has not been used in the past.

Validity refers to the consistency of the information, whether it fits with other facts.

Relevance refers to the importance of information. The more the source can help solve a problem or contribute to a solution, the more likely it is relevant.

- **Completely relevant:** the information comes from a tried and trusted source that can be depended upon with confidence.

- **Usually relevant:** the information comes from a source that has been successful in the past but for which there is still some element of doubt in a particular case.

- **Fairly relevant:** the information comes from a source that has occasionally been used in the past and upon which some degree of confidence can be based.

- **Not usually relevant:** the information comes from a source that has been used in the past but has proven more often than not unreliable.

- **Irrelevant:** the information comes from a source that has been used in the past but has proven unworthy of any confidence.

- **Relevance cannot be judged:** the information comes from a source that has not been used in the past.

7.3.2.   Common challenges of multisource information

There is a vast number of different possible information sources in a mission. Each source within a mission differs in allegiances, agendas, competencies and technical capabilities in information collection and analysis. Each source thus presents his or her own interpretation as a product of his or her own method of reporting. The JMAC analyst acquiring information from other sections in the mission should thus carefully assess each source and piece of information.

Circular reporting and deception

Circular reporting and deception are the most common sources of errors in the acquisition, analysis and sharing of information. Circular reporting often occurs when the same information is received multiple times from different secondary sources, which are all reporting from the same primary source. Circular reporting is more frequent when staff rotates regularly in and out of a mission. It refers to the same piece of information that surfaces on a regular basis. As new personnel come in, they lack the experience in the area and they rate the information highly and pass it on to others.

Deception occurs when one party actively and intentionally with fake information or deliberate actions tires to mislead another party. Deception can be justified in many ways, including self-preservation on the part of the source. It makes it more difficult for an outsider to grasp the complexity of the situation. Here again the help of national staff can be most precious to lift some uncertainly.[98]

How to evaluate source and data

Information can be cross-checked by enlarging and diversifying the sample of informants and by sharing findings with particularly knowledgeable individuals. When evaluating an information, data or source, the analyst should ask the "W" questions.

Table 7.10.

What, why, how, where, when and by and from whom has the information been acquired?

Evaluating information and data	
What	Is the content reliable, credible, accurate, relevant, complete, timely, valid? Is the data clear/specific? Are the concepts brought forward clearly defined? Are the numbers provided measurable? Could there have been double-counting? Are there misleading comparisons, timeframes, comparison groups or standards used?
Why	For what purpose was the information collected?
How	In which ways was the information/data acquired?
Where	In which location was the information or data acquired? Is the location representative of other locations? Is the date acquired geographically meaningful?
When	At what time, in which circumstances was the information acquired? Can the timing of the collected information impact the data?
By whom	What is the expertise of those who have collected, reproduced and disseminated the data? Are they sufficiently knowledgeable to research the matter? Have results been misinterpreted? Who was the interviewer? Who collected the data?
From whom	What is the agenda of the source? Could it be biased? Is there a strong track record of producing accurate information?

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[98] Rex Brynen, "Here (Very Likely) Be Dragons: The Challenges of Strategic Forecasting" in *Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making: Case Studies in Achieving Analytical Relevance*, Thomas Juneau, ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), pp. 57–76.

7.3.3. Collation

Collation refers to the process of recording or storing information to enable expedient information comparison, evaluation, retrieval, analysis and dissemination. Collected information should be vetted, and its value, reliability and relevance examined before collation and analysis are undertaken. Access rights shall be established in line with the Policy on JMAC, the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy and the SOP on Access to Information.[99]

Steps of collation

- **Register** the receipt of each incoming piece of information/data.
- **Categorize** each piece of information/data into an appropriate category or group through logging, marking on a map or chart, or entry into an electronic database.
- **Name**—use a naming convention that identifies all documents in a way that they can easily be found in a database so it is already clear by the name of the document who produced it, when it was produced, what the classification is and what the subject is. E.g.: DATE_Classifcation_ Organization_Desk_Name.

Data can be filed by:
- Date, region, theme or source
- Alphabetical order
- Chronological order
- Numerical order

The United Nations has a number of secure IT platforms, and JMAC should seek use the more advanced encryption technology available in the mission and more secure and compartmentalized IT platforms to counter the currently wide-spread use of local drives. Bespoke platforms developed within the mission, or "SAGE", should be privileged.

Securing information and records

The security of information and records must be ensured at all times throughout the intelligence cycle. Information must be securely classified, marked, accessed, handled and stored. The challenge is to find a balance between the transparency and openness of the United Nations as a public organization and the protection of sources.

Understanding sensitivity classifications

All documents and records under the control of JMAC analysts should be classified according to the three sensitivity classifications, notwithstanding whether they have been approved or signed as record. The JMAC Chief should determine the level of classification for each document,

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[99] PK/G/2015.03, PK/G/2017.07, PK/G/2010.36.

which should then be recorded and marked accordingly. The JMAC Chief, under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, controls the flow of documents coming from his or her centre. The approver of the records, under the supervision and guidance of the Head of Mission or mission pillar, retains the right to change the level of security classification.

Marking

Marking refers to the "process of placing identifiers on records showing the level of sensitivity assigned".[100] As a rule, the security classification reflects the highest level of sensitive information found in the document. Public documents are those that are immediately shareable with news media, whereas unclassified documents are circulated among members of the mission.

Handling information

It is the responsibly of each analyst to transmit and safeguard information according to the classification level. This entails vigilance at every step of interaction with information, including marking, transferring, storing, reproducing and disposing of it.

Shared drive or use of mission cloud

All offices should create informal folder structures on shared drives in order to create and share non-record drafts, other working files and reference material.

JMAC staff should never store records on local disks (C: or H drives), removable media or with third-party online storage vendors such as Dropbox or Google Drive. The use of these should be restricted to genuinely personal or publicly available information.[101]

Each office should develop and use locally applicable naming conventions to folders and files. Folders within the central file that contain records must be named in accordance with the applicable hierarchy of functions and activities defined in the file classification scheme.

> **How to use data management tools**
>
> - Who will have access?
> - Who will share it?
> - What classification levels will the information have?
> - What are the responsibilities of the JMAC?
> - What resources are needed (software, hardware, training, maintenance)?
> - What is the input for and output from the system?

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[100] Department of Management and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Information Sensitivity Toolkit Version I*, 24 February 2010, available from https://archives.un.org/sites/archives.un.org/files/files/Information_sensitivity/Information%20Sensitivity%20Toolkit_2010.pdf.

[101] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "Managing Information on Shared Drives (SOP)", 1 July 2016, PK/G/2016.21, p. 3.

7.4.   Analysis in a JMAC

Analysis refers to the methodical breaking down of information into its component parts; examination of each to find interrelationships; and application of reasoning to determine the meaning of the parts and the whole. Through the retrieval of collated information acquired through the tasking of assets, peacekeeping intelligence analysts shall apply processes of reasoning, integration and interpretation using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Peacekeeping intelligence analysis shall be a whole-of-mission process that makes full use of all resources available to the mission according to the comparative advantages, including expertise in the local situation, languages and cultures; military and police intelligence analysis capabilities; and security threat information analysis techniques.[41]

7.4.1.   Integrated analysis

Integrated analysis is the analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple United Nations entities, and which therefore requires participation and/or data to be provided by concerned entities. In the case of the JMAC, the Centre shall pull information together in its products from all relevant mission components ensuring a holistic coverage of political, security, human rights, development and humanitarian concerns as these apply to mandate implementation and in determining any relevant threats to it therein.[42]

Integrated analysis is the core business of the work of JMAC analysts. It consists of explaining the what, when and why of a situation while providing forecasts on the how the situation is likely to develop. Good analysis contextualizes while being both predictive and operational. Analysis is said to be integrated when based on a comprehensive range of information, synthesizing multiple perspectives in order to provide a rigorous and thorough understanding of a situation.[104]

7.4.2.   Critical thinking and structured analysis

Critical thinking is the backbone of analysis. It refers to applying a conscious process to reasoning following the principles of scientific inquiry. An analyst must base his or her thought processes on the needs of the clients, decomposing the issue at hand to identify the main elements and dynamics at play. In doing so, the analyst must strive to uncover his or her assumptions, proactively look for contradictory data and review diverse explanations. An analyst can then engage in a structured analysis: a process in which he or she adopts a step-by-step approach of identifying the "what?" and "so what?". A structured method ensures replicability, thereby enabling the client and peer analyst to understand the analyst's reasoning and arguments.

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[102] "Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy", PK/G/2017.07.

[103] "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03.

[104] Willmot, *Improving UN Situational Awareness*, p. 9. Willmot defines integrated analysis as "produced collaboratively, harvesting a broad range of information and leveraging several perspectives. This is intended to achieve a well-rounded, comprehensive view of a situation, which is of value to a broader spectrum of decision makers. In this way, decision makers share a common understanding of a situation, based on an assessment that has harmonized views at the working level".

Forward-looking analysis

Forward-looking analysis implies that current issues are analysed anticipating challenges and opportunities to the implementation of the United Nations mandate in the immediate, short and long term. It includes both predictive and early warning assessments. Predictive assessment is focused on elaborating and articulating a range of scenarios based on multi-source information (qualitative and quantitative data). It is used to describe possible/likely future operating environments for the mission and can be used to evaluate/estimate the probability, impact and severity of an event/environment on the implementation of the mandate in the immediate, short and long term, depending on each scenario. Early warning assessments and warnings aim to predict specific events to which the mission will have to react, providing a clear snapshot of a situation at a given time to anticipate escalatory development of a situation that potentially requires short-term preventive actions and long-term preventive measures.[105] It needs to be constantly updated to account for fluid and evolving, high-tempo dynamics. It focuses on immediate causes while assessing the severity and likelihood of short- and long-term impacts on the implementation of the United Nations mandate. This may not be related specifically to a peacekeeping environment, and assessments should be considered holistically in order to inform the wider United Nations community of threats to the operating environment. "Main challenges to forward-looking analysis are fourfold: data availability, issue complexity, analytic process and institutional constraints".[106]

Forward-looking and predictive assessments are most useful to the implementation of the PoC mandate, when applicable. As in any situation, event or action by the mission may result in harm inflicted on civilian populations, or an escalation of such harm. JMACs will try to apply a "PoC lens" to their analysis so as to proactively share PoC early warning information and analysis with decision makers. In some missions, this effort is combined with the alert systems in place and coordinated through an early warning, alert and response SOP (cf. MINUSCA).

Data availability

Data is necessary to assess trends. Identifying future possibilities can be impeded by missing or falsified data. Analyst must be aware that they operate on partial/imperfect information.

Issue complexity

Analysts are asked to provide predictive analysis and scenarios on situations that are "adaptive, complex and dynamic".[107]

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[105] Escalatory developments include human rights violations/abuse, political instability, economic hardship that threaten the immediate, short- and long-term implementation of the mandate. Early warning concerns slow, gradual, quick, sudden, changes upon which action should be taken.

[106] Rex Brynen, "Here (Very Likely) Be Dragons", pp. 57–76.

[107] Ibid., p. 62.

Analytic process

Analysts often lack time, professional training and/or experience and long-term observation. The analytic process however is based on implicit or explicit modelling of observation, which requires professional training, time as well experience and observation. Making sense of information is a function of implicit or explicit modelling. Predictive analysis is based on assumptions relative to triggers and drivers of events and how these variables interact. Experience and observation are key in this process yet are not always available, especially to new analysts.

Challenge: balancing current events and forward-looking analysis

The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy stresses the importance of forward-looking analysis.[108] While predictive analysis is key in a JMAC, forecasting can be misleading. JMAC analysts deal with environments that are made of "dense networks of non-linear relationships and feedback loops […] that may be prone to cascading changes and failures, whereby small changes in conditions create the conditions for subsequent dramatic transformations".[109] Their challenge is to capture the extent to which issues from these complex and adaptive systems might impede the implementation of the mandate and to describe the operating environment in the near term for senior leaderships. To do so, JMAC analysts are expected to assess both fast-breaking events and consider slow, often small and incremental, changes to the operating environment, contextualizing situations, identifying trends and patterns. Characteristic of working in a JMAC is thus both time pressure and attention to detail. The analyst must find the most efficient way to conduct, draft and deliver his or her analysis upon request.

Distinguishing necessary from sufficient conditions

Throughout their analysis, JMAC staff should carefully differentiate necessary conditions from sufficient conditions. Necessary means "X" is a *sine qua non* condition for "Y". Y could not exist without the presence of X. Sufficient conditions refer to the existence of X guaranteeing that Y is present. Necessary and sufficient conditions can also be combined.

Planning

Getting started checklist, aims, client checklist, and issue redefinition are four of the most common techniques to start and orient an analysis.[110] The analyst will choose the checklist in function of the objective of the analysis or the challenges/constraints he or she foresee in crafting it.

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[108] "Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy", PK/G/2017.07.

[109] Thomas Juneau, "Introduction" in *Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making: Case Studies in Achieving Analytical Relevance*, Thomas Juneau, ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), pp. 1–18.

[110] Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*, p. 69.

Table 7.11.

How to plan an analysis and its techniques

Step 1	**Planning:** Before delving into the analysis, a JMAC officer must take a step back and reflect on what is requested, required and how to craft and draft his or her analysis. The analyst must take into account the client's needs, his or her resource and time constraints, as well as the nature and dynamic of the issue at stakes.	**Selecting questions:** • Checklist • AIMS • Client checklist • Issue redefinition
Step 2	**Analysing:** The type of analysis will guide the analyst in the questions to be put forward.	**Select type of analysis:** Exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, interpretative, anticipatory, prescriptive **Select corresponding analytical techniques:** • Star bursting techniques **Analysis of competing hypotheses:** • Premortem analysis • What if? analysis • Red hat analysis • Outside-in thinking
Step 3	**Validating analysis:** The analyst will then choose the technique that best validates his or her line of reasoning	**Select validating technique:** • Deception detection • Analytical pitfalls and cognitive biases

Table 7.12.

Identification of starting points for JMAC staff analysis[111]

Checklist	AIMS	Client checklist	Issue redefinition
Why?	Audience?	Key client?	Redefine
What?	Issue?	Right question?	Review
So what?	Message?	Important message?	Why and how
For whom?	Storyline?	Added value of response?	Connect issues
Who?		Expected information?	Narrow focus
From		Action required?	Redirect the focus
		Timing?	Turn 180 degrees
		Format?	
		Visual?	
		Classification?	
		Distribution?	
		Perspectives?	

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[111] Adapted from Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques.*

✅ Checklist to start analysis

☑ What has prompted the need for analysis: is it a news report? A new intelligence report? A new development? A perception of change? A client's request?

☑ What is the key question to be answered?

☑ Why is the issue important for mandate implementation?

☑ What are the potential implications for mandate implementation?

☑ How can analysis make a meaningful contribution?

☑ Did the JMAC or any other United Nations unit answer this question or a similar question before, and if so, what was said? To whom was this analysis delivered? What has changed since that time?

☑ Who are the principal clients? Are these clients' needs well understood? What kind of product are they looking for?

☑ Are there other stakeholders who would have an interest in the answer to this question? Who might see the issue from a different perspective and prefer that a different question be answered? Consider meeting with other who see the question from a different perspective (Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, U2, PoC, DDR, etc.).

☑ From first impressions, what are all the possible answers to this question? For example, what alternative explanations or outcomes should be considered before making an analytical judgment on the issue?

☑ Depending on response to the previous questions, consider rewording the key question. Consider adding subordinate or supplemental questions.

☑ Generate a list of potential sources or streams of reporting to be explored.

☑ Reach out and tap into the experience and expertise of analysis in other mission sections—both within and outside the JMAC—who are knowledgeable about this topic. For example, call a meeting or conduct a virtual meeting to brainstorm relevant evidence and to develop a list of alternative hypotheses, driving forces, key indicators or important players.

> "Current and strategic events are neither opposed nor mutually exclusive. On the contrary, their combination enhances the relevance of analysis. Strategic implication can be extracted from current events: analysis can then be driven by fast-paced news cycle, responding to the immediate needs of decision-makers, while explaining the bigger picture drivers and consequences of those events."
>
> Juneau, p. 246

✅ ## AIMS Checklist

This checklist prompts the analyst to consider the client, the main stakes, the take-away points and the narrative to adopt.

☑ **A**udience: For whom is the analysis being produced? Who is/are the client(s)?

☑ **I**ssue: What is the key issue at stake?

☑ **M**essage: What is the take-away point?

☑ **S**toryline: What is your argument? Your narrative?

✅ ## Client checklist[112]

This checklist is used to craft a product focused on the client's needs. It identifies the type of information necessary for drafting the product.

☑ Who is the key person for whom the product is being developed?

☑ Will this product answer the question the client asked (or is likely to ask)? The JMAC analyst should draw the client's attention to potentially relevant events, developments, patterns and trends before they occur

☑ What is the key message to give this client?

☑ What value-added contribution can you make?

☑ How is the client expected to use this information?

☑ How much time does your client have to digest your product?

☑ What format could convey the information most effectively?

☑ Is it possible to capture the essence of your message in one or a few key graphics? (noting that every product will start with an executive summary)

☑ What is the customer's level of tolerance for technical language and detail? Can you provide details in backup materials, graphics or an annex?

☑ Does distribution of this document need to be restricted? What classification is most appropriate? Should you prepare different products at different levels of restriction?

☑ Would the customer expect you to reach out to other experts for assistance in answering this question? If so, how would you flag their contribution in presenting your product?

☑ To whom might your customer turn for other views on this topic? What data or analysis might others provide that could influence how the customer would react to what you will be preparing?

☑ What perspectives do other interested parties have on this issue? What are your responsibilities to other parties?

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[112] Adapted from Pherson and Pherson, *Critical Thinking*, p. 9.

✅ Issue redefinition checklist

This checklist focuses on the issue to be addressed. It is most useful when a new hypothesis or new information emerges and requires a shift in approaching a topic.

☑ What are the different ways to define an issue?

☑ Redefine the issue without losing the original meaning.

☑ Review the results to see if they provide a better foundation upon which to conduct the research and assessment.

☑ Ask why: ask a series of "why" or "how" questions about the issue definition. After receiving the first response, ask "why" to do that or "how" to do it.

☑ Keep asking such questions until you are satisfied that the real problem has emerged. This process is especially effective in generating possible alternative answers.

☑ Broaden the focus: instead of focusing on only one piece of the puzzle, step back and look at several pieces together. What is the issue connected to?

☑ Narrow the focus: can you break down the issue further? Take the question and ask about the components that make up the problem.

☑ Redirect the focus: what outside forces impinge on this issue? Is deception involved?

☑ Turn 180 degrees: turn the issue on its head. Is the question the one asked or the opposite of it?

Indicators vs. factors vs. drivers vs. triggers vs. thresholds benchmarks

Prior to conducting an analysis, the analyst should identify the indicators, factors, drivers, triggers, thresholds and benchmark (if applicable) as reference points to determine whether an issue or event is new, different, significant, useful or of sufficient interest that the mission leadership would like or need to know.[113]

● What is new or different about this issue or event?

● Is it an indicator of a significant change?

● Do you need to warn of an imminent or potential threat?

● Does the issue or event relate your clients' interest or schedule?

● What can you add that will support your clients in meetings or policy discussions?

● Does the event or issue present opportunities or pitfalls for your clients' programs, actions or policies?

● Is the issue relevant to your organization or a broader audience?

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[113] Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*, p. 37.

Table 7.13.

Determination of the type of the event/issue

Reference points	Definitions
Indicators	Observable phenomena that help analysts identify emerging trends, track events, validate hypotheses and warn of unanticipated change. Indicators should be revised regularly as to adapt to the evolving dynamics of a context, of actors' objectives and interests
Factors	Contribute to the trends concerning the object of focus
Drivers	Lead the flow of events, contribute to reinforce/lead a dynamic
Triggers	Spark a latent trend
Thresholds	Turning points
Benchmarks	Reference points on which to assess the evolution of a situation

Table 7.14.

Qualities of good indicators

| |
|---|
| **Observable:** can be noted by a reliable source |
| **Valid:** measurable accurately and reliably |
| **Reliable:** consistent across multiple users |
| **Stable:** useful over time to compare |
| **Unique:** measure only one thing or, taken with other indicators, points only to the issue in question |

Table 7.15.

Six types of analysis[114]

Type of analysis	Questions and purpose	Analytical technique
Exploratory	What is there? How useable is it? Identify key situations/trends/patterns	Key assumption check Star bursting
Descriptive	5 Ws: What, Where, When, Where, Why? Summarize and compare	
Explanatory	Why? How come? Explain	Outside-in thinking Conflict analysis matrix Pre-mortem analysis and structured self-critique
Interpretative	So what? What does it mean? What else could it mean? Imply and conclude	
Anticipatory	What will happen next? What if? What then? Predict and forecast what might happen next	Analysis of competing hypotheses
Prescriptive	What could be done? Suggest and advise	Pre-mortem analysis What if? analysis Red hat analysis

7.4.3. Choosing an analytical technique

JMAC Information analysts should choose the analytical technique that best fits with the requested product. Below is a non-exhaustive list of some analytical techniques.

- **Star bursting:[115]** form of structured brainstorming that helps to generate as many questions as possible. It is particularly useful in developing a research project, but can also be helpful to elicit many questions and ideas about conventional wisdom. The process allows the information analyst to consider the issue at hand from many different perspectives, thereby increasing the chances that he or she may uncover a heretofore unconsidered question or idea that will yield new analytic insights.[116]

Figure 7.6.

Star bursting example[57]

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
[114] Adapted from Assessment Capacities Project, "The Analysis Spectrum", available from www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/resources/files/acaps_analysis_spectrum_poster.pdf.

[115] Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*, p. 113.

[116] Ibid., pp.113–115.

[117] Ibid.

- **Key assumptions check:** helps the information analyst identity his or her premises regarding the object of focus (his or her interests, caveats, goals, etc.). The analyst should recognize and question his or her premises.

- **Analysis of competing hypotheses:** requires analysts to start with a full set of plausible hypotheses rather than with a single most likely hypothesis. Information analysts then take each item of relevant information, one at a time, and judge its consistency or inconsistency with each hypothesis. The idea is to refute hypotheses rather than confirm them.

- **Pre-mortem analysis:** uses a form of reframing, in which restating the question or problem from another perspective enables analysts to see it in a different way and come up with different answers.

- **What if analysis:** imagining that an unexpected event could have happened and considering the potential consequences. This creates an awareness that prepares the analyst's mind to recognize early signs of a significant change, and can enable decision makers to plan ahead for that contingency. A what if analysis can be a tactful way of alerting decision makers to the possibility that they may be wrong.

- **Alternative explanations:** developing a hypothesis to explain what has occurred based on the available evidence and logic. Analysts should assess whether any alternative explanations should be considered, positing that the initial or lead hypothesis is not true, focusing on data that are consistent with the alternative explanation and rejecting other data that are inconsistent.

- **Red hat analysis:**[118] the main challenge of predictive analysis is for the analyst to avoid mirror imaging i.e. projecting onto others his or her own perception, anticipation and strategic course of actions. Red hat analysis is used to identify what motivates an actor, to grasp how he or she perceives his or her reality, his or her trade-offs, constraints and opportunities. This technique is used to challenge the analyst's understanding of a situation by shifting the focus on the rationale of the subject of study. One technique is thus to break down conception of a situation using the categories depicted on the following page.

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[118] Developed by Heuer and Pherson, this technique was developed during the Cold War (hence "red" referring to the symbolic colour of the Soviet Union). "To see the options faced by foreign leaders as these leaders see them, one must understand their values and assumptions and even their misperceptions and misunderstandings. Without such insight, interpreting foreign leaders' decisions or forecasting future decisions is often little more than partially informed speculation. Too frequently, the behaviour of foreign leader appears "irrational" or "not in their own best interest". Such conclusions often indicate analysts have projected American values and conceptual frameworks onto the foreign leaders and societies, rather than understanding the logic of the situation as it appears to them". Richards J. Heuer, Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Langley: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), p, 33, available from www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence /csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf. See also Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*, pp.263–265.

Table 7.17.

Red hat analysis

Relationships	Information issues	Interest	Structural aspects	Values
• Interactions • Stereotypes • Communication	• Contested versions • What is relevant for whom?	• What are their interest in their positions/ demands?	• Political, economic constraints • Environment • Institutions	• Norms • Change • Traditions

- **Red team analysis:** the term "red team" or "red teaming" is "the practice of viewing a problem from an adversary or competitor's perspective".[119] This technique is initiated by the chief of section as it is used as a strategy "for challenging an organization's plans, programs, and assumptions at all levels—strategic, operational and tactical".[120] It is meant to ensure that other reasonable alternatives have been carefully considered. It consists of "role playing" to understand the mental model of individuals or groups that operate following various codes of behaviour and whose motivations and interests seem to depart from standard references. The method associated with this technique of analysis is to elaborate an assessment by building the strongest case against it.

Table 7.18.

Comparison of red team and red hat analysis[121]

Red team	Red hat
Initiated by a leadership decision to create a special project, cell or office with analysts whose cultural and analytical skills qualify them for dealing with this special type of analysis. A modern version of the devil's advocate.	Culturally sensitive analysis of an adversary's or competitor's behaviour and decision-making initiated by a regular line analyst or analytic team. Done as standard analytic practice.

- **Outside-in thinking:** a JMAC analyst must be careful not to narrow his or her analysis to security issues only. This technique is helpful to assess a wide spectrum of factors that, together, can challenge the implementation of the mandate. They include political, environmental, technological, economic or social forces and trends. It is more useful when the analyst deals with a significant database. It widens the analyst's horizons and forces the analyst to strive to grasp the complexity of interactions and interrelations between issues at stake, and get the "bigger picture".

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[119] Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*, pp.282–284.

[120] Ibid, p. 282.

[121] Ibid., p. 283.

7.4.4. Avoiding common fallacies

While crafting his or her analysis, the analyst must avoid common analytical fallacies. The main ones are listed below.[122]

- **Circular argument or tautological claims:** using the claim or conclusion as part of the supporting argument.

- **Inadequate sampling:** when the sample used as a measure to draw a conclusion is too small.

- **Hasty generalization:** general claim based on insufficient or unrepresentative evidence. It often includes stereotypes and words like all, every, always, and never.

- **False analogy:** supports an argument with evidence that is not essentially similar.

- **False dichotomy:** when a set of opposing forces or possibilities is reduced to only two options, misrepresenting the complexity of the situation.

- *Non-sequitur***:** asserts a logical relationship between a conclusion and a premise where none exist. The conclusion does not follow the premise.

- *Post hoc, ego propter hoc***:** claims that if an event preceded another, it must have caused the subsequent event to occur.

- **Slippery slope:** relates the first and last step in a causal chain when the intervening steps have not occurred.

- **Distraction:** brings irrelevant points to distract attention from the issue being argued.

- *Ad hominem***:** against the person making the argument rather than against the argument.

- *Ad populum***:** uses popular behaviour or opinion to argue a point rather than citing factual evidence.

- **Appeal to authority:** when the opinion of a recognized expert is automatically seen as valid.

Analytical pitfalls and cognitive biases

While analysing, there are several common pitfalls to avoid/cognitive biases to mitigate. The following tables list a number of them both in the intellectual process of analysing information and in the social context in which information is processed. Mitigation strategy refers to ways in which the analyst can minimize the risk of these biases.

Each analytical model entails its own pitfalls and biases, and an analyst must be ever-vigilant to stay conscious of his or her own analytical shortcomings.

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[122] Adapted from Pherson and Pherson, *Critical Thinking*, p. 149.

Richards Heuer, a specialist in the psychology of intelligence, notes that "human beings tend to perceive what they expect to perceive; form and adhere to implicit mental models that they are reluctant to change; and remember—imperfectly at that—what they want to know. They often handle imperfect information poorly, have difficulty linking cause and effect, and 'satisfice' by uncritically accepting the first explanation they encounter that appears to fit the facts. They also rather poorly understand the own analytical process [...] the analyst is typically unaware not only of which variable should have the greatest influence, but also which variables actually are having the greatest influence".[123] For process biases, red hat analysis and what if strategies are the best mitigation strategies.

Table 7.19.
Cognitive biases[124]

Process biases	Definition
Looking for the scoop	Overemphasizing/overestimating information about possible discontinuities over evidence of stability
Blind spot	Not seeing our own biases
Choice supporting	Seeing previous choices as good
Clustering illusion	Seeing patterns where there are none
Hindsight	Knowing after the event that it was predictable
Hyperbolic discounting	Preferring immediate payoffs over later payoffs
Impact	Overestimating the importance of an event because of its potential impact
Information volume	Seeking more information when it is not necessary
Irrational escalation	Justifying increased time investment based on previous time investment
Negativity	Focusing attention on negative experience
Ostrich	Ignoring dangerous information
Overconfidence	Being too confident about our abilities
Planning	Overlooking the significance of uncertainty
Risk adverse	Fearing of losing more than willing to win
Selective attention	Focusing attention on only one part of the problem
Status quo	Not being able to see past the current situation
Wishful thinking	Overestimating the probability of positive events
Zero risk	Preferring to eliminate a smaller risk instead of reducing a bigger risk

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[123] Heuer, *Intelligence Analysis*, p. 56.

[124] ACAPS, annex, pp.19–20, available from www.acaps.org.

Table 7.20.

Social biases[125]

Social biases	Definition	Mitigating strategies
Compensation of known cultural biases	Giving excessive importance to peculiar cultural aspects of the mission environment	Alternative hypotheses Devil's advocacy Implicit association Unconscious evaluative judgments Social Logic mapping Key assumption check
Attribution error	Personality-based explanation instead of situational	
False consensus	Overestimation of consensus within a group	
Framing	Being influenced by how the situation is presented	
Groupthink	Choosing the option the majority of the group prefers	
Halo effect	Agreeing/disagreeing with someone because of his or her personality	
Implicit association	Unconscious evaluative judgments	
Institutional	Organizational interest	
Mirror imaging	Assuming that others will act the same as we would	
Stereotyping	Expect a group to have certain qualities	

7.5. Dissemination

Dissemination is a key part of the JMAC, as the best of analysis is useless unless delivered in a timely and accurate manner, and in the appropriate format. Dissemination should be done to clarify "reality" and optimize the value of the analysis. For a JMAC, dissemination refers the

> Intelligence is a service […] You must not waste their time by telling them what they already know or present them with only what they want to hear.
>
> Pherson and Pherson, p. 19

sharing of analysis or analytical products rather than the sharing of information (un-analysed).

Dissemination is defined as "the process of conveying peacekeeping intelligence to mission decision makers and other relevant mission personnel. Peacekeeping intelligence products developed as part of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle may be disseminated directly by individual participating mission entities to their respective managers […] or jointly through the mission intelligence coordination structure".[126]

The Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy highlights that "the delegation of authority to disseminate peacekeeping intelligence products shall be clearly identified as part of the mission's peacekeeping intelligence support plan and/or internal guidance for participating mission entities. The dissemination of peacekeeping intelligence products shall be done in compliance with the

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[125] Ibid.

[126] "Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy", PK/G/2017.07.

> "The most important factor of success is the trust from the senior management. If you don't get the trust you become irrelevant. Interpersonal relations and skills of the CJMAC are capital."
>
> Sebastian Fasanello,
> Chief, JMAC MONUSCO

'need to know/need to share' concepts as well as the below organizational requirements for information classification, security, handling, ownership and sharing".[127]

When a JMAC product is commissioned, its final dissemination should be discussed by the tasking authority and the JMAC Chief, and the final

distribution list recorded in the PIR. The JMAC Chief is responsible for ensuring that any changes in the dissemination list are cleared with the tasking authority.

7.5.1.   Need to know and need to share

When sharing information:
- Seek guidance and approval from JMAC Chief
- Specify the recipients
- Do not use Word, PowerPoint, Excel or JPG (which can all be modified without your knowledge)
- Use PDF or print
- Highly sensitive information should preferably be conveyed orally only

Information and analysis should be disseminated on a need to know/need to share basis. Both needs must be identified and approved by the HoM and the JMAC Chief. This principle refers to the fact that one has to justify the need, and must have the requirements or the authority to receive the information or record requested. It is meant "to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information".[128]

Need to know

Information can be requested or shared based on a need to take action, when information is key for someone to complete a job. It is an information that needs to be known to be acted upon.

Need to know: [129]

- Applies primarily to sensitive records;[130]
- Must always be balanced with the need to share;
- Requires that only those individuals who must have access to be able to carry out their jobs or have other strong justifications for seeing the information should be provided access;

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[127] "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03.

[128] *Information Sensitivity Toolkit Version 1* (see footnote 100).

[129] Ibid.

[130] Whether or not somebody needs to know something does not depend on the sensitivity of the information. We should never share everything with everybody, but should tailor information to the requirements of the receiver.

- Requires a clear delegation of authority from the originator or staff member who originally applied the classification level;
- Implies that sensitive information is only disclosed to trusted individuals to ensure that it is not widely disseminated.

Need to share

Information can also be shared if it is for the wide benefit of greater learning, such as lessons learned, but not to be acted upon. For example, information that was distributed after the Baghdad bombing where staff needed to understand the reality of security at the United Nations. This is the exception in which the need to share overrode the need to know.

The Information Sensitivity Toolkit specifies that the need to share refers to "the individual and collective obligation to make records available, discoverable and accessible for colleagues that require the information to perform their official tasks […]. It extends to providing colleagues access to information for the purpose of knowledge sharing. Such information though not explicitly required for the colleagues' official functions could enable them to innovate and improve by building on others' experiences and lessons learned. Need to share is a healthy baseline approach to access rights because it fosters the Organization's commitment to openness and transparency. Staff members and business units benefit greatly from a 'need to share' culture in that greater awareness of the work of others can lead to the identification of partnership opportunities the removal of duplicative processes and documentation and a greater ability to find information for him or herself or on behalf of others. The concept of need to share can be applied to non-sensitive and sensitive records alike".[131]

A security alert to all staff is a classic example of a need to share.

Sharing with the Head of Mission (HoM)

Dissemination is guided by the Secretary-General's guidelines on the handling of sensitive information. Information should be primarily made available on a "need-to-know basis". The HoM and the SMT receive all JMAC products. In addition to the dissemination of written materials, JMAC staff members should be available on request to offer ad hoc or routine briefings; for example, briefings for senior incoming staff and visiting United Nations officials, or to the SMT. JMAC Chief should attend regular meetings with the HoM and/or with senior managers, as well as critical mission-level meetings with the host country so as to keep abreast of the challenges facing the SMT and be prepared to offer support to decisions they will have to take in the future.

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[131] *Information Sensitivity Toolkit Version 1*, p.15 (see footnote 100).

Sharing with non-United Nations entities

Sharing of information with non-United Nations entities can be mutually beneficial, but needs to be carefully managed, particularly where there is a risk that the information could be misused.

Sharing with United Nations entities

Dissemination to heads of components of the mission, Headquarters, and as appropriate with the UNCT, is encouraged so as to ensure a two-way information flow. Undertaking joint analysis and monthly meetings in which the JMAC, all relevant/key/substantive components and relevant UNCT elements consult, validate and justify information has proved beneficial to enhancing information flow in some missions. Through such activities, JMACs has a "bridge building" role between the mission and UNCT.

Sharing between JMAC and Headquarters

The sharing of information by JMACs must be sanctioned by the mission leadership to ensure that once shared, information and analysis are properly protected. The primary recipient of JMAC products is the UNOCC.

Sharing between JMACs

Regional cooperation should be sanctioned by UNOCC and both among peacekeeping operations and special political missions in a common region. Travel within the region and regional staff exchanges optimizes collaboration.

7.5.2.   Meetings

The JMAC Chief should attend Crisis Management Team meetings and complement JOC briefings. JMACs also have an important role in respect to missions' crisis-preparedness activities. JMACs should be involved in contingency planning, including through leading the development of scenarios, and producing lessons-learned reports. On the issue of planning in general, JMAC analysis should inform integrated operational planning. JMACs have an important role anticipating potential and emerging crises and articulating possible outcomes and implications.

Table 7.21.

Example of JMAC Participation to weekly, monthly and ad hoc meetings in MONUSCO

Working Group	Chaired/organized by	Level of attendance	Frequency
Strategic Planning Group	SRSG/MCOS	JMAC Chief	Monthly
Joint Operations Planning Team	DRSG Ops East	JMAC Chief	Ad-hoc
Electoral Task Force	DSRSG/RC/HC office	P3	Weekly
Elections Strategic Communication Task Force	DSRSG/RC/HC office	P3	Weekly
Civil Society Working Group	CAS	JMAC Chief and P3	Monthly
Protection Working Group	PoC Adviser	P3/P4	Monthly
Senior Management Group on Protection-Provincial	HoO	P3	Monthly
Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-P)	SRSG office/UNJHRO	JMAC Chief	Monthly
Serious and Organized Crime Working Group	Police Commissioner	JMAC Chief/P3	Monthly
Radio Okapi Editorial Board	SRSG	JMAC Chief	Monthly

Table 7.22.

Example of JMAC Participation to weekly, monthly and ad hoc meetings in UNMISS

Type of meeting/ working group	Chaired/organized by	Level of attendance	Frequency
Briefs the principles	PMM—senior	JMAC Chief	Weekly
Management meeting	Mission Leadership		
Head of sections meeting	MCOS	JMAC Chief	Weekly
Brief on EW alert matrix to senior management group	SMG SMT Head of United Nations AFPS Security Management Team	JMAC Chief	Weekly
CoS	CoS	JMAC Chief	Weekly
DRSG political	DSRSG	JMAC Chief	Weekly
Diplomatic forum	Diplomats	JMAC Chief (but can delegate)	Routine
EW working group	JMAC Team	JMAC Chief (but can delegate)	Weekly
Political pillar		JMAC Chief (but can delegate)	Weekly
Section coordination meeting	All members of section		Weekly
JOC coordination meeting	EW team leader	JMAC Chief and EW team	Routine
Operational planning meeting		Geographical team lead	Ad hoc
Air threat meetings		Senior JMAC analyst	
Diplomatic security meeting		Senior JMAC analyst	Monthly
Transitional-security-arrangements-related meetings		JMAC Chief/ senior JMAC analyst	Ad hoc

POLICE NAT

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RÉPUBLIQUE D'HAITI

CANADA

MAITRE D'OUVRAGE : MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE ET DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE
MAITRE D'OEUVRE : POLICE NATIONALE D'HAITI

PROJET: CONSTRUCTION DU SOUS COMMISSARIAT DE OUANAMINTHE
FINANCEMENT : GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA
ENTREPRENEUR : L.P. CONSTRUCTION
SUPERVISION : PNH / MINUSTAH / OIM
DUREE : 6 MOIS

Chapter 8.   JMAC products

8.1.   Principles of JMAC products

JMAC products are the result of multisource (i.e. integrated) analysis and focus on assessing threats (and their corresponding risk) and opportunities to the implementation of a mandate.[132] They are meant to be provided to the HoM and SMT in support of their decision-making and planning. JMAC is also mandated to generate

Multisource (i.e. integrated)
Predictive/forward-looking
Risk, threats, challenges and opportunities to the implementation of the mandate

products designed to support other components' operational, reporting and planning processes (e.g. inputs to draft reports of the Secretary-General, mission risk analysis, mission threat assessment, PoC strategy, etc.) where they require integrated multi-source analysis (therefore, do not lead to duplication of effort). JMAC products should be forward-looking and should indicate the probability of a suggested eventuality in quantitative or qualitative terms.

Three key components:[133]

1. What is the issue?
2. What is the role of the analyst?
3. Who is the decision-maker or the audience?

The primary audience

What mandate-relevant event, incident, development, trend or pattern are the key customers struggling with now or may have to deal with in the future? What is their greatest concern or greatest need at the moment or in the future? Is the key question tightly focused, actionable and answerable in more than one way? What is the bottom line that you want to convey to your key client (i.e. HoM/SRSG)? With the clear bottom line message in mind, can you present the message in a simple and direct way to the customer?[134]

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[132] See box on p. 123 for definitions of "threat" and "risk".

[133] Pherson and Pherson, *Critical Thinking*, p. 22.

[134] See p. 105 for the "client checklist", which outlines these questions further.

Managing time

Analysts should generally be working on multiple projects at the same time, balancing current and longer-term responsibilities. Some examples include:

- Short, current pieces that introduce new information on front-burner or developing topics;

- Medium-term analysis that frame issues or changes;

- Longer-term assessment that looks back over a period of time at events or issues;

- Forward-looking estimates of trend changes and what happens next.

The list of products and their associated annexes are neither mandatory nor exhaustive, but are intended to offer the JMAC Chief and HoM/SMT options from which they may select à la carte, or amend in form and content to suit their specific needs. Some are routine reports (weekly, monthly) others are ad hoc (profiles, scenarios, risk analysis, timelines, etc.). The focus of JMAC products will always be on the analysis (i.e. insight and context) and assessment (i.e. foresight) rather than descriptive overviews of facts. A JMAC product should always answer the "so what?" question relative to the implementation of the mandate.

Figure 8.1.

Example of products in the JMAC MINUSCA 2017

1. DESCRIPTION OF JMAC / MINUSCA
1.2. TASKS & PRODUCTS

REGULAR PRODUCTS:
- MONTLY THREAT ASSESSMENTS
- MONTHLY LRA THREAT ASSESSMENT
- MONTHLY SECURITY RELATED INCIDENT BRIEF
- JMAC WEEKLY OUTOOK
- JMAC WEEKLY PRESIDENTIAL ANALYSIS
- ELECTORAL THREAT ASSESSMENTS

"AD-HOCs":
- NOTES TO FILE
- TOPIC ASSESSMENTS
- EARLY WARNING NOTES
- BRIEFS (INCLUDING MONTHLY SECURITY RELATED INCIDENTS)

8.2. List of products

8.2.1. Assessments

JMAC weekly assessment or analysis

This product is a regular assessment issued every week and integrates a number of topics for the period under review to reflect all the main issues of the mandate. The aim of this product is to ease the decision-making process of the Head of Mission and senior management team by giving a condensed overview of the situation, particularly emerging threats, trend analysis, scenarios and topic estimates significant in the country for the implementation of the missions' mandate. The purpose of a weekly assessment is thus to draw the SRSG and SMT's attention to past (i.e. during the reporting period), current and (potential) future events, incidents, developments, trends and patterns that can affect mandate implementation, and to identify the implications of these items. This paper should not be more than a total of five pages every week. It should provide an explicit and thorough synthesis with good infographics.

JMAC weekly assessment or analysis template

Weekly analysis from 9 to 17 January 2016

Section 1: General overview

Section 2: Regional stability

Section 3: National context

Section 4: Current national sources of risk and tension

Section 5: Security threats and risks

Section 6: Trends (including graphs and maps)

Weekly situation report (SitRep)

In some missions, the weekly SitRep is the responsibility of the JOC, JMAC or the Political Affairs Division as directed by the HoM. This routine report is meant to recap and analyse the most significant events, identify trends, explore linkages between cross-cutting issues and contain assessments and commentary. Again, if there is no other weekly coming from the JMAC, this report should be informative and synthesize the most important information to retain.

Weekly situational report template

CONFIDENTIAL

WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

[MISSION NAME]

Weekly Situation Report Covering Period: Tuesday [Date] (00:01hrs) to Monday [Date] (24:00hrs)

SUMMARY
[The purpose of this section is to ensure that key developments and events are not overlooked by SitRep readers. The section should summarise and analyse the most significant events during the reporting period.]

POLITICAL
[This section should provide a summary and analysis of events, incidents or developments with a notable operational impact, irrespective of the mission component affected, e.g. humanitarian, human rights, civil affairs, logistics, military, police, mine action and others, as applicable.]

SECURITY/SAFETY
[This section should provide a summary and analysis of incidents or developments with a significant impact on the security situation in the mission area. It should cover any new threats to personnel, special security measures established or lifted during the reporting period, and an update on any personnel missing, seriously wounded or killed during the reporting period, where applicable.]

[OTHER SUB-HEADINGS IF REQUIRED]
[Additional sections can be added if considered necessary for purposes of clarity. However, the most simplified reporting format is preferable.]

COMMENTS
[This section is optional and may not be necessary given that the main body of the text should have an operational focus.]

Mission threat and challenge assessment (MTCA)[135]

The JMAC analyst should approach this product as a challenge assessment to the mission's mandate. Threat is an encompassing concept that is especially relevant when there is immediate danger to the implementation of the mandate. This product is meant to explain the threats or potential threats (not limited to security, including political, humanitarian, human rights, economic dimensions) against the mission and its

> **Threat:** Any factors (actions, circumstances or events) which have the potential or possibility to impede the implementation of the mandate.
>
> **Risk:** The combination of the impact and likelihood for impediment for the implementation of the mandate. Risks are categorized from very low to very high for their prioritization.

mandate. The MTCA may be reviewed on a regular basis, or when a significant event triggers a change in the threat profile. Working in partnership with Headquarters (particularly the Integrated Operational Teams) and other external entities is critical for ensuring that the widest possible range of threats is evaluated. The MTCA is meant as an integrated threat assessment that draws on component-specific evaluations, such as those produced by security, police and the military.

JMAC mission threat and challenge assessment template

Mission threat and challenge assessment as of dd/mm/yy

1. Summary

Provides a summary and assessment of the general situation, forward-looking in the mid- to long-term (political, social, economic, security, etc.).

2. Key judgments

Outlines, in general, what the consequences of these threats would be and what kind of impact they could have on the mission's mandate.

(samples can be provided upon request)

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[135] PK/G/215.03, para. 27 c, "Identifying threats and challenges to mandate implementation".

Incident or critical event assessment[136]

This assessment gives a thorough and verified account of an incident or an event, locating it in the context of implications for mission mandate implementation. This elaboration of the wider (i.e. multiple perspectives, and relying on multiple sources and kinds of information) context, and implications for the future, is what distinguishes the JMAC incident analysis from an incident report or summary produced by a single component.

Incident or critical event assessment template

Incident or critical event title

Date, Time:

Location:

Brief Summary:

Description of actors involved: Identities, motivations, interests, intent.

Sequence of events: Include indication of degree of certainly (verified facts, suspicions) and remaining areas of uncertainty. Timings for each episode of the sequence.

Underlying causes/related issues: Motivations, interests, intent.

Consequences: Immediate consequences for mission area and integrated mission operations for mission mandate implementation. Wider consequences for host nation and long term political/ other processes.

Comments:

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[136] See also annex IX. The threat assessment group is intended to be an implement mechanism to apply an integrated approach to sharing, evaluating and assessing and disseminating a security threat information.

Profiles[137]

A profile may take as their subject an actor (e.g. a local leader, public figure), an institution (e.g. a political party), a locality (e.g. a town or province), and also includes group profiling (e.g. the "who's who" analysis). Profiles should describe their subjects in terms that inform a decision maker on how the subject might respond under a range of circumstances, or how the mission might involve the subject in one of its mandated processes. Possible elements include: geographical, political, economic and possibly tribal features, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, intentions, perceptions, associations, etc. The profile should be dynamic and always kept updated.

Armed group profile template

Armed Group Name XXX

1.0 Purpose

2.0 Summary

3.0 [Group name]

    3.1   Background/history

    3.2   Leadership and structure, command and control and internal dynamics

    3.3   Motivation/intent, discipline and morale

    3.4   Areas of operation (including maps where possible)

    3.5   Capability

    3.6.   Impact on civilians and civilian objects (including human rights violations, forced displacement, humanitarian needs)

    3.8   Use of public relations and media for strategic objectives

    3.9   Opportunities/vulnerabilities

    3.10 Resources

    3.11 Support

    3.12 Current activity

    3.13 Current dialogue engagement with United Nations and external actors

4.0 Overall assessment

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[137] For a detailed template on group profile, see annex II.

Network analysis and network charting

From the profiles, a **network analysis** can be built thus linking the different kind of actors that are relevant to the implementation of the missions' mandate.

The network analysis is a review, compilation and interpretation of data to determine the presence of associations among individuals, groups, businesses, or other entities; the meaning of those associations to the people involved; and the degrees and ways in which those associations can be strengthened or weakened. It is the best method available to help analysts understand and identify opportunities to influence the behaviour of a set of actors about whom information is sparse.

Analysis of networks is broken down into three stages, and analysts can stop at the stage that answers their questions:

- **Network charting** is the process of and associated techniques for identifying people, groups, things, places and events of interest (nodes), and drawing connecting lines (links) between them on the basis of various types of association. The product is often referred to as a link chart.

- **Network analysis** is the process and techniques that take the chart and strive to make sense of the data represented by the chart by grouping associations (sorting) and identifying patterns in and among those groups.

- **Social network analysis (SNA**) is the mathematical measuring of variables related to the distance between nodes and the type of influence one node has on another. "Network analysis is used extensively in law enforcement, counterterrorism analysis, and analysis of transnational issues such as narcotics and weapons proliferation to identify and monitor individuals who may be involved in illegal transnational activity. Network charting (or link charting) is used literally to connect the dots between people, groups or other entities of intelligence or criminal interest. Network analysis puts these dots in context, and social network analysis (SNA) helps identify hidden associations and degrees of influence between the dots".[138]

Value-added network analysis has proved to be highly effective in helping analysts identify and understand patterns of organization, authority, communication, travel, financial transactions or other interactions among people or groups that are not apparent from isolated pieces of information. It often identifies key leaders, information brokers or sources of funding. It can identify additional individuals or groups who need to be investigated. If done over time, it can help spot change within a network. Indicators monitored over time may signal preparations for offensive action by the network or may reveal opportunities for disrupting the network. SNA software helps analysts accomplish these tasks by facilitating the retrieval, charting, and storage of large amounts of information. Software is not necessary for this task, but it is enormously helpful.[139]

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[138] Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*.

[139] Ibid.

Mandate-related conflict and risk mapping

Conflict mapping is a graphic and visual way of representing a conflict and its hotspots. Conflict mapping focuses on actors and their inter-relationships as well as their geography: areas of influences, strongholds and dynamics.

Risk mapping is the graphic representation of risk distribution. It is often used as a tool to inform/support further JMAC analysis and enhance predictive analysis (particularly on trends), but may also serve as an output for others to use in processes such as planning and reporting. In this regard, use of free geospatial software such as Google Earth, and/or licensed software packages such as IBM i2 iBase 8 and/or IBM i2 Analyst Notebook, and close collaboration with the (in-mission) Geographic Information System (GIS) section—in light of ArcGIS software use—is critical.

Figure 8.2.

Examples of conflict and risk mapping

ix. Conflict and Risk Mapping

Conflict mapping is a graphic and visual way to represent the conflict and its hotspots. It helps to see things with greater clarity and for analysts to understand/analyse conflict thoroughly. Conflict mapping focuses on actors and their inter-relationships as well as their geography: areas of influences, stronghold and dynamics.

Risk mapping is the graphic (geo-spatial / map) representation of risk distribution (e.g. 'hotspot map'). It is often used as a tool to inform/support further JMAC analysis and enhance predictive analysis (particularly on trends), but may also serve as an output for others to use in processes such as planning and reporting. In this regard, use of freeware geospatial software as Google Earth, and licensed software packages as IBM i2 iBase 8 and/or IBM i2 Analyst Notebook, and close collaboration with the (in-Mission) Geographic Information System (GIS) section – in light of ArcGIS software use – is thus critical.

Topic assessments

A topic assessment is a full assessment of a single topic of interest for the HoM and the SMT, which may contain a narrative and graphics/maps. It includes a background, deductions, inductions and conclusions, and may end with a forecast, projection or prediction. This product can be lengthy, only qualitative or a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis. There are no studies of imminent threats, as a topic assessment serves more to explain and inform.

Topic assessment template

Topic assessment 01/08
01 January 2015

Arab and Ruareg relations in Northern Mali

Key judgments or executive summary

Introduction

1. **History**
- Pre-colonial relationships
- Colonial history
- Arabs and Tuaregs in rebellion peace agreements with the Malian State since 1963

2. **Geography and sociology of the conflicts**

3. **Origins of the Arab-Tuareg current clashes**
- Immediate causes
- Medium- and long-term causes

4. **Regional dynamics**

5. **Impact on MINUSMA**
- Security concerns
- Political and peace process concerns

Conclusion

Annexes (graphs with statistics, maps, profiles of main actors, chronology)

Strategic assessment

The objective of a strategic assessment is to develop a set of robust strategic options for United Nations senior leadership review and decision-making. It is usually undertaken when a country is being considered for the establishment of a United Nations presence and/or following a significant change in circumstances at mission level requiring a review of a United Nations mandate. The Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy and its Handbook provide the overall policy, principles and requirements under which a strategic assessment must be conducted. A strategic assessment is meant to be a comprehensive, inclusive and integrated exercise. It should complement, and draw on, analytical processes that different United Nations entities may have already undertaken. The JMAC can benefit from and contribute to the strategic assessment by sharing relevant analytical products, such as the mission threat assessment, and giving contextual analysis to what members of the ITF/IATF are considering in terms of policy prescriptions to senior leadership.

Strategic assessment template

Framework for JMAC analysis to support development of transition plan and identification of threats

1. Introduction and overview

- Background to transition, reference to mandate and other direction
- Purpose of the document (e.g. to support the development of a joint transition plan, etc.)
- Likely timelines
- Assumptions

2. Security situation/environment

- Analysis of likely threat environment 2011–2017:
  - Assessment of likely events within the sub-region (AOI) and their impact on country stability (e.g. elections)
  - Assessment of key national events and issues in country (AOR) and their impact on the security situation (elections, justice system and processes process)
  - Latent threats that will endure behind transition (e.g. crime, reconciliation, war crimes, land disputes, ethnic and tribal issues etc.; development of geographic latent threat cluster map as an annex). Supporting material could include ethnicity maps, natural resources and demarcation issues
  - Development of a timeline with decision points (included as a chart in annex)
- Detailed analysis of the situation—possibly as a result of a field survey
  - County by county/district assessment
  - Analysis of threats to develop common risks and challenges
  - Key security concerns and understanding of "vital ground" (e.g. capital, airport, border etc.)
  - Development of "hotspot" map (included as a chart in annex). This is used to assist field headquarters and UNPOL deployment planning

3. Analysis of mission capability

- Overview of mission deployment
- Analysis of what will cease as mission draws down (e.g. road maintenance, security of key terrain features, assistance to host nation security agencies, etc.)
- Critical security concerns
- Capability requirements to carry out these tasks post-United Nations departure

4. Analysis of host government capability

- Planning ability
- Construct and size of security agencies
- Ability to meet likely threats
- Ability to assume responsibility
- Assessment of main capacity gaps (included as a chart in annex)

5. Capacity gap analysis

- A comparative analysis of current capability vs. capability requirements, drawn from United Nations mission capability/functions
- Estimation of likely host government capacity enhancements over the drawdown period
- Statement of critical gaps and impact assessment if not filled

Optional: Development of scenarios for drawdown (if applicable)

6. Overall assessment

7. Recommendations

8.2.2.   Code cables (CC)

A code cable is used for formal communications with peacekeeping operations headquarters that require the attention of senior management, both in DPKO-DFS and in the field. The JMAC could be tasked to draft a CC to provide integrated analysis, or to contribute to a CC drafted by another section. The strategic picture should be described and the analysis should include forward-looking assessments and comments from various sources. Every product should be re-viewed and approved by the JMAC Chief (internal distribution within mission headquarters) and HoM for external distribution (outside mission headquarters). CCs can only be sent out by HoM.

Code cable, structure of an analysis template

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

TO: USG LADSOUS, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
    USG HAQ, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO:

FROM: XXXX, X Mission, X Location
DATE: 9 January 2015
NUMBER: CZX-083
SUBJECT: Outbreak of Violence in XXXX

Summary

Main points

1.

2.

Political reactions

3.

Human rights and PoC dimension

4.

Humanitarian dimension

5.

United Nations response

6.

Possible scenarios

7.

Observations and way forward

8.

9.

Drafted by: PAD with JMAC

8.2.3. Timelines

A timeline illustrates the flow of events, highlighting relationships between key trends and actions. Timelines are used to depict patterns or correlations between situations. They seek to illustrate links between seemingly disconnected events. These events might be simultaneous (concurrent) or successive. Useful in briefings, they are meant to provide a snapshot of the dynamics and evolution of a situation.

The analysts can build timelines by

1. Logging events following a chronological order;

2. Assessing the time delay between key situations;

3. Identifying missing information.

Multiple lines can be drawn to illustrate multiple timelines of different groups/actors. This allows and analyst to compare the pace and flow of events between two groups/entities.

The analyst should be careful as to avoid implying causations (vs. correlations).

Timelines are particularly useful when analysts are called upon to support investigations in which the fast pace of events, high level of scrutiny and sheer quantity of information can be overwhelming.

Figure 8.3.

MINUSCA JMAC product: timeline

JMAC Brief # 90 – TIMELINE: FPRC STRATEGY AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF UPC

8.2.4.   Protection of civilians (PoC) trend analysis

In missions with PoC mandates, the JMAC should work closely with PoC advisers to produce in-depth analysis in support of this mandated task for the strategic and operational-level decision-making bodies on PoC, but also for crisis response. The following methodology is only meant to guide JMAC analysts to be more attuned with the PoC information and analysis requirements to the extent that the JMAC's capacity allows it.

What threats should the strategic PoC analysis prioritise?

- All sources of violence against civilians are to be considered.[140] Across the variety of contexts faced by peacekeeping operations, this includes threats posed by:
    - Regular non-state armed groups and asymmetric threats;
    - Community-based violence, including intercommunal violence, self-defence groups and criminality;
    - Domestic and foreign state security forces, including international peacekeeping forces.
- Missions are not expected to prevent or put an end to all instances of violence.[141] They act within capabilities and **focus on strategic PoC threats, i.e. predictable violence that may result in mass civilian casualties**. They will however also intervene to address instances of physical violence against civilians taking place in their proximity, no matter the level of violence,[142] so as to maintain credibility and manage expectations

Steps for the PoC threat and risk assessment and decision-making process[143]

- Following a thorough assessment of existing threats, communities at risk and capacity of other protection actors, the mission will assess the risk (impact and likelihood) to civilians associated to each threat.[144]
- Analysis will also take into account the mission's capacity, comparative advantage and possible consequences of its actions or inactions, so as to decide on the priority list of threats to be addressed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels inscribed in the PoC threat matrix.[145]
- Overall PoC threat and risk analysis will result in a priority list of threats to be addressed. At the strategic level, mid- to long-term PoC threats will be incorporated in the PoC strategy and aligned with the mission threat assessment.

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[140] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department for Field Support, "The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping", 1 April 2015, PK/G/2015.07, para. 15.

[141] Ibid. para. 18.

[142] Ibid. para. 20.

[143] Ibid. paras. 34–50.

[144] Ibid. paras. 36–48.

[145] Ibid. paras. 46–50.

What analysis should the JMAC consider?

PoC analysis may be developed as a stand-alone product, but can be mainstreamed, i.e. inserted in a wide range of JMAC products and strategic information requirements. Analytical products on PoC may therefore include some of the following activities and integrated analysis products.

A. The mission's PoC strategy and specific plans per PoC threat or risk should for instance include a strategic PoC assessment, PoC trend analysis or conflict and risk mapping, aligned with the general mission threat assessment.

    1. Conduct strategic and forward-looking or predictive assessment of threats and risks of physical violence against civilian communities and objects, taking into account regional and international dynamics and the wide range of possible threats and risks civilians face.

    2. Identify conflict dynamics and related trends and patterns of violence against civilians (harm caused by perpetrators, impact on and coping strategies of victims, and response by protection actors).

B. Strategic and operational planning and decision-making cycles on PoC will build upon profiles of group and individual perpetrators or communities at risk, but also other (protection) actors. Forward-looking or predictive PoC assessments, including PoC scenario papers, or more immediate PoC situation, incident or early warning assessments and notes may also be useful, alongside weekly or monthly forward-looking PoC outlook papers, to inform and trigger crisis decision-making and response.

    1. Develop individual and group profiles: assess perceptions, intentions and capabilities of direct and indirect spoilers and perpetrators of violence against civilians, but also of civilian communities at risk and protection actors.

    2. Inform the prioritization of strategic PoC threats and risks identified through a weekly or monthly outlook and the PoC threat matrix (or PoC flashpoints matrix, protection matrix, etc.).

    3. Inform the development of prevention and response strategies or plans for each PoC threat or risk within the framework of the mission's political strategy.

    4. Analyse specific PoC incidents or situations and provide early warning notes or scenario papers on strategic PoC threats that may require immediate action—when relevant, integrate PoC early warning, alert and response mechanisms through a standard SOP.

    5. Inform public messaging, political positioning and key leader engagement lines for spoilers and perpetrators, but also for communities, civil society and other protection actors.

What kind of preparedness and precautions are necessary for PoC analysis?

All of this presupposes that PoC advisers and JMACs, jointly with PoC working groups, ensure the establishment of appropriate and integrated mechanisms and processes for the management of PoC-related information, analysis or early warning tools (including the appropriate community-based early warning and alert networks, community liaison assistants and perception surveys, integrated protection teams, etc.). It also requires for the appropriate information collection, management and security measures to be in place to ensure the protection of sources, including informants, witnesses or victims.[146]

Practically, applying a PoC lens to analysis and planning requires the following questions to be answered:

- Who or what may be the sources of physical violence against civilians? Why and when? Remember that violence on civilians can be inflicted by a wide range of actors, including our own presence and actions; partners such as host state or other security forces; armed groups and other opposing forces, community-based militias, criminals, etc.

For each specific PoC threat or risk, identify:

- What civilians are most at risk of violence?

- What is the level of risk, i.e. what is the potential impact on civilians and lifesaving civilian services, and what is the probability of violence occurring?

- What are ways to identify, monitor, and counter hate speech, disinformation, propaganda, rumours and other possible acts of incitement of violence that affect the security and PoC situation, particularly within communities (social media, community media, etc.)?

- What are the opportunities available to affect the intent or capacity of perpetrators to harm civilians, but also their supporters or spoilers?

- What are the key influencers within and outside the mission (including communities, civil society, host state, humanitarians, regional actors, international community, etc.), and how could the mission mobilize and support these influencers so as to affect hostile intents, but also to enhance the resilience of communities at risk and build a protective environment?

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[146] Most of the above tasks will be implemented with inputs by members of strategic and operational-level PoC coordination fora, the Humanitarian Country Team, Protection Cluster and its sub-Clusters on Child Protection and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), OCHA CIMCOORD and any other relevant partner or source. As relevant, some of the above tasks may be implemented jointly or with inputs from national- or local-level state authorities and security forces, but also non-state armed actors, civil society or community representatives. In such instances, extra care will be paid to ensuring the security of national civilian staff, or external civilian individual or groups that may be exposed as a result of PoC-related information sharing

For each plan, task or activity under development or review:

- What are the objectives, milestones and indicators of achievement? Which ones contribute to or should be incorporated in order to address PoC risks or threats?

- What is the intended PoC effect (link to PoC indicator) of each planned activity?

- What are the PoC risks associated with each planned activity? For instance, what are and how can risks to civilians, witnesses and victims that may be posed by the public positioning, engagement, dialogue and other communication actions by peacekeepers be mitigated?

- What are the mitigation measures in place to address those PoC risks?

- What is the process to ensure continuous risk analysis as the plan unfolds?

- What capacity and processes are in place for possible contingencies that may arise and pose risks to civilians?

A more detailed list of PoC indicators (qualitative and quantitative, situation-focused or action-focused) that can contribute to a PoC analysis can be found in the DPKO and DFS PoC Handbook (2018).

Map 8.1.
Example of PoC areas of concern mapping, MINUSCA (2016)

A PoC threat matrix shall as much as possible:

- List and prioritize the short- to mid-term PoC threats to civilians based on their probability of occurrence and potential impact on civilians;

- Map specific populations at risk and vulnerabilities affecting them;

- Map other protection actors, for the purpose of coordination (presence, resources, intent and actions);

- List and monitor implementation of all short-term activities conducted to prevent, pre-empt or respond to all priority PoC threats, taking into account the relative capacity of protection actors and the primary responsibility of the State to ensure PoC;

- Identify mission resources;

- Flag gaps in response and recommend corrective action on the response and resources.

Table 8.1.

Example of a matrix for monitoring the PoC flash points

Location/ priorities	Threat	Populations at risk	Other protection actors	Mission response/ activities	Mission resources	Recommendations/ comments
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						

8.2.5.　Predictive assessments[147]

As products, predictive analysis/scenarios are specifically focused on assessing the likelihood of key challenges and opportunities to the implementation of the mandate in immediate, short and long terms. Predictive assessments may incorporate a range of techniques and approaches, including but not limited to trend analysis, risk analysis, mapping and timelines.

Scenario-based papers

"A good set of scenarios bounds the range of possible futures for which decision maker may need to be prepared. […] scenarios provide a framework for considering multiple plausible futures. […] Generating several scenarios helps focus attention on the key underlying forces and factors most likely to influence how a situation will develop.

Heuer and Pherson, p. 158

These papers develop and examine a range of likely/unlikely and best/worst case scenarios (in relation to mandate implementation), and should include the following elements: assumptions, best/worst case range, probability (expressed quantitatively or qualitatively), sequences, benchmarks, implications, dynamics, speed of change, mitigating and aggravat-

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[147] "Policy on JMAC", PK/G/2015.03, para. 27 b, p. 5.

ing factors. Scenario papers can be a tool for further JMAC analysis or a product for the HoM/ SMT to consider intervention/mitigating measures. Scenario papers can also be a PoC tool to be discussed at relevant PoC fora.

JMAC scenario template

JMAC Scenario Paper

Brief summary of scenarios

a. XXXX

b. YYYY

c. ZZZZ

Detailed descriptions of scenarios (one for each)

- Assumptions
- Best/worst case range
- Sequence of events
- Benchmarks
- Implications
- Dynamics
- Rate and speed of change
- Mitigating and aggravating factors
- Uncertainties (knowns, unknowns)
- Probability

Supporting data

Maps, statistics, trend analysis

Implications and potential consequences

- For the mission area (e.g. political, social, economic)
- For mandate implementation

Conclusions

- Most likely scenario
- Worst case scenario

Multiple scenario generation

Multiple scenario generation is a systematic method for identifying alternative trajectories by developing plausible but mind-stretching "stories" based on critical uncertainties to inform and illuminate decisions, plans, and actions today.

Multiple scenario generation applies the collective knowledge and imagination of a group of experts to:

- Identify a set of key drivers (forces, factors, or events) and assumptions that are likely to shape an issue;

- Assess how these key drivers—when allotted different weight—might play out in plausible scenarios that illuminate the future;

- Reduce complexity and structure a collection-requirements strategy or a research plan.

Trend assessment

Trend assessment draws on historical information to develop understanding of ongoing trends by categorizing and arranging sets of incidents with reference to their relationships. It highlights the wider (e.g. political, social, economic) implications of these trends and relationships in terms of their significance for the implementation of mission mandated tasks. Often the trend analysis is illustrated by graphs or maps based on quantitative data within a particular time range.

JMAC trend analysis template

JMAC trend analysis

Trend title

1. Brief summary of trend

2. Detailed description of trend

- Time-frame
- Direction
- Turning points
- Key milestones
- Accelerating factors
- Mitigating factors
- Influential agents and interests
- Uncertainties (knowns, unknowns)

3. Supporting data

Graphs, diagrams, etc.

4. Probabilities and uncertainties

- Show quantitative or qualitative probability

5. Implications and potential consequences

- For the mission area (e.g. political, social, economic)
- For mandate implementation

6. Conclusion

Warning note

A **warning note** is similar to a MTCA but concentrates on a single current or emerging threat. It is a short note addressed to the HoM/SMT to give early warning that ongoing analysis has revealed an emerging or potential threat that requires a timely and specific response. It should

detail possible scenarios (including the worst case), the timeframe within which the situation could develop, milestones, possible accelerants and other notable features that will assist the HoM/SMT in the formulation of a policy or operational response.

JMAC warning note template

JMAC Warning Note

1. Brief description of the issue/opportunity

Who/what, how, where, when, probability, best case, worst case

2. Background

- Fundamental origins
- Broader context and related issues
- Earlier occurrences and any precedents for mitigating measures

3. Likely future developments

- Aggravating elements
- Rate of threat development, projected critical moments, milestones
- Scenarios with assessment of probability

4. Attachments

- Maps
- Briefing materials such as graphics, charts, etc.
- Any other supporting information

5. Summary

8.2.6.   Early-warning techniques and analysis note

Early-warning techniques

There are two main early warning techniques: indicators/warnings, and scenario-based assessment. Dependent on the requirement, either or both maybe most appropriate. Early warning is meant to inform decision-making in view of potential pre-emptive action. JMACs are only responsible for the warning/analysis portion, and analysts must be careful to leave it to other sections, normally the JOC, the force and PAD under the SLM's instructions, to focus on response. This is particularly true for PoC-mandated missions, with PoC advisers and coordination fora focused on the prevention and response to PoC incidents.

This is an important mental delineation; too often analysts get emotionally attached to the provision of a "solution to an issue". Recommendations are fine, interference in response coordination is not.

Situational awareness and horizon scanning

Early warning techniques support the ability to detect change. The application of these techniques implies a sound understanding of what is or is not within the range of "normal" for any given setting.

Situational awareness is contextualized as an awareness of what is happening on the ground; the report of incidents, actions, events. This is typically a JOC responsibility for the whole mission. Aside from the environmental understanding element, which is a core JMAC function, horizon scanning and early warning are JMAC areas of interest.

Typically, early warning refers to a likely/predicted specific event, while **horizon scanning** refers to a more holistic consideration of the future operating environment for a mission, and how that environment could affect mandate implementation. Early warning/horizon scanning product distribution is highly sensitive, so distribution lists and confidentiality of information therein must be considered and carefully balanced.

Early warning checklist

☑ Devise a number of scenarios ranking them from most to least dangerous and likely

☑ From those scenarios, identify indicators and key triggers[148]

☑ Monitor these indicators

☑ Prepare analysis based on the appearance of the triggers

☑ Make predictions based on that analysis

☑ Issue warnings when the predictive analysis warrants and when one of the triggers appears

Early warning assessments will differ with regards to

- Object of focus (instability, natural disasters)
- Scope of location (village/city, region/province, country)
- Time horizon (hours, weeks, months)
- Potential impact (on civilians and in general)

Structuring the horizon through risk analysis

One of the most straightforward ways to identify and monitor such a potentially complex set of factors in a structured and meaningful way is to adopt a risk-based approach.

Using this approach, the main factors that describe overarching contextual elements (e.g. political, socio-economic, humanitarian) become "risk categories". These risk categories are then

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[148] Please refer to section 7.4.2 for a detailed discussion on critical thinking and structured analysis.

Chapter VIII | JMAC products

broken down into sub-categories ("risk types"), each of which provides a broad outline of a risk within the category that currently exists or could realistically become manifest over an identified period of time (typically one year). An example of a risk category is "political", under which is nested the risk type "planned elections cancelled".

These risks can then be captured in a simple **risk monitoring register** (an Excel table works well for this). The register can be used in the following ways:

1. M**onitor** key risks, and to capture trends or change;
2. Provide the basis of **trend visualization** (note: limited scoring required);
3. Provide the basis for the generation of **early warning analysis**;
4. Provide the basis for **analysis of particular risks** (note: methodology required).

Populating the risk monitoring register

Analysts should take care to ensure that risks captured in the register are the most probable and meaningful for a mission. In order to help achieve this balance, a suggested rule of thumb for any initial register is to limit the breakdown of each risk category into a *maximum of five* different risk types.

Analysts should continue to critically appraise the risks identified to ensure that unanticipated or emerging risks are added to the risk monitoring register. The register should not replace regular horizon scanning activities and engagement, but is intended as a tool to help structure and support these. It can also form the basis for asking critical questions about why a situation may be changing *or not changing*, and for observing any apparent interdependencies.

It is also useful to capture the sources of the information reflected in the register. This can easily be done by creating a second page with relevant references.

The risk monitoring register can be updated as regularly as is useful. This type of approach should incorporate both qualitative and quantitative information. Qualitative information can then also be used to form the basis of charts to illustrate any trend.

Trend visualization—suggested scoring method

Why score?

The scoring method helps to detect change and deviation from contextual normalcy and enable analysts to visualize data and generate simple trend charts. This scoring method is not about predicting, it is about capturing the present status of the indicators for tracking purposes.

What is being scored?

The scoring method is a simple way in which to track in general terms how far a risk indicator is deviating from the understood "norms" that exist in the context in question, in terms of scale, level of concern and deviation from normalcy. The scoring method also allows analysts to introduce a

means by which to track the perceived direction of an indicator relative to other key indicators. This can help to visualize and highlight interdependencies at a macro level, which may require further analysis. Note that due to the iterative nature of the process, the scoring method must be used as part of a broader toolkit, which includes rigorous analysis of potentially significant trends.

It is important to note that the simple scoring method is *not* a means by which to assess risk. The register is also not a comprehensive risk register, and for practical purposes should not capture every type of risk or how such risks might become manifest. While it is possible that the analyst may wish to assess a risk or risks, this is a distinct and separate process.

How to undertake basic scoring

Using a scale of zero to a maximum of either 5 or 10, baseline scores should be established for each of the indicators identified in the risk monitoring register. The score for each indicator should be relative to the perception and scores of other indicators. Indicators need not start at zero. The initial scoring exercise is one best undertaken in consultation with a colleague, as part of an iterative process to establish realistic baselines in order to help balance situational under-standing with any inherent situational bias. Monthly scoring thereafter should follow similar patterns of logic and understanding. For continuity purposes, it is recommended that a second "mirror" sheet be used to capture an outline of the logic of scoring decision (e.g. why a score has changed or remained the same).

It is recommended that scoring is undertaken in intervals of two, as shown below, which allows more flexibility in perception, and also allows for greater emphasis where there is more cer-tainty regarding the veracity of information that may not have been fully confirmed, but could be important (e.g. confirmed information could be given a higher score in the same increment).

Table 8.2.
Suggested scoring increments

| Score	Rationale
0	Factor does not exist/is not a concern
1–2	Factor is present/within contextual norms
3–4	Factor is occurring on a limited scale/intensity is of some concern/is within contextual norms
5–6	Factor is widespread/at a level which is of concern/at the upper end of norms
7–8	Factor is very widespread/the intensity is a very serious concern/is out with norms
9–10	Factor is uncontrolled/the intensity is unprecedented

Table 8.3.
Example risk monitoring register (with scoring)

Risk indicator category	Risk indicator type	Month 1 baseline snapshot	Month 1 score	Month 2 snapshot of key developments	Month 2 score	Month 3 snapshot of key developments	Month 3 score
Political	Planned elections are cancelled	Election planning progressing	0	Ongoing	0	Ongoing	0
	Possibility of military coup d'état	Good links between government and miliary	0	Unverified reports of a rift	2	No change, more unverified reports emerging	3
Socioeconomic	Failure of government to pay civil servants and security forces	Sporadic reports of this in one region	2	Sporadic reports of this in two regions	3	Sporadic reports of this in three regions	3
Environment	Significant loss of life/damage following hurricane	Wrong season	0	Wrong season	0	Wrong season	0
Security	Armed groups seize control of increasing territory	Limited presence in two regions (AA&BB)	3	Consolidated presence in same regions (AA&BB)	4	No change	4
	Significant and/or widespread civilian unrest	Occasional peaceful protests in major cities	1	Several contained but violent protests in two cities	2		4
Socioeconomic	Levels of unemployment	20 per cent	3	20 per cent	3	25 per cent	4
Humanitarian	Significant limitations on humanitarian access in country due to insecurity	Access to all areas	0	Loss off access to two or more areas	3	No access to three or more areas	5
	Significant influx of refugees from neighbouring country	Small number in establisheed camps	1	No change	1	No change	1
Human rights	Systematic targeting of minority groups by government	No reports/evidence	0	No reports/evidence	0	One unverified but plausible report	2
	Excessive use of force in crackdown against protestors	No reports/evidence	0	Limited unsubstantiated reports	1	Evidence of excessive force in several cases	3
	Restrictions on freedom of the press	Mostly unhindered	1	Mostly unhindered	1	Four journalists detained for unspeficied reasons	2
Health	Outbreak of Zika virus	None recorded	0	Initial report of outbreak in specific region	3	Outbreak in two specific regions and possibly a third	7

The below type of chart can be created from the risk monitoring register.[149] This can be used to select particular issue and to illustrate trends (e.g. the escalation of a Zika outbreak).

Figure 8.4.

Example trend chart based on scored risk monitoring register

Significant and/or widespread civil unrest

Possibility of military coup d'état

Planned elections are cancelled

Outbreak of Zika virus

Failure of government to pay civil servants and security forces

Excessive use of force in crackdown against protestors

Armed groups seize control of increasing territory

Early warning analysis note

Early warning analysis should provide an evidence-based outline of why a particular issue or issues are of potential concern (e.g. what actual or potential change has been detected and why it is significant), what the understood scope is/may be, what the possible timeline of change might be, and what the potential impact on both the context and the United Nations could or will be.

Early warning analyses need to identify potential challenges or risks, but also identify potential courses of action that the United Nations might take to help mitigate any particular risk, or if unavoidable, prepare for anticipated change.

Depending on the context, the JMAC analyst may undertake a formal analysis of a particular risk. **Risk analysis combines an assessment (and scoring) of the likelihood of a risk occurring with the impacts it might have**. This type of risk scoring allows the analyst to plot the risk on a risk table for visual impact. This methodology is routinely used by DSS to assess operational security risks. This requires a structured analysis of the risk or risks in question, but can help to convey the significance of the issue in a brief and impactful way.[150]

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[149] Note that you must create a drop-down menu within the Excel sheet for risk indicator categories in order to enable the data sorting required to generate the chart.

[150] Please note however, that the methodology used by DSS also contains a dimension that relates to the appetite of the United Nations to accept risk for operational purposes. This is beyond the scope of the use of a risk matrix for JMAC purposes.

The suggested content of an early warning analysis note would include the following (of no more than two sides):

- The geographic area of concern (add a small map if possible);
- The problem and the context;
- Key actors and a brief indication of why they are/could be important;
- If practical, a trend chart[151] to illustrate and evidence evolution of trend to date;
- A projection of the future timeline of how the issue could evolve;
- Key risks, and a brief outline of the possible impact should a risk be realized.

When assessing risks, you must follow a clear methodology, and you must think clearly about the target of the risk you are assessing. This is important, as the impact of an event on different elements will vary.

Likelihood: the estimated probability of a hazard to take place. Depending on the nature of the risk, different methodologies apply to estimate it.

Impact: a powerful effect that something, particularly something new, has on a situation, a person or the United Nations mandate. Depending on the nature of the risk, different methodologies apply to estimate it.

Risk matrix template

Risks	Impact	Likelihood	Seriousness	Preparedness	Prioritization
Risks of very high concern					
	X	x	X	X	To further discuss
	Very high	Very high	Very high	Strong/low	3/1
	Moderate?	Very high	High	Low	2
Risks of high concern					
	Low	Very high	Moderate	Low	3
	Low?	Very high?	Moderate	Medium/low	4/3
	Low	Very high/high	Moderate	Medium/low	4/3
	High	Very high	High	Medium	3
	Low	High	Moderate	Low	3
Risks of moderate concern					
	High	Low	Moderate	Medium/strong	4/5
	X	x	x	x	To further discuss
	Low	Very high	Moderate	Medium	4

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[151] You can create a chart from your Excel risk monitoring matrix.

Note that all early warning analysis must be suitably caveated, and a clear distinction must be made between facts, assumptions and assertions. An early warning or risk matrix accompanied by a short narrative (risk analysis) could be a monthly product for the JMAC, while a mission-wide early warning analysis could be conducted with the rest of the substantive components under the coordination of the JMAC every six months.

Figure 8.5.

Example of a suggested layout for an early warning assessment product

Matrix

A matrix is an analytic tool (and not a product) for sorting and organizing data in a manner that facilitates comparison and analysis. It consists of a simple grid with as many cells as needed for whatever problem is being analysed. Matrices are used to analyse the relationships between any two sets of variables or the interrelationships between a single set of variables. Among other things, they enable analysts to

Qualitative term	Associated likelihood range
Very likely	More than 90%
Likely	75–85%
Moderately likely	55–75%
Unlikely	25–50%
Very unlikely	0–20%

- Compare one type of information with another;
- Compare pieces of information of the same type;
- Categorize information by type;
- Identify patterns in the information;
- Separate elements of a problem.[152]

The difficulty in constructing a matrix is how exhaustive a list can become, thereby impeding its use at an analytical level. A list with too many indicators may be thorough yet not applicable for analysis. The analyst should also be mindful that indicators can be misleading in fixing the analyst in a certain mindset, being on the lookout for only specific signs or benchmarks while ignoring new developments that do not fit in the matrix he or she has developed.

8.2.7. Maps

A map must have a clear purpose and message. It should not be overloaded. The information selected should be based on what a client needs to know (versus what would be nice for the client to know). The visual must be appealing and clear, and the map should be commented.

Table 8.4.

Definitions of risk and conflict mapping

| |
|---|
| Conflict mapping is a graphic and visual way to represent the conflict and its hotspots. It helps to see things with greater clarity and to understand/analyse conflict thoroughly. Conflict mapping focuses on actors and their interrelationships as well as their geography: areas of influence, strongholds and dynamics. |
| Risk mapping is the graphic (geospatial/map) representation of risk distribution (e.g. "hotspot map"). It is often used as a tool to inform/support further JMAC analysis and enhance predictive analysis (particularly on trends), but may also serve as an output for others to use in processes such as planning and reporting. Use of free geospatial software such as Google Earth, and licensed software packages such as IBM i2 iBase 8 and/or IBM i2 Analyst Notebook, and close collaboration with the (in-mission) Geographic Information System (GIS) section—in light of ArcGIS software use—is thus critical. |
| Conflict/risk mapping is important for analysts to understand in order to analyse a conflict thoroughly. It is also crucial for briefing purposes, notably mission leadership and decision makers. |

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[152] Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques*, pp. 93–95.

Map 8.2.

Example of map produced with GIS for JMAC information requirements

Joint Mission Analysis Centres Handbook

Map 8.3.

Example of map produced with GIS for JMAC Information requirements (Mali)

Map 8.4.

Example of map produced with GIS for JMAC Information requirements in MINUSCA

8.2.8.   Graphs and infographics

Graphs

Illustrating the analysis helps with synthesizing data. The type of graph to be used should be selected based on the intended take-away messages and what the JMAC analyst wants the client to focus on.

For example: pie charts are best for representing proportions of similar data, while polling results and line graphs are best for showing trends over time.[153]

Challenges associated with graphs

Colour

The use of colours can greatly enhance visual display, but the analyst should be aware that various societies perceive colours differently. When using colours, analysts should pick a palette where the intensity of the colour matches the intensity of the indicator. Purple and blue are some of the best colours to use to show multiple levels with increasing degrees of intensity.[154]

Featured information

An analyst should parsimoniously balance the amount of information portrayed in the graph. A graph that is overcrowded with information will be difficult to read. The analyst must craft the graph to make sure key information stands out while background data also puts the information displayed into context.

Design/display

The information displayed in a graph differs depending on whether it stands alone, or if it is included in a longer paper (report or assessment). In a longer document, the graph should be strategically placed. An overarching summary graph is often best located on the facing page of the first page of the document as it allows the client to situate the argument as he or she begins to read the paper.[155]

Visual presentations work much better than text for explaining complex and highly interrelated systems. Creating graphics can be learning experiences in and of themselves. Crafting a single chart to map the key line of argument in a paper will not only focus attention on the most important points, but could reveal gaps in knowledge or logic.

By leaving out the details and engaging the topic from a higher degree of abstraction, analysts are forced to think more rigorously about how they have organized their product as well as ask

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[153] Pherson and Pherson, *Critical Thinking*, p.199.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Ibid.

themselves what they have left out. Analysts must plan ahead for what graphics will be incorporated into a draft and often organize longer article around what graphic are likely to prove the most effective in telling their story.

Figure 8.6.

Example of JMAC product displaying graphics (JMAC MINUSCA)

The power of data visualisation and infographics[156]

With the amount of free and ubiquitous information available, the ability to extract value and visualize data is a crucial asset for an analyst. The visualization of data has become an essential instrument to convey findings, distil complex ideas, and call the attention of the SMT to overlooked issues. Within this context, infographics have grown in popularity.

An infographic is a graphic representation of various data or knowledge aimed at concisely and quickly presenting information. This tool can be a crucial asset for a JMAC to inform stakeholders and decision makers, or to reach a public audience. An infographic is a story that needs to be told, a compelling narrative that instead of being presented in the form of a traditional textual

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[156] See annex V for detailed information on infographics.

paper becomes a graphic object. This form has the greater benefit of improving human cognition by leveraging the ability of the visual system to spot trends and to effectively retain the information presented.

Infographics are essentially a combination of various tools. As can be seen from the infographic "The Human Cost of Peace" produced by DPKO, infographics can combine various types of charts (line graphs, pie, histograms), maps, and text boxes to inform and accompany the cognitive flow of the reader, facilitating learning, especially on broader topics.

Similarly, in the infographic produced by OCHA shown below, maps and various types of graphs convey essential figures, geographically and over time, allowing the reader to quickly assimilate crucial information regarding a humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic.

Figure 8.7.

**Example of infographics used by DPKO**

Figure 8.8.

Example of OCHA Infographics for the CAR (2014, Relief Web)

Creating an infographic

1. **Research:** 50 per cent of an impactful infographic is its content. Therefore, we should focus on the story and the findings that make the infographic meaningful.

2. **Wire framing:** once we know the narrative, we can sketch the arrangement of the elements on a page schematic representing the framework of our graphic work. This planning phase is particularly crucial to check the flow of the reasoning.

3. **Design:** at this point, we can proceed to using software to find the right design and to start creating graphic content. Annex VI contains a list of free and commercial tools for non-developers to create infographics, charts and gather various data.

What do you need to have in mind while creating your infographic?

- Focus on one message.
- Research is 50 per cent of the infographic. Check facts and figures and cite the sources.

- Clutter is your enemy! (Add white space).
- Think of the cognitive load of the reader.
- Keep it simple.
- Target the message and the design to your audience.
- Start with a killer headline and follow the flow.

Here you can find an infographic with 10 rules for an infographic:

http://www.avalancheinfographics.com/references/10rulesinfographic.jpg

Chapter 9.   Communication: briefing and presentations

Communicating analysis through briefings or other presentations is key in highlighting to the tasking authority what is new, different or critical. Briefings and presentations foster interactions and spontaneous questions, and allow for further development.

> "Without the effective communication of intelligence to policymakers, all the previous efforts in collection and analytic production are futile".
>
> Arcos, p. 11

For any meeting, the "elevator pitch" format is the most useful: what you would tell the senior leadership in less than a minute to convey the crux of a situation. Effective communication is clear, brief and to the point. Optimal presentations:

- Spark interest and attention;
- Structure the message so the logic is clear and obvious;
- Present simple and direct arguments.

When preparing a briefing/presentation, an analyst ought to ask:

- What do I want my busy client to get (or take away) from this presentation?
- What are my key arguments?
- What are the implications?
- What is the main take-away point?

9.1.   Preparing briefings and oral presentations

Briefing and presentations should always be prepared in advance, never improvised.

1. Know your audience

To be effective, briefings and presentations must be tailored according to the background, expectations, interest, agenda and capabilities of the audience. The analyst should craft the presentation keeping the primary audience foremost in mind,

> "Analysis is portrayed as a conceptual, reflective and intellectual exercise, but its success is gauged by how well the judgments are communicated as well as the degree to which the actions and impacts are accomplished as a result."
>
> Pherson and Pherson, p. 27

but at the same time considering that senior officials may be present, and that the information being conveyed must be useful to them and concise enough to fit with the most senior audience.[157]

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[157] Heuer and Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques.*

- Who is the audience?

- How diverse is the audience?

- How large is the audience?

- How many people are targeted/concerned by the presentation?

- What are their priorities?

- What do they *need* to know (i.e. potential implications of an event, incident, development, pattern or trend for mandate implementation)?

- What are their constraints?

- What do they already know?

- Do they have any preconceptions about the topic at hand?

- Is there any risk involved in conveying your message?

- What is their mood (challenging, welcoming, resistant, sceptical, etc.)?

2. Focus on the purpose of the meeting

- How does your presentation/briefing fit in the purpose of the meeting?

- What is the value-added of your analysis?

- What is your goal (to inform, interpret, update, describe)?

- What is your strategy to achieve this goal?

3. Be aware of your environment

- Is it formal/informal?

- What is the equipment available?

- Is it in-person or through video teleconferencing?

- How is the briefing set-up/environment likely to affect attention to your presentation?

4. Mind timing

- When will you present: before, after whom?

- At what time of the day?

- At what stage in the decision process?

- How is it likely to impact the message?

- How much time do you have?

- How likely is it time to be truncated? Extended?

5. KISS

- Keep It Short and Simple.

- Use clear, precise, succinct sentences.

- Avoid acronyms or identify what they stand for the first time you use them.

- Avoid using colloquialisms or informal expressions.

- Use active voice.

- Speak at a controlled pace.

- Be aware of your tone and keep diplomacy and tact in mind depending on the audience.

- Pay attention to phrasing and labelling (some labels can lead/mislead the understanding of the analysis (for example, "violence" vs. "armed violence", "terrorism" vs. "attack", etc.).

- Beware of false cognates (the same words do not necessarily have the same meanings in different language).

6. Anticipate

- Anticipate questions, concerns, requests for additional information.

- Anticipate having less time than you think—be explicit, but concise and specific so you can cover everything you intend to and not have to leave out key points.

- Anticipate lacking time: be ready to shorten/summarize your presentation.

Table 9.1.

Outline of a presentation

Ratio	Structure	Content
10%	Introduction	Summarize topic, identify key points
		Present agenda of the presentation
70%	Body	Justify relevance, substantiate your points, highlight importance, clarify dynamics, relationships, trends/patterns
		Identify three main points
		Each point = one idea related to your main purpose
		Each point should be backed by clear arguments/examples/facts/evidence
		Organize points following a logical structure: • Chronological • Spatial • Topical • Ascending/descending importance • Cause-effect • Problem-solution • Pattern of inquiry • Elimination order
		Support each point with information and reasoning
		Give examples
20%	Conclusion	Repeat take away points and identify recommendations /follow-ups

9.2.   Delivering presentations

- Visual support should not be underestimated, as it can contribute to clarifying your message. It should be simple, clear, colourful and add value to your speech (add information that can't be conveyed verbally with the help of maps, graphs, etc.).

- If standing, control body language by avoiding rocking back and forth, putting your hands in your pockets, or any other unnecessary movements (playing with hair, pens, sheets).

- Make eye contact (respecting the etiquette of the audience).

- Speak clearly and project loudly enough.

- Avoid filler words or sounds such as "umm, well uhh… OK?" etc.

- Avoid reading text directly from slides and limit bullet points to phrases (avoid full sentences), have cue cards ready.

> Practice the virtue of repetition:
> "Say what you are going to say, say it and say what you said."

- Never pretend to know the answer to a question.

9.3.   Analytic writing techniques

Analytic writing for a JMAC must be clear, concise and highlight the "so what" question in relation to the implementation of the mandate. Information should be presented in order from the most essential to the least important.

Kaiser and Pherson divide analytical written products into five types:

1. **Basic information**: provides hard facts and statistics that are current and reliably accurate. This includes key background information from which to start and is often readily available.

2. **Current reports**: focusing on new developments, informs the audience or explains brand new or very recent developments including news digests, situational reports that are updated regularly (weekly, daily).

3. **Evaluative assessment**: explains why a development occurs, its implications, and consequences to evaluate. Offers analysis of reasons, motivations, drivers, and catalysts that might explain what underlies a situation occurring.

4. **Estimative reports**: offers forecasts and predictions from sources specialized in gathering data on trends and patterns, and lay out possible or probable scenarios.

5. **Warning assessment**: predictive writing that provides warnings of imminent threats or alerts about opportunities to enable taking preventative measures.[158]

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[158] Louis M. Kaiser and Randolph H. Pherson, *Analytic Writing Guide* (Great Falls, VA: Pherson Associates, 2014), p. 6.

Steps for analytic writing

1. Draft a detailed outline

- Before writing a paper, the analyst must clearly conceive the purpose and the logical structure of his or her text. The structure should put forward insights and judgments useful for the client's decision-making process.

- The analyst must create a "writing roadmap" relative to the target audience and the constraints in timing, format and resources.

- The analyst must structure his or her written document with a focus upon how or why it will be of interest to the audience in terms of the "so what" question.

- The analyst should start by identifying the key questions and associated sub-questions to be covered in the paper. Each paragraph must focus on one point, illustrated by the most significant data and information. Each section should follow a logical order.

- Each paragraph should present a point explicitly significant in answering part of the "so what" question.

> **So what?** Stating the main issue at stake in relation to the client's interest.
>
> **What?** Describing the issue at stake (it can also cover the **how, when, where**).
>
> **Why now?** Providing explanations on developments or absence of developments. Explicitly explaining why this written piece is currently needed and relevant.
>
> **Impact on the mandate so far?** Assessing explicitly the implication to the mandate.
>
> **Scenarios?** Putting forward likely consequences in the immediate, short, long term.

2. Honing the writing

The analysis should remain explicit and specific. The sentences must be precise, clear, accurate, consistent, thorough and digestible.[159] Use active voice and prioritize the use of short sentences. Each word in a sentence should be essential to understanding the matter discussed. Delete unnecessary detail, repetition and/or redundant language.

Avoid the following:

- Alliteration;
- Clichés;
- Contractions;
- Overly broad or blanket statements;
- Profanity;
- Exaggerations;

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[159] Kaiser and Pherson, *Analytic Writing Guide.*

- Analogies;

- Passive voice;

- Slang and other informal language.

3. Review paper

The analyst should review his or her paper applying the "no-kidding" rule to decide whether a sentence/words can be deleted without losing/altering sense for the reader.[160]

4. Formatting the paper

The title of the analytical paper should highlight the "so what".

✅ JMAC analyst writing checklist[161]

☑ Explicitly answers the client's information requirement

☑ Addresses directly the "what" and "so what"

☑ Identifies relevant forces and dynamics at play

☑ Articulates a clear line of analysis putting the main take-away point first

☑ Puts forward the main point of the paper in the title and the first paragraph

☑ Announces the outline of the paper

☑ Ensures that each section, paragraph and sentence contribute to answering parts of the "so what"

☑ Supports all judgement with sound reasoning and most significant evidence

☑ Clearly distinguishes analytics, judgement and factual information

☑ Identifies contrary information that is not consistent with the line of analysis

☑ Addresses the impact of information gaps on the analysis

☑ Reports alternative views or explanations

☑ Specifies levels of confidence in the key judgments and presents reasons for any uncertainty

☑ Incorporates graphics to advance and underscore the message

☑ Deletes unnecessary words

☑ Uses concise, explicit and specific sentences

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[160] Kaiser and Pherson, *Analytic Writing Guide.*

[161] Ibid.

Chapter 10.   Leaving or closing a JMAC

10.1.   Closing a JMAC

The JMAC Policy specifies that the JMAC is one of the last entities to close in a mission. Its core capabilities should thus be maintained so it can continue to inform the HoM about the challenges to the transition/drawdown process. The JMAC Chief is due to draft an end-of-assignment report, before leaving and/or closing down, to his or her parent office at the United Nations Headquarters level, i.e. UNOCC.

10.2.   Sick leave, and rest and recuperation (R&R)

In general, up to 20 working days of sick leave are available during a 12-month period, subject to the presentation of medical certificate within 20 days following the initial absence from duty, and approval by the JMAC Chief.

Relevant administrative instructions include:[162]

- ST/AI/2005/3/Amend.1—Sick leave;
- ST/AI/2005/3—Sick leave.

Rest and recuperation is available to staff members at specified intervals of four, six, eight or twelve weeks, depending on the nature and subsequent classification of their duty stations. The authorized time off for rest and recuperation is five consecutive calendar days, plus actual travel time in each direction to and from the rest and recuperation destination.

To be granted time off for rest and recuperation, service at a duty station approved for rest and recuperation purposes must be uninterrupted. Absence from the duty station for more than three working days in total due to business travel or leave will cause a staff member's rest and recuperation cycle to be reset.

Rest and recuperation may not be taken in advance, carried forward from one qualifying period to the next or be combined with subsequent rest and recuperation periods. R&R cannot be taken with home leave, family visits or travel related to education grants. R&R shall not be granted during the last month of service.

Rest and recuperation cycles are reviewed if conditions change.

Relevant administrative instructions include:

- ST/AI/2011/7/Amend.2—Rest and recuperation;
- ST/AI/2011/7/Amend.1—Rest and recuperation;
- ST/AI/2011/7—Rest and recuperation.

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[162] Information about all HR related policies can be found at the HR portal: hr.un.org.

When taking his or her rest and recuperation leave, the JMAC analyst must ensure continuity relative to his or her contacts by passing along the required information for his or her colleagues to cover his or her absence.

10.3. Leaving a JMAC

Ensuring security of information acquired by analyst

It is the responsibility of the JMAC Chief to ensure continuity in his or her staff assessment of the implementation of the mandate. The Chief should thus always make sure that his or her staff tasks, contacts and documents are securely passed along so as to cover any leave or transition.

10.4. Handing over sources, data, etc.

Any information, whatever the format received or created by an information analyst, must stay within the JMAC, as it is the mission's rather than personal "property". They represent and document the unique contributions the analyst made to the team and the mission. These records will continue to be valuable after the analyst leaves the organization.

There are four main tasks you as an employee need to complete to ensure that your work legacy is in the best condition possible after you are gone.

1. **Clean up the records stored in your filing cabinets** and stored on network drives, on your personal computers and on removable disks. **Dispose of transitory records** if they are no longer valuable to the organization. For example:

   - A document received as a copy and maintained for convenience without directing you to take action;

   - Information required for a short period of time to complete a routine action or to prepare another record;

   - Working notes—after the necessary information has been documented within an official record;

   - Reference material;

   - Information about meeting reservations, holidays, etc.;

   - Personal information.

2. **Organize the records** according to the classification structure of the organization and store them within an established system.

3. **Prepare a concise list, with descriptions, of all your records**, both paper and electronic. The list only needs to identify and describe the general groups of records and where they are located (e.g., drawer one of filing cabinet, network drive Z, folder X, subfolder Y). You want to make it easy for new staff replacing you or those requiring access to understand and gain access to the records.

A handover note is mandatory and should follow the template below.

Handover note template

Handover note

Name:

Title of position and location:

Portfolio:

Duration of staff assignment:

1. Short narrative on workplan implementation (bullet points)
2. Issues to be covered in absentia and to follow up
3. Locations of documents and contact lists
4. Personal observations
5. Contact information if absence temporary

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4. **Before you leave, meet** with the JMAC Chief to ensure that he or she has a clear under-standing of the professional contacts, documents and task that fell under your control, where they are located and how they are organized. **Don't have this meeting on the last day.** There may be things you need to do as a result of the meeting and you want to leave yourself and others enough time to carry them out to.

5. **Hand over sources or source contact details to the JMAC Chief** to ensure continuity in the acquisition of information.

Responsibilities of managers

There are three records management tasks a manager should perform when informed that an employee is leaving:

1. Meet with the employee immediately after he or she has provided notice of his or her departure, is to discuss his or her responsibilities for cleaning and organizing, passing any records, documents, data, contact under their control.

2. Meet with the employee a few days before he or she is scheduled to leave to ensure that the transition has been made.

3. Assign responsibility over the records to an officer who will replace the departing em-ployee, or to an employee who will assume interim responsibility.

10.5. Writing an end-of-assignment report and handover notes

Definition and purpose: end-of-assignment reports (hereafter EoAR) are personal, analytical accounts by senior mission staff of lessons identified and learned in the implementation of missions' mandates and on DPKO-DFS institutional capacity to carry out mandated tasks, particularly with regard to the specific areas of responsibility of the JMAC Chief.

EoARs should provide recommendations for improving JMAC's effectiveness and efficiency, e.g. by reviewing strategic priorities, guidance and training. EoARs help preserve the Organization's institutional memory and contribute to continuous learning.

EoARs are distinct from handover notes, which are strictly factual and do not contain analysis, assessment or evaluation. EoARs are organizational learning resources and remain United Nations internal documents.

Who: as per the DPKO-DFS Policy on Knowledge Sharing and Organizational Learning,[163] the JMAC Chief should submit an EoAR to UNOCC, the parent office or upon the request of senior mission management.

When: EoARs should be submitted two to four weeks prior to leaving the position.

Contents: the EoAR should start with a brief description of the mandate and/or terms of reference and priorities/work plan[164] of the mission, including key milestones in the mandate or work plan implementation. Further, the report should focus on lessons and good practices and highlight replicable factors that contributed to success or failure, from the personal viewpoint of the drafter. EoARs are learning documents, and the most valuable EoARs focus on presenting lessons and analysing what worked well, what did not work well and what should be done differently in the future. Drafters should seek to answer the following questions:

- What has been learned/noted during the assignment that should either be replicated or avoided elsewhere?
- What can the Organization do in terms of policy development, training or otherwise, to improve its capacity to support similar activities/operations in the future?

EoARs shall not be used to report on individual misconduct or wrong-doing of staff members. While it is the duty of staff members to report any breach of the Organization's regulations and rules, such information is to be treated as strictly confidential and disclosed through appropriate channels, as per ST/SGB/2005/12 and in accordance with the DPKO-DFS Policy on Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Operations.[165] For more information, DPKO-DFS personnel are encouraged to visit the Policy and Practice Database at http://ppdb.un.org for examples of EoARs prepared by personnel.

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[163] PK/G/2015.13.

[164] For example, Under-Secretary-General/ASG Compact, multi-year strategy, office/unit priorities endorsed by the DPKO-DFS leadership.

[165] PK/G/2015.10.

Confidential observations: authors are encouraged to capture any potentially sensitive information that is meant for a restricted readership in a separate "confidential observations" section at the end of the report.

Authors are requested to specify the audience for confidential observations, if necessary. In exceptional circumstances, authors may decide to mark their entire EoAR as confidential.

Follow-up: UNOCC periodically reviews all EoARs received and, in consultation with the director, provides an analysis of recommendations to the JMAC chiefs workshop.

End-of-assignment report template

Name:

Title of position, including name of mission:

Date of end-of-assignment report:

Duration of assignment:

1. Short narrative on mandate/work plan Implementation (1–2 pages)

2. Issues and recommendations

This is the main section of the report. The author should identify issues that pertained to or influenced mandate implementation in his or her area of responsibility.

2.1. Recruitment/staffing table/training

   2.1.1. Uniformed personnel

   2.1.2. Challenges and lesson

   2.1.3. Recommendations for mission or office

   Actionable recommendations that are applicable only to the particular mission or office

   2.1.4 Recommendations for other missions and DPKO-DFS, including recommendation for policy reviews

   Actionable recommendations directly correlated to a specific issue that are applicable to other missions and DPKO-DFS headquarters. Highlight areas where policy development could provide a solution to a particular issue.

2.2. Issue: "…"

   2.2.1. Background

   2.2.2. Best practices

   2.2.3. Challenges and lessons

   2.2.4. Recommendations for mission or office

   2.2.5. Recommendations for other missions and DPKO-DFS, including recommendation for policy reviews

[Continue with as many issues as necessary]

3. Policy and guidance:

Authors are recommended to include observations on the implementation of critical United Nations-internal policy and guidance relevant to the functions and/or the mission mandate, and any guidance gaps that were encountered.   *(continued)*

4. Cross-cutting mandates

Authors in senior managerial functions are requested to reflect on the implementation of cross-cutting mandates that apply to all personnel across all missions, in particular the respect for human rights by mission personnel, the implementation of the human rights mandate of the mission and the promotion of gender equality.

5. Personal observations (1–2 pages)

Observations that are not necessarily linked to recommendations or change. This section could include information regarding key interlocutors and contacts, if relevant. Biographical sketches of interlocutors may be included as well.

6. Confidential observations (if appropriate, 1–2 pages)

In this section, authors can include observations that are politically sensitive or should otherwise remain restricted. This section will not be made available on the Policy and Practice Database and distribution will be restricted, as explained in the guidance note for drafters.

If the author wishes to restrict dissemination of confidential observations or of the entire EoAR to certain staff within DPKO-DFS, kindly specify below. Full EoARs will always be forwarded to the Offices of the Under-Secretaries-General.

Dissemination only to: (please indicate functional titles, not individual names, e.g. ASG DPKO OO)

- …

- …

7. Contact information (optional)

Email address and telephone number where the author can be reached in the future.

Part IV:
Annexes

Annex I. How to conduct an interview

Preparing the interview

Interviews need to be prepared in advance to ensure the quality of the information to be acquired and the security of both the source and the interviewer. While preparing for the interview, the analyst should reflect on the person to be interviewed, the location, the timing and the risks. The more background information the analyst has, the more he or she will be able to make of the interview.

Who?	Identifying the interviewee
Why?	Clarifying the purpose
When?	Assessing the timing
Where?	Securing the location
How?	Optimizing the acquisition of information

Who to interview?

Analysts must anticipate the information necessary to conduct their assessment of a situation. It is up to JMAC analysts to identify key people to be interviewed and determine ways of contacting them. Some individuals might contact JMAC analysts directly to share information, but at other times, JMAC analysts will need to be proactive and persistent in seeking contact and testimonies.[1] Spending time in the field and visiting location where locals typically gather can facilitate the development of trust as well as the identification of well-informed actors.[2]

For each person interviewed, the analyst should seek personal details and relevant affiliations (e.g., political, clan, community or association), validate the spelling of the person's names and confirm with him or her the preferred means of contact (e.g., phone, email, through an intermediary). In some contexts, details might not be available or known to the interviewee, or may not be appropriate to ask (e.g., ethnic origin, religion, marital status).[3] The analyst should also seek to assess the extent of the interviewee's risk and interest in answering the questions and bear in mind the specific implications of interviewing survivors of trauma. Interviewers ought always to assess the risk of causing harm before each interaction. In the case of a survivor of trauma, the analyst might provide his or her questions to a human rights officer, trained to approach vulnerable interlocutors. Further, the analyst should clarify if the person identified to be interviewed has "a motive for providing the information sought; whether he or she is likely to exaggerate the facts; is hoping to benefit by providing information; or has the intention to mislead."[4]

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[1]   Thomas J. Pepinsky, "Interview-Based Fieldwork: Questions and Answers for First-Timers", 2012, available from https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/tp253/docs/fieldwork_qs.pdf, p. 2.

[2]   OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring*, p. 15 (see footnote 41).

[3]   Ibid., p. 17.

[4]   Ibid., p. 19.

Identifying an interviewee	
Who to interview	• How can the necessary individuals be identified?
	• How can they be contacted (email, text, networking, intermediaries, walking down the village path to find them, etc.)?
	• What are their interests in participating in the interview?
	• What are the risks of participating in the interview?

Source: Pepinsky, "Interview-Based Fieldwork".

By whom?

While preparing for the interview, the analyst should seek to anticipate the dynamics with the interviewee. He or she should remain aware that his or her professional status as well as personal characteristics influence interactions with the interviewee, whether it be along the dimension of gender, age, social class or appearances, among other possibilities.

A JMAC analyst should try to anticipate how these characteristics might influence the type and amount of information conveyed.

	Personal characteristics	Examples of questions
Self-assessment	Professional background	How specific should you be about your employment: do you intend to specify you are working for the United Nations, for the JMAC, for information purposes? If you are military, trade and rank can be useful to establish a link with the interviewee.
	Marital status	If you are single, married, divorced or widowed, how can it relate to the marital status of interviewee?
	Personal situation	How can you relate to the interviewee depending on whether you have children, take care of elderly family members, etc.?
	Gender	Some topics might be easier to address depending on gender.
	Age	Age might influence in the level of deference to give to a senior/junior interviewee.
	Language/local dialect proficiency	How can you foster trust and signal understanding by using local expressions, proper phrases in the local language or dialect?
	Knowledge of the country/region	How well can you refer to local/national traditions, how well do you know the territory, the geography of the country, how well do you know the weather, the seasons and how clearly can you picture it when you receive a testimony about different events?
	General Appearance	What you wear sends different signals. An interviewee might notice types/colour of clothes, hair, jewelery. Dress with consideration for local culture, of professional/casual context, etc. For example, do not wear shorts in a conservative setting or a full suit in a casual environment.

Similarly, if using an interpreter, the analyst should be mindful of who the interpreter is and how he or she can also influence the interaction with the interviewee. The analyst should assess the *professional and personal background* of his or her interpreter and his or her possible links to the person to be interviewed, his or her affiliation with the national authorities, political movements, security forces, etc.

The analyst should also consider how the *gender, age, ethnic origin and other identity factors* might be perceived by the interviewee and influence his or her responses. The analyst should be aware of the level of familiarity the interpreter has with the language spoken by the interviewee, his or her dialects or use of locally specific expressions. The analyst should make sure to limit and/or to know whether or the extent to which nuances are lost in translation. The analyst should make the most of his or her interpreter's knowledge of the country or region to maximize his or her ability to identify the use of expressions, political or historic references. Finally, the analysts must be able to trust the interpreter with confidential and sensitive information. This should be clearly addressed and discussed with the interpreter prior to the interview.[5]

Identifying an interpreter	
Assessing the interpreter	• Professional and personal background • Gender, age, ethnic origin and other identity factors • Language/local dialect proficiency • Knowledge of country/region • Understanding of confidentiality requirements

Why? Defining the purpose

The initial purpose of the interview must be clear to the analyst, but at the same time, he or she should remain open to new information to be acquired, intentionally or not, during the interview. The analyst must familiarize him or herself with the reasons that lead that person to be identified as useful for an interview. In order to keep the focus, the interviewer should prepare an outline of the interview, a list of questions and topics to be addressed. The analyst should pay close attention to the wording of his or her question as it might influence or lead the answer of the interviewee.[6]

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[5] OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring,* chap. 11 (see footnote 41).

[6] Ibid.

Purpose of the interview	
Why?	• Date and location of the interview
	• Name of the interviewer(s) and interpreter
	• Type of interviewee (i.e., victim, witnesses, other source or alleged perpetrator)
	• Personal details of the interviewee (including full identity, sex, age, nationality, ethnicity, contact)
	• Affiliation (e.g., any membership, association or connection of a person with a particular institution, organization or group)
	• Status (refugee, IDP, person with disabilities, human rights defender)
	• Informed consent given by the interviewee to use and/or share the information (including any restrictions)
	• Reliability of the interviewee
	• Protection concerns
	• If the interviewee is an alleged perpetrator: rank or position, alias, degree of involvement in the alleged violation
	• Narrative of the facts as provided by the interviewee

Where?

The safety of both the interviewer and the interviewee should be the first concern in locating a place to conduct an interview. Particular attention should be given to striking a balance between the levels of confidentially/privacy sought and putting the interviewee at ease with the setting. Locations vary greatly depending on the interviewee. Analysts should be ready to conduct "interviews in less comfortable settings, for instance sitting on the floor in the sun, or after having walked or driven for hours to reach a location, or in dirty or malodorous locations (e.g., prisons)".[7]

Identifying location for interview	
Where to interview?	• Safety
	• Confidentiality/privacy
	• Comfort
	• Symbolism (are you planning the interview in a place that is associated with an event, a practice, a ritual, etc.? What does it signal to the interviewee?)

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[7]   Ibid.

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When?

The JMAC analyst should be mindful of the timing of the interview and assess the extent to which it might impact the information shared/acquired. The JMAC analyst should thus be aware of the time constraints of the person interviewed. He or she should consider how the timing of the interview affects the person's daily routine, whether professional or personal.[8] The analyst should also double check for "different temporal references". Dates and times are culturally connoted (e.g. Ethiopia has a unique calendar year with thirteen months and with a day divided into 12 hours, 6 a.m. being hour 0). The analyst should thus inquire (1) whether the interviewee shares his or her understanding of dates and time, and (2) whether the scheduled appointment is set during an event, season, holiday or festivity that might influence the content/conduct of the interview. The analyst should also make sure to adopt a pace for the interview that fits with the local culture/time. For example, it might be impolite for an analyst to rush to specific questions instead of spending time to inquire about the interviewee's family and general situation. The pace also plays a role in the level of trust to be developed/maintained with the interviewee. Pacing the interview inappropriately might signal to the interviewee the analyst's limited understanding of the local context and traditions or be perceived as a lack of consideration, both of which might impede collaboration and sharing of information.

Assessing timing	
When to interview?	• Is there a common understanding of date and time?
	• What are the interviewee's time constraints?
	• How does the interviewee spend his or her time (e.g. can you disturb villagers at their work or do you have to wait until the evening)?
	• What should be the pace/tempo/flow of the interview be?

How?

Any interview contains three main steps: introduction, questions, and conclusions.

How to conduct an interview

Introduction

• **Greetings/setting the tone**

When greeting the interviewee, the analyst should strive to be culturally appropriate, making sure to be sensitive to local politeness rituals (should there be eye contact? Should hands be shaken? Who should sit first? etc.). The analyst should seek to make the interviewee at ease (for instance by offering water or by exchanging a few words about a topic to which the interviewee can easily relate).[9] Cultural awareness and language play a key part in setting the tone for the interview. The analyst should be mindful that information can be drawn from both non-verbal and verbal communication.

If there is an interpreter, he or she has to be introduced in the same manner.   *(continued)*

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[8]   Pepinsky, "Interview-Based Fieldwork".

[9]   OHCHR, *Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring*, chap. 11 (see footnote 41).

- **Explaining the purpose**

The analyst should offer an explanation for the purpose of the interview. Depending on the information sought (whether it is specific/general), the analyst can be more or less precise. The analyst should make sure that the interviewee understands that participation in the interview is voluntary and that he or she is not compelled to answer any questions. The interviewee should also feel comfortable to pause or end the interview at any time.

- **Understanding consent, confidentiality and protection issues**

The analyst should make sure to understand the level of confidentially requested by the interviewee. Some will wish to remain anonymous for security purposes; others might wish to be cited, for example to use the interview to pass a message to indirect interlocutors or third parties.

The analyst should be mindful of any safety/security concerns of the interviewee. The analyst should never promise protection.

Questions

- **TED technique ("tell me", "explain", "describe")**

The interview should start with open, general questions. If the five "W"s are often used in an analytical process, the open-ended technique is referred to as "TED".

- "Could you **tell me** what happened?"
- "Could you **explain** how you were able to see the incident from your position?"
- "Could you **describe** where the police took you after your arrest?"

- **Tempo/pace and content**

The analyst should respect the tempo and content of the interviewee's answers at all times. The analyst should refrain from interrupting the narrative of the interviewee. The analyst should take note of any gaps and seek clarification later. The analyst should thus remain mindful of the thought process of the interviewee and of the interviewee's priorities during the interview. The interviewee might express the desire to vent, to express personal concern prior to addressing more specific facts. The analyst should also seek to use the interviewee's own words and stay as close to his or her testimony so as not to erroneously interpret the message.

- **From general to more sensitive/from open to more specific**

The analyst should start with non-controversial and non-sensitive questions and later move to more sensitive issues. Again, the analyst should respect the flow of the interviewee and not insist on any particular topic. The analyst should show empathy and state an appreciation of the emotions experienced or described by the interviewee. He or she should respect pauses, silences. The analyst can inquire whether anyone else could corroborate the testimony. When asking for specification, the analyst should come back to the start of the narrative of the interviewee and ask to specify/to give more details with guiding questions like "earlier you said… can you tell me more?"

- **Ask for clarification**

At various points in the interview, the analyst can also summarize the narrative to make sure to follow the account of the interviewee. The analyst should also keep track of the coherence/consistency of the interviewee's testimony with other information acquired and seek clarification accordingly. The analyst should be careful (1) not to appear skeptical, mistrusting, and (2) to avoid revealing information provided by other individuals or these individuals' identity. The analyst should remain mindful that the narrative/recollection of traumatic events might entail gaps in the narrative that might appear like inconsistencies. The analyst should thus acknowledge the possibility of mistakes in details, etc.   *(continued)*

- **Using visuals/props**

Photographs and props are useful when interviewing victims, witnesses and other sources, since they can help the interviewee provide a clearer account of what they observed or experienced and a more detailed description of the facts. The analyst must be careful not to suggest information that the interviewee does not know.

- **Enquiring about existing documentations/additional contacts**

The analyst should also check whether the interviewee, victims, witnesses or other sources possess any documents or materials to support his or her narrative/testimonies. The JMAC should not take the originals but rather make copies of documents (such as pictures with a cell phone). The analyst should keep a formal record of each piece of information, including: the name of the source; the name of the JMAC receiving it; and the date of reception. "Hard copies of documents should be scanned and safely stored in a database or other information management system used by the field presence".[10]

Conclusion

- **Opening**

The analyst should be open for the interviewee to add information or comments (do you have any other comments?) or to ask question or concerns (do you have any other questions or concerns?).

- **Follow-ups**

Analyst should conclude the interview without making any promises that he or she cannot keep.

The analyst might ask for a follow-up interview. Indeed, some interviewees might have to be met several times for trust to be established. Regular exchange of information can thus ensure trust in information.

During the interview, the analyst should be prepared to take notes. If he or she finds it distracting at various moments during the interview, the analyst should plan to sit down and write just after the interview to complete the information he or she did not have time to write down.

The analyst should be mindful that the questions asked can reveal important information about the mission's priorities, situational awareness, perceptions, etc. This should be taken in particular consideration when engaging sensitive contacts. The timing of questions should be taken into account. It might be preferable to ask more sensitive questions later in the interview or when the interlocutor addresses the sensitive issue him or herself.

Conducting an interview with an interpreter

If the interview is conducted with the participation of an interpreter, the analyst must make sure to meet with the interpreter prior to the interview and agree on how to conduct the meeting, the seating arrangement, its purpose and its tone.

The analyst should lead the interview. The interpreter should translate without altering the expressions used. The analyst should ask short, direct and clear questions to minimize the loss of

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[10] Ibid.

information in translation. The interpreter should make sure to understand the question asked by the analysts.

The analyst should always keep direct contact with the interviewee and not refer to him or her as a third party (e.g. "Who else did you see?" rather than saying to the interpreter "ask her who else she saw").[11]

Coordinating with an interpreter	
How to conduct interview with an interpreter	• Explain purpose and conduct of interview
	• Set seating arrangements
	• Ask short, direct, clear questions
	• Keep direct contact with interviewee

What do you seek from the interview[12]

The nature of information the analyst is trying to acquire should be clear before the interview. However, the analyst should remain open to unanticipated/fortuitous information and should be ready to acquire such "unplanned" information.

Non-verbal communication

Non-verbal communication should be taken into account when JMAC information analysts conduct an interview both for the analyst him or herself and for the interviewee. Non-verbal communication might signal the interviewee's attitude toward a specific question or topic or send a cue for the need to change the tempo/pace or even to stop the interview.

The interviewer should be mindful of his or her

1. Sitting position (e.g. are you leaning toward an interviewee as to signal vivid interest or on the contrary sitting backward, signalling distance?).

2. Writing habits (taking notes while the interlocutor speaks signals different levels of interest in the answers/testimonies by the interviewee).

3. Posture (are you signalling nervousness, stress, fatigue?).

4. Movements (what does the pace of your movements signal in terms of comfort with the interviewing situation?).

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Jeffrey C. Johnson and Susanne Weller "Elicitation Techniques for Interview", in Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein, *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method* (London: Sage, 2001), p. 498.

With regards to the interviewee, pay close attention to:

1. Silence (timing, duration): this might be a cue to change the tempo/pace of the interview.

2. Sitting position: does the interviewee sit back straight, or does he or she lean in toward the interviewer? Does he or she cross his or her legs away/toward the interviewer, does the interviewee cross his or her arms across his or her chest: these might signal unease, or on the contrary eagerness.

3. The location of where the person is sitting (against the wall, facing the door, facing the window, etc.): is the person looking for new people coming in?

4. Posture (hands in pocket): is the interviewee fiddling with an object? It can signal nervousness about a specific topic, and hence a cue to move on to another question, topic.

5. Movements (rocking back and forth, trembling).

All these are messages to take into account in an interview.

There are many hurdles and obstacles to conducting an interview. Interviewees might suffer from memory loss (on purpose or not) or might be reluctant to answer questions. Here are some tips on how to overcome these obstacles.

To help an interviewee recall certain people, the interviewer can use:

- Social proximity
- Chronology
- Location
- Social role
- Anchoring (providing a mnemonic point of reference) by asking for further information on those already recalled that might help to improve the informants' recall overall
- Visual approaches: photographs, artefacts, actual items of interest

A respondent may be reluctant to speak to analysts or their collectors for various reasons, including:

- Questions intrude into the private sphere or delve into some personal experience
- Questions concern deviance and social control
- Questions impinge on the vested interest of powerful persons or the exercise of coercion
- Questions deal with things sacred to those being studied that that they do not wish to profane
- Secretive respondent
- Sensitive respondent
- Respondent feels advantaged by the information he or she has
- Respondent feels disadvantaged relative to the interviewer or another person/group

Cues to help overcome reluctance of an interviewee	
Exchange	An exchange can be done (other than financial and within the legal means of the mission and United Nations rules).
Demographic Characteristics	If there is a perceived overlap between the interviewer and the interviewee in such areas as age, gender, social class, ethnicity, and general appearance, a reluctant respondent may be more prone to more openness during the interview.
Location	Finding a discrete location might be a good technique for those subjects who are anxious about exposure. Discretion might translate in a crowded environment in which the subject is anonymous or in a remote location, with few witnesses to the meeting.
Language	Phrasing of the questions is important. The use of key words and expressions must be well-chosen and pronounced. Be aware of "faux amis" in which the same word has different meaning in different languages or contexts.
Visuals	Providing the interviewee with images or videos can help to find another approach to reach other types of responses.

Adapted from Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler, "The Reluctant Respondent" in Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein, *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method* (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 527–531.

Annex II.   Armed group profile template

Armed group profile	
1. Purpose	What the group has been listed for
2. Summary	Brief textual summary of key points
3. Group name	
3.1. Background/history	• Historical overview of emergence of group, noting any changes in objectives, structures, names and relations with other entities • Where available, key periods in the group's history, including formation, periods of heightened activity, or major changes in activity
3.2. Leadership and structure, command and control and internal dynamics	• Key military and/or political leaders (including historical, communal or other relationships) • Organizational structure (centralized, decentralized, cellular), hierarchies and relations between constituent parts (political and military wings, formed units, vocational, seasonal, community-based, etc.) • Nature and methods by which command authority/direction is exercised (e.g., centralized, hierarchical, decentralized, tribal, filial, collaborative, consensual, etc.) • Level of effectiveness of command and control structures where known • Relationships between the main leaders and sub-commanders and between various levels and ranks • Any key issues, personalities and aims that affect internal relationships within the group • Gender balance and the role of women within the group where known or relevant • Uses organizational charts or infographics where possible
3.3. Motivation, intent, discipline and morale	• Overview of the main political, religious or other motivations driving the group's activities and the major strategic aims and objectives that it seeks to achieve • Primary tactics and targets, or commitments on protection (if applicable) • How orders or instructions are implemented and any mechanisms for ensuring compliance with organizational goals • Any internal rule structures, codes of conduct or disciplinary mechanisms • Status of morale and state of mind of the group, whether the group is cohesive, collectively or individually, strong or weak, and provides any available information on the level of the group's faith in the cause they fight for

Armed group profile	
3.4. Areas of operation	• Includes geographic areas of operation, both historic and current, including details of major strongholds if known • Type of geographic presence of group (e.g., operating as conventional force in defined area or in disparate locations as multiple cells) • Where possible, demographic composition or religious orientation of the group and dynamics of interaction between the group and the local population • Uses maps wherever possible
3.5. Capability	Group's estimated strength in terms of personnel, as well as weaponry and equipment, training and specialized expertise
3.6. Use of children and other grave violations committed against children	Record of violations of child rights, to be completed by OSRSG-CAAC
3.7. Patterns of commission of sexual violence	Record of commission of sexual violence, to be completed by OSRSG-SVC
3.8. Use of PR and media for strategic objectives	Use of publicity and media for strategic purposes
3.9. Opportunities/ vulnerabilities	Strengths and weaknesses of the group and current posture, and potential openings for engagement
3.10.Resources	Group's financial architecture, including primary source(s) of funding, as well as the geographic or operational concentration of the funding sources
3.11.Support	• Alliances and rivalries both with actors internal to the country and those external to the country, including nature and significance of relationship • Ideological and material influences (national, regional and international)
3.12.Current activity	• Current operations and strategies of the group, including any information on potential changes in posture
3.13.Current dialogue engagement with United Nations/ external actors	• Current and historic dialogue between the group and United Nations or other external actors, including content, status and prognosis of outcome
4. Overall assessment	• Summary of the key points of the assessment

Points to note

- **Nature, identity, profiles:** perpetrators of violence against civilians include elements of national and international security forces, non-state armed groups, criminals as well as other civilians (as in cases of inter-communal violence, etc.).

- **Motivation, interest or intent:** violence against civilians may be strategic and systematic, opportunistic or even accidental; it may be indiscriminate or targeted at an individual or group; and motivated by power, ideology or identity (cultural, ethnic, tribal or religious), fear, survival or greed.

- **Structure, capabilities and resources, preparedness:** command and control; human, material and financial means; supply lines.

- **Presence and deployments**

    - **Relations:** political, security, economic and social supporters and allies; affiliation and clients.

    - **Mode of action or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs):** pattern of attacks or other forms of violence (including attacks on specific categories of vulnerable such as women, children or IDPs, etc.), movements of perpetrator, etc.

    - **Historical precedent:** monitoring of violations under national or international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law will further avail information regarding the gravity, intensity, pattern and scale of physical violence affecting civilians, and enable trend and impact analysis. Beyond violations, missions will also track all casualties as a result of lawful actions by peacekeepers, state security forces and non-state armed groups. Collateral damage or casualties resulting from mines and EWRs will require specific attention in certain contexts.

Annex II | Armed group profile template

Annex III. Mission intelligence collection plan template

Date XXXX

Introduction

The mission intelligence collection plan (ICP) translates the strategic direction provided by the senior management team and requirements communicated by operational planners into tangible priority information requirements. It provides a roadmap for the fulfilment of these requirements through directed acquisition and analytical work by participating mission entities.

The mission's intelligence collection plan has been produced in close cooperation with the substantive sections, the Force and United Nations Police.

1. Purpose of the ICP

The mission intelligence collection plan serves as the primary basis for the development of collection plans by participating mission entities (e.g. military intelligence collection plan), which will be at a greater degree of specificity and incorporate the specific information requirements of the primary client of that participating mission entity.

2. Defining peacekeeping intelligence

Peacekeeping intelligence is the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate. The primary purpose of the use of peacekeeping intelligence should be safety and security of uniformed personnel and protection of civilians.

3. Confidentiality

This document should be marked and handled as a strictly confidential document. Any knowledge that can be communicated or any documentary material regardless of its physical form or characteristics that are owned by, produced by or for, are under the control[1] of the United Nations.

Annexes

A. Priority information requirements and mission intelligence collection plan

B. Glossary of abbreviations used in the ICP

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[1] "Control" means the authority of the department, office or mission that originates information, or its successor in function, to regulate access to the information.

Annex IV. Security classification: levels, risk and access

Classification level	Risks	Access
Strictly confidential	Information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to or impede the conduct of the work of the United Nations, such as: 1. Endanger the safety or security of any individual 2. Violate individual rights 3. Invade individual privacy 4. Endanger the security of Member States 5. Prejudice the security or proper conduct of any operation or activity of the United Nations 6. Cause long-lasting and/or far-reaching impairment of a United Nations mission, operation, or programme 7. Lead to the death or physical injury of a United Nations employee or third party 8. Violate of an employee's right to medical privacy 9. Cause anger to troop movements within a mission area 10. Lead to sabotage resulting in significant damage to a peacekeeping mission's communication channels 11. Lead to the collapse of a local population's confidence in a peacekeeping operation	Should be circulated among selected few as it entails life/death risk to people, the organization, etc.
Confidential	Information or material whose unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause: 1. Damage to the work of the United Nations 2. Harm the United Nations, Member States, or individuals, where the damages incurred could potentially be repaired through negotiation, good offices, or other means 3. Strained relations between the United Nations and a non-governmental organization 4. Lack of confidence between the United Nations and a vendor	Should not be widely circulated
Unclassified	Information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected not to cause damage to the work of the United Nations, such as: 1. Information that will not result in any damage to the United Nations, Member States, or individuals 2. The media's knowledge of a principal's participation in a conference 3. A Member State's knowledge of how its contributions to a trust fund have been used	These should constitute the bulks of all documents. These are meant to be circulated within the organization

Access

It is up to the JMAC Chief to determine the need to know, need to share and right to know (see section on JMAC Chiefs) of information held by JMAC and of JMAC products.

Each member of the JMAC staff is responsible for ensuring he or she is handling and protecting information appropriately, in function of the level of classification. The disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals can be deliberate or inadvertent, direct or indirect, oral or written.[1] In any case, disclosure of sensitive information is considered misconduct. Each mission defines its own original classification authority list, under the overall authority of the Head of Mission.

Level of confidentiality	Access

Strictly Confidential	SRSG/Head of Mission
	• Officials designated by the Head of Mission:
	    • Deputy SRSG for Operations and Rule of Law
	    • Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination and Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction
	    • Force Commander
	    • Director or Chief of Mission Support
	    • Chief of Staff
	    • Chief of Safety and Security Section
	• Mission staff members delegated this classification authority

Confidential information	Officials with original STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL classification authority
	• Officials designated by the Head of Mission in the Sensitive Records Register, typically chiefs of:
	    • Administrative Services
	    • Civil Affairs
	    • Human Rights
	    • Integrated Support Services
	    • Joint Military Committee Office
	    • Joint Mission Analysis Centre
	    • Joint Operations Centre
	    • Legal Affairs
	    • Office of the Spokesperson for the Head of Mission Police
	    • Political Affairs
	    • Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
	• Mission staff members delegated this classification authority

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[1] For more details on United Nations misconduct and disciplinary action, refer to: Revised disciplinary measures and procedures (ST/AI/371); Staff regulations (ST/SGB/2009/6); and Status, basic rights and duties of United Staff Members (ST/SGB/2002/13)

Protecting confidential and strictly confidential records

All documents, records and data should be securely stored at all time. Documents should never be left unattended.

All records creation and storage facilities—including filing cabinets, computer systems, records storage rooms, or other spaces—should be maintained securely at all times.

Remember that information may be sensitive even if documents are in draft form. As a safeguard, you should consider all documents to be strictly confidential or confidential until their classification is confirmed.[2]

JMAC staff must keep electronic and physical records that they create (or receive from organizations external to the United Nations Secretariat) by saving them into a filing system.

All JMAC staff members are accountable to the JMAC Chief for complying with the Records Management Policy[3] and the DPKO and DFS records management program. All staff members have the responsibility of creating official records, regardless of form or medium.

The following standards should be maintained when handling classified information

- All classified information must be transported in a sealed envelope or container and stored under lock and key in a secure location
- All out/in going classified information must be recorded in a special registry
- Classified information may be duplicated only with the authorization either of its originator or the receiving/originating office
- Electronic transmission of classified information shall be performed only through the use of protected means of communication

Protecting records

Physical, environmental and technological hazards can place United Nations records and information at risk. When records are lost or the information in them is compromised, an office will struggle to fulfil its mandated responsibilities. Protecting electronic and paper records from loss or damage is essential to ensuring work can carry on effectively and efficiently.

When records are lost or damaged, the office is exposed to several significant risks, such as:

- the inability to meet operational goals and objectives (operational risk)
- the failure to document or financial decisions or expenditures adequately (financial risk)
- the loss of status as a reliable, effective, and accountable agency (reputational or image risk)
- the exposure of personnel and facilities to loss or damage (physical or security risk)

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[2] United Nations, Archive and Record Management Section, "How do I protect sensitive information?", available from https://archives.un.org/sites/archives.un.org/files/uploads/files/Guidance%20Sensitive%20Information.pdf.

[3] "Records Management", PK/G/2016.19.

Records can be lost as a result of disasters such as fires, floods, earthquakes, explosions, military conflicts or terrorist attacks. Records can also be damaged by emergencies such as power outages, security breaches or insect infestations. Also dangerous are seemingly minor situations, such as:

- not labelling folders, cabinets or storage boxes clearly, so that records cannot be found

- not securing records when personnel leave their positions, hindering the transition for new personnel

- not destroying superseded records systematically, leading to confusion about authoritative versions

- not protecting computer systems with up-to-date antivirus software, risking data damage or loss

- not imposing strong password controls, leaving gaps in computer security systems

All United Nations records—regardless of whether they are in paper or electronic form—must be protected from damage, loss, destruction, misuse, unauthorized disclosure, modification and other risks.

Whether or not records are unclassified, confidential, or strictly confidential, all personnel in the United Nations must manage records so that they are safe from loss, destruction or misuse. To help offices across the United Nations protect all their valuable information assets, the United Nations Secretariat has implemented a comprehensive information security programme. The goal is to protect information as securely as possible while ensuring personnel across the United Nations can access information and records in order to carry out their duties effectively.

The following guidance relates specifically to protecting official records. For further advice on managing documents and records, contact the records professionals at United Nations ARMS. For help on other information security issues, contact the information security professionals at United Nations OICT.

- Ensure all storage containers for records are strong, stable and non-flammable, and in waterproof areas

- Keep all records storage areas clean and tidy

- Identify and label vital records clearly so they can be retrieved immediately in an emergency

- Always keep desks and records storage areas clean and free of records when not in use

- Distinguish between information and records as soon as possible after creating/receiving them: keep records safe for ongoing use and remove non-record information as soon as possible

- Assign clear and understandable names to all records or file folders so that electronic and paper records can be easily filed and retrieved

- Destroy duplicates or convenience copies of records as soon as you no longer need them

- Secure official records in authorized record-keeping systems, such as physical or electronic storage repositories, according to established classification systems or file plans

Electronic records require additional safeguards to protect them from loss or damage. Most important is to work with the IT specialists at United Nations OICT and the records specialists at United Nations ARMS to guarantee that computer systems are configured properly, so that electronic records are created, managed, and stored securely and disposed of appropriately. United Nations OICT should provide assistance for:

- Regular and secure backups of all official records

- Robust, high-quality computer firewalls and up-to-date virus protection software

- Strong password protection for all computers and related equipment

- Data encryption as appropriate to protect sensitive electronic records

- Surge protectors and backup systems to protect computers during power outages

Understanding levels of risk

The United Nations is constantly exposed to a variety of risks, including:

- **Operational risk**: the inability to meet operational goals and objectives

- **Financial risk**: the failure to document financial decisions or expenditures adequately

- R**eputational or image risk**: the loss of status as a reliable, effective, and accountable agency

- **Physical or security risk**: the exposure of personnel and facilities to loss or damage.

The effective management of official records can help eliminate or reduce the impact of these risks by ensuring your office can provide the evidence you need to prove your actions, confirm operational or financial decisions, demonstrate accountability and transparency, and protect employees and property from harm.

Protecting records in offices and storage areas

Follow these basic security measures to safeguard physical (i.e., paper) documents and records:

- Fit doors and windows in all offices and records storage areas with strong locks

- Keep filing cabinets and other records storage areas locked at all times when not in use

- Label all files, folders and boxes so that their contents, dates and extent are clear

- Equip offices and storage areas with fire and security alarms and test alarms regularly

- Only permit access to records storage areas to a small number of qualified personnel

- Supervise all external visitors whenever they are in offices or records storage areas

- Conduct regular security and facility inspections of all work spaces or records storage areas

- Transfer records with ongoing value to United Nations ARMS according to records retention schedules

- Destroy obsolete and superseded records securely as soon as they are no longer needed

- Maintain full documentation about all records destroyed or transferred to United Nations ARMS

Protecting electronic records

Follow these steps to safeguard electronic documents and records, including emails:

- Do not use computer hard drives (C: drives) to store sensitive information. Instead, store sensitive information in formally established electronic record-keeping systems or, in the absence of such systems, in secured network drives.

- Regularly clean up computers and network locations by destroying superseded or obsolete records that have met their retention periods.

- Recognize that deleting electronic records is not the same as destroying them. Work with the IT specialists at United Nations OICT and the records specialists at United Nations ARMS to guarantee that computer systems are configured to ensure that deleted records are permanently removed from network drives or other storage locations.

- Contact United Nations OICT for guidance about ensuring your computer systems are configured with appropriate security systems, anti-virus software, password protection and automatic time out/lock features to restrict access to password holders only.

- Contact Un ARMS for guidance about how to create, store and manage electronic records so that they are safe, accessible and authentic, now and in the future.

Remember, secure record-keeping involves protecting records as long as they need to be kept, then disposing of them appropriately. Good record-keeping also involves keeping full and accurate documentation about which records were destroyed and which were sent to United Nations ARMS for permanent preservation.

Stocking information/documents

JMAC documents should be stocked and marked not to be destroyed.

A document must be declared to be a record and stored in the office official record system if:

- It documents a United Nations business activity

- It provides evidence of United Nations accountability

- It is needed to protect the interests or rights of the United Nations

- It relates to the function or mandate of the JMAC

- You are the creator the document

- You are the primary recipient of the document, if it came from a source outside the office

- You are the person in the JMAC responsible for management this type of document.

JMAC analysts should:

- Correctly file records in designated areas

- Name information and records as per naming convention

- Separate non-record drafts from final-version records and file them correctly

- Regularly delete out-of-date, duplicate or unnecessary information

- Ensure sensitive information is appropriately handed in accordance with policy

Annex V.   List of infographics and data visualization tools

Tools for infographics

- canva.com
- venngage.com
- visme.co
- piktochart.com
- easel.ly

Create beautiful graphs

- datawrapper.de
- Tableau
- Infogram
- Rawgraphs.io
- Plotly
- Chartblocks (www.chartblocks.com)
- Visual.ly

Data aggregators and visualization tools

- Knoema
- Quandl
- Vizala
- Tableau
- Power Bi
- Statista www.statista.com
- Google public data explorer
- Graphiq
- Statista www.statista.com
- Qlik

Hint:

Are you unsure of what visualization to use? Check the Data Viz Catalogue

https://datavizcatalogue.com

Visualize news

- Google trends

- Newsmap.jp

- Infomoous

Geospatial visualizations

- Carto

- Openstreet

- ulivemap

- Mapbox

- Qgis

Online courses

"Learning Infographics design with Amy Ballet" available from www.lynda.com/Infographics -training-tutorials/

Books

Krum, Randy. *Cool Infographics: Effective Communication with Data Visualization and Design*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. 2013.

Lankow, Jason, Crooks, Ross and Ritchie, Josh. *Infographics: The Power of Visual Storytelling*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. 2012.

Nussbaumer, Cole. *Storytelling with Data: A Data Visualization Guide for Business Professionals*, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. 2015.

Advanced resources

Kirk, Andy Timms, Simon, Rininsland, Ændrew and Teller, Swizec. *Data Visualization: Representing Information on Modern Web*. Birmingham, UK: Packt Publishing. 2016.

Annex VI.   Peer review guidelines

- Is the main purpose of the analysis clear?

- Does the draft analysis answer the problem/question it set out to address?

- Is it clear why the analysis is important to the audience?

- Is there a clear "so what?" for the audience?

- Is the writer's tone appropriate for the audience?

- Are the needs of the audience kept in mind? For instance, are acronyms and abbreviations spelled out initially where needed, is sufficient background information provided (but not too much), are examples clear and effective to non-security professionals, etc.

- Can I accept the assumptions made? Why or why not?

- Is any obvious evidence or counterevidence overlooked?

- Is the author proposing or recommending something? If so:
    - Are other options examined adequately?
    - Has the author overlooked some negative or unattractive effects of his or her recommendation?

- Looking at each paragraph separately:
    - What is the basic point?
    - How does each paragraph relate to the paper's main idea or previous paragraph?
    - Should some paragraphs be deleted? Be divided into two or more paragraphs? Be combined? Be put elsewhere?
    - Is each paragraph adequately developed? Are there sufficient details?
    - Are the introductory and concluding paragraphs effective?

- Conciseness: Are all details necessary to develop the argument? Is information that is "nice to know" annexed or should it be?

- Are visuals used (charts, graphs, pictures, maps, etc.)? Can they be improved, adjusted, removed, and/or added to enhance the arguments or make them clearer for the audience?

- Is the argument presented as fair and informed?

- Is the title appropriate? Will it grab the intended audience?

- Are the word choices appropriate (i.e. avoiding politically sensitive terminology) while still remaining unambiguous and concise?

- Does the executive summary accurately reflect the full report and conclusions?

- What are the paper's chief strengths?

- Make specific suggestions that you think will assist the author to improve the paper.

Adapted from guidance documents by the Department of Safety and Security.

Annex VII.   Possible risk mitigation measures to ensure adequate protection of sources

- Assess the level of threat and risk of harm to the informant and other cooperating persons before, during and after establishing contact with them. If you assess that you will not be able to ensure the safety of the person you are cooperating with or you do not have sufficient information to make an informed determination, do not collect the information.

- Choose the most appropriate and safest method to establish contact with the informant (i.e. should contact be established directly or through a third party/intermediary?).

- Consider minimizing his or her exposure, for instance establish direct contact in a manner that may seem coincidental; consider developing secure methods of communication to keep in touch.

- Choose the safest place to obtain/gather information from the informant (i.e. should interaction with the source be visible or discreet? Protect his or her identity).

- Guarantee confidentiality and security of information: if there is a risk of endangering the informant(s), information should not be disclosed or should be disclosed in a manner that removes the risk (i.e. providing information on a general pattern without revealing specific details; ensuring that only trusted intermediaries are used). Confidentiality with regard to individual protection cases also covers information on the protective measures taken, including any support given by partners external to the field presence to strengthen the protection of a person at risk.

- Ensure informed consent and always take into account the knowledge and views of cooperating persons by involving them in the risk and threat assessment and the choice of measures to be taken to ensure their safety (i.e. the source/witness/informant or victim may have family members elsewhere who could be contacted if there is a need for his or her relocation).

- Do not raise expectations (upon establishing contact and before proceeding with the gathering information, consider informing victims, witnesses and other cooperating persons of the limitations in guaranteeing protection).

- Consider providing the persons with useful contacts in the community that could offer different types of assistance (e.g., protection networks) and/or of local authorities, if these can be trusted in case there is a risk of reprisals as a result of the interaction.

- Map the capacity and/or commitment of the duty bearers to respond to protection concerns to help them make informed decisions.

- Make use of the resources available in the community by facilitating contact with local protection networks.

- Share information on personal details of sources, victims and witnesses in line with relevant information-sharing and reporting protocols (consult HRD and CPS for further guidance). For instance, details that would allow for identification of witnesses and victims, such as pictures, names, etc. should be only shared with Human Rights, Child Protection or Protection of Civilians colleagues, and other sections as appropriate and approved by the Head of Office, for follow-up.

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Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms

ACABQ	United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACH	analysis of competing hypotheses
AFP	United Nations Agency, Fund and Programme
AIR	additional information requirement
AO	area of operations
AoR	area of responsibility
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
AT	assessment team (DPKO/OMA)
CoS	Chief of Staff
CSA	Chief Security Adviser
CSO	Chief Security Officer (DPKO Missions)
CSP	Country Security Plan
DFS	Department of Field Support
DO	designated official
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSA	Deputy Security Adviser
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
EFP	explosive formed projectile
ePAS	electronic performance appraisal system (United Nations Secretariat)
FS	Field Service (DPKO appointment grade)
FSA	Field Security Adviser (Security profession within the AFPs)
FSCO	Field Security Coordination Officer
FSHB	Field Security Handbook
FYEO	for your eyes only
GIS	geographic information system
GS	General Staff (DPKO appointment grade)
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
i2	i2 Analysts Notebook, software by IBM
IA	Information Analyst
IAU	Information Analysis Unit or Integrated Analysis Unit
IASMN	inter-agency security management network

IED	improvised explosive device
IMS	information management system
IR	information requirement
IS	information security
IT	information technology
JAPU	Joint Analysis and Policy Unit
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
LAN	local area network
LT	local time
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MILAD	Military Adviser
MORSS	minimum operating residential security standards
MOSS	minimum operating security standards
MSO	Mission Security Officer
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NY	New York (City)
NYT	New York Time
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management
OMA	DPKO Office of the Military Adviser
OO	Operations Officers
OROLSI	Office for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions
OSD	open source digest
OSI	open source information
P	Professional Staff
PIR	priority information requirements
POSS	Peace Operations Support Section (DSS)
PSC	private security company
RA	risk assessment
RFI	request for information
RLU	Research and Liaison Unit (SITCEN)
RSP	Regional Security Officer (DPKO)
RSS	rich site summary
SA	Security Adviser
SAA	Stand-Alone Analyst

SAHB	Security Analysis Handbook
SAPP	security analysis process and practice
SG	Secretary-General
SIA	Senior Informational Analyst
SICU	Security Information Coordination Unit
SIOC	Security Information and Operations Centre
SITCEN	DPKO-DFS Situation Centre
SLS	security level system
SMT	senior management team
SMS	security management system
SO	Security Officer
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPM	Special Political Mission
SRA	security risk assessment
SRM	security risk model
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSIA	Senior Security Information Analyst
SSIRS	significant security incident reporting system
SSS	Security and Safety Service
STA	structured threat assessment
STI	security threat information
STIM	security threat information management
STIN	security threat information notice
TA	threat assessment
TAG	Threat Assessment Group
TCC	troop-contributing country
TJO	temporary job opening
ToR	terms of reference
TRS	Threat and Risk Service (DSS)
TTP	tactics, techniques and procedures
UN	United Nations
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNOCC	United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VA	vulnerability assessment

List of United Nations missions

MENUB	United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOGBIS	United Nations integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali