

# **Addendum 2: Framing a Business Case for Multifunctional Peace Consolidation Missions**

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## INTRODUCTION

This essay argues that the United Nations should modify the integration<sup>1</sup> mandate for multifunctional United Nations presences.<sup>2</sup> It would be replaced with incentive-based guidelines, articulated through a business case,<sup>3</sup> that encourage participating United Nations entities to collaborate in ways that accountably enhance United Nations system performance. The proposed business case does not replace the Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) Policy. Rather, it strengthens and elaborates that Policy by filling some critical gaps which our interviews have revealed are serious barriers to efforts by the United Nations to exploit fully its collaborative advantages.

Such a reorientation would shift the current focus by missions on how to integrate to the challenges and opportunities of meeting, efficiently and effectively, the strategic priorities of the multidimensional mission. With this re-orientation, United Nations presences would integrate their activities when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, not otherwise. The essay is arranged as follows. Part 2 discusses the United Nations integration mandate. Part 3 identifies the elements which the IAP Policy requires and explains why a business case is more useful for determining how peace consolidation missions should or should not be integrated. Part 4 examines how the IAP Policy aligns with the formulation of a business case. Part 5 has concluding observations.

## TWO: BACKGROUND

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has emphasized integration as a means of improving UN system performance. In his *Agenda for Peace*, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali explained that the multidimensional nature of the tasks facing the United Nations “made it necessary to improve coordination within the Secretariat, so that the relevant departments function as an integrated whole under my authority and control.”<sup>4</sup> He argued that “(T)he responsibilities involved in multifunctional peace-keeping operations and in peace-building transcend the competence and expertise of any one department, fund, office or agency of the United Nations.”<sup>5</sup> That conclusion is as undeniable today as it was in the early 1990s.

Much less convincing, however, has been the idea that United Nations entities should be compelled to integrate, an approach taken by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In *Renewing the United Nations*, he sought to transform “...the leadership and management structure of the Organization, enabling it to act with unity of purpose, coherence of effort and agility in responding to the many challenges it faces.”<sup>6</sup> To underscore the point, Secretary-General Annan gave his Special Representatives “authority over all United Nations entities...in all large multidisciplinary field operations...” so that “the efforts of different components of the system are mutually reinforcing.”<sup>7</sup>

In 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon “reaffirmed” integration “as a guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the United Nations has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated.”<sup>8</sup> His Decision underpinned the Integrated Mission Planning Guidelines (IMPP), issued in 2010<sup>9</sup> and the IAP Policy, approved in 2013. These documents formalized where, when, and how integration was mandated.<sup>10</sup>

As part of his peace and security reforms, Secretary-General Guterres “reconfirmed” his “commitment to integration as a way of maximizing the impact of the United Nations in mission settings.” He directed that the IAP Policy “be revised to improve coherent action across the United Nations system in support of

1 Integration is also referred to as improved coordination, joined up, acting-as-one, delivering-as-one, or, more recently, cross-pillar coordination. Here, integration covers all these terms.

2 Secretaries-General Boutros-Ghali and Annan described these presences as “multidisciplinary,” “multifunctional,” and “multidimensional.” The Security Council used the term “multidimensional” for its missions in Mali and Central African Republic. We use the terms interchangeably.

3 Also known as a viability review or feasibility assessment.

4 Boutros-Ghali 1995, par.91, p.34

5 Boutros-Ghali 1995, par. 93, p. 34

6 United Nations 1997, p.2

7 United Nations, 1997, par. 119, p.39

8 SG Decision 2008/24, June, par. i.

9 United Nations, May 2010, December 2010

10 United Nations 2013, 2018

sustaining peace.”<sup>11</sup> His development reforms do not mandate integration, but there is no doubt regarding its importance.<sup>12</sup> Finally, Secretary-General Guterres insisted that “(T)he United Nations role in transition processes must be comprehensive and coherent, and work in an integrated way to address the interlinked and often stubborn drivers of conflict...”<sup>13</sup>

Mandating or requiring integration misconstrues what the process entails. At its most basic level, integration is one of several instruments that enable the United Nations system to perform better. Structurally, operationally, functionally, or strategically integrated missions are relevant, efficient, and effective only to the extent that they advance the mission’s objectives.

Well-documented UN experience shows that, for multiple reasons, some UN entities cannot and, moreover, do not productively integrate.<sup>14</sup> Common reasons are discord and disagreement among key personnel, misalignment in their institutional structures (formal mandates, funding sources and cycles, operational procedures), incoherent objectives, distorted incentives, dysfunctional mission leadership, and weak accountability mechanisms.<sup>15</sup>

Despite the IAP Policy mandate and the vigorous urgings of UN leaders, some UN entities do not have to integrate. Loose coordination, parallel operations, or general alignment will enable them to help meet mission objectives. Under these circumstances, the IAP Policy mandate is not only ineffective but may materially degrade the mission and the performance of the United Nations system.<sup>16</sup>

### THREE: MOVING FROM MANDATE TO INCENTIVE-BASED GUIDELINES

The IAP mandate should include flexibility for missions to decide how, and if, joining up United Nations entities (or sub-sets of them) will efficiently and effectively contribute to their objectives. With the pressure of requiring UN entities to integrate removed, such flexibility may induce them to explore more extensively how varying degrees of integration could multiply their effectiveness in meeting the mission’s goals. This point, however, should not be pushed too far. It is naïve

to believe that United Nations entities will voluntarily integrate.<sup>17</sup> Explicit guidance and incentives will be needed to meet a mission’s goals. Examples from our interviews of factors that encourage integration include joint funding, increased cross-pillar mobility of personnel, common pool logistics, and staff advancement that rewards cooperation and collaboration.<sup>18</sup>

These changes have several advantages. United Nations entities participating in a mission will be prompted to evaluate how, when, where, and over what period they can efficiently and effectively join-up their activities to make progress towards the mission’s strategic objectives. The latter include, for example, consolidating peace, sustaining peace, promoting political stability, fostering electoral reform, child protection, and accelerating achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.<sup>19</sup>

One means of moving beyond the IAP Policy mandate is to prepare and implement a business case.

11 United Nations 2018, Section II, par. 15, p. 4.

12 United Nations 2017, para 12, p. 40; para 16, p. 41.

13 Guterres 2019

14 This point was recognized by SG Boutros-Ghali (1995, para 94, p. 35) and SG Annan (United Nations 1997, par. 62, p.23; par. 86, p. 26).

15 The outcomes can be counterproductive, or even toxic. These are evident from our interviews and the broader literature, within and outside the UN (Wright 1993; Reindrop and Wiles 2001; MFA Norway 2008; Hansen 2009; Kohle 2011; Pritchett and Aiyar 2015; Kremer 2018; Cabiddu, Moreno and Sabatino 2019; Ruzickova, Yaremchek and Besgul 2019).

16 The degradation would occur if, as references in note 17 above show, relationships among the entities are toxic.

17 A reviewer kindly added that, even if entities may wish to work more closely, collective action issues often limit their capacity to do so.

18 A study of field experience from 2001 shows that Humanitarian agencies have been willing to more closely coordinate if there were appropriate incentives and there was value added in doing so (Reindrop and Wiles 2001, p.50). Our interviews confirm these findings.

19 Interviewees have repeatedly stated that integration (or cooperative) efforts are more effective when the relevant UN entities remain focused on the population groups they serve.

**Why a Business Case?** A business case provides a context-specific<sup>20</sup> justification for the proposed multifunctional mission<sup>21</sup> supported by a detailed examination of the risk-related benefits and costs of what each United Nations entity would do, how, with whom, and in what sequence to meet the mission's objectives. By directly building in monitoring and evaluation and clarifying who is responsible for outcomes and who is accountable to whom for them, the business case provides a framework through which the mission's leadership has the information to regularly reconfigure how, where and when United Nations entities should be interacting productively. These adjustments would improve United Nations system performance throughout the mission's lifecycle.

A business case would yield a set of regular benchmarks, indicators, and targets against which the performance of the entities and individuals contributing to the mission can be held accountable and evaluated. This, alone, would be a major improvement over current field practice. Missions do not generally comply<sup>22</sup> with the IAP Policy's "minimum requirement" of ensuring that every mission includes "integrated monitoring and evaluation."<sup>23</sup> As a result of this neglect, the United Nations leadership typically bases its management and oversight<sup>24</sup> of missions on external reviews and special assessments.

Notwithstanding these issues, the United Nations system has enjoyed considerable success with its integrated presences since the end of the Cold War. Close to twenty such missions have made the transition to sustainable peace.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, this impromptu, disorganized method for supervising missions has serious shortcomings – lack of accountability among the mission leadership, communication gaps between Headquarters and the mission, the sidelining of the UNCT by the mission, adverse incentives undermining integration, counterproductive inter-agency competition and strategic non-cooperation among UN entities, limited learning from mission experience, "box-ticking compliance" with the IAP Policy, unbalanced budgets across entities and the mission, and weak mainstreaming, especially of gender issues. Each of these has damaged mission effectiveness, weakened United Nations system performance, and poorly served by often denying urgent assistance to host country populations.

A business case addresses many of these matters. For each mission, it would develop procedures through which the appropriately integrated activities of the participating United Nations entities could be monitored and evaluated and periodically reassessed to support context-specific adaptations and adjustments. These adjustments are unlikely to "maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response" as required by the IAP Policy.<sup>26</sup> However, they offer the opportunity to re-organize the mission's activities in ways that make progress towards the mission's goals.

Preparing a business case has two disadvantages. The first is the increased coordinated input and effort to develop the case by staff from Headquarters, Agencies, Funds and Programs, and the UN Country Team. The process is both organization- and time-intensive. The second disadvantage is the added cost for the UN to expand the resources for integrated assessment and planning to prepare the case and to create and fund fully *from the start* a "soup to nuts" system of performance incentives, monitoring, evaluation, and accountability.

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20 SG Decision 2011/10 confirms the principle of form-follows-function (i.e., context-specific assessment and planning) for multifunctional missions.

21 The IAP Policy defines the circumstances covered. Section C.7 states: "The requirements set out in this policy apply in all cases where a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission is deployed alongside a UN country team, or where such presence is being considered." Section C.8 notes: "UN activities in response to critical needs in areas other than peace consolidation fall outside the scope of this policy."

22 This point is supported by our interviews and a literature review.

23 In addition to being a "minimum requirement," monitoring and evaluation is an essential component of the Integrated Structural Framework (See IAP Policy 2018, Sections F.30 iv, H.49.f, H.55, and J.67).

24 IAP Policy requires that each mission be directed and overseen at Headquarters by Integrated Task Forces (Section F.29, I.64). These are established "as soon as an integrated presence is being considered."

25 Howard 2019, Ch. 1, cited by Welsh 2020, p.5c. See also: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist\\_3\\_1\\_0.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist_3_1_0.pdf)

26 Technically, missions cannot "maximize individual and collective impact." The IAP Policy does not specify which peace consolidation impacts would be maximized. Yet, even if it did, maximizing one impact would place unsustainable pressures on other mission elements, such as the financial and resource costs. A further difficulty noted in Part 4 below is that peace consolidation impacts overlap with many of them being complementary. Consequently, none of them can be optimized (maximized or minimized) independently of the other.

An offsetting advantage in both instances is that the improved mission preparation, dedicated M&E, capacity to constructively adapt over the mission lifecycle, and enhanced accountability structures will raise the mission's effectiveness.<sup>27</sup> Since missions cost billions of dollars annually, such improvements could result in large savings for the UN and Member States.<sup>28</sup>

**A Business Case Framework:** To develop a business case, the UN should draw on the broadest range possible of potential participants to understand the mission context, agree on mission objectives, identify and examine the benefits and costs of pursuing these objectives, determine the organizational, institutional, and other risks that will arise, and indicate how they might be mitigated.<sup>29</sup> A business case will also include the various phases through which the mission is likely to proceed and, to the extent possible, provide guidance on the challenges and opportunities that will emerge during implementation. Finally, it will identify and include the mechanisms (M&E, periodic reviews), benchmarks, indicators, targets, and outcomes through which those responsible for implementation will be held accountable and the mission's organization and activities can be reassessed and, if required, adjusted over time.

The last point is critical. No business case is one-and-done. The underlying assumptions upon which any mission is based will change, implementation of its programs and projects will generate consequential outcomes (positive and negative) for the host country, the goals being sought will be modified by those outcomes and how host country citizens react to them, and the capacities of the mission and its participating entities to deliver will vary over time as the experience and commitment of their leadership and staff changes. For some missions, shifts in external support may also determine whether its strategic priorities require adjustment. Few of these developments can be anticipated as the business case is being formulated, but the case itself should ensure that the mission has the organizational, operational, and human capacities to identify how the relevant factors are changing and devise ways to deal with them.

To summarize: preparing a business case involves an assessment of the problems the mission will confront

and, given the context, the changes needed to address them;<sup>30</sup> the expected outcomes and impacts of UN engagement; the institutional and technical capacities available within each participating UN entity to address the problems; the financial, organizational, institutional, and personnel resources required; the benefits and costs and associated risks of meeting the mission's goals; the anticipated timescale for the mission; the reputational and institutional considerations of the proposed activities (including decisions not to act); and mission governance and oversight.

## FOUR: ELABORATING THE IAP POLICY AS A BUSINESS CASE

A business case can be aligned with the IAP Policy using the framework above – the problem, expected outcomes/impacts, institutional and technical capacities, resources required, benefits and costs of the mission, associated risks, anticipated timescale, reputational and institutional considerations, and mission administration and accountability.

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27 The business case can (and should) specifically examine whether the gains in UN system performance resulting from preparing the case exceed the costs and other disadvantages (time, skill, organizational resources) involved. At present, the UN does not assess whether the mandates in the IAP Policy generate results that compensate for the time and effort expended in meeting them or, with respect to integrated M&E, ignoring them.

28 Over the decade 2010/11 to 2019/20 the average cost of peace-keeping missions (the amount approved by the UN General Assembly) was \$7.6 billion with a range of \$8.5 billion (2014/15) to \$6.8 billion (2019/20). Source: [https://casquebleu.org/index.php?title=Peacekeeping\\_financing](https://casquebleu.org/index.php?title=Peacekeeping_financing)

29 In principle, the IAP Policy requires that such comprehensive representation is assembled to devise the Strategic Assessment and Integrated Structural Framework for a multifunctional mission. Practice has often fallen short. Moreover, too little attention has been given to the benefits and costs of integration because too little attention has been focused on integration as an instrument for meeting the mission's goals.

30 Those who prepare commercial business cases will recognize that this question typically refers to opportunities, for example, the opportunity to improve product quality or customer service, reduce costs by raising efficiency, augment revenue streams, and/or reorient the firm's strategy. Some opportunities will be defensive, for example, to protect market share by enhancing competitiveness, or reducing debt to improve resilience. The UN has similar choices. Its opportunities include improving governance, extending the rule of law, reducing violence, promoting political participation, empowering women, and ending impunity. Other opportunities include rebuilding resilience by strengthening institutions, expanding trust by engaging marginalized groups, and enhancing livelihoods.

**The Problem:** The IAP Policy stipulates “...minimum and mandatory requirements for the integrated conduct of assessments and planning in conflict and post-conflict settings where an integrated UN presence is in place or is being considered...” (Section A.1).<sup>31</sup> The Policy is designed so that “integrated assessment and planning processes...maximize the individual and collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activities of the UN system.” The operative term is “context-specific” ensuring that assessment and planning is based upon a detailed understanding of the mission context.<sup>32</sup> This is achieved through the Strategic Assessment or SA (Sections D.16, E.20, F.37, G.31, 35, 36, 37, 41) and the Integrated Structural Framework or ISF (Section H.48, 49) which is derived from that Assessment. The context for the business case would be the same.<sup>33</sup>

**Expected Outcomes/Impacts:** The IAP Policy does not define “peace consolidation” or “impact.” A common understanding of these terms is critical to determine what is expected of a multifunctional mission. A 2010 UN document *Monitoring Peace Consolidation*<sup>34</sup> helps on both counts. It notes that “a consolidated peace... [is]...a self-sustaining peace,” adding that peace “... becomes sustainable when conflicts that arise within a state can be resolved peacefully...”

An impact is a “system-wide outcome” that reflects the “...long-term direct and indirect effect (positive and negative) produced by operationalization of the strategic vision.”<sup>35</sup> Peace consolidation has three impacts: the capacity of a state to peacefully resolve conflicts that may arise, the absence of major threats to public security, and the absence of political repression and discrimination.

A business case would work back from these (and other) impacts deemed crucial for the mission. That process would identify what has to be done and how by which UN entities as they selectively and efficiently integrate their activities, in what sequence, with what resources, where and when, in ways that ensure that the mission being assessed and planned has a high probability of delivering the desired system-wide outcomes over the mission’s lifecycle.<sup>36</sup> Some, but not all of these points are addressed in the SA (Section G.32, 34, 39) and ISF (H.49a,b,c).

**Institutional and Technical Capacities:** The IAP Policy asserts that a multifunctional mission will involve “a minimum” of “...the peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian entities...” (Sections A.2, E.25, G.31 ).<sup>37</sup> This combination poses specific challenges for those developing the business case, just as it has for those following Section G and H to prepare the SA and ISF. Based on the collective understanding of the context, the challenge is to determine which UN entities or sub-groups of entities can most effectively and efficiently integrate their activities to achieve the mission’s goals. For the business case, this exercise will also yield an assessment of which UN entities would find it more useful not to integrate but to collaborate, act in parallel, or loosely coordinate.

31 Reviewers of this paper have noted that the IAP Policy does not explicitly include implementation; rather, its focus is “integrated assessment and planning.” This puts the Policy in a logical bind since, as noted in the text, the assessment and planning processes are intended to maximize impact. Impact without implementation is impossible. More importantly, the IAP Policy provides numerous directions on how implementation should proceed. Examples include Section C.11 “level and depth of integration,” Section E.20 “modalities for working together,” Section E.22 “comparative advantage,” and Section K which highlights “responsibilities, authorities and accountability” which go well beyond assessment and planning (see, especially Section K.78).

32 One of several IAP Policy guiding principles is “flexibility to context” (Section E.19).

33 Preparing a business case will overlap with the information assembled as part of the CPAS i.e., the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (United Nations 2020, July, September). The CPAS is a “whole-of-mission” approach to understanding the context and developing an evidence-based system to identify deliverables and assess performance designed to responsively adjust the mission’s activities (and objectives) over time.

34 United Nations 2010, Appendix A, Box 1.1, p. 53

35 United Nations 2010, Section 1.2.2, Figure 1.2, p.19

36 UN discussions intentionally understate the capacity of the UN system to generate impacts (i.e., system-wide effects). The recently published CPAS Guidance (United Nations 2020, July p.1) defines “intended impact” as “How the Mission wants to influence a driver of change to accomplish its priority objectives...” (emphasis in original). It adds: “(M)issions can only contribute to intended impact - they cannot claim to have achieved a given impact on their own, as drivers of change are heavily affected, positively and negatively, by factors inside and outside the mission’s control.” This dodge should be unacceptable. Uncontrollable factors always influence macro and micro level performance. UN multifunctional missions are designed to consolidate peace and since the end of the Cold War, there have been many successful examples (Kosovo, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, among others). It is disingenuous (if not misleading) for the UN to argue that its presence did not help consolidate peace (the intended impact), even if other factors were involved. If this impact was not intended, what plausible justification is there for the UN to mount peace consolidation missions costing multiple billions of dollars?

37 These are the “minimum” contributors. The Policy also states (Section B.6) that “compliance with this policy is required by all UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes” and (Section K.79) “(E)ach UN entity is responsible for ensuring the implementation of this policy.”

While the IAP Policy states which four pillars should be represented (Sections A.2, C.9, E.25), it offers no indication how, where, or when any of them should be integrated.<sup>38</sup> It does, however, assert that the relevant “...tasks should be allocated to the UN entity best equipped to carry them out...” i.e., according to their respective “comparative advantages” (Section E.22). This directive appears sensible and non-controversial. Practical difficulties arise because it is never clear in advance whether individual comparative advantages will persist once the entities integrate, i.e., become mutually dependent. This question is especially relevant to entities with overlapping mandates and “competences.”<sup>39</sup>

This is where a business case diverges from the IAP Policy. The former does not automatically presume (as the latter does) that integrating UN entities adds value. Instead, a business case explicitly examines which UN entities should integrate with one another, to what degree, and how the degree of integration should be modified over the mission lifecycle.<sup>40</sup> It also highlights where integration across UN entities is either unlikely to succeed or be counterproductive, i.e., subtracts value.

The IAP Policy (Section I.64 and 65) specifies as a “minimum requirement” the “integration mechanisms” devised at Headquarters and in the field and which agencies will participate. A business case would follow this requirement adjusting each of them to the context if needed.

**Resources Required:** The IAP Policy has two references to resources (and none to finance, equipment, skills, or material). Section K.77 refers to “mobilizing resources against ISF priorities” and Section E.22 indicates that each UN entity identified for its comparative advantage should request resources to carry out its agreed tasks.

The IAP Policy presumes that once UN leadership has decided the mission will proceed, the relevant resources will be found. This is not a viable basis for preparing missions with annual budgets of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Having identified the sub-sets of UN entities that would integrate to pursue the mission’s strategic

priorities and those which would contribute with a looser degree of association, a business case would provide estimates (some more precise than others) of the resources required. Most of these estimates will come from the participating entities once it is determined how, when, where, and over what period they will contribute to the mission’s goals.

**Benefits and Costs of the Mission:** The IAP Policy has little to say about “costs” with equivalent terms not mentioned. As with resources above, the implication is that the costs of complying with the Policy’s mandates will be met. Where costs are mentioned, the reference is to the “transactions costs” related to form follows function (i.e., context-specific) nature of each mission (Section E.20).

References to “benefits” (or equivalent terms such as “gains”) are equally sparse. They appear only once as part of guiding principles under the heading “upfront analysis of risks and benefits” (Section E.26):

→ Integrated assessment and planning processes must include an analysis of the risks and benefits that integration arrangements may result in, particularly for humanitarian activities.<sup>41</sup> Integrated assessment and planning processes should provide a forum to assess these risks and benefits and decide on ways to manage them in a manner satisfactory to all UN entities involved.

<sup>38</sup> Section C.9, however, allows humanitarian action to “remain outside the scope of integration” although there is no about all entities complying with and implementing the Policy.

<sup>39</sup> These circumstances are the most likely to produce inter-entity competition, subtracting value rather than adding it. Entities which are likely to retain their respective comparative advantages when integrated are those with divergent mandates or roles, e.g., peace keepers supporting humanitarian agencies such as WFP, UNDP working with Electoral Affairs on elections, gender advisors in agencies collaborating with UN Women on GBV, and strategic planning units in the UNCT coordinating with their counterparts in the mission. Few UN entities are likely to believe they lack a comparative advantage in logistics or procurement.

<sup>40</sup> Some readers will suggest that this point is recognized in Section H.49c stating that the ISF should provide “(A)n articulation of all programmatic, functions and/or operational areas requiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of integration.” It would if the IAP Policy did not contradict the provision by mandating integration and specifying, as noted earlier, that all UN entities must comply with the Policy.

<sup>41</sup> As noted earlier, humanitarian concerns are explicitly covered in Sections C.9 and E.25.

A business case explicitly focuses on the benefits and costs (or gains or losses) of meeting a mission's goals. In most cases it would be too ambitious (and often premature) to compute the benefits and costs of peace consolidation in a particular conflict setting when a mission is first being planned. Nonetheless, there are many sub-components of the mission for which risk-adjusted cost-benefit computations can be derived. Examples would emerge through exercises to determine an "appropriate" (if not optimal) degree of integration among UN entities, or sub-groups of them. Such an analysis has the advantage of revealing the various outcomes and impacts generated by integration and whether they justify the costs involved. A further advantage of these calculations is to show that integration among UN entities is not "one-size-fits-all," but requires experimentation and adaptation to derive the depth and degree of integration that is most productive.<sup>42</sup>

By glossing over both costs and benefits, the IAP Policy undercuts its own "minimum requirement" that each mission should have "integrated monitoring and evaluation." An important role of M&E is to identify the benefits and costs of the mission, measure them to the extent feasible, and use the results to assess whether UN system performance has been enhanced.<sup>43</sup>

**Associated Risks:** The IAP Policy mentions several risks. They include general or systemic risks (Sections F.30, G.31, and H.54), risks to humanitarian operations (Sections C.9, E.26), risks to personnel (Section H.53) and security risks (Section H.61, 62). There are also risks to the "integration arrangement" (Section E.26) and risks to the UN, its role, and comparative advantages (Section H.49d). It is not possible, before the fact, to identify all risks which a mission will encounter. A business case would include the risks that can be anticipated and propose mechanisms (buffers, backup capacity, and mitigation procedures) to respond to unexpected developments. Examples of relevant risks include shocks (both positive and negative) in operational, structural, and strategic dimensions of the mission, delays in access to resources and staff deployments, natural disasters, and unforeseen shifts in the conflict-setting itself. Among the last-mentioned, the major risks relate to positive or negative political, economic, and social changes in the host country.

Recent examples are the fall of the Bashir regime in Sudan and the coup in Mali.

Those formulating the business case would rely on the context assessment and their experience to identify the different risks and to understand and estimate their potential effects. Many of the risks identified will be mitigated (partially at least) by the way the mission is structured, the operations of the participating UN entities, and the procedures and risk reduction strategies each of them employs.<sup>44</sup> An obvious example is the security provided by UN peacekeepers. In certain circumstances, such protection enables the humanitarian agencies to safely assist refugees and internally displaced persons. The risks will also be mitigated by the information assembled to monitor mission performance, the quality and timeliness of its evaluation, and the response of the mission's leaders.

The business case would recognize that the UN presence will increase some risks. Warring factions do not uniformly welcome peacekeepers and peacebuilders. Political leaders differ in their attitudes and reactions to UN "assistance." Meeting their mission's goals, requires peacekeepers, if so mandated, to put an end to wanton destruction, violence, mayhem, and looting (official and ad hoc). These activities are often lucrative and empowering for selected groups, many of which are allied with those with formal authority. Likewise, in its efforts to restore law and order, end impunity, and improve governance, the UN mission will disrupt, and even disable, regional, factional, and ethnic power relations. This creates resistance which often "puts a target on the UN's back." Our interviews reveal that these have been features of peacekeeping in Mali and Sudan-Darfur.

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<sup>42</sup> Section C.11 briefly notes this point.

<sup>43</sup> This is consistent with the IAP Policy's "guiding principle" of "continuous planning and transitions" (Section D.28, E.21, G.40, H.53, 57). Missions were urged to be "...organized to anticipate and accommodate significant changes in the structure and mandate of the UN presence." This idea is reflected in Sections H.56, 57, 58, 61, and 63. It should be emphasized, however, that continuous, adaptive planning can only succeed, if "integrated monitoring and evaluation" (Sections H.55, J) occurs. Otherwise, it is guesswork.

<sup>44</sup> A reviewer disagreed with the point but then added that "Generally the UN family has been weak at agreeing shared, specific mitigation measures."

**Anticipated Timescale:** A business case requires some “reasonable” or “workable” timescale with which to anchor the analysis of the benefits and costs of meeting the mission’s goals. “Timelines” are raised in discussing the context in the ISF (Section H.49e) although no time is indicated for the UN system to maximize the individual and collective impact on peace consolidation.

The experience from other multifunctional missions offers a guide, enabling the business case to divide the mission lifecycle into phases – roll-out, implementation, and transition.<sup>45</sup> Although phases do not provide a timescale, they focus attention on the tasks involved and help identify the necessary assessment and planning processes along with the activities for which the benefits and costs need to be measured.

The inability to determine a timescale further reinforces the importance of missions monitoring and evaluating their performance. Given the high annual costs incurred, noted earlier, the resources saved by reducing a mission’s timescale are large. *Reputational and Institutional Considerations:* These issues supplement the risk analysis. From the earlier discussion, the IAP policy referred to “risks to the UN, the UN role, and its comparative advantages” (Section H.49a). There are multiple examples of risks when the UN acts, and when it does not. There have been no easy answers. Depending on the context and the circumstances – Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Syria, Sudan-Darfur, and others – the UN has often ended up on both sides of many issues.

One specific institutional risk which the IAP Policy emphasizes is “program criticality” (PC). The Policy states (Section H.62):

- In countries or geographic areas where UN personnel operate at high or very high security risk, as determined by the UNSMS SRM [UN Security Management System Security Risk Management] process, a PC assessment is required which involves all UN entities operating in that area. The assessment must utilize existing UN strategic planning frameworks such as an ISF, UNDAF and HRP to determine the Strategic Results against which the criticality of outputs is assessed.

A business case would incorporate the same information.

Such precautions are essential, although it should be recognized that by undertaking a multifunctional mission, the UN leadership is simultaneously accepting the associated reputational and institutional risks. As in the IAP Policy, an important task during the formulation of the business case will be to highlight the processes and procedures through which mission leaders and heads of UN entities can mitigate (if not minimize) these risks. In this respect, it will be important for leaders to understand whether integration helps or hinders UN system performance.

*Mission Administration and Accountability:*<sup>46</sup> The IAP Policy (Section K) has a detailed description of the “responsibilities, authority, and accountability for integrated assessment and planning.” The responsibilities and authorities relate to actions by S/ERSG, RCs/HCs [Special/Executive Representative of the Secretary General, Resident Coordinators/Humanitarian Coordinators] and Heads of Agencies, Funds and Programs. Responsibilities for implementation fall on each of these actors (Section K.78) and as Section K.79 states “each UN entity.” The problem is that there is no clear line of responsibility and no obvious mechanism for accountability. This is evident in Section K.77:

- The finalization, implementation, and regular review and adjustment of Integrated Strategic Frameworks is a joint responsibility of S/ERSGs, Resident Coordinators, Humanitarian Coordinators and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes, including through cooperation in mobilizing resources against ISF priorities.

<sup>45</sup> The publication *Monitoring Peace Consolidation* referred to earlier noted: “A peace consolidation phase, as expressed in a Security Council mandate or request for CDW [Consolidation, Drawdown, Withdrawal] benchmarking, normally has a limited time frame of 2-6 years” (UN 2010, p.42).

<sup>46</sup> The term “governance” appears only once in relation to internal procedures of UN entities (Section H.60).

Joint responsibility presents major administrative challenges. In practice, everyone is mutually responsible, with no one being accountable. By explicitly identifying who does what, with whom, and how, a business case would establish clear lines of responsibility for performance. The information generated by the dedicated M&E would permit the necessary responsibilities to be assigned.

The IAP Policy makes no reference to “oversight” (or an equivalent such as “supervision” or “governance”) although the implied intention is for that function to be performed by the “Integrated Task Forces” (Section F.29). Accountability is mentioned twice. In Section K.78, it is folded into existing mechanisms:

- Delivery against priorities outlined in the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Frameworks must be integrated into existing accountability mechanisms, including S/ERSG Compacts and existing performance systems for DSRSGs, RC/HCs and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes.

This requirement deflects accountability and performance from the IAP Policy to other (external) procedures and mechanisms. Such an approach rarely works, a point confirmed in our interviews. The most generous assessment is that mission accountability not only muddled but is uniformly weak. As noted above, by identifying responsibility for performance, the business case would establish clear channels of who is accountable to whom and how. Again, the M&E system would be essential to providing the relevant data.

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The paper has argued that the UN should modify the integration mandate for multifunctional UN presences. This would induce missions to shift their attention from integration as a requirement to its role as one of several instruments contributing to peace consolidation. Instead of being required to integrate because the process is mandated, participating UN entities would integrate their activities when doing so helps advance the strategic priorities of the mission.

To determine when integration adds value and when it does not, the assessment and planning processes for a mission would include the formulation of a business case. Such a case would provide a justification for the mission by identifying and quantifying (to the extent that can be done in advance) which entities should integrate to achieve the mission’s goals within a framework that highlights the costs, benefits, and incentives required to foster integration. The business case would also identify the risks involved and provide for the dedicated monitoring and evaluation which, in addition to tracking mission performance, would identify clear channels of accountability for that performance.

Developing a business case should not be viewed as another planning requirement that is being foisted on already overloaded United Nations staff. Rather, it is more appropriately seen as a constructive elaboration of many of the existing features of the IAP Policy. The advantage is that instead of being forced to integrate to satisfy a mandate, participating UN entities will be induced and guided to integrate in ways that foster progress towards the mission’s goals. Such an approach will make the most effective and efficient use of their individual and collective “competence and expertise” and, by doing so, enhance UN system performance.

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