Addendum 1:
Case studies

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INTRODUCTION

1. The integrated assessment and planning policy is applicable in the presence of a peacekeeping mission or in the presence of a special political mission, even in settings that are not structurally-integrated. The requirement for integration is also particularly acute in transition settings during which the United Nations is reconfiguring from one type of context to another. Considerations related to cross-pillar integration are also relevant in some non-mission settings. The integration review undertook in-depth examinations of four case studies to examine, for each type of context, the extent to which the United Nations is operating in an integrated fashion, to ascertain the utility of integration tools to identify barriers to integration that may need to be addressed in a systematic manner.

I. Afghanistan: integration involving a special political mission

CONTEXT

2. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established in 2002 following the December 2001 Bonn Agreement. From the outset, there was heavy emphasis on national ownership and maintaining a "light footprint" for the mission. Given the need to ensure that the support and assistance met national needs, Security Council resolution 1401 (2002), which established the mission, gave UNAMA a coordinating role for international donors.[1] In addition, the resolution gave the SRSG "full authority…over planning and conduct of all United Nations activities in Afghanistan", providing a basis for UNAMA as an integrated mission. The core work of UNAMA includes support for local and national peace efforts; support for organization of elections,

efforts towards sustainable peace, human rights reporting and advocacy, support government's efforts to improve the rule of law and governance, support of national priorities for development and promotion of regional cooperation, among other things.

3. UNAMA is headed by an SRSG and has two pillars, the political pillar headed by a DSRSG and the development pillar headed by a DSRSG/RC/HC. The mission's size peaked around 2010, when there were over 20 field offices . The mission currently has close to 1,200 staff, in Kabul, in 11 field offices across the country and in liaison offices in Tehran and Islamabad, a level that is approximately half the size at its peak.

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[1] The current mandate, contained in Security Council resolution 2543 (2020), refers to leading and coordinating "international civilian efforts".

4. In the last several years, especially since the election of Ashraf Ghani as President in 2014 and with the Secretary-General's reform initiatives, UNAMA has faced increasing pressure to ensure there is a coherent and effective division of labor within the United Nations system and—linked to this—to ensure efficiencies and reduction of the mission budget. The pressure further accelerated in 2017 with the United States pushing for reduction of costs for United Nations operations, and culminated in the request by theSecurity Council, in its resolution 2344 (2017), for the conduct of a strategic review and to increase efforts to achieve greater coherence, coordination and efficiency among the relevant UN entities, with a view to "maximizing their collective effectiveness" and to "optimize the division of labour and configuration to ensure better cooperation and minimize duplication with other United Nations related organizations". While there are divergent views regarding the consultations and engagement of the strategic review, some interviewees of this integration review noted that the 2017 exercise was insufficiently consultative or inclusive. The review highlighted that Afghanistan was not a post-conflict context and one of the recommendations was to focus rule of law work on advising on normative issues at capital. This resulted in a further reduction of the size of the mission particularly in the field offices, where presence of the governance unit was eliminated. As seen below, this had some negative impact on the integrated performance of the United Nations in Afghanistan.

5. Interviews and discussions revealed that, while there have been significant efforts towards integration and coherence, there have been serious challenges to the capacity of the United Nations system to integrate in Afghanistan. These challenges span a diverse range of factors, from inter-personal tensions, personnel turnover and vacancies, multiplicity of fora and processes, lack of planning capacity, to differences in staff benefits (such as rest and recuperation entitlements) between the Secretariat and agencies, cost-sharing challenges and insufficient efforts to understand each other's perspectives.

6. Afghanistan is at a key juncture. In February 2020, the United States reached an agreement with the Taliban and signed a declaration with the Government of Afghanistan. This led to the start of peace negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban in Doha in September 2020. At the same time, as part of the agreement with the Taliban, the United States has committed to withdraw its troops within 14 months of the signing of the agreement, provided certain conditions are met. These developments are taking place against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, which, combined with continued violence, natural disasters and food insecurity, add to the acute humanitarian emergency. The United Nations estimates that 18.4 million people will require humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan in 2021. More than ever, the United Nations system needs to ensure a coherent approach to continue to meet the needs of the population.

7. In case study interviews, there were many references to President Ghani's critical views of the United Nations system, particularly its development agencies. The President believes that these agencies divert resources away from the government, do not deliver in line with national priorities and are insufficiently responsive to needs on the ground. In the interviews, many noted that the United Nations in Afghanistan has not been development oriented and that the humanitarian country team (HCT) is powerful and rich in resources. Some described ongoing efforts to "shift the needle" towards development, but it is not clear whether discussion of such re-orientation is taking place in a coherent and strategic manner. According to some, the President's criticism of particular entities has encouraged "independence" on the part of certain United Nations agencies, which affects efforts toward integration. UNAMA leadership, however, emphasizes a unified approach, noting that if the President criticizes one part of the United Nations, he is criticizing the whole United Nations.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING POLICY

8. Interviews revealed a lack of familiarity with the IAP policy. Few are aware of it and only a handful are familiar with the content. One suggestion for the IAP policy was to have more explicit reference to the

usage of the United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework as the unifying framework for the United Nations system in country, in lieu of an integrated strategic framework (ISF). Across UNAMA and the country team, there is no common understanding that the eventual cooperation framework would be the unifying framework that would pull the UN system together.

9. As part of the process of developing the new cooperation framework, the country team is currently undertaking a common country assessment (CCA). The RCO has established 22 working groups for the process, of which UNAMA participates in four: human rights and access to justice, governance, multidimensional risk and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. From the interviews, the degree to which the mission feels ownership of this process seemed to vary depending on the function.

One UN for Afghanistan

10. In 2016, the government adopted the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) with a five-year time frame (2017-2021)[2]. In response, the country team developed a "One UN for Afghanistan" framework, aligned with the ANPDF, signed with the Government in March 2018. This framework focuses the work of the United Nations on six thematic areas (education, food security, nutrition and livelihoods, health, return and reintegration, rule of law and normative work, including human rights advocacy and protection). The country team established six thematic working groups to support these priority areas.

11. While some refer to the One UN for Afghanistan framework as a positive example of integration, others note that it was done for political reasons rather than programmatic ones. Another criticism is that the document essentially "retrofits" what United Nations agencies were already undertaking into a framework. While certain parts of the mission, notably human rights, participate in the thematic working groups, the level of ownership felt by various mission components towards this framework is unclear. It is also unclear how the work around this framework and the thematic working groups link to other processes, including the ongoing CCA process.

12. The review did not find evidence of monitoring and evaluation of the framework, which could have indicated to what degree the United Nations system is collectively performing towards supporting national priorities. As such, it is not clear that the One UN for Afghanistan functions as the primary unifying and collective framework for UN activities in priority areas.

Multiplicity of mechanisms and unclear linkages

13. United Nations country team meetings are held on a regular basis, and the SRSG attends consistently. Many appreciated the strong and genuine engagement of the SRSG with the UN country team. At the same time, some noted the ballooning size of country team meetings (some referred to cases where there were over 80 participants), making them only useful for information sharing and not decision making. Some colleagues have questioned the political pillar being regularly brought into country team meetings, and that there were discussions to revert to "normal" country team meetings with only agencies present. However, these views seem to be in a distinct minority.

14. In addition to the thematic working groups for One UN, country team meetings, and the CCA working groups, there are other mechanisms and fora competing for time and attention. Several interlocutors noted that they are overwhelmed with the number of meetings, and some questioned their effectiveness, noting that they feel that they "are forced to meet" but that after the meetings everyone goes and "does what they want". Linkages among these fora and mechanisms, if they exist, are not very clear. There does not seem to be an overarching, regular meeting that brings together mission section heads with AFP representatives, except on specific issues like the COVID task force. Many pointed out that when issues arise, they tend to be resolved in smaller meetings, and that the current leadership is very approachable when there is a need to address issues.

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2   A revised framework, ANPDF2, was recently adopted in the context of the November 2020 Geneva pledging conference.

THEMATIC AREAS

15. When it comes to certain thematic areas, however, the United Nations has been able to integrate in order to effectively deliver in Afghanistan. Areas where this is evident include human rights, where the work of the Human Rights Section on civilian casualty tracking and reporting is highlighted by many as effective. The section documents and reports on civilian casualties, whether caused by the government or the Taliban. This area of work has strengthened the perception of impartiality of the mission, and data on civilian casualties and injuries is used by agencies to understand the impact of hostilities, including economic and social aspects, and can inform programmatic activities. Another area is electoral assistance, where the tangible, time-bound nature of the requirements helps bring the system together.

16. Engagement with the Taliban was also cited by many as an effective area of integration, in part because of the clear division of responsibilities: the SRSG leads on political discussions, the HC leads on humanitarian access, and OHCHR leads on civilian casualty discussions. Some also cited a "less stove-piped approach" that has been taken vis-à-vis the Doha talks, with different mixes of UN political, development and humanitarian actors being involved at different times. At the same time, at least one agency noted that they have separate channels and negotiations with the Taliban (related to access), though they do keep the mission leadership informed of such negotiations.

17. Integration in the areas of rule of law and governance has been more challenging in Afghanistan, though there has been some collaboration in the area of anti-corruption. The mission's rule of law capacity has undergone significant changes in the last several years. The 2017 Strategic Review, endorsed by the Security Council, recommended to reduce the capacity from 27 staff to six. In addition, the Review recommended a focus on normative advice in capital. The subsequent withdrawal of capacity from the field offices had an impact on the mission's capacity at the field level to lead in the engagement of provincial authorities as "One UN". In fact, the review recommendations, particularly the cuts to the Rule of Law and Governance Units seem to have resulted

in more challenges for effective integration, from the withdrawal of governance expertise in the field to trust fund issues described below.

18. One of the criticisms against the strategic review is that it made cuts but did not identify a transition process. While the positions were cut, there was no reduction in the requests for support from the government and institutions, and according to some, UNDP had not stepped up its rule of law work. There have also been delays in transforming a Law and Order Trust Fund (of the United Nations country team) into a multi-partner trust fund with a window on justice and anti-corruption. Not having this fund established means that there is no effective way to channel funds for rule of law, which hamper the ability of the United Nations system to step up its work in this area. This also raises reputational concerns for the United Nations vis-à-vis the donors, as they are keen to have an effective trust fund to channel their support.

19. Despite this overall context, there has been collaboration in some areas such as anti-corruption. Based on the national anti-corruption plan, UNAMA, UNODC and UNDP have developed a joint plan and a division of labor. UNAMA leads on the political side as well as advocacy. UNDP provides project support and UNODC leads on specialized capacity building, including mentoring. However, there have been some tensions over funding between UNDP and UNODC. The establishment of the aforementioned MPTF and the window on justice and anti-corruption would be helpful to reduce such tensions.

20. On women, peace and security and gender issues, interviews revealed that while there are some instances of collaboration, particularly between the mission and UN-Women, others described efforts in these areas as "dysfunctional" and "disjointed". Many noted that what is needed is leadership driving and setting the tone. With regard to coordination mechanisms, there is a Gender and Humanitarian Action Working Group, but it is focused on COVID. A few suggested that it might be helpful to have a gender working group in the country team. On gender-based violence, the sub-cluster working group (within the Protection Cluster) stopped meeting a few years ago. Some attributed the dysfunction to personalities, while others noted that the

DSRSG/RC/HC had not been keen to expand the work of the humanitarian country team, which contributed to the work in this area being dormant. There are now efforts underway to reinvigorate the work, partly due to pressure from NGOs and others like UN-Women.

HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

21. In Afghanistan, there are generally good relations between the mission and the humanitarians. There is an appreciation for the mission's efforts for impartiality, for example in its civilian casualty tracking and reporting, and there has been good coordination on negotiating with the Taliban. On the other hand, some pointed out the limited linkages between the humanitarian and development agencies.

22. In a number of interviews, some raised the issue of whether humanitarian assistance can be seen as a peace dividend, particularly in the context of the Doha talks. The review heard divergent views on this issue, with some strongly stating that it is a peace dividend, while others advocated for a more nuanced approach[3]. The reality is that humanitarians will continue to do the utmost to deliver assistance when and where needed, so this issue of whether such assistance is a peace dividend seems to be a red herring. On another note, some from the mission noted that the humanitarians in Afghanistan had "taken brave steps" to widen their assistance to go beyond simply providing food to include more sustainable efforts. The humanitarians noted that there had been significant success in working with the World Bank, including through the conduct of a common needs analysis, which fed into the humanitarian needs overview for 2021. However, there does not seem to be significant collaboration with other United Nations development actors.

INTEGRATION AT THE FIELD LEVEL

23. UNAMA has 11 field offices and 2 liaison offices (Tehran and Islamabad). The main coordination mechanism across the mission and agencies at the field level are the United Nations regional teams (UNRTs). UNRTs usually meet monthly. They promote information sharing and develop common understandings of dynamics and political space in the regions. However, there is a general sense that agencies are not invested in UNRTs. One of the challenges cited was the lack of linkage between the UNRTs and the country team. UNAMA field offices were recently "kicked out" of country team meetings, apparently due to the size of the meetings. On the other hand, the degree of participation and buy-in from the agencies for the UNRT varies. At times the agencies are represented at junior levels not empowered to make any decisions. The field offices also bear the burden of organizing the meetings, including agenda setting and production of meeting notes.

24. This dynamic is also seen in the operationalization of the One UN for Afghanistan framework at the field level, which has been entrusted to the heads of field offices. Some cited the different approaches between the mission and agencies as a major challenge to implement the framework in the field. Some colleagues noted that agencies tend to be focused on the national level, and there is not enough done at the field level to tailor programme delivery to the needs on the ground (though this may vary from agency to agency). The agency representatives in the field also tend to be project staff who are not empowered to make such adjustments.

25. The mission and agencies have joint meetings with provincial governments and conduct occasional joint trips. From the mission side, there is a sense that all of the logistical heavy lifting for these joint endeavors are undertaken by them. On the other hand, some agencies have complained about the mission's "bossy" and "arrogant" attitude.

26. Many pointed out how the security environment can affect the degree of integration and coordination. In the South, particularly for Taliban controlled areas, the mission and agencies have worked together, driven by the need for operational access. With increasing Taliban control, negotiating access is challenging. Some noted that agencies often want to go on their own and there are risks to such independent

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3   Some articulated that the main concern is over the need to ensure that assistance is not seen as a driver or tool for peace and that humanitarian work does not become instrumentalized as part of the peace process, but rather achieved as a result of the peace process.

approaches. The mission and its leadership has been making concerted efforts towards a more coordinated approach to engaging with the Taliban.

MISSION SUPPORT/BUSINESS OPERATIONS

27. Some interviewees noted there are no effective mechanisms or fora to have frank discussions or explore solutions to issues related to co-location and other mission support/business operations issues. While there is an Operations Management Team chaired by the UNDP Operations Manager, it is not given the importance that it should. Agencies are represented by junior staff and not empowered to contribute to discussions or make decisions. At the field level, there are no mechanisms to handle the administrative issues that arise from co-location, which also requires a considerable amount of executive authority which the heads of field offices lack.

28. A case in point is the provision of medical services. UNAMA established the Joint Medical Service (JMS) in 2018. It is cost-shared among resident agencies. Around 20 agencies have signed up. Some key agencies have decided to opt out of the JMS and currently outsource medical services to an external service provider. From the mission's perspective, this is disappointing, and it also affects the mission budget, which was prepared on the assumption that these agencies would be part of the JMS. From an agency perspective, the fundamental problem is what is perceived as the poor quality of the service provided by the JMS. As a result, some agencies feel that they need to seek outside contracts to meet their duty of care to staff and their dependents. These concerns appear to have been borne out during COVID pandemic, when agency clinics were able to respond much faster than the JMS to testing requirements. Further withdrawal of international forces will also impact United Nations access to emergency life-saving medical care facilities. Again, from the interviews, there does not seem to be an effective senior level mechanism to frankly discuss the issues and identify solutions.

FACTORS

29. Almost all interviewees emphasized the importance of leadership setting the tone and driving integration. Many commented on the interpersonal dynamics of the senior leadership. In the recent years, these dynamics, including personality clashes, seem to have had a negative impact on relations between the mission and United Nations country team. The approach taken by the former DSRSG/RC/HC elicited divergent reactions. Some noted that there were "favourite" agencies and that agencies without resources were often excluded from discussions or frameworks. Many found this approach to be divisive.

30. Many interviewed noted that the current SRSG brought in a new energy and is successfully building relations within the system and beyond. She has a strong working relationship with the acting[4] RC and acting HC and is invested in the United Nations country team. The SRSG is conscious about speaking on behalf of the United Nations system, not just the mission, which is in line with the expected role of mission leadership. She strongly believes in the importance of helping the system to come together, whether in the context of COVID-19 or in support of the Doha talks. Many remarked on the benefit of the collaborative approach she has adopted.

31. Many pointed out that the physical separation between the mission and agencies is not conducive to integration. In addition, UNAMA was at its peak size 10 years ago, with double the resources compared to now. Compounds were designed to accommodate that peak size. Some of the field offices are considered "white elephants" and are expensive to maintain. The mission has been promoting co-location in these field compounds, in part to share costs. Some agencies have been reluctant to co-locate or have decided to move away from co-location, due to high costs (linked to security costs) and, in some cases, concerns around maintaining humanitarian space. Many of the agencies resent being charged for what they consider to be "core costs" of the mission. Throughout the interviews, neither side seemed to see the other's perspective.

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4   At the time of the review, there was an acting RC and an acting HC (in the absence of a DSRSG/RC/HC).

32. Issues also rise once there is co-location. Some have pointed out that some agencies have compartmentalized themselves. Anecdotally, the review heard of a case of locked gates within a compound that require specific codes on IDs; this not only negates some of the benefits of co-location, but could also create problems during a security incident.

LOOKING FORWARD

33. For some, the fact that UNAMA is a special political mission and not a peacekeeping operation meant that it is easier to engage, given its smaller size. One observation noted that peacekeeping operations tended to be "omnipresent" and that with UNAMA, there was a stronger "sense of equilibrium" amongst the different parts of the United Nations in country. At the same time, some agency colleagues still see the mission as "well-resourced and well-staffed", which may no longer match reality. The fact that the mission has no programming resources was mentioned several times, and some called for the need for flexibility in programmatic funding, so that the mission could have resources to incentivize collaboration. Programmatic funding was cited as a potential enabler.

34. Looking ahead, along with the trajectory of the Afghanistan peace negotiations (in Doha), another key juncture is the rapid withdrawal of the international military forces. There is a need for the United Nations to consider the potential risks of the international military withdrawal and what it means for the entire United Nations system. There could be huge impacts in terms of security, which may affect the ability to maintain field presences. There may also be operational impacts, for example access to aircraft landing strips, medical services and facilities. There may also be impact on how the United Nations is perceived, which could affect humanitarian space.

35. Finally, with the appointments of both DSRSGs, there is a major opportunity to establish a strong senior leadership team under the current SRSG, who is not only committed to integration as a means of improving United Nations system performance in serving the target population but also has creative ideas and has already cultivated strong relations across the United Nations system and beyond. The importance of strong leadership of agencies, funds and programmes was also raised.

II.Mali: Integration in a peacekeeping context

CONTEXT

36. With a budget of $1.183 billion[5], an authorized strength of 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel and a staffing table with nearly 2,000 civilian staff and United Nations Volunteers, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is one of the largest peacekeeping missions currently deployed. It is also the most dangerous mission; in its first five years of deployment, MINUSMA alone accounted for nearly half of all fatalities in United Nations peacekeeping. MINUSMA was established as a structurally integrated mission, with one of its two deputy special representatives (DSRSG) simultaneously dual-hatted as resident coordinator (RC) and humanitarian coordinator (HC). In Mali, the United Nations country team[6] consists of some 20 organizations, most of which were present before the deployment of MINUSMA.

37. Mali is a difficult environment for mandate implementation and programme delivery for all parts of the United Nations system not only because of the logistical challenges present in the centre and north of the country, but also because of the complex conflict dynamics in Mali and the fact that United Nations personnel are regularly the target of asymmetric attacks. These non-permissive conditions have prompted the Security Council to request MINUSMA to carry out its mandate with a proactive and robust posture, including countering asymmetric attacks in active defense of its mandate[7], and provide the mission with additional mandated tasks, including providing operational and logistical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force[8] and supporting the redeployment of the Malian defense and security forces, including through joint operations[9]. The compatibility of these tasks with the three principles of peacekeeping and whether they make the mission a party to the conflict continue to be hotly debated and have significant implications for integration in the Mali context.

38. MINUSMA currently operates under an integrated strategic framework, which was finalized in 2019. A transition plan to guide the work of the United Nations in support of the 18-month civilian transition is under development which, in turn, will inform the development of a new integrated strategic framework.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING POLICY

39. The need for integration is not really questioned in Mali. However, there is no common understanding of what integration entails. This was raised by some as an issue, particularly given that the term is routinely invoked. Some cynics remarked, though, that the language and vocabulary of integration is often used by individuals seeking to expand their remit or influence over the activities of others.

Integrated strategic framework

40. The process of developing the 2019-2021 ISF was led by the office of the DSRSG/RC/HC and took eight months from start to finish. Participants described an open and participatory process, but many members of the United Nations country team had difficulty understanding the division between the ISF and the UNDAF+ and which would take precedence. Some humanitarian agencies also had a conceptual issue

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5   General Assembly resolution 74/290

6   Throughout this paper, the term "country team", used without qualifiers, should be understood to refer to the Mali-based presences of the United Nations system entities and organizations that are part of the United Nations country team in Mali.

7   Security Council resolution 2295(2016), paragraph 19 (d)

8   Security Council resolution 2391(2017), paragraph 13

9   Security Council resolution 2423(2018), paragraph 38 (b)

with a document formalizing their institutional cooperation with MINUSMA. The section of the results matrix that ostensibly established a division of responsibilities simply listed the ongoing activities of the various actors. As such, the framework developed provided very little added value to either the mission or the country team. When the ISF was finalized in early 2019, it was promptly ignored by all. Members of the country team considered the UNDAF+ and HRP as their primary planning frameworks and saw the ISF as a MINUSMA document. No implementation plan was ever developed for the framework as a whole; without such a plan, the framework was too high-level and not granular enough to be of use.

41. Despite the issues with the ISF, interviews revealed that there is, in fact, a desire for a proper integrated strategic framework in Mali. A number of interviewees indicated that they wished there were a clear vision for the United Nations in Mali that could also inform coordinated messaging to the government, donors and other partners. Some also noted that the division of responsibilities between the mission and the country team was not always clear.

42. In addition to the ISF, there are many other overlapping planning frameworks in Mali. Most notable are the UNSDCF and the HRP. Each of these has a different time horizon and different approach to resourcing. And whereas MINUSMA was part of the previous UNDAF+, it is not a signatory to the UNSDCF. This was deliberate; one interviewee indicated that the exclusion of MINUSMA was in line with guidance provided by Headquarters. Some mission interlocutors expressed their view that, after the development of the UNSDCF, the mission is now farther away than ever from the country team, as there is no longer a single document guiding the activities of the entire United Nations system in Mali.

Integrated mechanisms

43. At the mission level, there is a proliferation of meetings, many of which have very similar compositions and overlapping agendas. The forum that formally serves as the decision-making venue for issues related to the ISF is the senior leadership forum (SLF) chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

(SRSG). Interviewees from across the mission and country team were firmly united in their assessment of the inadequacy of the SLF as a coordination mechanism. Not only does it not meet frequently enough, but it has far too many participants to facilitate meaningful discussion. The lack of a functional integrated senior-level decision-making mechanism between the mission and the country team has apparently led to the informal use of the security management team (SMT) meeting for this purpose. The SMT meets every two weeks and begins with an analysis of security threats, but this often segues into a discussion about the political situation. As such, many of the topics discussed in the SMT are actually ones that one would expect to be covered in the senior leadership forum.

44. The DSRSG/RC/HC convenes a United Nations country team meeting every two weeks. The DSRSG/RC/HC also convenes a humanitarian country team meeting every month, which includes the United Nations humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organization (NGO) country representatives and two observers from the donor community. These were described by interviewees as being very frustrating and disappointing, as decisions are seldom taken in these meetings—and when they are, there is never any follow-up.

45. Agency and NGO interviewees found the monthly civil-military coordination (CMCoord) meetings coordinated by OCHA to be far more useful than the humanitarian country team meetings. CMCoord meetings, which are convened in Bamako, Mopti and Gao, include representatives of both the MINUSMA military component and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa). However, the fact that participation by the MINUSMA force is generally not at a decision-making level created significant frustration and prompted the establishment of a quarterly "high-level CMCoord" meeting that includes the Force Commander and senior representatives from FAMa, Operation Barkhane and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. These high-level meetings provide a venue for frank airing of views, but meetings have at times been confrontational and have not necessarily resulted in any changes in posture or meeting of the minds.

46. Finally, joint planning and analysis structures are absent. The mission Strategic Planning Unit (SPU),

which reports to the Chief of Staff, plays a central role in ensuring cohesion within MINUSMA. However, the SPU and RCO do not regularly meet, and both the mission and the country team identified the need to improve communication between the two units as an area for improvement. Similarly, there is no ongoing joint analysis between the mission and the country team. The most obvious interfaces for this would be between the Joint Mission Analysis Cell and the resident coordinator office, but there does not appear to be much interaction, if any, between these two offices.

Monitoring and reporting

47. As there is no implementation plan for the ISF, there is also no dedicated monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the ISF. Staff members across the mission and country team noted that, following the finalization of the ISF, everyone simply continued with their existing reporting cycles. Some suggested that an ISF reporting requirement could help provide some teeth to the framework.

48. Other reporting frameworks exist within MINUSMA. The results-based budget, for all of its major flaws, is the primary planning and reporting framework for the mission. While the RBB lacked enthusiastic proponents in the mission, most mission staff interviewed see the new Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) positively, even optimistically. If nothing else, interviewees suggested that CPAS was helping to get colleagues out of an output-focused mindset towards thinking about impact. That said, many noted that CPAS creates additional reporting burdens for staff across the mission. Indeed, there appears to be a continuing trend of adding reporting and performance measurement frameworks—and software platforms to support those frameworks—without any effort to make these systems interoperable. All of these parallel systems are time-consuming to manage and feed; moreover, they are of limited utility to mission leadership because they are not linked and therefore cannot provide a comprehensive picture.

MANDATE-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS

49. The many parts of the United Nations system in Mali represent a diverse array of mandates and approaches to the multitude of development, humanitarian and peace and security requirements in the country. Having to balance the various mandates is a constant and complex undertaking. Beyond differences in mandate, the differences in organizational cultures, mindsets and perspectives cannot be overlooked. The fact that different actors and entities operate on very different time scales can also exacerbate frictions when attempting to coordinate activities.

Security Council dynamics

50. The robust mandate of MINUSMA adopted by the Security Council is often cited as a major culprit for the tensions between the mission and the country team. Besides the fact that many of the mandated tasks appear to be code for counter-insurgency, the mission has a mandate to provide material support to FAMa—a party to the conflict—and the G5 Sahel Joint Force—a counterterrorism operation. This has led many humanitarian actors in Mali, including some members of the United Nations country team, to conclude that MINUSMA is a party to the conflict.

51. The Security Council emphasized from the inception of the mission that its intention was not for the mission to be purely military focused, which is why multidimensionality and integration were emphasized in the mandate and highlighted in the very name of the mission. However, the Security Council has failed to acknowledge—or even understand—that the heavy military and security elements of the mandate complicate efforts at integration.

Militarized context

52. Mali is a heavily militarized operating environment. In addition to communal militias, extremist groups and jihadist insurgents, there are many foreign security forces operating in parallel, including MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane, the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the European Union Training Mission in Mali. Coordination

is essential when there are so many forces operating in parallel in a country. The Instance de Coordination Militaire au Mali is a mechanism established to allow the commanders of the various forces to convene and set priorities. However, some respondents believe that coordination needs to move beyond high-level strategy to a much more operational approach that clearly establishes who is doing what where and when.

53. Even if MINUSMA does not itself execute counterterrorism operations, it is mandated to support the Malian defense and security forces, which do. MINUSMA provides logistical support and services, such as medevac, that the Malian defense and security forces lack. Support to non-United Nations forces, including the Malian armed forces and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, falls within the scope of the human rights due diligence policy. Notably, support provided by the United Nations system to signatory armed groups is also subject to the HRDDP.[10] Some country team members have pushed back against the requirement to submit their projects through the HRDDP task force, but the Human Rights Division was able to overcome some objections by establishing HRDDP focal points in each agency and co-opting some agencies by including them as members of the HRDDP task force.

Humanitarian space

54. Taken together, the more controversial elements of the MINUSMA mandate and the high visibility of the military and security activities of the mission foster an impression that the mission prioritizes a security-driven approach. This view of MINUSMA is further reinforced through its high-profile efforts to generate military capabilities such as attack helicopters and special forces units that are generally considered to be offensive—as opposed to defensive—in nature. As a result, many humanitarian NGOs identify MINUSMA as a party to the conflict, and the Mali International NGO Forum has expelled members who have partnered with the mission on projects funded from the MINUSMA trust fund. Many interlocutors pointed out that the question of the neutrality of MINUSMA also risks fragmenting the humanitarian system in Mali between those in the United Nations system, which are bound to MINUSMA as a result of structural integration, and NGOs.

55. Within the mission, many interviewees described the humanitarian NGOs who refuse to work with MINUSMA as radicals and consider the principled position taken by those NGOs as an unhelpful and outdated mentality. Many interlocutors pointed out that the humanitarian situation can only be resolved once effective civil and judicial institutions are re-established throughout the country. To some country team staff, one real challenge is that many agencies, NGOs and donors view the triple nexus with suspicion because they equate the peace element with military operations and fail to acknowledge the peace and security activities performed by the country team or by the MINUSMA civilian substantive component.

56. Humanitarian NGOs acknowledge that access has become more challenging in recent years, but note that they can still reach most of the country, either directly or through local NGO partners. The reason for their ability to maintain access, and without military escort, is their consistent adherence to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. They also question the extent to which the military can actually secure access. Several interviewees noted that armed groups return the moment the military withdraws, pointing out that even Operation Barkhane—a force that is much more flexible and responsive than the MINUSMA military component—has been playing a futile game of whack-a-mole for years with the insurgents.

57. A recent situation that was frequently cited by interviewees was an incident in October 2020 in the village of Farabougou, in central Mali. At the time, the village was under siege by jihadists, and neither the Malian armed forces nor humanitarian agencies could reach the villagers. Ultimately, the MINUSMA force delivered 24 tons of food for FAMa. Farabougou may well be the Rashomon of integration in Mali, as it illustrates the vast differences in perspectives at play. Some saw the delivery of assistance to Farabougou as a good illustration of cooperation between military and humanitarian actors. Many used this as an example of how the military could access areas that humanitarians could not reach. Others, however, pointed out that negotiations had been underway between OCHA and

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10   MINUSMA 2010.10 SOP on implementation of HRDDP

the militants to secure humanitarian access; the military operation not only failed to provide an opportunity for the negotiations to succeed, but could preclude the possibility of gaining access in the future, as had happened following the airdropping of food to the village of Mondoro a year earlier. Others used this situation as an example of the lack of operational coordination between MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane, pointing out Barkhane separately airdropped 20 tons of food to Farabougou without informing either the mission or the country team.

58. There is a recognition by some humanitarians, particularly those within the United Nations country team, that cooperation with the MINUSMA military component is sometimes unavoidable. However, what inroads that humanitarians make with the force are always fleeting in nature given the pace of rotation and turnover within the military component. This is part of a broader set of frustrations shared by interviewees, including the fact that many within the force—especially officers from NATO countries—simply do not understand international law or how the United Nations works. There is a perception that the military does not truly accept the concept of civilian leadership, that they are simply "off doing their own thing". As one individual noted, there are three very different cultures that exist in tension with one another in Mali, namely the humanitarians and their desire to preserve humanitarian space, the civilians and their desire to maintain the primacy of politics and the military and its need to maintain the chain of command.

Mopti

59. Interlocutors across the mission, country team and NGOs agree that leadership is sine qua non for bridging these differences in culture and for bringing together the humanitarian agencies, development organizations and MINUSMA to work towards a common purpose. They also agree that this necessary ingredient emerged with the arrival of a deputy humanitarian coordinator (DHC) in 2019. The DHC is based in Mopti, though staff from across the mission and country team described this as an "exile" from Bamako and not an assignment to Mopti.

60. There is general recognition that the close collaboration between the MINUSMA head of office in Mopti and the DHC has yielded tangible results. The "One UN" approach adopted in Mopti consists of an integrated planning process between the mission and the country team that identifies and reviews priorities on a quarterly basis, develops agreed action plans based on those strategic priorities, reviews progress on action plans every two weeks and engages with external partners on a regular basis through the monthly Mopti CMCoord meetings. Mopti is an illustration of the triple nexus at work—in fact, several interviewees noted that it works in Mopti because the approach is not explicitly described as being the triple nexus.

61. A few reasons were volunteered for why integration has been successful at the Mopti level in a manner that doesn't exist in the other regions. For one, the close working relationship between the DHC, the Mopti head of office and the UNDP resident representative is regularly cited as a key factor of success. Second, the nature of the conflict in the centre is different from that in the north; while the former was, until recently, primarily intercommunal, the violence in the north is primarily from jihadist insurgents. Third, the government and the FAMa do have a presence in the Mopti region but are largely absent from the north. Finally, many noted that distance from the turf wars in Bamako allows staff in Mopti to focus on pragmatism over principle.

Thematic areas

62. A challenge to "One UN" approach in Mopti is the duplication of reporting lines. Although the broader United Nations strategy for the centre of Mali is overseen by the DSRSG(P), humanitarian activities fall within the purview of the DSRSG/RC/HC. In fact, the issue of the organization of MINUSMA into two pillars, one led by the DSRSG(P) and the other by the triple-hat was raised as an issue in numerous interviews. In MINUSMA, human rights, political affairs and civil affairs report to the DSRSG(P), while stabilization and early recovery, SSR and DDR, electoral affairs and justice and corrections report to the DSRSG/RC/HC. Across numerous interviews, interlocutors noted duplications of effort and varying degrees of rivalry between civil affairs and

stabilization, between electoral affairs and political affairs and between justice and corrections and human rights. Some suggested that the reasons for the conflict between units in the mission is not entirely due to the division of responsibilities between the two DSRSGs, but actually stems from internecine rivalries between departments and thematic units at Headquarters.

63. One programmatic area in which cooperation between the mission and the country team appears to be working well is electoral assistance. United Nations efforts are organized under an integrated electoral team led by the Chief, Electoral Assistance Section. All relevant agencies, funds and programmes and MINUSMA sections are represented in the team. A clear division of responsibilities exists between the mission and the country team, with MINUSMA focused on logistics and electoral security, while UNDP focuses on capacity building and manages the basket fund. Another reason for the close cooperation is the fact that the UNDP chief technical advisor is a former MINUSMA staff member and who therefore has a very strong working relationship with the Electoral Assistance Section. All of this collectively contributes to what one interviewee called "the textbook example of coordination".

64. Rule of law is another thematic area with a long history of cooperation between missions and country teams. In Mali, the United Nations system efforts are coordinated through a rule of law forum chaired by the chief of the MINUSMA Justice and Corrections Section. One of the posts in this section is a shared resource with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); although funded from the mission budget, the post is filled through a joint selection process and the individual maintains dual reporting lines to MINUSMA and to UNODC. Staff from within the mission and country team suggested that rule of law is an area that could be better coordinated in practice, and pointed to the lack of a common agreed rule of law strategy, competition for funding for projects and weaknesses in programme delivery. Some suggested that tension between the various rule of law actors in Mali ultimately stems from turf wars and rivalries between the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions at Headquarters and other actors across the United Nations, including OHCHR and UNDP.

FUNDING MECHANISMS

65. Many funding mechanisms coexist in Mali to support the delivery of programmatic activities. In addition to the funding available to the various agencies, funds and programmes operating in Mali, MINUSMA also has nearly $60 million allocated for programmatic activities in its budget[11], $4.8 million for quick-impact projects as well as voluntary contributions provided by donors to the mission-managed Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali. Furthermore, Mali has been eligible for funding through the Peacebuilding Fund since 2014; it was declared re-eligible for funding in 2020.

Programmatic funding and quick-impact projects

66. Programmatic funding is allocated on a thematic basis for activities clearly established in the mission budget. The overwhelming majority of programmatic funding in the MINUSMA budget is for mine action activities, much of which is aimed at reducing the threat posed to the mission by improvised explosive devices.

67. Although quick-impact projects (QIPs) are intended to be small-value projects that can be quickly implemented to win the hearts and minds of the population, many mission staff see no meaningful distinction between programmatic activities and QIPs. Humanitarian actors in particular are wary of the use of QIPs by MINUSMA. Despite the fact that the QIPs policy requires coordination of QIPs with the country team through the project review committee, this is not consistently done, leading to much frustration. In particular, the country team takes umbrage with the implementation of QIPs that compete with or conflict with humanitarian or development activities in areas served by the country team; by one count, such cases account for some 40 percent of all MINUSMA QIPs implemented since 2013. Others questioned

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11 Apart from $46 million for mine action, the 2020/21 budget request included $8 million for DDR/CVR and $2.8 million for rule of law projects, as well as funding for confidence-building, community stabilization, electoral support and gender-related activities.

the sustainability of some projects initiated as QIPs, and noted that there must be planning to link QIPs to longer-term projects.

Stabilization trust fund

68. The majority of programmatic activities of the mission are funded through the Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali. Since its establishment in 2013, the trust fund has received over $106 million in voluntary contributions from 15 donors and has allocated over $94 million in funding to 224 separate projects[12]. Proposals for trust fund activities are submitted through a project review committee chaired by the DSRSG/RC/HC. A monitoring and evaluation system is in place, and payments are disbursed in installments on the basis of progress achieved.[13] Initially, the trust fund was only used for mission projects, but the trust fund is now increasingly used for projects jointly implemented by a mission section and one or more external partners.

69. There is concern from parts of the mission and across the country team that the stabilization trust fund undermines integration because it creates competition for resources between the mission and the country team, and also contributes to a politicization of or the dominance of security in the assistance provided. Within the mission, a number of staff members voiced the concern that peacekeeping missions are not effective at managing trust funds or implementing projects, and that such activities are more effectively carried out by UNDP. A broader concern is the fact that the trust fund—and indeed all of the funding available to the mission for its programmatic activities—is simply not being used in a strategic manner. Several noted that there is a missed opportunity for using the trust fund as the main vehicle for ISF implementation and have it serve as the main driver of coordinated action in service of a common United Nations vision and associated priorities.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

70. Although funding mechanisms—whether programmatic funding, QIPs or the trust fund—can serve as opportunities for joint delivery between MINUSMA and the country team, there are many administrative barriers that pose headaches to the collaborative use of these mechanisms. Most fundamentally, the budget and reporting cycles of MINUSMA and the country team are different. Beyond this, staff in the mission and the country team provided a litany of challenges, ranging from incompatible systems that create difficulties in the transfer of funds and which therefore delay the implementation of projects, to Secretariat policies and procedures that fail to take account of austere field environments.

71. Despite these challenges, there are some areas in which the mission provides services to the country team. For example, MINUSMA provides medical services to the country team, and the implementation of the systemwide medevac framework has been well-received in Mali, which has been hard hit by COVID-19. That said, the areas in which common services are being delivered in Mali are fairly limited, for a variety of reasons. From the perspective of the mission, which has a large and well-resourced mission support component, there is simply no need to cooperate with the country team. Moreover, cost recovery from the country team for services provided has often been difficult and frustrating for both parties. On the part of the country team, there are no plans to include MINUSMA in the business operations strategy, as there is a sense that getting the agencies, funds and programmes to align their business processes is already a challenging enough task.

72. The ability to use procurement contracts of other United Nations system organizations under mutual recognition has been valuable. For example, the country team uses MINUSMA fuel contracts in northern

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12 United Nations Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali: Global Report 1 April 2019-30 June 2020

13 MINUSMA 2016.04 Instruction permanentes: Gestion du fonds fiduciaire des Nations Unies en soutien à la paix à la sécurité au Mali.

Mali and the mission was able to make use of UNICEF contracts for medical supplies and equipment as a stopgap measure in the early days of the COVID pandemic while it was in the process of negotiating its own contracts. In the area of logistics, however, the humanitarians and the mission largely operate in parallel, as the nature and scale of requirements are very different between the mission and country team.

FACTORS

73. Across the interviews conducted for this case study, a number of recurring themes emerged regarding factors that helped or hindered integration, including leadership, personalities, organizational differences, colocation and information sharing.

Leadership

74. Interviewees unanimously identified leadership—or the lack thereof—as having a major impact on integration in Mali. Although individual members of senior United Nations leadership in Mali may be effective in directing units formally reporting to them, the absence of leadership in driving integrated action across the system is keenly felt in Mali. Interviewees saw this lacuna as being particularly pronounced when it comes to bridging cultural gaps, bringing together different parts of the system and coordinating with donors. And in balancing the different priorities of the United Nations system, many felt that humanitarian considerations were not being effectively championed by senior leadership. It is for this reason that humanitarians welcomed the appointment of a DHC in 2019. The DHC has done much to repair relations between the mission and the country team through his proactive and pragmatic engagement. His efforts have clearly made a positive impact in Mopti, but many humanitarians are concerned that his focus on the centre means that the benefits of his engagement aren't being felt in other regions or—more critically—in Bamako.

Co-location

75. Co-location is not the norm in Mali, whether in Bamako or in the regions. The fact that units like the RCO and SPU are not in the same location was offered as one reason why they do not work as closely together as they should. At the same time, physical separation does not preclude close cooperation; the RCO works very closely with the front office of the DSRSG/RC/HC, and the integrated electoral team also works effectively together despite its geographical distribution. The difference, perhaps, is the fact that entities that do work closely together do so because coordinating with their counterparts is clearly understood to be part of their job, whereas the linkage between the RCO and SPU—while critical to the success of integration—is not a formal requirement.

76. Many country team entities actively resist being co-located with MINUSMA. For some, this is a matter of preserving humanitarian space. Security, particularly outside of Bamako, is certainly a concern in Mali, but even in more dangerous locations, many of the agencies, funds and programmes prefer to visibly keep at arm's length from the mission rather than to have their staff shelter at MINUSMA bases, even though this requires extra coordination so that the MINUSMA force can defend them should they come under attack. Some country team staff offered a different rationale for maintaining distance from the mission: as MINUSMA is frequently targeted by jihadist groups, maintaining distance from MINUSMA premises and convoys is simply the pragmatic thing to do to avoid becoming collateral damage.

Information sharing

77. The sharing of information is generally seen as the least common denominator for integration in Mali. Yet while all stakeholders appear to agree that information sharing should be pursued, the extent of sharing is impeded by the incompatibility of systems, down to the lack of interoperability of radios. There are also evidently misgivings about how shared information might be used, and concerns were also expressed about the absence of secure channels for information exchange. MINUSMA has established a new protection of civilians early warning system, but many

humanitarians are opposed to providing the mission with direct access to community-based protection staff and monitors, preferring instead to have information channeled through the protection cluster. The insistence of maintaining such a firewall is frustrating to many—and not just from within the mission—as the extra bureaucracy reduces the time available to respond to potential violence against civilians.

78. There is one area where information sharing appears to work effectively, namely in the area of security. In addition to communications and close operational coordination between the security personnel of the various organizations of the United Nations system, there is also good information sharing between OCHA and the mission JMAC and JOC that facilitates improved situational awareness across the system. Indeed, as noted earlier, discussions on security often provide a pragmatic segue to discussing other issues of common interest, whether at the technical level or at the level of the Security Management Group.

III. Sudan: integration in a transition context

CONTEXT

79. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was the first hybrid operation. The operation was established on 31 July 2007 and took over from the earlier African Union Mission in Sudan on 1 January 2008. Despite its ostensibly hybrid nature, the United Nations was responsible for operational aspects and the day-to-day management of the operation. At its height, the operation was the most expensive peacekeeping mission deployed, with an annual budget that peaked at over $1.8 billion in 2010/11. The mandate of the operation was terminated as of 31 December 2020, and the mission is currently in the process of liquidation.

80. Divided by mandate, by leadership, by geographic coverage and location, and by differences in vision and analysis, there has been minimal historical collaboration between UNAMID and the United Nations country team. UNAMID was not mandated as an integrated mission given that a structurally-integrated mission—the United Nations Mission in Sudan—already existed in Sudan at the time of its establishment. Even after the closure of UNMIS, no serious consideration was given to converting UNAMID into an integrated mission, both because of objections from the country team to integrating with what was ostensibly an African Union mission, but also because of the separate geographic areas of focus.

81. UNAMID was established as a hybrid mission out of political necessity because of Sudanese opposition to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur. The strained relationship between the operation and the host government only further deteriorated over time, exacerbated by the indictment of then-President Bashir by the International Criminal Court. Across the interviews, there was agreement that the intransigent nature of the government obstructed peacekeeping activities, undermined the overall ability of the mission to deliver on its mandate, and served as a disincentive to the United Nations country team to work more closely with the mission. Some interviews reflected that elements of the mission may have been frustrated with the country team's more active engagement with the Bashir government. It was argued that these divisions fragmented the UN's power and ability to position with the government and were seen by respondents to have contributed to the divide within the system at the beginning of transition planning.

82. It was only in 2018 that respondents felt that intentional efforts towards integration were made with the SCR 2429 mandating the creation of joint UNAMID-United Nations Country Team liaison offices, which then led to the establishment of the state liaison functions (SLFs). The creation of the SLFs was supported by two incentives, namely the provision of programmatic funds and UNAMID staffing, and was also facilitated through the issuance of two Secretary-General's planning directives for the planning and preparation of the UNAMID transition and for the development of consistent and coherent United Nations transition processes.

83. While many interviews reflected that the transition directives stimulated integrated behavior, participants were unanimous in their assessment that the turning point for the UN system in Sudan was the visioning exercise led by the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Sudan (SASG) in 2019 following the revolution which let to the establishment of a civilian-led Government. The visioning exercise delivered a common analysis of the context and the role the United Nations could play in Sudan. The analysis was grounded in a presentation by the newly appointed Prime Minister who outlined Government priorities and expectations of the United Nations. These efforts contributed to in the adoption of Security Council resolution 2524 (2020), which mandated the establishment of a United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS).

84. The civilian-led transitional Government has contributed to a new tone. The Government of Sudan has provided clear directions to the United Nations system and expects coherence. The Government was insistent that UNAMID and UNITAMS should not be operational at the same time. They have designated the SRSG as the sole interlocutor with the Prime Minister in an attempt to streamline the number of interlocutors with the Government.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING POLICY

85. Despite the fact that UNAMID was not a structurally-integrated operation, it operated under an integrated strategic framework at the time of its closure. UNITAMS, on the other hand, has been established from the start as a structurally-integrated mission.

86. UNAMID and the humanitarian community had a complex relationship. The humanitarian community relied on the operation for security, escorts, and recognized its essential role in the protection of civilians. The difficult relationship between UNAMID and the Government of Sudan and its uneasy relationship with the local population also resulted in humanitarians seeking to preserve their independence, and humanitarian principles more broadly, as far as possible. Ultimately, the relationship was a pragmatic one, with no interviews indicating there was ever a need for a complete separation between the operation and humanitarians.

Strategic reviews

87. Over the course of its existence, UNAMID has been the subject of numerous mandated strategic reviews, but prior to the transition planning these do not appear to have had a major impact on the approach taken by the operation. The operation and the country team seldom adopted joint programmes, and both approached semi-regular meetings of coordination mechanisms and the strategic reviews themselves as "check-mark exercises".

Common articulation of vision

88. Interviews consistently reflected that not having a unified vision diluted the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations system. With more than twenty components of the system present, interviewees consistently reflected that everyone is "doing their own thing." Without significant development and peacebuilding funding, pressure and competition for resources has been fierce and presents a further risk of

fragmentation. One interview noted that "once there is agreement on what needs to be done, it will be easier to define who does what, and with what resources."

89. The transition in Sudan was guided by the Secretary-General's planning directives. In line with these, planning for the transition was co-led by the Deputy Joint Special Representative (DJSR) and the RC/HC, with bi-monthly Senior Leadership Forum discussions. Day to day work was supported by a Joint Transition Cell, and guided by a United Nations Joint Transition Action Plan, which built on six workstreams (political, peacekeeping and mission issues, integrated SLFs, programming/resources, operational support, and Communication. In practice, the tools designed to support the transition were additional to existing mechanisms. Many interviews commented that a six month period went by without a Senior Leadership Forum discussion. The Transition Action Plan, though practical, did not evolve even though it was explicitly created to be a living document and not a high-level strategy document. The Joint Transition Cell was highlighted as a successful practice, that helped the mission benefit from lessons learned from other transitions and opt for best practices. However, some noted that the UNCT was not able to benefit from the Transition Cell support to the same extent as the mission.

90. There was an effort to ensure an inclusive and consultative process in developing the mission concept for UNITAMS. Some interviews did regret that the process did not start with a common analysis to anchor the discussion, as the context had evolved significantly since the 2019 visioning exercise. The UNITAMS planning team sought to be as inclusive as possible in the development of the mission concept: DPO staff have been deployed to work alongside DPPA colleagues, and stakeholders from across the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes have had ample opportunity to provide input. This has resulted in a mission design that includes integrated approaches such as the embedding of mission staff with country team counterparts and vice versa. However, the process was also challenged by the magnitude of engagement: some meetings were reported to have more than 100 participants; some organizations were reported to have dedicated up to six people, while organizations with fewer resources and staff members struggled to

remain engaged; and some were frustrated that the budget and structure decisions were less consultative. Some of the interviews reflected that heavy input from Headquarters, which sought to fill perceived gaps not identified by the field, increased the demands of the mission and risked shifting the centre of gravity from the field. One interview reflected that "the UN must balance an inclusive vision with finite resources." While input and consultation are important, there must be clear directions as to the resources to be allocated, the prioritization, and who will make the final decisions.

91. Throughout the case study process, respondents highlighted the importance of the UNITAMS contribution being reflected as part of the overall United Nations contribution and not separately. There has been continued debate on the appropriate planning frameworks to be used going forward. Some respondents argued that the integrated strategic framework should come first as it will help translate the mission concept into an approach. Others emphasized the need for a common country analysis to come first, and that the United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework (UNSDCF) should set the vision that other planning tools feed into. Still others argued that a UNSDCF should be postponed until after national elections. To address the challenge of an overarching programmatic framework taking into account both the transition of residual UNAMID activities and the integration of UNITAMS, the United Nations system is developing a Sudan Peacebuilding and Stabilization Programme. The goal is that this Programme will be developed jointly with the Government and the international partners and will be mainstreamed into the ISF.

Integrated structures

92. Despite Sudan receiving significant attention and support from the Secretariat, the DPO and DPPA teams were not merged into one Sudan team. Interviews reflected that the two departments were sometimes working at cross purposes, with tensions related to the appropriate tools and approach. With separate leadership and teams, it was felt that there were disincentives to work together, as well as a potential incentive to bypass reporting lines. Respondents felt that the concept of the spectrum of peace responses

remains elusive and that the peacekeeping and political division remains.

93. Many interviews reflected that there is an enormous number of coordination mechanisms on the ground, including the United Nations country team (and UNCT+), the humanitarian country team (and HCT+), the Joint Protection Coordination mechanism, thematic working groups and others. Some United Nations country team members reflected that they could attend meetings full time, rather than having the space to lead their operations. Some respondents indicated that country team members do not have the resources to engage in additional planning and coordination mechanisms, which contributes to continued fragmentation. In particular, it was noted that the United Nations country team (and UNCT+) meetings were often procedural and lacked dialogue, debate, and ownership of United Nations system priorities. Many pointed out that when issues arise, they tend to be resolved in smaller meetings. In the majority of cases, the review came away with the impression that the United Nations system is meeting together because they are "supposed to".

94. As the government transitioned to a civilian-led structure, a cluster of agencies from the country team with the largest operations was created to provide input to the SASG. This was considered very effective as they had strong connections to government officials and communities, they had the ability to bring resources to the table, and it served to minimize spoilers. However, some of the organizations with smaller presence did feel that this excluded them and created two tiers of country team members.

STATE LIAISON FUNCTIONS

95. The SLFs, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2429 (2018), were introduced at a time when the United Nations system "couldn't catch a break in Darfur." Its four workstreams covered rule of law, durable solutions and livelihoods, human rights and immediate basic services. The SLF proved to be a flexible mechanism to bring participating UNCT members and the operation together during a volatile period marked with protests, suspension of the Constitution, creation of a new government, the Juba

Peace Accord and the COVID pandemic. For participating organizations, SLF provided a forum for common analysis, joint planning and a convening platform for planning towards a common goal of "ensuring Sudan wouldn't relapse into conflict" and "needing to enhance the protective environment."

96. This is the first time such structures had been established, and no framework or previous experience was available to inform the way forward. The Security Council was not eager to provide funding for the SLF, expecting the funds to come from the United Nations country team, despite repeated examples of the fiscal cliff that faces countries when a mission departs. It was unanimously agreed amongst interviews that assessed contributions were needed as an incentive to bring the country team to the table. The initial allocation of USD 15 million to the SLFs for six months expanded to approximately USD 45 million through five phases (through 31 December 2020). Although this was an important inducement for cooperation and may have been the most significant support of UNCT programmatic activities, the amount provided was described by some as being "peanuts" compared to humanitarian funding—i.e. not nearly enough to serve as a meaningful inducement for the largest members of the country team. Nonetheless, United Nations country team members saw the SLFs as a successful experience that provided a resourced platform that supported integrated action.

97. Participants were unanimous that the short timeframes for each phase (between three to six months, including project approval and implementation) effectively prioritized projects that could be implemented quickly, rather than prioritizing longer-term projects that may have had a greater impact. Likewise, activities were evaluated against the overall objectives, and not in consideration of other activities. This took away the potential of designing projects for their cumulative contributions to the objectives, and broader peace and development dividends. One interview noted that "Stability is not an activity-based process".

98. The SLF provides a tool for the United Nations system to actively engage in transition planning, and the incentive of funding cannot be ignored. While the SLF experience was not without flaws, it has been

an important step forward in the United Nations approach to transitions and sustaining peace. The United Nations system and the Government of Sudan have begun an important discussion around enhancing the protective environment, responsible transition, and implementing peacebuilding efforts as a basis of development. While it is agreed that major impact would require at least a one- or two-year time frame to focus on larger-scale projects, the SLF has demonstrated its catalytic support in reinforcing UN-Women, and allowing IOM, UN Habitat, and UNFPA to establish and scale up sustainable activities.

Government engagement

99. The 5+5 mechanism was established as a UN-Government coordination mechanism for the State Liaison Function, and was cited as a best practice throughout the interviews. Prior to the creation of the 5+5, interviews reflected that the first phase of the SLF was perceived to be a mainly Headquarters-driven process, with USD 15 million of projects presented to and approved by he ACABQ prior to consultations of Government counterparts. The establishment of the 5+5 mechanism (which has since expanded to include the relevant technical ministries, making it a 5+8 mechanism), served to bring together the United Nations with the Government of Sudan government to implement priority initiatives through the SLF. Respondents noted that the 5+8 mechanism has served to facilitate alignment both within the United Nations system, as well as with the Government, and has contributed substantially to government ownership.

Reporting requirements

100. Major challenges and frustrations were raised by interviewees regarding the financial and project reporting. For example, UNAMID developed its own memorandum of understanding and did not use a standard agreement. This caused a bureaucratic burden for the mission and for SLF partners who had to register and negotiate the memorandums of understanding with their respective legal teams. Moreover, the operation's financial period (July-June) does not align with that of the funds and programmes (January-December), resulting in perceived delay of financial

reporting. This caused challenges for the preparation of reports to the Fifth Committee, which were watching the SLF expenditures very closely. And while the country team agreed to interim, final and financial reports, with monthly updates, interviewees stated that multiple, additional requests from different parts of UNAMID for the same information in various formats was a burden on SLF partners. Several individuals interviewed concluded that these bureaucratic hurdles could have been insurmountable without the personal engagement and commitment of the DJSR. A standard approach or framework to facilitate processes could have spared time for implementation that would have benefited the experience.

Monitoring and evaluation

101. The challenge of getting the projects up and running, with 10 agency partners, combined with the time pressure, resulted in monitoring and evaluation being sacrificed at the early stages of the SLF process. The operation recognized that it did not have the technical capacity to implement a monitoring and evaluation strategy and brought in expertise to develop a monitoring and evaluating framework and a data mapping tool, consolidate lessons learned and seek to measure impact of the activities so far.

THEMATIC AREAS

Protection of civilians

102. Respondents noted that prior to the transition there was tension between the operation and UNCT related to the protection of civilains mandate as analysis and activity planning were not carried out together. The operation and the country team approach protection from different perspectives, and it was concluded that common analysis and coordination could have enabled the country team to use the operation's political engagement to address issues. The arrival of a new Head of the Protection of Civilians Unit during the transition improved the relationship, positioning the operation to feed into the country team protection strategy, highlighting where synergies could have been leveraged previously. Interviews reflected that,

throughout the transition, protection of civilians was—and remains to this day—an area of significant concern for the United Nations system. Responsibility now lies exclusively with the Government, guided by its National Protection of Civilians Strategy.

103. The Joint Protection Group, chaired by the DJSR, was cited in many interviews as having been a successful platform for common analysis and prioritization. The structure was adapted to the transition, opened to all heads of agency, and benefits from JMAC analysis to inform coordination. While not all heads of agency regularly attend, it was highlighted as a positive output of the transition that is appreciated by the country team. One participant noted that it could be strengthened by being opened further to the humanitarian country team to bring in the perspective of NGOs.

Human rights

104. There continue to be challenges related to the human rights work of the United Nations in Sudan. In a few interviews, it was suggested that the country team continues to fear that engagement in human rights issues, including being perceived to engage in monitoring and reporting, could upset the government. In a few interviews, country team members were accused of sacrificing principled discussion—especially related to human rights issues—to ensure access to targeted populations and to maintain flexibility in programming. A counterpoint was made that this approach—separating human rights efforts—ultimately allows the government to dictate access and mandate and poses a risk for the system more broadly. It was recognized that this leads to fragmentation, politization and instrumentalization of support and undermines the ability to speak with one voice. The establishment of an OHCHR office, which is separate from UNITAMS, was welcomed in a few interviews as an important step for influencing country team understanding and integration of human rights considerations in their planning. The UNITAMS Joint Workstream on Protection has facilitated discussions between human rights actors and the country team. It was also noted that, with the delinking of the RC, it will be important for the RC to engage with the Government on human rights issues.

Rule of law

105. Launched in 2016, the Joint Programme for Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur was created to strengthen delivery and impact of the United Nations in the rule of law sector by pooling resources and jointly focusing interventions on shared priorities. Despite active engagement by UNAMID and counterparts in UNDP, including the operation reallocating funds as seed money to demonstrate proof of concept to donors, external resources were not secured which prevented the delivery on the planned outcomes.

106. In the transition to the State Liaison Function, the experience with the Joint Programme helped streamline solutions in the thematic areas related to Rule of Law, as joint analysis, planning and coordination were already in place and priority activities for transition had already been identified. The joint approach helped to establish comparative advantages and identify clear opportunities that would benefit from an integrated approach. The second phase of the SLF also facilitated an alignment with government priorities.

107. Throughout the interviews, diverse actors pointed to the success of the Rule of Law experience, from the delivery of gender programming, to community dialogue and engagement, infrastructure support, to capacity strengthening for local officials and police forces. The ability of the operation, country team and Government to deliver programmes together was pointed to for helping to establish community acceptance while training local police and behavior and community engagement.

Gender

108. The coherence of the approach to gender was raised in a few interviews, with a concern that there was no common approach within the country and competing structures. However, UNAMID has provided support to country team members on gender-related issues. The SLFs provided catalytic resources for UNFPA, enabling real investment and embedding in work to counter gender-based violence with police and the judiciary as well as introducing national standard operating procedures on referral pathways and mechanisms. The secondments provided valuable staff

who had pre-existing relationships that facilitated the roll out of programmes, for example with the police commissioner.

109. The transition helped to leverage operation and UN-Women capacities to strengthen and consolidate gender as a cross-cutting issue. Prior to the transition, UN-Women struggled to secure funding for its operations, and the country team did not prioritize investing in gender through common approaches, including the Peacebuilding Fund. Despite not receiving funds through the first State Liaison Function allocation, UN-Women benefitted from direct UNAMID support during the transition process, including operating costs, delegated staff to work with them and participate in trainings, and their messaging integrated into programming related to Rule of Law, Human Rights and Livelihoods. This positioned UNWomen to benefit financially from the later phases of the SLF and reinforce their presence in a total of four states in Darfur. Through engagement with the SLF, UN-Women was able to work directly at the grassroots level with women and decision makers.

Triple nexus

110. Throughout the case study, participants reflected on the enormous scale of humanitarian activities in Darfur, particularly compared to the minimal level of peacebuilding and development activities, which were hindered by the designation of Sudan by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism. Throughout the deployment of UNAMID, programmes to address the root causes of the conflict were not rolled out at scale. With the political transition, the context continues to evolve and require a humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach to Sudan as a whole. The recent de-listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism now makes it a candidate for debt relief and financing from the international financial institutions; the presence of the World Bank has introduced the possibility for large scale social protection and safety net programmes. There continues to be an urgent need for the United Nations to provide a coherent and holistic response in support of the continued stability of Sudan.

MISSION SUPPORT/BUSINESS OPERATIONS

111. In practice, the mission can create an enabling environment for other United Nations actors. UNAMID had a number of memorandums of understanding and service-level agreements with country team members prior to transition, including for the facilitation of medical support, travel and fuel. During the COVID response, smaller country team members made use of UNAMID accommodation through service contracts. There is concern within the country team that the closure of UNAMID will leave a vacuum for some services that UNAMID was providing, including medevac and medical services. This may create risks to the duty of care by country team members for their staff in Darfur. While WFP will take over responsibility for providing health services on behalf of the system, it was noted that this is another coordination activity in addition to its core activities. The sustainability of this type of solution must also be explored.

112. UNAMID and the country team have been able to benefit from mutual recognition, particularly in the area of procurement, though there was recognition that different rules and regulations made the process difficult to navigate. One respondent highlighted that having received a secondee from the mission helped to facilitate the process for procurement. As part of its liquidation, UNAMID surplus property will be made available to agencies, funds and programmes at fair market value, in line with financial regulation 5.14. The availability of these resources was welcomed by the United Nations country team in many of the interviews.

113. One operational challenge has come up with the UNHAS Users Group, with a report that there was a limited donor opposition to UNITAMS staff using the service, citing humanitarian principles. While there is agreement between WFP and the Mission for the use of UNITAMS flights, it does provide an example of where tensions may arise as partners adjust to—and learn about—the role of a special political mission.

FACTORS

Leadership

114. The separate leadership of UNAMID and the country team was repeatedly cited as one of the main sources of fragmentation of the United Nations system in Sudan. Differences in reporting lines, level, mandate and geographic coverage and location created conditions that restricted the potential for integrated behavior. Efforts that delivered integrated products often depended on the initiative of individuals, and their ability to work constructively with their counterparts. Senior leaders were often viewed as working at cross purposes, which both reflected and aggravated the disconnection at the operational level. In some instances, it was noted that public disagreement empowered some United Nations actors to "go around" leadership to achieve their objectives, contributing to the fragmentation of approaches. Moreover, it was perceived that there is little incentive for integrated behavior: the investment of time in lieu of core activities; the lack of resources to support engagement; and the potential sacrifice of independence. With few consequences for not engaging in integrated behavior, the participation of the "larger" operations was based on goodwill and personal investment.

115. The majority of the interviews attributed the success of the State Liaison Functions to the personal commitment of the DJSR. With experience working with different country team organizations, working at the Secretariat, as Resident Coordinator, and then within the mission, the DJSR was positioned to understand how to navigate the various elements of the system, and overcome institutional hurdles that arose.

116. The RC/HC was presented with a difficult challenge in leading the country team in the transition exercise. The operating context had completely changed from the time of her appointment. The timing of the transition also coincided with the de-linking of the RC system. This left the RC/HC without an office to support her, nor the resources to unify the country team in a common approach. At the time of the transition, the four or five organizations with the largest budgets and operations effectively coordinated amongst themselves and engaged directly with government counterparts, bypassing the RC/HC when she was not considered to be a value-add. Respondents agreed that the recently arrived RC/HC a.i. has been able to bring the country team together. With previous experience working in a mission environment, and an astute leader, many interviews credit his arrival with the mitigating of potential spoilers. Every interview reflected that the appointment of a DSRSG is time-sensitive and requires a profile that can facilitate the relationship between the UNCT and UNITAMS.

117. Divisions within the Security Council were felt to have tied the hands of the Secretariat in the appointment of the SRSG and DSRSG. Power struggles within the Security Council delayed the appointment, eroding the opportunity for strong United Nations leadership in the country. Strong leadership is required to guide the mission. Even with agreed priorities, activities and goals, without a clear leader, there is no voice to speak for the United Nations.

Downsizing

118. Staff morale has been a sensitive topic during the UNAMID drawdown. Interviews reflected both fatigue and despair, challenging delivery on portfolios. Uncertainty about careers, and the lack of formal recognition or responsibility for contribute to a transition can undermine efforts to support the political transition. There are not direct incentives nor accountability for downsizing staff to contribute to the transition, yet the experience and institutional memory of staff is essential to the success of mission transition processes.

IV. Burkina Faso: integration in a non-mission setting

CONTEXT

119. Since 2014, Burkina Faso has experienced a series of shocks that have compelled the United Nations contribution to evolve from a development-focused programme to one of prevention and humanitarian response. Burkina Faso was selected as a pilot for the sustaining peace approach through which the United Nations committed to introducing integrated approaches to support the country in addressing drivers of instability through politically-driven engagements emphasizing resilience building. In 2019, the deteriorating security context prompted a rapid system wide scale up to galvanize the sustaining peace approach and reorient its posture to one of prevention However, without the benefit of additional resources, the country team has been challenged in expanding its focus beyond humanitarian and development programming.

120. Despite a proposed common United Nations vision endorsed by the Executive Committee, individuals interviewed do not believe that the country team is delivering against a common vision or priorities. There does not appear to be a clear understanding of each entity's comparative advantage or role in a common approach. Although a Prevention and Peacebuilding Assessment action matrix was developed as a common planning and coordination tool, respondents did not indicate that it has influenced their activities. The RCO has struggled to support national analysis or planning efforts that could bring the United Nations country team together. Individual actors have made an effort to deliver on integrated solutions, but these are ad hoc measures and could easily be overwhelmed by an eroding humanitarian context.

121. In Burkina Faso, function appears to have followed form, with an emphasis on scaling up operations before having agreed on the appropriate approach. Instead of supporting a coherent response, based on analysis and planning, the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes at Headquarters have introduced multiple systems and processes to force an already overstretched country team in to delivering more, and differently, without commensurate structural support and resources, all while having to continue responding to a humanitarian crisis. The Area Offices, which were the main manifestation of the change in posture and were deployed to bring the United Nations to the affected areas have, in practice, seen country team members implementing programmes without a consistent common vision or delineation of responsibilities. The RC, who was left with fewer resources during the early period of the reorientation in 2019, following the de-linking with UNDP and an almost empty office at times, was unable to bring the country team together to agree on a common approach to the reorientation requested by the Executive Committee, as no incentives were provided for entities to adjust their posture, nor sanctions applied for those failing to do so.

Efforts to foster a common vision and approach

122. Government planning defines the national approach, including through the 2017 Sahel Emergency Programme and a nationwide SDG localization integrated programme for revitalizing local economies (PADEL). The Government has called for integrated United Nations responses that are institutionalized and avoid duplicating existing structures. A common country team approach requires that the United Nations shifts from project-based engagement to contributing to policy and systems solutions in support of Government priorities.

123. With the selection of Burkina Faso as a pilot country for the sustaining peace approach, an inter-agency process was launched. Co-chaired by UNDP, on behalf of the UNDG, and DPA, it produced a common strategic

framework – the Sustaining Peace Initiative. This was approved in 2017 and informed the development of the 2018-2020 UNDAF. Assessments have found that the sustaining peace efforts provided a common approach to support the Government on politically sensitive issues, such as security sector reform and national reconciliation. However, interviews broadly agreed that the approach did not significantly impact programming. Explanations for this varied; most noted a lack of ownership by the country team, as the exercise was perceived as Headquarters-driven. Others noted a lack of bandwidth, as the country team was forced to focus its limited resources on humanitarian response to floods and then the deteriorating security situation. Furthermore, despite a stated commitment by Member States to increase their contributions towards preventative action rather than crisis management, such funding did not materialize.

124. In 2019, with the deteriorating security situation, the Executive Committee called for a mission to review how the Burkina Faso country team was set up to respond to the priorities facing the country. With the full participation of the country team, the mission developed a common vision of the situation and recommendations for the United Nations to change posture in Burkina Faso to engage more on prevention. The assessment recommendations were endorsed by the Executive Committee for implementation, including expanding the United Nations footprint for scaled-up, accelerated and localized development, humanitarian and peacebuilding support through the creation of five integrated presences to be based in Dori, Kaya, Fada, Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouahigouya. In addition, the mission called for the enhancement of human rights capacity, additional and re-profiled UNDSS support and a reinforced RCO with enhanced analytical capability.

125. Interviews reflected that the mission provided a valuable opportunity for the country team to participate in a common, cross pillar analysis. However, some interviewees surmised that country team members might not have realized that a shift in posture would be required to deliver on the prevention agenda. These interviewees suggested that measures such as timely deployment of a country team capacity assessment and a technical assessment mission to consider the

mechanics of translating the recommendations into action would have been valuable in supporting the reorientation. Not much changed. The CCA and UNDAF were not updated following the EC decision to reflect the new approach . Respondents also did not believe that the 2019 prevention and peacebuilding assessment—jointly carried out by the World Bank, African Development Bank, the European Union and PBSO to define common priorities for immediate action for prevention and peacebuilding in Burkina Faso—had been used to develop common United Nations priorities.

126. To catalyze action towards resolving outstanding issues in the implementation of the Executive Committee decisions, a planning directive was issued to strengthen the strategic direction of United Nations system-wide actions in Burkina Faso. Through the interviews, many respondents concluded that—while the directive communicated expectations, galvanized action around common analysis and vision and served as an impetus for a posture change by the country team—the key challenges that had faced the country team, namely the paucity of resources and absence of a coherent plan, remained unaddressed. The challenge of responding to the directive was further compounded by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. While there was recognition that COVID has "been a glue" bringing the system together to prepare an adequate pandemic response, it has introduced a new challenge and burden to programming. In this context, the issuance of the Secretary-General's Planning Directive with aggressive deadlines during the pandemic contributed to the perception that Headquarters "didn't understand what the country team was facing."

127. The review did find that the Modus Operandi that had been developed by the country team, and which was appended to the directive, was an important tool for facilitating alignment in the area offices, establishing an enabling environment for humanitarians to operate. The Modus Operandi formed the basis for a civilian approach, clearly establishing that no programmes are delivered to, or with, military and police authorities and that training takes place removed from the field. The expectation for the Modus Operandi is that it would enable the United Nations to "stay and deliver". The majority of individuals interviewed were extremely supportive of the consultation and approach in developing

the Modus Operandi, noting that it provided an important step defining how humanitarian principles would be preserved and that it brought a human rights lens to the United Nations system response.

128. Throughout the interviews, respondents reflected on the number of plans and processes that were requested of the country team, without any additional resources. Instead of rationalizing or prioritizing existing processes, additional ones were created for the country team to respond to. Interviews concluded that the lack of consistent and dedicated planning capacity within the RCO undermines the capacity for the country team to revise common plans to guide response. The review came away with the impression that the multiplicity of plans, priorities and processes contributed to the feeling that the country team did not have a common purpose or vision to work towards. The United Nations did not have a common thread running through the analysis and planning, preventing implementation in an integrated manner. In the absence of clear guidance, country team members focused on immediate demands and delivered on their individual mandates, scaling up programming, especially in terms of humanitarian response. Interviews were unanimous that the UNCT was under incredible pressure to balance the demands to reorient towards Sustaining Peace and Prevention during an expanding humanitarian crisis. The responsibility to address the humanitarian needs of the population was sometimes noted as having eclipsed the focus on sustaining peace, especially with the imbalance of funding for peacebuilding and prevention activities in comparison to the large budgets for humanitarian.

Leadership

129. The Executive Committee decision to delegate the responsibility of the implementation of the Inter-Agency recommendations to the Emergency Task Force echoed the guidance of the 2012 policy on special circumstances in non-mission settings, but did not explicitly invoke them. This resulted in the effective creation of a new model, without the leadership of an envoy or non-resident Special Representative of the Secretary-General that would have been provided had the policy been followed.

130. The review found that the RC was not positioned to bring the United Nations system together and lead the country team in the reorientation. In addition to the responsibilities that accompanied the Executive Committee decisions, the Resident Coordinator was appointed Humanitarian Coordinator. In the aftermath of the de-linking of the resident coordinator system from UNDP, the RC/HC was left without an office to follow through on key analysis and coordination functions. Temporary deployments and repeated turnover in the RCO delayed action on items that were considered a priority by Headquarters, prevented the development of institutional memory and established relationships to facilitate engagement both with the country team as well as with Headquarters. While for the most part, interviews reflected goodwill within the country team, some respondents indicated that difficulties related to navigating the division of labour between the Resident Coordinator and the UNDP Resident Representative was another challenge to building a common vision and approach.

131. Regional support, including political leadership by the SRSG for West Africa and the Sahel, was considered an important relationship that could have been better tapped. The leadership of the SRSG during the inter-agency mission in February 2019 was agreed to have brought the political leverage to bring the system together. Some interviews noted that this leadership could have again been drawn on to hold the country team, as well as non-resident organizations, accountable for delivering on the Executive Committee decisions. In addition to the SRSG, a few of the interviews noted that the convening power of regional bureaus and regional directors was bypassed, missing the opportunity to use their ability to monitor and hold country team members accountable for delivering on common objectives.

132. Headquarters support was galvanized by the establishment of the Emergency Task Force (ETF), chaired by the DPO/DDPA ASG for Africa, with ASG representation from throughout the United Nations system. The ETF successfully mobilized senior level attention and engagement around Burkina Faso, to ensure the scale up of the United Nations in the five integrated field offices within two months, and to monitor and support the reorientation of the United Nations system

in Burkina Faso. It served as a means for establishing a common approach and sending joint marching orders to the field. Interviews agreed that the ETF provided a forum to ensure action on the scale up. However, it was also agreed that the ETF did not deliver a common vision for the area offices; no resources were identified to support the scale up, and the RCO did not have the capacity to bring the country team together to respond to the demands. Furthermore, Headquarters often stepped in to fill perceived gaps, creating tension with the country team that ultimately prompted the issuance of the Secretary General's Planning Directive.

TOOLS AND MECHANISMS

Mapping exercise

133. The 2019 inter-agency assessment mission called for a "review [of] how the UNCT in Burkina Faso is organized to address challenges facing the country and assess how the UN can leverage its assets and enhance capacities." The mapping was to be used to inform country team strategic positioning and planning and to ensure the capacities to operate in a complex setting, to drive programmatic coherence, and actively contribute to building resilience. The mapping exercise was misunderstood by some country team members as a mechanism to decide on country presence, which contributed to low levels of participation and delays, with recommendations coming more than 10 months after the exercise was launched. Moreover, the exercise effectively created another framework for action and monitoring.

Clusters

134. The Emergency Directors Group mission to Burkina Faso in October 2019 led to the activation of clusters. Throughout the interviews, respondents reflected that the humanitarian response was better coordinated and able to scale up response. The value of such existing tools and structures that could be quickly rolled out to support the reorientation was noted in a few interviews.

Peacebuilding Fund

135. The role of the Peacebuilding Fund was high-lighted by some respondents as a mechanism that facilitated common analysis and planning, as well as being a useful catalyst for developing analysis with the Government. However, respondents noted that the common analysis was limited only to those who engaged; there is a risk of designing and funding individual projects without prioritizing them in support of an integrated vision, and the projects are not connected to other plans. Further, there were frustrations with the apportioning of the limited funds, with multiple respondents regretting they were used to give everyone "a piece of the pie" rather than providing funding to reflect comparative advantage.

Peace and development advisors

136. One challenge that was highlighted was the lack of consistent analysis and planning support that was available to bring the United Nations country team together, with repeated turnover in the RCO. As a result, there is a perceived lack of familiarity of the services that could be leveraged to bring the system together. The Peace and Development Advisor can help bridge political and development activities in support of national prevention capacities as well as share analysis to support more conflict sensitive and prevention-oriented strategies and programming. The Review was informed that Nexus planners are to be deployed to the five area offices to support coherence in the activities that are being implemented by the country team.

United Nations country team meetings

137. The United Nations country team has regular meetings where information is exchanged. In a few interviews, it was noted that the meetings were often procedural, with little debate and discussion. One interviewee suggested that systematic sharing of the key outcomes and decisions could provide the country team a common understanding of the approach and priority issues to be addressed.

Area offices

138. The March 2019 Executive Committee decision to scale up hubs in 5 locations within two months to act as a buffer to the spreading insecurity led to an intense system effort to deploy. While the country team coordinated to respond to the request to scale up, it did not take an integrated approach. The scale up was guided by a deadline for office creation and not a common vision. Each office was led by a different agency, without coherence or coordination between the offices. Furthermore, there was inadequate security support to enable the operationalization of the offices, and compliance continues to be a risk.

139. To ensure the scale up of each of the area offices, the country team members who led the offices covered the associated start-up expenses with the expectation that they would be reimbursed. Agency headquarters enabled this through the provision of loans and/or agreement to move forward on a "no regrets basis". However, the absence of reimbursement resulted in some agencies almost running out of funding for their programmes. In the future, agencies may be reticent to provide advance funding, or to refuse scaling up until resources are available, should a similar approach be proposed in other countries.

140. The offices still do not have a standard structure or planning approach; while country team members implement programmes from the offices, respondents agreed that a system has not been developed to create a unifying vision between the offices, nor a prioritization of objectives for each office. While co-locating produces some knowledge sharing and coordination, and some common efforts have grown organically, respondents agreed that there is a need for a more consistent structure and approach to programming. Planned RCO, OHCHR, DPPA staff that were included in the July 2019 proposal have not been deployed to 5 locations . There is now an effort to deploy nexus coordinators to each office to help ensure coherence in actions and that there is proper reporting. One particular success story has been a UNICEF-led WASH-nexus approach, that was highlighted in many interviews. Working with government and donor partners in the Kaya sub-office, the approach includes four concrete results

that include development, humanitarian and peace outcomes. The type of approach is being considered for Fatah, this time in support of nutrition outcomes.

MISSION SUPPORT/BUSINESS OPERATIONS

Budget

141. While the absence of the resources to support the scale up has been covered, it was also noted by respondents that the United Nations could not easily prepare a detailed costing of the surge. The inter-agency assessment mission prepared an estimate that was deemed too conservative, while a subsequent country team estimate was perceived as inflated as it included programmatic requirements. An eventual mission by DOS delivered a cost estimate that only covered elements that were related to Secretariat functions, and not the system as a whole.

Security

142. The need for enhanced security analysis and support was raised across the interviews. Many respondents lamented that DSS had not adjusted its posture in country and had been unable to deploy permanent support. One respondent noted that the larger operating agencies resorted to recruiting their own security teams to fill the gap. Respondents argued that the Executive Committee decision to push out an expanded United Nations presence should have been accompanied by commensurate support from DSS. There was a broad call for a re-examination of DSS support provided in non-mission settings, especially in volatile contexts.

Business operations strategy

143. The Secretary General's Planning Directive called for a "UNCT/OMT-led approach that outlines the sustainability of the five sub-offices in terms of security risk management and common back offices, with an agreed cost-sharing mechanism." It was noted by one respondent that the implementation of the BOS

approach has brought the system together. It has led to the sharing of assets, and enabled integrated programming, joint information technology efforts and cost sharing. The approach prompts practical discussions on issues such as joint budgeting, and one specific innovation realized in Burkina Faso is the cost sharing of a United Nations Common Telecommunications Network that was established by WFP to support UNDSS in providing common technology for staff safety. It provides service for the country team, as well as some key partners including the World Bank and IMF.