



**United
Nations**



Review of UN Integration Final Report



Executive summary

OCHA
UNITED NATIONS

Executive summary

1. Since the end of the Cold War, successive Secretaries-General have pursued the vision of a United Nations system acting in concert to address the challenges faced by the world. To this end, they have issued numerous directives and policies mandating integration. The promise of integration also captured the imagination of Member States who—motivated by pragmatic, altruistic or pecuniary instincts—have mandated structurally integrated missions and have called for ever more coordination. And yet, three decades into this agenda, integration within the United Nations system remains a patchwork of formal and informal mechanisms, the success of which rests more on personality than on policy. The application of tools established to foster integration has been uneven and the commitment of disparate parts of the United Nations system has been inconstant, a legacy of historical grievances and internecine competition. At the same time, the imperative of effective integration has never been higher, as over half of the total annual expenditure of the United Nations system is in integrated settings and crisis-affected countries, and because achievement of the 2030 Agenda requires an integrated approach.

2. It is against this backdrop that the Executive Committee commissioned a review of integration in the United Nations with the objectives of assessing the extent to which entities are working jointly to maximize impact in complex settings, identifying the challenges to integration, measuring the impact of existing integration tools and reviewing the existing structures that support integration. The objective of the review is to generate recommendations to the Deputies Committee for revising the integrated assessment and planning policy and handbook and fostering the coherent and effective integration and cross-pillar coordination required to improve United Nations system performance. To this end, the review interviewed a broad crosssection of interlocutors of varied backgrounds and experiences—including staff from the Secretariat, agencies, funds, and programmes at both Headquarters and the field—and has conducted in-depth studies of integration in four types of situations: in the presence of a special political mission (Afghanistan), in a peacekeeping context (Mali), in a transition setting (Sudan) and in a non-mission setting (Burkina Faso).

3. Those interviewed all recognize the multidimensional nature of the issues to be addressed in each country, but highlight the institutional obstacles to integration, including the lack of incentives or accountability mechanisms to promote or enforce integration. The review found that integration is easiest where individuals have cross-pillar experience and has been most effective where participants have focused on identifying pragmatic ways to enable principled action. There has also been a tendency for Headquarters to create new processes, systems and reporting requirements to promote integration, but the failure to provide resources to support these additional measures has served to undermine delivery in the field.

4. Behavioural considerations have been a particular focus of the review. An examination of the types of personnel with the greatest impact on integration and the types of behaviours that are most conducive to integration yielded nine broad behaviours and five groups of individuals most responsible for behaving in the ways identified. In addition, the analysis identified seven overarching behavioral barriers to integration, as follows: (1) facilitating successful integration requires focus and attention, which is often in short supply; (2) the risks of pursuing integration appear higher than they may be while (3) the benefits of pursuing integration appear smaller than they are; (4) the abundance of options can inhibit decision-making; (5) professional identities, prior experiences and perceptions of integration lead people to adopt a siloed approach, (6) individuals often assume bad faith on the counterparts instead of considering context and (7) operational hurdles can discourage the actions necessary for integration.

5. The feedback received also lays bare the limited familiarity on the part of staff and managers alike with the integrated assessment and planning policy, even though it has been the formal basis for integration since its promulgation in 2013. At the same time, the principles of the policy remain broadly relevant. To strengthen the policy and increase its relevance, the review recommends reframing of the integrated strategic framework (ISF) as a country-specific business case for integration. Funding mechanisms—including mission budgets, the Peacebuilding Fund and country team resource mobilization efforts—should be linked to ISFs. Monitoring and evaluation should be used to monitor the achievement of the expected benefits of integration and inform adjustments to implementation plans. Recommendations have also been made to address the behavioural barriers identified and to address obstacles to integration posed by human resources management policies and practices, including the need to have balanced senior management teams, the absence of incentives or accountability mechanisms for integration and the need to facilitate cross-pillar mobility.

6. Finally, the review recommends entrusting the Integration Steering Group with an expanded role to promote integration across the United Nations system, including reviewing the implementation of a revised integrated assessment and planning policy and monitoring the effectiveness of senior managers in promoting integration in individual country contexts.

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION	10
MANDATE.....	10
BACKGROUND.....	10
REVIEW OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY.....	11
HISTORICAL SURVEY.....	12
II. CASE STUDIES	18
III. OBSERVATIONS	22
INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING POLICY.....	22
PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM.....	24
BEHAVIOURS AND ASSOCIATED BARRIERS.....	27
INSTITUTIONAL RIVALRIES AND COMPETING CULTURES.....	33
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.....	34
REFORM IMPACT.....	34
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS	38
INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING POLICY.....	38
RELATED POLICIES.....	42
ROLE OF THE INTEGRATION STEERING GROUP.....	43
BEHAVIOURAL SOLUTIONS.....	44
DATA AND INFORMATION-SHARING.....	49
PROGRAMMATIC FUNDING.....	50
HUMAN RESOURCES.....	51
V. CONCLUSION	56
ANNEX I: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	57
ANNEX II: ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE	58
ANNEX III: INTEGRATION SCORECARD	60

ADDENDUM 1: CASE STUDIES

ADDENDUM 2: FRAMING A BUSINESS CASE

ADDENDUM 3: CONSTRUCTING AN INTEGRATION INDEX

ADDENDUM 4: BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS FOR UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATION

Acknowledgements

The report was drafted by Jordan Ryan, Ideas42 and the integration review team under the auspices of the Deputies Committee in its capacity as the Integration Steering Committee. We thank the support of the Integration Working Group, Red Team and expert consultation group.

This Review was made possible by the generous contributions of the governments of Canada, Germany, Sweden, and The United Kingdom.

Cover: © UNMISS – WFP food drop in Bentiu.



I. Introduction

I. Introduction

MANDATE

1. This review of the implementation of integration in the United Nations was launched pursuant to Executive Committee decision 2017/15, which instructed the Integration Steering Group to review and update the 2013 integrated assessment and planning (IAP) policy and handbook. The scope of the review was subsequently expanded to examine cross-pillar integration more broadly. The decision directs attention to the recent changes in the decision-making mechanisms and integration policies of the United Nations and the need to support and reinforce United Nations collaboration with outside actors, such as the international financial institutions, regional and sub-regional partners.

BACKGROUND

2. What is integration in the context of the United Nations system? The principal difficulty in answering this question is that current United Nations policy requires the system to integrate in country contexts where a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or special political mission is deployed alongside a United Nations country team without explicitly defining “integration”. The meaning emerges implicitly through multiple references to its role, purposes, actions and outcomes. In most cases, the context conveys what integration is meant to imply, particularly if the relevant documentation identifies who is to be engaged with whom, and what they are expected to accomplish. Formal discussions of integrated activities typically refer to designated United Nations entities¹ “improving coordination”, acting with “unity of purpose” or “coherently”, being “joined-up” or “closely aligned” and cooperating “across pillars”. From these expressions we can derive a working definition of integration as the bringing together of United Nations entities to enhance the individual and collective impact of the activities of the United Nations system in a specific context.

3. As detailed in other sections of the report, the purpose of integration is ultimately to improve peace consolidation outcomes in a country, and as a result, is only desirable, i.e., successful, when it leads to improvements in those outcomes. We do not surmise that all integration is beneficial on its own, but that integration is successful when it is used as an instrument to consolidate peace more effectively.

4. An examination of integration should not be approached from the perspective of principle alone, as the strategic challenges of integrated action and the opportunities it affords are substantial. In 2018, over half of the total expenditure of the United Nations system was in integrated or fragile contexts.

INTEGRATION

Over the last three decades, the United Nations has described integration in ways that emphasize connectedness, jointness, inter-relatedness and interdependence, which distinguishes them from activities (or entities) which are co-located, agglomerated, clustered, juxtaposed, or operating in parallel.

Integrated entities are mutually dependent; their activities are contingent upon and responsive to the activities of other entities. The degree to which the entities integrate (or mutually interact) depends upon their common objectives, incentives and capacities.

¹ For the purposes of this report, the term “United Nations entity” is used to refer to major organizational units of the Secretariat (e.g., departments or peace operations) as well as individual funds, programmes, specialized agencies and related organizations of the United Nations system.

REVIEW OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

5. The present review has four objectives:

- Assess the extent to which United Nations actors are working jointly to maximize impact;
- Identify the strategic, operational and behavioural challenges to integration;
- Measure the impact of existing integration tools on the coherence and effectiveness of the United Nations system; and
- Review the existing structures that support integration and identify opportunities created by the Secretary-General’s reforms.

IMPACT

Though “impact” is central to the IAP policy, it is not defined in the policy. Several United Nations sources fill the gap. Impact is defined in the 2010 Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmarking as “... longterm direct and indirect effect (positive and negative) produced by operationalization of the strategic vision [for peace consolidation]” and in the United Nations Evaluation Group guidance on impact evaluation as “Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended”. The essence is clear—an impact is a significant longer-term system-wide outcome or tangible change that is induced or generated by some purposeful action.

In relation to integration, impact is the added value generated by the mutual interaction between or among United Nations entities. It is measured as the positive movement towards peace consolidation objectives created by joined-up activities relative to what was (or could have been) achieved if each United Nations entity had acted separately.

6. To meet these objectives, the review identifies procedures which promote or impede integration in conflict, post-conflict, and peace consolidation settings; draws lessons regarding the efficacy of integration within the United Nations system; and analyzes the behaviours which drive integration, as well as behavioural barriers that inhibit successful integration. Based on these procedures, lessons and behaviours, the review makes recommendations related to the IAP policy and fostering coherent and effective integration and cross-pillar coordination required to improve United Nations system performance.

7. The review was conducted in two phases. Phase I consisted of a literature review, surveys, interviews, focus groups, and a thematic case study of integration in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. Phase II focused on case studies of four types of settings: peacekeeping (Mali), special political mission (Afghanistan), transition (Sudan/Darfur) and non-mission (Burkina Faso). These case studies examine the implementation and impact of integration and are not intended as detailed examinations of the work of the United Nations system in those country contexts. The present report presents the views expressed by respondents, from which the review has drawn general observations and made recommendations. The review applies behavioural science—the study of how humans make decisions and take actions—to explore the challenge of promoting successful United Nations integration. Behavioural science separates the influence of context, such as the perceived behaviour of members of peer groups or the presence of habits formed during previous experience, from structural factors such as incentives (pecuniary or reputational) or information deficits. The resulting specialized behavioural analysis, which defined behaviours critical to integration and diagnosed barriers to identified behaviours, yielded a range of recommended behavioural solutions that should be applied to complement the other policy recommendations presented.²

² See Addendum 4 for details on the specific methodology used for the behavioral analysis.

HISTORICAL SURVEY

8. The historical evolution of integration within the United Nations has been widely discussed and several comprehensive studies are available, many of which are often critical of United Nations integration efforts.³ The principal driver of integration was the end of the Cold War, a point acknowledged by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*.⁴ In a follow-up report, the Secretary-General underscored the need for significantly broader “coordination” at United Nations Headquarters and in the field, stating that “the multifunctional nature of both peace-keeping and peacebuilding has made it necessary to improve coordination within the Secretariat, so that the relevant departments function as an integrated whole under my authority and control” and that “improved coordination is equally necessary within the United Nations system as a whole.” The basic justification for integration was that “The responsibilities involved in multifunctional peace-keeping operations and in peace-building transcend the competence and expertise of any one department, programme, fund, office or agency of the United Nations”⁵. The rationale remains relevant today. Yet, having understood and advocated for integration, the Secretary-General recognized that “such coordination has to date proved difficult to achieve”. Many problems of coordination arise from the mandates decreed for the agencies by discrete intergovernmental bodies and therefore defy the capacity for inter-Secretariat coordination.⁶

9. In his 1997 report entitled “A Programme for Reform”,⁷ Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued that, for the United Nations to address the post-Cold War challenges, its management needed greater “unity of purpose and coherence in performance”. Integration was central to this effort. Affirming that the United Nations was to “act as one at the country level”, he requested the General Assembly to appoint a Deputy Secretary-General who, among other responsibilities, would “support the Secretary-General in ensuring inter-sectoral and inter-institutional coherence of activities and programmes”. He also recommended that the Department of Political Affairs be made the “focal point” for post-conflict peacebuilding.⁸ This would make sure that the “United Nations efforts in countries

that are emerging from crisis are fully integrated”. As a fourth example, the Secretary-General noted that “(a)n integrated approach is particularly important in the field, where lack of cohesion or differences among United Nations entities can be exploited by the parties”. To counteract this prospect, he asserted that a “vital” role of Special Representatives of the Secretary General, in “countries where large multidisciplinary field operations are in place”, is to “ensure that the efforts of the different components of the system are mutually reinforcing”.

Introduction of structurally-integrated missions

10. Over the following decade, the expansion of United Nations peace-making, peacekeeping and peace consolidation activities substantively modified the nature and scope of integrated missions. A major adaptation was the increasingly frequent designation of “structurally-integrated” missions in which a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) was double- or triple-hatted with the functions of resident coordinator (RC) and, in some cases, humanitarian coordinator (HC). The DSRSG/RC/HC was responsible for ensuring that missions and country teams in such contexts were integrated.⁹ Numerous directives were issued and handbooks prepared on the organization

³ See, for example, the Brahimi report (A/55/305-S/2000/809); Eide et al. (Report on Integrated Missions: Practice, Perspectives and Recommendations. May 2005); MFA, Norway 2008; Boutellis (Driving the System Apart? A Study on United Nations Integration and Integrated Strategic Planning. IPI, August 2013). These studies are often critical of the UN’s integration efforts. For example, MFA Norway (p. 5) concluded: “In the UN, reforms to bring about greater coherence, collaboration and integration of efforts in multidimensional peace operations have promise, but at present they are being implemented in a policy vacuum, and are beset by problems caused by a fragmented and unwieldy system.” (emphasis in original). The other sources are equally harsh.

⁴ A/47/277-S/24111

⁵ A/50/60-S/1995/1, paragraph 91

⁶ Ibid., paragraphs 94-96

⁷ A/51/950

⁸ The current peacebuilding architecture, including the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) were created in response to the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. In 2019, as part of the reform of the peace and security architecture, PBSO was merged into the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

⁹ Guidance on Integrated Missions: note from the Secretary-General dated 9 February 2006

and management of integrated activities. The most notable was the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which the Secretary-General endorsed in June 2006.¹⁰

11. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was committed to integration. His decision 2008/24 stated, “the Secretary-General reaffirms integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the United Nations has a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated. It noted that the “...main purpose of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN presence, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace”. A decision in May 2011¹¹ “strongly” reaffirmed his support adding that “country level arrangements can take different structural forms, reflecting the specific requirements and circumstances.” This is the “form follows function” feature which requires that integration be adapted to national contexts.

12. These decisions underscore, at the highest level, the commitment to integration. For their part, Member States demonstrated increasing interest in integration following the development of the IMPP. In the General Assembly, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations called for more integration between peacekeeping missions and country teams in the implementation of peacebuilding activities and explicitly requested briefings from the Secretariat on the IMPP. The connection between country teams and missions were also reinforced by the Security Council in its resolutions such as 1996 (2011) establishing UNMISS and resolution 2086 (2013) on multidimensional peacekeeping. The Security Council specifically included the word “integrated” into the names of MINUSMA and MINUSCA when those missions were established in 2013 and 2014, respectively.

13. Another driver of Member State support of integration was the increase in the financial cost of peacekeeping operations, which more than doubled in the years following the issuance of the IMPP.¹² For major financial contributors, stronger coordination mechanisms between missions and country teams were a means of assuring a clear division of responsibilities

and minimizing the need to finance so-called “programmatic activities” out of assessed peacekeeping mission budgets. This desire to eliminate perceived overlap in programmatic activities was reflected in Fifth Committee debates and Security Council mandate renewal negotiations.

Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy

14. It was in this environment that the IAP policy was developed in 2013. The purpose of the IAP policy is “to define the minimum and mandatory requirements for the integrated conduct of assessments and planning in conflict and post-conflict settings where an integrated United Nations presence is in place or is being considered, and to outline responsibilities of United Nations actors in this process”. These IAP processes “are intended to maximize the individual and collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activities of the United Nations system”.

15. The policy states why integrated assessment and planning are “essential”. It then stipulates four minimum requirements: (1) the joint conduct of strategic assessments; (2) the articulation of a common United Nations vision, priorities and respective responsibilities in support of peace consolidation; (3) the establishment of integrated mechanisms at both field and Headquarters levels; and (4) the conduct of integrated monitoring and evaluation.

16. Four aspects of the IAP policy are notable. First, the only mandated feature are the four minimum requirements that “must” be met. There is no requirement for integrated implementation which involves joint activities, operational integration or cross-pillar coordination across United Nations entities. Second, although the policy stipulates that the purpose of integrated assessment and planning is to “maximize... the impact...of peace consolidation activities” and lists nine outcomes for which they are “essential”, the policy has no requirement for developing a “business

¹⁰ SG Decision No. 2006/26, 14 June 2006. Drafted in 2006, the IMPP guidelines were formally adopted in 2009

¹¹ SG Decision No. 2011/10, May

¹² From \$3.6 billion in June 2006 to a high of \$8.5 billion in June 2015.

case” (or its equivalent) to suggest why or how the various elements might be relevant. That is, there is nothing formally required by the policy to inform decision-makers at Headquarters or in the field whether the collaborative advantages of integrated United Nations entities are being realized, a cost-effective degree of integration has been planned or, more generally, whether the benefits of integrated United Nations activities in the country in question are commensurate with the costs involved. Third, while one of the minimum requirements is the establishment of “integrated mechanisms for joint analysis...and decision-making”,

the implementation of such mechanisms has often been weak. Fourth, once the United Nations entities comply with the minimum, mandatory requirements for IAP policy, there are no inducements or incentives for missions and country team entities to “act as one”, “join-up”, “closely align” or integrate their activities.¹³

17. None of these factors undermines the case for integration across United Nations entities. But, taken together, they markedly diminish the IAP policy as the foundation for integration within the United Nations system.

Recent developments

18. Over recent years, enthusiasm for integration appears to have declined, in part due to “integration fatigue” within the United Nations. The retrenchment of peacekeeping since 2014/15 also reduced the pressure from major financial contributors to pursue integration as a means of cutting costs. Nonetheless, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations confirmed in its 2015 report the continuing need for the United Nations to further integrate its efforts—between Headquarters and the field and between missions and United Nations country teams—to sustain peace.¹⁴ Similarly, the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Peacebuilding Architecture Review recommended the strengthening of system-wide strategic planning in conflict-prone and conflict-affected contexts.¹⁵ In response, the General Assembly and Security Council emphasized the importance of joint analysis and strategic planning across the United Nations system in its 2016 twin resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.¹⁶ Recognition has also grown for the need for coherent approaches with partners outside the United Nations. This has involved efforts to improve coordination with the European Union¹⁷ and the African Union¹⁸ and engage them in assessment and planning processes.

19. The ongoing United to Reform agenda—which covers peace and security, development, and management—has also renewed the impetus for integration. The three tracks of the reforms are intended to improve the effectiveness and accountability of mandate implementation, primarily by improving the coherence of delivery within the Secretariat and across the United Nations system. Under the development system reform, relevant measures include strengthening of the resident coordinators and the establishment of the Development Coordination Office in the Secretariat, the five transformative areas for enhanced coordination identified as part of the regional review and the signing of the statement of mutual recognition by the Secretary-General and the heads of many of the funds and programmes, specialized agencies and related organizations. The restructuring of peace and security was also intended to improve coherence by moving towards a whole-of-pillar approach. Finally, the establishment of the Department of Operational Support as

a service provider to the entire Secretariat and resident coordinator system, as opposed to the narrow field mission-specific remit of its closest pre-reform analogue, is intended to encourage greater coherence in the administrative and logistical foundations for the work of the Organization. Underlying all of these reform efforts is the reality that the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals requires an integrated approach.



A UNAMID police officer interacts with women at a water point in Nifasha camp for Internally Displaced Persons, North Darfur.

¹³ It should be noted that the IAP policy includes a provision for humanitarian interventions to remain outside the scope of integration, recognizing that integration can at times challenge the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver according to humanitarian principles. However, humanitarian actors are still required to participate in joint analysis and planning as well as coordination mechanisms.

¹⁴ A/70/95-S/2015/446

¹⁵ A/69/968-S/2015/490

¹⁶ General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282(2016)

¹⁷ As stipulated in the 2014 guidelines on coordinating with the EU during the planning of United Nations and European Union missions.

¹⁸ S/2017/454 on options for authorization and support to African Union peace support operations outlines the agreed joint planning and mandating processes between the United Nations and African Union.



II. Case studies

II. Case studies

20. Integration generally occurs in practice in three types of contexts: in the presence of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, a special political mission or in a non-mission setting. The requirement for integration is also particularly acute in transition settings during which the United Nations is reconfiguring from one type of context to another. The review examined each of these types of situations to help understand the extent to which the United Nations entities are integrated, determine the utility of integration tools and mechanisms and identify barriers to integration, including behavioral considerations that prevent the United Nations system from advancing its strategic priorities in a particular country context.

Afghanistan: Integration in the presence of a special political mission

21. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established in 2002 under Security Council resolution 1401 (2002). UNAMA is headed by an SRSG and has two pillars, the political pillar is led by a DSRSG and the development pillar by a DSRSG/RC/HC. The mission's size peaked in 2010 with over 20 field offices. It currently has around 1,200 staff. Staff are in Kabul, in field offices across the country and in liaison offices in Tehran and Islamabad. The United Nations system operates under a "One UN for Afghanistan" framework signed with the Government in March 2018. This framework focuses the work of the United Nations on six thematic areas—education, food security, nutrition and livelihoods, health, return and reintegration, rule of law and normative work in the areas of human rights advocacy and protection.

Mali: Integration in a peacekeeping context

22. With a budget of \$1.183 billion¹⁹, an authorized strength of 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel and nearly 2,000 civilian staff and United Nations Volunteers, the Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is one of the largest peacekeeping missions currently deployed. The mission mandate has included several controversial elements, including countering asymmetric attacks in active defense of its mandate²⁰, providing operational and logistical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force²¹ and supporting the redeployment of the Malian defense and security forces, including through joint operations²². The mission is structurally integrated, with one of its two DSRGs simultaneously dual-hatted as RC and HC, and the United Nations system operates under an integrated strategic framework. A review of the framework is planned to reflect the requirements of the ongoing political transition.

Sudan: Integration in a transition setting

23. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was the first of its kind. It was established on 31 July 2007 and took over from the earlier African Union Mission in Sudan on 1 January 2008. UNAMID was not set up as an integrated mission nor was it converted into one. The United Nations Mission in Sudan, an integrated peacekeeping mission, was closed in 2011. Subsequent developments, however, prompted the shift towards a more integrated approach and the drafting of an integrated strategic framework. In 2017 the mandate of the operation was re-oriented to a twopronged approach of peacekeeping and stabilization²³. Making clear its intention to close the operation, the Security Council in 2018²⁴ endorsed the concept of state liaison functions, a programmatic mechanism funded through the UNAMID budget but

¹⁹ General Assembly resolution 74/290

²⁰ Security Council resolution 2295 (2016), paragraph 19 (d)

²¹ Security Council resolution 2391 (2017), paragraph 13

²² Security Council resolution 2423 (2018), paragraph 38 (b)

²³ Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)

²⁴ Security Council resolution 2429 (2019)



OCHA staff speak with local populations in Afghanistan

led by the agencies, funds and programmes to facilitate the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur. Following the establishment of the transitional government in Sudan, a 2019 visioning exercise led by the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Sudan (SASG) examined the context and provided guidance on the role that the United Nations could play in Sudan. That guidance drew upon the newly appointed Prime Minister's description of government priorities and expectations of the United Nations. In 2020, the Security Council mandated the establishment of a United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)²⁵ and terminated the UNAMID mandate, effective 31 December 2020²⁶.

Burkina Faso: Integration in a non-mission setting

24. Since 2014, Burkina Faso has experienced shocks that have induced the United Nations to progressively shift its focus from development to prevention and humanitarian response. Burkina Faso was one of three pilot countries for the sustaining peace approach. Under this approach, the United Nations was to provide

Burkina Faso with integrated support to address drivers of instability through political engagement emphasizing resilience building. Due to the deteriorating security situation in 2019, the Executive Committee initiated a review of how the country team could respond. The review recommended that the United Nations concentrate more on prevention calling for the enhancement of human rights capacity, additional DSS support, and a reinforced RCO with enhanced analytical capability. The Executive Committee endorsed the recommendations, including the accelerated scale-up of localized development, humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance through the creation of five integrated presences based in Dori, Kaya, Fada, Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouahigouya. Additional resources were not provided and, as a result, the country team has been stretched in expanding its focus beyond humanitarian and development programming.

²⁵ Security Council resolution 2524 (2020)

²⁶ Security Council resolution 2559 (2020)



III. Observations

III. Observations

25. Integration has moved a considerable way over the past fifteen years. Some concepts that were contentious a decade ago are taken for granted today, and the potential benefits of integration are widely accepted by stakeholders. In mission settings, the head of mission has the overall authority to coordinate and give strategic direction regarding Security Council-mandated tasks; agencies, funds and programmes must be guided by and operate consistently with decisions taken by the head of mission on those activities. The challenge, however, is translating intentions into action. As demonstrated through the case studies, implementation of integration has rarely been straightforward and never easy. There is also considerable room for improvement for the system. Examples include working jointly to enhance impact by overcoming difficulties arising from differences in mandates, cultures, business practices, funding arrangements and internal organization within the United Nations system as well as the absence of meaningful incentives for integration. In this section, we summarize the key findings from the case studies.

INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING POLICY

26. Few of the individuals interviewed were familiar with the integrated assessment and planning policy, let alone the related tools and techniques. Even those familiar with the policy acknowledged that integration in practice generally depends more on individuals than on policy. The two main criticisms leveled against the policy are that the associated processes are heavy and that it is not relevant to the day-to-day work of staff. Those who were aware of the existence of the integrated assessment and planning handbook indicated that the document was of limited practical use and lacked guidance on issues that regularly emerge, such as reconciliation with other planning and budgeting frameworks and whether funding mechanisms can be pooled. As a result, staff confront difficulties in implementation of the policy by its inaccessibility and lack of practical support.

Integrated strategic framework

27. An important feature of the IAP policy which is supposed to be reflected in the strategic assessment and the integrated strategic framework (ISF) is the need for United Nations entities to agree on the common United Nations objectives. Interviews revealed that such agreement was typically not achieved. Furthermore, the lack of a unified vision was seen as undermining the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations system. Many interviewees report that most United Nations entities are “doing their own thing.”

28. The fundamental weakness of the ISF, as indicated across the interviews and case studies, is that there is little understanding of how to move an ISF from plan to implementation in a practical way. Interviewees report that there is little ownership of the ISF at the field level—the requirement to develop an ISF is often seen as one imposed by Headquarters—and there is a general perception of the ISF as a mission-centric document. The imperative of developing an ISF in as inclusive a manner as possible creates a tendency to draft a document that simply lists all of the activities that are already underway by all parts of the United Nations system. This is the opposite of the intended purpose of the ISF, which is to serve as a high-level vision statement or articulation of common priorities that serves to guide the plans and activities of the mission and the country team. ISFs are often shelved and forgotten once they are finalized.

29. The lack of linkage between an ISF and resources also serves to undermine its practical utility. A meaningful ISF would inform the development of mission results-based budgets and also drive resource mobilization efforts of the country team. The different financial systems, policies and budget cycles were continuously identified as obstacles to integration, but few efforts appear to have been ever made to identify practical means to overcome these perennial roadblocks. As a result, most respondents did not believe that the ISF added value, with UNAMID being the notable exception.

30. One interviewee pointed out that an envisioned benefit of the ISF was that it was supposed to be a document that could be quickly finalized in a matter of weeks, as opposed to the UNDAF, which took months to put together and which required agreement by the host government. In practice however, the development of an ISF can be extremely time consuming. For instance, the development of the 2019/2021 ISF in Mali took eight months to complete. The process was open and participatory, but members of the country team had difficulty understanding what distinguished the ISF from the UNDAF+. Indeed, many interlocutors pointed to the need to be more practical and less process oriented in the implementation of all elements of the IAP policy. They noted that heavy bureaucratic processes take a lot of time and effort, and also risk becoming mechanical exercises that lose track of their intended purposes.

Joint structures

31. There are multiple tools and mechanisms to facilitate integration. Too often, meetings designed to foster coordination and collaboration tend to proliferate and agendas can readily overlap. A common view was that country team members could attend meetings full time thereby diverting time and effort from leading their operations. While integrated task forces at Headquarters and senior leadership forums in the field are supposed to support a more strategic approach to integration, these operate mostly as information sharing mechanisms rather than as strategic bodies or decision-making forums. Consequently, they are generally regarded as not being very useful. The size and level of attendance of these forums were regularly cited as contributing factors. Similar complaints were raised about United Nations country team meetings. In addition to consuming large amounts of time, country team meetings were frequently seen as being overly procedural and devoid of dialogue or debate on United Nations system priorities. In contrast, action-oriented forums were identified as being more effective, including the regional monthly reviews at Headquarters as well as the security management team, senior leadership team and civil-military coordination meetings in the field.

32. It was also noted that there is a tendency within the United Nations to create new areas of work for issues that are supposed to be mainstreamed. Examples raised during interviews with mission and country team staff included early recovery, gender, women, peace and security and protection of civilians. The creation of dedicated units can be valuable for coordinating work on these issues, but this can also be counterproductive, as the existence of such units may exacerbate fragmentation or give rise to the mistaken notion that responsibility for the issues rests with the dedicated units in question and not with the mission or agency more broadly. Several individuals decried the reflexive response of creating new structures to coordinate cross-cutting approaches, noting that staff should be focused on incorporating such approaches into their work rather than focusing on maintaining separate coordination tools and systems. These individuals suggested that certain cross-cutting functions could be staffed by drawing expertise from across the United Nations family into joint teams without creating new structures.

Planning

33. The paucity of planning capacity within the system was also raised. The requirement for a substantial interagency planning capacity was recognized as part of the integrated mission planning process that preceded the IAP, but never materialized. Today, a strategic planning capacity within EOSG exists to support analysis and planning for conflict response efforts and the establishment and transition of peace operations. So far, this capacity is under-resourced. Within the peace and security architecture, DPO has a dedicated—but small—assessment and planning unit, while DPPA lacks a standing planning capacity. In the field, the dedicated planning capacity in missions and RCOs alike are limited. Outside of these small units, planning is still treated as an esoteric discipline rather than a skillset that is widely dispersed across the United Nations system. The evidence shows that integration works well when there is a conjunction of individuals with planning backgrounds, but such occurrences are rare. Moreover, several individuals interviewed who are current or former military officers indicated that the types of products labeled as plans

by the United Nations are not really plans but rather lists of activities. To such individuals, the lack of a planning tradition or culture within the United Nations is particularly striking.

Monitoring and evaluation

34. Without exception, interviewees confirmed that there was little if any effort to engage in monitoring, reporting and evaluation in accordance with the IAP policy²⁷. In Mali, it was noted that since there was no implementation plan for the ISF, no dedicated monitoring, reporting or evaluation on ISF implementation existed. In Sudan, the effort to organize the ten agency partners to “get” state liaison function (SLF) projects “up and running” proved to be so time- and capacity-intensive that monitoring and evaluation was “sacrificed at the early stages of the SLF process.” This was later rectified through the deployment of a monitoring and evaluation expert and the development of a results monitoring and tracking tool. A further factor was the recognition that the mission lacked the technical capacity to implement a monitoring and evaluation strategy.

35. Interviewees acknowledged that monitoring, reporting and evaluation are areas that need to be strengthened to allow the United Nations to better measure impact and to adjust to improve the effectiveness of delivery. Moreover, the absence of monitoring and evaluation resulted in a missed opportunity for feedback loops that could strengthen the perceived benefits of integration; without a measurement of impact, it was unclear to interviewees how integration has been and could be more beneficial than “going it alone”. Some noted, however, that the need to strengthen monitoring and evaluation should not be about creating or strengthening a particular unit, but fostering a mindset and increasing capacity across the mission and the United Nations presence as a whole.

PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM

36. A recurring theme which bedevils discussions of integration is the need to preserve “humanitarian space”. In Sudan, for example, UNAMID and the humanitarian community had a complex relationship. On one hand, the humanitarian community relied on UNAMID for security and escorts. At the same time, the tensions between UNAMID and the former Bashir government also motivated the humanitarians to keep their distance from the mission and act independently to the extent possible.

37. The tensions around the maintenance of humanitarian space are acute in Mali, where many humanitarian actors identify MINUSMA as a party to the conflict. Humanitarian actors acknowledge that humanitarian access has become more challenging in recent years. Nonetheless, they attribute their ability to reach most of the country without military escort, either directly or through local NGO partners, to their consistent adherence to the humanitarian principles. On the other hand, many interviewees within the mission describe the position of humanitarian actors who refuse to work with MINUSMA as being position as an unhelpful and outdated.

38. The experience with human rights is mixed. In Sudan, respondents noted that many country team members fear that human rights activities, especially monitoring and reporting, could alienate the government and, in turn, limit access to populations in need and reduce flexibility in programming. On the other hand, separating human rights efforts allows the government to dictate access, leading to fragmentation, politicization and instrumentalization of support which undermines the ability for the United Nations to speak with one voice. Indeed, the engagement of human rights officers in analysis and planning can tangibly support the work of the entire system, as demonstrated in Afghanistan. There, the work of the Human Rights Section on civilian casualty tracking and reporting was cited by interviewees as having helped strengthen the perception of the mission as an impartial actor. Moreover, data collected on civilian

²⁷ The requirement for “monitoring in reporting” in the IAP policy was amended in the 2018 interim policy to “monitoring and evaluation”.



Colleagues carry out COVID safe meeting in Eastern Chad

casualties and injuries are used by country team members to understand the effects of hostilities, including economic and social aspects, and to inform the development and implementation of programme activities.

39. The United Nations system has been able to facilitate integrated approaches while preserving humanitarian principles by focusing on pragmatic solutions and the practical requirements of local populations. Several individuals pointed out that the various parts of the United Nations system are often able to work together effectively in the deep field, where distance from the politics of the capital or Headquarters allows staff members to be pragmatic and focus on programme delivery. In Mali, a case frequently cited is the “One UN” approach adopted in Mopti²⁸. A similar sentiment was heard from respondents in Sudan where field office activities were coordinated and programmes were collaborative. Some interviewees also noted that a good starting point for establishing a common purpose was to align behind the priorities established by the host government, in line with the principle of national ownership.

40. The presence of a crisis has often been a catalyst for integration, as clearly demonstrated during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This unprecedented situation created a clear shared purpose for the United Nations system, which in turn facilitated a coordinated United Nations response across the areas of global public health, internal operations and programme delivery. At the same time, many of the challenges that affect integrated settings were evident in the systemwide response to COVID. Although the crisis management policy was quickly activated, the multiplicity of mechanisms resulted in overlap, and attempts to consolidate information revealed that the United Nations has far too many incompatible data sources and information technology platforms.

41. Common security risks also provide a catalyst for effective cooperation. Numerous individuals cited the effective cooperation between mission and

²⁸ The “One UN” approach in Mopti consists of an integrated planning process between the mission and the country team that identifies and reviews priorities on a quarterly basis, develops agreed action plans based on those strategic priorities, reviews progress on action plans every two weeks and engages with external partners on a regular basis through the monthly Mopti CMCoord (civil-military coordination) meetings.

country team security personnel, as well as mission Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres. Several interviewees identified the security management team as a more effective venue than the senior leadership forum for discussing operational issues of common interest, even if such issues are not directly related to security.

42. Focus on practical outcomes is also a common thread in thematic areas that are generally seen as being well-integrated, such as electoral assistance. Interviewees suggested that the tangible, time-bound processes related to elections help bring the United Nations system together. Missions and country teams have well-functioning coordination mechanisms and a clear division of responsibilities. In Mali, for example, respondents explained that MINUSMA handles logistics and elections-related security while UNDP focuses on capacity building and managing the basket fund. These arrangements contribute to what one interviewee called “the textbook example of coordination”.

43. The record with respect to rule of law is more mixed. Where the system works in an integrated fashion, there is generally a clear division of responsibilities, underpinned by mechanisms for joint analysis, planning and coordination. The Global Focal Point for Rule of Law, established in 2012, has been an important mechanism to bring together the United Nations system and to overcome fragmentation. A 2018 review of the arrangement found that it helped reduce duplication and create efficiencies. At the same time, interviewees in the field generally did not find the Global Focal Point to be useful, and several suggested that some of the tensions on the ground between entities working on rule of law stemmed not from any real disagreements within the country team, but rather were reflections of continued institutional rivalries between entities at Headquarters.

44. It was noted that gender issues have been under-represented in discussions of integrated responses, and several interviewees suggested that gender mainstreaming in missions has generally been ignored. Some referenced the compartmentalization of the components of the women, peace and security agenda, noting that, even within missions, the dedicated capacities responsible for different aspects of the agenda

are dispersed across the organigramme. Moreover, as several interlocutors noted, coordination can be weak between the gender advisers of different entities in the same country.

45. One interviewee posited that there are three main factors for successful integration,²⁹ namely personalities, structure and projects. Structures have the least impact but are given the most attention. Instead, personalities—or, more accurately, the chance presence of like-minded individuals—and projects—or shared objectives—were the most important factors. Similar sentiments were expressed across most interviews. Many individuals provided examples of how the change of individuals in key positions, such as country team representatives, dramatically improved or damaged cooperation. The ability to understand and work with different priorities and perspectives—a skill often fostered through previous experience in a different pillar or organization—was regularly cited as a common attribute of individuals who saw the value of integration and were able to make it work.

46. With few exceptions, interviewees emphasized that strong leadership is the sine qua non for integration. Even if the mission and country team have agreed priorities, activities and goals, operationalization is impossible without clear leadership. The experience varied across countries. Effective leaders were described as bringing energy and fresh perspectives to their roles, who worked to bridge cultural gaps and who promoted proactive and pragmatic engagement between the mission and the country team. On the other hand, challenges frequently raised included the interpersonal dynamics within the senior leadership, lack of familiarity by certain individuals with the United Nations system, extended vacancies and the absence of effective accountability measures to address under-performance. The dysfunction and lack of coherence in cross-cutting areas such as gender in certain missions was frequently attributed to a lack of leadership attention. Yet, as was uncovered over the course of the review, leaders may be important catalysts for integration, they are not the only element.

²⁹ The ultimate purpose of integration is to improve peace consolidation outcomes in a country. It is only desirable when it leads to improvement in those outcomes. We, therefore, use the term “successful integration” to refer to integration that leads to improved peace consolidation outcomes.

BEHAVIOURS AND ASSOCIATED BARRIERS

47. Successful integration requires a multifaceted process involving many different people and behaviors. The viability, relevance, and success of the United Nations hinges on its capacity to maximize collective impact in response to global demands. But organizations consist of people—and it is the ability of individuals to make the requisite decisions and actions that, in turn, determine organizational capacity. In integrated settings, facilitation of successful integration therefore requires attention to all of the human factors—not just policies, protocols and explicit incentives—that drive individual behavior. Over the course of the review, nine broad behaviors critical to successful integration and five types of roles that are most influential to its success were identified, as follows:

48. In the words of one interviewee, “Integration should be an orchestra, with different instruments involved depending on what is necessary on the ground.” While the identified behaviors are broadly relevant to all staff, some are most influential to achieving successful integration when performed by certain subsets of staff—such as senior leaders. When these specific personnel behave in these ways, it brings the entire system—or each integrated setting—closer to achieving successful integration.

49. The interplay between human psychology and context can have a powerful effect on behavior. Better understanding of how staff interact with their environment can allow for the design of work environments that help staff to make optimal decisions and act in ways that support successful integration. Many

		KEY ROLES				
		Senior leaders in the field	Managers in the field	Staff in planning and front office functions in the field	Senior leaders at HQ	Staff involved in cross-pillar collaboration at HQ
BEHAVIOURS	Publicly define and demonstrate commitment to integration	●			●	
	Establish and improve upon appropriate forums and mechanisms to foster integration	●			●	
	Provide clear and simple guidance on decisions effectively to all staff	●				
	Proactively seek out relevant data and viewpoints of entities and individuals	●				
	Support amicable dispute resolution between entities and between individuals	●	●		●	
	Identify and solicit buy-in for collaboration points across pillars		●	●		
	Incorporate data and viewpoints from other entities and individuals into decision-making					●
	Proactively build relationships with cross-pillar counterparts		●	●		●
	Proactively exchange information with crosspillar counterparts			●		●

features of United Nations working environments are created by the United Nations itself, from the layout of physical workspaces to policies related to staffing, and from workstreams to actual working methods.

50. Over the course of the interviews, seven broad behavioral barriers were identified. Behavioral barriers exist as features of the context that limit staff from behaving in ways critical to successful integration. Staff can be greatly affected by these features of the environment. Identifying how staff are affected by the current United Nations contexts and environments in which they operate from a behavioral science perspective illuminates under-recognized challenges to integration and establishes the foundations for building contexts most conducive to successful integration. While the seven barriers are broadly relevant to the behaviors and sets of key individuals identified previously, not all are relevant for all staff at all moments. Instead, they represent challenges that were identified during the research in many settings that have had effect on behavior across a spectrum of individuals.

BEHAVIORAL BARRIER 1: THE CRITICAL BEHAVIOURS REQUIRE FOCUS AND ATTENTION THAT ARE OFTEN IN SHORT SUPPLY

51. The ability of individuals to pay attention to several things at once is much more limited than generally assumed. When attentional capacity is stretched—for instance, when staff are navigating too many important tasks such as making determinations on several inquiries, preparing multiple reports, attending back-to-back meetings and planning future activities all at once—people are effectively blind to information they would easily notice under less fraught circumstances. The challenge in many mission settings is that most staff frequently navigate a multitude of important tasks at once, which affects their ability to behave in ways critical to successful integration. In such situations, people tend to focus on the most pressing decisions and actions, crowding out other vital but less time-sensitive tasks—such as many of the behaviors critical to successful integration, even if they are deemed important.

52. For example, for senior leaders to publicly define and demonstrate commitment to integration requires is much more than delivering a set of talking points on the topic—it is a multi-step process to identify how and when to message what to whom within a network of individuals and entities of differing opinions, experiences, and constraints. These decisions and actions require a large amount of attention, but senior leaders—and people in general—only have a finite amount at their disposal. When the majority of that attention is devoted to navigating day-to-day decision-making, senior leaders do not prioritize or give the attention that is needed to determine how to promote integration successfully, and then act on those determinations.

BEHAVIORAL BARRIER 2: THE RISKS OF ENGAGING IN THE BEHAVIORS APPEAR MORE FORBIDDING THAN THEY ARE

53. Individuals generally avoid ambiguity or risk, preferring to stick to decisions and actions with relatively safe—or at the least, known—outcomes. In integrated settings, the challenge of behaving in ways that are critical to successful integration often requires staff to go “above and beyond”—choosing uncharted paths with no assured line to success. Most people find relative safety and success in the silos of their own organization or entity. Within each, there are clearly aligned goals supported by leadership that connect to each person’s workstream and assessed performance. Choosing to individually step outside of the bounds of existing silos—particularly when joint goals are not closely aligned, leadership support is limited, and performance indicators on collaboration are non-existent—can easily be perceived as stepping into the unknown.

54. This is commonly the situation when senior leaders must proactively seek out relevant data and viewpoints from other individuals and entities. When they do, they are not able to anticipate what information they receive and how it will affect their decision-making. They could potentially be soliciting viewpoints that may contradict their existing narrative—necessitating a rethinking of their position on a topic—or are even critical of their current approach. Senior leaders have a difficult task. It can be problematic to weave divergent viewpoints from across United Nations entities into a judgement that is coherent, balanced, and relevant for the context. The task is made more difficult because many senior leaders do not have prior professional experiences spanning multiple pillars of the work of the Organization. In response, senior leaders frequently stay within the silos of information with which they are most comfortable. This enables them to discuss matters familiar to them, anticipate outcomes and make decisions accordingly.

55. Individuals are also greatly affected by the visible behavior of their peers. Stepping outside of “the norm” is perceived as a costly endeavor in many circumstances. For example, senior managers regularly experience or witness low-level conflict at a variety of coordination meetings, hear of disputes between other entities or pillars even if they are not directly involved and have experienced similar ongoing disputes in previous roles in other integrated settings. If deferring or maintaining conflict is the norm, then supporting amicable dispute resolution between entities and individuals—which falls outside the norm—becomes a difficult behavior to engage in no matter how beneficial.

**BEHAVIORAL BARRIER 3:
THE BENEFITS OF ENGAGING
IN THE BEHAVIORS APPEAR
SMALLER THAN THEY ARE**

56. The degree to which people perceive that their decisions or actions will lead to positive outcomes affects how likely they are to make the decision or act. Staff often perceive individual actions—particularly actions to enhance collaboration and increase successful integration—as not enough to affect real change. This can be true; structural barriers embedded in policy and protocol can impede staff from successfully affecting change at the individual level. Yet, as noted above, perceptions do not always match reality, and staff may underestimate the scope of their practical influence on successful integration.

57. For example, in field settings, the sheer enormity of the enterprise that senior leaders manage can also lead them to underestimate the benefits of action, particularly in supporting amicable dispute resolution between entities and individuals. Heads of mission have no formal oversight role over country team members. As a result, some may hesitate to weigh in on or arbitrate disputes, thinking that—as they have no direct control over the country team—they cannot affect change. In fact, senior leaders underestimate their moral authority as a high-ranking official and often fail to capitalize on opportunities where they could push entities to arbitrate and resolve disputes.

**BEHAVIORAL BARRIER 4:
THE EXISTENCE OF TOO MANY
AVAILABLE OPTIONS, COMBINED
WITH TOO FEW GUARDRAILS,
INHIBITS DECISION-MAKING**

58. The United Nations operates in complex, dynamic environments where the context can change rapidly and often. To be effective, staff must adapt to fit the current context. To do so requires that people be able to navigate the multiple emerging choices in their day-to-day work—from choosing which workstream to prioritize, with whom to develop and maintain professional relationships, what meetings to attend and information to exchange, among other choices. But too many choices can be overwhelming. Most people faced with a wide range of options regularly fail to choose the best option—or fail to choose at all. For this reason, existing tools or mechanisms should be available to activate to rapidly respond to changing situations. An example is the Emergency Directors Group mission to Burkina Faso in October 2019 which led to the activation of clusters, which interviewees noted contributed to a wellcoordinated humanitarian response.

59. In practice, individuals tend generally to choose what is comfortable and familiar. This leads to behaviour which maintains the status quo or the selection of a pre-set option even when better alternatives are available. In these circumstances, arbitrary options that define the status quo—for example, default settings—play important roles in decision-making and can determine what eventually is chosen. For example, when working-level staff at Headquarters attempt to incorporate data and viewpoints from other entities and individuals, they have to decide who to approach. Each decision comes with its own risks and rewards. Compounded by mental bandwidth and time constraints, it is natural that these staff choose pre-set options. They solicit and incorporate data from the “usual suspects”—those with whom they have established relationships, have learned to reach out to through handover and guidance documents, and are familiar with the data they will receive. Even if there are other productive viewpoints to include, the choice to open up to other (new) groups of people is often mentally challenging, time-intensive, and often paralyzing—particularly in expansive settings such as at Headquarters.

**BEHAVIORAL BARRIER 5:
PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES, PRIOR
EXPERIENCES, AND PERCEPTIONS OF
THE TASK AT HAND LEAD STAFF TO AN
OVER-RELIANCE ON FORMAL PROTOCOL**

60. Productive collaboration occurs when individuals are able to expand their sense of their role, think independently and take small risks in order to close gaps that exist between formal mandates. And yet, subconscious narratives, impressions, and perceptions based on experiences may stand in the way of taking initiative. For example, when staff establish perceptions of integration-related tasks as outside of their formal responsibilities—as a majority of people surveyed appear to have done—it makes them less likely to prioritize those tasks.

61. In many cases, staff do not see themselves as being part of a common United Nations system. Their professional identities are tied to a specific entity or organizational unit. Indeed, managers in integrated settings are typically professionals who have developed particular “identities” over their careers, which affects their acceptance of conflict and role in resolving it. Their training and careers are largely focused on their entity and pillar, and their accountability and incentive structures are all tied to the outcomes of their entity. In such case, they are less likely to engage in collaborative behaviors with other entities and they make decisions and take actions within the bounds of what they perceive is best for the entity as opposed to the broader United Nations system. By contrast, staff who have developed identities spanning entities and pillars due to prior experiences—establishing a level of “trilingualism” across the peace and security, development and humanitarian work of the Organization—are more likely to establish identities as they relate to the United Nations system as a whole.

62. Furthermore, individuals who have witnessed failed attempts at integration in day-to-day activities during their careers more regularly form impressions of integration as a bureaucratic imposition secondary to agency or department priorities. These staff are less likely to prioritize integration-related tasks or step outside of entity imperatives to behave in ways critical to promoting integration—such as demonstrating commitment to integration, soliciting buy-in for collaboration, or building forums and mechanisms to foster cross-pillar collaboration. In some cases, such individuals may co-opt the language of integration to meet parochial institutional interests, using integration as an excuse to impose their will on others rather than as a means of working together collaboratively. Integration in implementation can therefore become more about who is driving an agenda or chairing a meeting, rather than focusing on results.

BEHAVIORAL BARRIER 6: INDIVIDUALS ERRONEOUSLY ASSUME BAD FAITH RATHER THAN RECOGNIZE THE SITUATION'S INFLUENCE ON ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL'S BEHAVIOUR

63. Individuals tend to believe that the ways in which people behave primarily reflect who they are as people, although behaviour is often influenced by situational factors. When staff perceive counterparts behaving poorly—missing a deadline for providing feedback, disagreeing with others during cross-pillar meetings, and generally not collaborating—they brand them as difficult personalities. When “irreconcilable personalities” are perceived to drive behavior as opposed to situational factors, valuable opportunities are missed to resolve situational challenges and collaborate effectively.

64. For example, many interviewees mentioned internal agency or department pressures for the inability to resolve disputes amicably during discussions on strategy and implementation—they often were facing considerable pressure to deliver on their own urgent priorities. Yet when asked about peers in these same settings, interviewees often perceived their peers' personalities as the cause for the disputes. As a result, they were less willing to work towards a mutual solution.

65. In addition, minor situational factors such as external deadlines or time constraints strongly influenced working-level staff's ability to incorporate data and viewpoints from other entities and individuals. This is attributed to personal indifference to the alternative views. Rather than reach out to staff to understand the situational challenge and negotiate different deadlines, counterparts would escalate the situation into a high-level dispute or simply not collaborate with the person in the future—neither of which resolved the problems nor led to outcomes that promoted successful integration.

BEHAVIORAL BARRIER 7: OPERATIONAL HURDLES AT EACH MOMENT MAKE THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF COLLABORATING PROHIBITIVE

66. Many times, individuals do not act in accordance with their intentions because hassle factors, or minor inconveniences or obstacles, stand in the way of achieving their intentions. In numerous interviews, staff expressed intentions to behave in ways critical to successful integration—such as soliciting and identifying buy-in for collaboration points, exchanging information, or proactively building relationships—but minor inconveniences or obstacles often impeded follow through. Overall, field settings do not appear to be set up for integration, requiring staff to negotiate numerous hurdles as they attempt to collaborate. For example, the physical distance between staff of different entities creates practical obstacles to building relationships proactively among working-level staff in the field. To establish productive relationships, staff must identify relevant counterparts, establish contact, and continuously engage. This is particularly challenging when individuals do not work in the same locations and do not use the same information technology platforms, challenges that have been exacerbated by travel restrictions imposed during the COVID pandemic.

67. Co-location, however, may not always be possible, for various reasons. In some cases, differences in mandates may cause some entities to prioritize locations closer to government ministries or closer to airports. Humanitarian agencies often resist being co-located with missions, particularly in militarized contexts, as a means of preserving humanitarian space. Concerns regarding costs and cost recovery may also discourage co-location. Yet cooperation is possible without co-location. Several examples were provided in which physically separated units maintained effective cooperation. What often distinguishes these units is that coordinating with their counterparts is clearly understood to be part of their job.

INSTITUTIONAL RIVALRIES AND COMPETING CULTURES

68. The concept of divided cultures was a recurring theme throughout the case studies, with a clear “us versus them” dynamic in play between mission and country team interlocutors. While this primarily stems from the issue of professional identities explored in the previous section, institutional rivalries can also be exacerbated by factors including differences in mandate, size, level of resourcing, leadership, location and priorities. Within the country team, competition for donor funding can drive fragmentation. Moreover, entities do not always appreciate the distinction between their mandates—which frequently overlap with other entities—and their capacity. The deployment of large peace operations can often foment further tensions and resentment, as these missions are frequently far more generously resourced than members of the country team. Many interviewees from the agencies, funds and programmes regularly described mission colleagues to be “arrogant” in believing that missions—with their money, mandate and (in the case of peace-keeping operations) military—are uniquely positioned to solve the problems of the country. Development agencies typically resent being sidelined and having their long expertise and presence disregarded. Many staff from the agencies, funds and programmes bitterly recounted instances when missions took credit for country team achievements in reports to the Security Council.

69. Missions are also perceived as “cash cows”, even after the General Assembly has significantly reduced their budgets when international attention has drifted elsewhere. For this reason, the insistence by missions to provide common services such as flights or accommodations on a cost recovery basis can also foster bitterness. Country team staff at times fail to appreciate the degree of scrutiny to which intergovernmental and oversight bodies subject mission budgets to ensure that assessed contributions are not used to subsidize voluntarily-funded activities. Missions are also hamstrung by rigid administrative policies that can create frustrations on all sides. Together, these administrative challenges can create the perception that individuals are being unhelpful and can exacerbate

distrust. Although individuals from the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes both acknowledged that there is much room for further cooperation in the delivery of common services, including potential efficiencies to be realized through economies of scale, the degree of dialogue and compromise required discourages individuals at the field level from pursuing these benefits to their fullest extent.

70. That said, cooperation in support issues is possible if stakeholders all perceive it to be in their interest. A case in point is the rapid establishment of the system-wide medical evacuation (medevac) task force in early 2020 in response to the COVID pandemic, which developed a unified medevac framework that set out a system-wide approach to consolidate and streamline efforts of individual United Nations entities, leveraging comparative advantage, economies of scale and cost efficiencies. It is particularly noteworthy that there is no formal agreement that established the Medevac Task Force and that its chair does not have formal authority over its constituents. Despite this, participating United Nations entities were able to agree on the Framework without the “usual” disagreements and reluctance to join forces or bureaucratic hurdles raised regarding the different regulations, rules and policies in the various organizations. The main factor for the success of the task force was the clarity of the requirements, which could not be met by any individual organization acting alone.

71. It is also important to note that the COVID-19 medevac framework applies only for COVID-19 cases. Medevacs for all other cases still follow “regular” approaches, with each entity having its own arrangement in each location, with no harmonization or coordination. This leaves substantial room for optimization, but there has not yet been any serious consideration regarding whether the unified framework established for COVID-19 could be expanded to eventually cover all medevac requirements.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

72. Administrative issues were routinely cited as barriers to cooperation between missions and country teams. For peacekeeping missions, a major challenge is the mismatch in budget and reporting cycles. Beyond this, staff in the mission and the country team provided a litany of challenges, including incompatible systems that create difficulties in the transfer of funds and which therefore delay the implementation of projects, Secretariat policies and procedures that make no sense in austere field environments, and a proliferation of reporting frameworks and agreements which create bureaucratic burdens for missions and country team members alike.

73. Despite broad recognition that common services can facilitate integrated delivery while reducing overall costs and distributing risk, little has been done at the field level to explore opportunities for systematic cooperation between missions and country teams on common services, including under the framework of the business operations strategy. The limited areas where common services have been provided, with varying degrees of success, include medical support and the provision of accommodations. There are several reasons for the limited progress. From the perspective of those missions with large and comparatively well-resourced mission support components, there may simply be no compelling need to cooperate with the country team. In some instances, experiments with common services have not succeeded, as in the case of the Joint Medical Service in Afghanistan in which multiple country team members withdrew because of concerns about the quality of service provided. Moreover, cost recovery from the country team for services provided has often been difficult and frustrating for missions and country team members alike.

74. Regarding supply chain management, the ability to use procurement contracts of other United Nations system entities under mutual recognition has been valuable, including for fuel and medical supplies. In the area of logistics, however, the humanitarian and the mission largely operate in parallel, as the nature and scale of requirements are very different between

the mission and country team. With respect to air operations, however, there clearly is a demand for greater cooperation between missions and the country team. In Sudan, there were some donor objections to the use of UNHAS flights by mission personnel, citing Inter-Agency Steering Committee policies and humanitarian principles, while in Mali staff members from the country team complained after MINUSMA began charging for flights.

75. An underlying problem is that there are seldom effective mechanisms at the country level for frank discussions to explore solutions related to administrative and logistical issues. Some missions have established an operations management team as a coordination forum on administrative and logistical questions, but in most cases such forums are not considered useful, whether due to the level of attendance, frequency of meetings or other considerations.

REFORM IMPACT

Development system reform

76. Of the three tracks of reform, the development system reform is generally seen to have the most impact on integration, particularly given that the very definition of structural integration is the presence of a dual-hatted DSRSG/RC. In each of the case studies, the repositioning of the development system does not appear to have helped the cause of integration.

77. In structurally-integrated contexts such as Mali, the lack of a common understanding of the postreform role of UNDP and of its division of responsibilities with the RCO has created tensions. While RCOs may aspire to the role that OCHA performs for the humanitarian system, they lack the resources and capacity to match this level of ambition. At the same time, there is a sense that RCOs bristle at the notion of UNDP playing this role as they believe that—post reform—UNDP no longer has a role in coordination. Moreover, much of the guidance developed by DCO does not account for the requirements of integrated contexts, creating confusion on such questions as what role missions should have in processes such as the CCA, whether missions could be included in UNSDCF and whether UNSDCF

could be used in lieu of ISFs in the same manner as UNDAFs. Institutionalized linkages between RCOs and the planning and analysis capabilities of missions are also lacking, therefore further complicating attempts to foster integrated approaches.

78. The situation is even bleaker in non-structurally integrated contexts, where the system has simply not delivered empowered RCs. This was particularly acute during the transition period, when RCOs were not properly staffed and resourced. RCs have often found it difficult to build a relationship of trust and influence with the country team and lack the support or resources to incentivize the country team to come together. One interviewee remarked that, without resources, RCs are forced to choose between asking and threatening. In many cases, country team members had stronger, direct relationships with the government and are unwilling to surrender this privileged role to the RC. At the same time, governments may prefer to engage directly with country team members that have financial resources rather than to work through RCs. Staff from country team agencies noted that tensions within the country team may have deepened following the reforms because of the inability of RCs to pull the country team together and ensure delivery on priorities. This is further complicated by the need for UNDP to build its own identity in the aftermath of the de-linking, which can translate into independent action that creates friction with the RCO and the broader country team.

79. Interviews also revealed that the humanitarian-development-peace nexus is not yet fully accepted by many agency staff and certain donors, and a common understanding of what delivering on the nexus means in practice remains elusive. Development agencies fear that development activities often “lose space” to humanitarian response and peace interventions. At the same time, humanitarians are wary of proximity to peace-related activities because of the perceived politicization or militarization of such activities by missions.

Peace and security reform

80. Interviewees at the country level saw the peace and security reform as a Headquarters-specific exercise that had no positive bearing or impact on the field despite the explicit objective of the reform to improve coherence across pillars. Multiple respondents referenced the persistent tensions between DPO and DPPA, the maintenance of structural divides between DPO and DPPA teams within ostensibly shared regional divisions and, more broadly, the continued absence of a coherent approach across the full spectrum of peace operations. Several noted that large parts of the peace and security architecture were untouched by the reform, and suggested that this was a missed opportunity.

Management reform

81. Most mission staff interviewed were not well-versed with the elements of management reform, but those who were familiar of the reforms generally viewed them positively, particularly the enhanced delegation of authority to missions over resource management as well as the ability to draw upon contracts from other United Nations organizations through mutual recognition.



IV. Recommendations

IV. Recommendations

82. A wide range of recommendations are necessary to respond to the observations outlined in the previous section. The following paragraphs enumerate recommendations regarding updates to the IAP and related policies, measures to address the seven behavioural barriers previously identified, as well as measures to address administrative and operational challenges, particularly related to human resources management. These recommendations should not be approached in isolation; progress across all of these areas is necessary such that the promise of integration can be fully realized in complex settings. Moreover, specific attention should be paid to ensure that both structural and behavioral solutions defined below are approached in an integrated manner; one cannot exist in silo of the other and their success is in their complementarity to each other.



INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING POLICY

83. A clear and consistent finding of the review is that the potential benefits of integration are widely acknowledged by stakeholders across the system. Despite the low level of familiarity that staff have with the IAP policy, the objectives and principles that underpin the policy are broadly accepted and remain valid. What has been missing in implementation—and the reason why the tools of integration, particularly the integrated strategic framework, have had such a limited impact—is a focus on ensuring that integration is tailored in each context to meet the requirements of missions and country teams alike. Integration needs to be understood as a means to an end, and not an end in itself. The interviews and case studies show that, too often, integration is approached as a requirement—a mentality that lends itself to implementing the IAP policy as a “box-checking” exercise—rather than the result of a structured consideration of whether and how integration can actually maximize the effectiveness of delivery by the United Nations system.

The Executive Committee should revise the IAP policy to reframe the integrated strategic framework as a business case for integration

84. Integration is relevant, efficient, and effective only to the extent that it advances the objectives of the entities subject to integration. The literature review, interviews and case studies all show that some United Nations entities resist integration. The most common reasons for this resistance are discord and disagreement among key personnel, misalignment in institutional structures (formal mandates, funding sources

and cycles, operational procedures), incoherent objectives, distorted or absent incentives, dysfunctional or absent leadership and weak accountability mechanisms. Without appropriate adjustments to account for these considerations, integration can be counterproductive, and can materially degrade UN performance.

85. A major problem with the current approach to integration as an end rather than an instrument is that it precludes the necessary work of determining how integrating United Nations entities (or sub-sets of them) will allow each to contribute efficiently and effectively to advancing the strategic priorities of the United Nations. This, however, should not be pushed too far. It is naïve to believe that United Nations entities will voluntarily embrace common approaches. Explicit guidance and incentives will be needed to overcome entrenched interests that currently inhibit integration even in situations where the potential benefits are clear. Some examples of possible incentives include access to funding sources, more cost-effective administrative and logistical support and career incentives for country representatives and staff.

86. The cornerstone of an incentives-based approach is the reformulation of the integrated strategic framework as a country-specific business case for integration. A business case would set out the justification for integration based on a detailed examination of the costs, benefits and risks involved of how, with whom, in what sequence United Nations entities should integrate to advance the mission’s commonly-agreed objectives. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms would include a set of regular benchmarks, indicators and targets, thereby allowing for an objective measurement of progress towards the achievement of the expected benefits of integration. Inclusion of the mission into the country team business operations strategy should be a part of the presentation of the business case.

87. A rigorous business case would provide an evidence-based means by which United Nations leadership on the ground has the information to regularly reconfigure how, where and when entities should be interacting productively. The incorporation of monitoring and evaluation as an integral part of implementation is critical to provide a constant feedback loop to allow the refinement of implementation plans and subsequent updates to the ISF and provide a basis for measuring the achievement of expected benefits of implementation. To the extent possible, evaluation of the implementation of ISFs and the achievement of their expected benefits should build on efforts now underway to strengthen evaluation across the system, including the implementation within the Secretariat of a new evaluation policy finalized in 2020.

88. Preparing a business case comes with two challenges. The first is the time and effort required from all participating entities to develop a case. The second is the lack of dedicated expertise for this task, particularly when the interviews and case studies clearly indicated that the resources and expertise available for existing requirements under the IAP policy, such as common analysis, planning, monitoring and reporting, are regularly missing from integrated planning. On the other hand, a tailored approach to integration would ensure that the cost and effort involved would be outweighed by the improvements in the impact and reputation of the United Nations system associated with successful integration in a measurable manner. A business case approach linked to funding mechanisms could also provide a starting point for calculating the collective impact of the United Nations system in a particular context. Such data could also help improve Member State confidence in the work and relevance of the United Nations.

The Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes should avoid creating new or additional forums and reporting frameworks, particularly if they are not adequately resourced

89. There has been a tendency for Headquarters to create new processes, systems and reporting requirements in the name of promoting integration, but the failure to provide resources to support these additional measures has only served to undermine delivery in the field. Instead of creating new frameworks, mechanisms and forums, existing ones should be used or adapted to the extent possible. This is one reason why the business case has been proposed not as an additional mechanism, but as a means of strengthening the relevance of the existing ISF. The system should be afforded the possibility to use the UNSDCF in lieu of the ISF where the mandate of the mission and the requirements of the country in question permit, while also taking into account process economic considerations and the fact that the ISF does not require approval of the host government while the UNSDCF does.

The Secretariat should establish integrated mechanisms to support ongoing joint analysis and planning at both Headquarters and country level

90. Joint analysis and planning establish the conceptual glue for integration at the country level; while this is already a requirement of the existing IAP policy, joint analysis and planning is seldom done on an ongoing basis. In integrated contexts, standing mechanisms should be devised for analysis and planning that engage relevant staff from the mission—including, as applicable, mission planners, staff from the Joint Operations Centre and Joint Mission Analysis Centre, military, police and mission support—and staff from development and humanitarian agencies. These can either be created as joint units or through

institutionalized and ongoing cooperation between units from the mission, the RCO and OCHA. Analysis and planning must be informed by gender and human rights priorities and should include the involvement of relevant thematic experts. In non-mission settings, the deployment of peace and development advisors can be particularly valuable for bridging political and development activities and to support more gender-responsive, conflict sensitive and prevention-oriented strategies and programming.

91. Planning capacity is also lacking, or uneven, at Headquarters. The imbalance in the planning capacity within the peace and security pillar should be rectified through the establishment of a shared planning capacity be established for the peace and security pillar that can also serve as a single interface for joint planning with development, humanitarian and mission support planners in DCO, OCHA and DOS.

The Executive Committee should establish minimum standards for strategic assessments

92. There has been a growing tendency in recent years to use independent strategic reviews in lieu of the strategic assessments required in the IAP policy to underpin the development of integrated strategic frameworks. Recent independent strategic reviews often have an explicit mission-oriented focus, and therefore many are focused on examining how a mission ought to be configured or how a mandate should be changed. Many country teams do not feel ownership of changes made in response to such reviews. The IAP policy should be revised to clarify that other types of reviews, including independent strategic reviews, are acceptable in lieu of strategic assessments, but only if minimum requirements are met, including that the reviews are aimed at developing a shared understanding across the United Nations system on a conflict or post-conflict situation, the role of stakeholders and the core priorities for peace consolidation or sustainment.

Funding mechanisms, including mission budgets and the Peacebuilding Fund, should be aligned with integrated strategic frameworks

93. The role of the Peacebuilding Fund was highlighted by several respondents as a useful mechanism which facilitates common analysis and planning; this clearly demonstrates the important role that funding can play in supporting integrated action. However, interviewees noted that the common analysis and planning that underpins the use of the Peacebuilding Fund is separate from and additional to other analysis and planning frameworks, and the risk exists that projects designed and financed under the Fund are not aligned with or prioritized as part of an integrated United Nations vision for a particular country. Furthermore, there were frustrations with the apportioning of the limited funds, with multiple respondents regretting they were used to give everyone “a piece of the pie” rather than providing funding on the basis of comparative advantage. In fact, these issues apply collectively to all of the programmatic funding mechanisms that exist at the country level, including programmatic funding in mission budgets, quickimpact projects, multi-donor trust funds (and stabilization trust funds managed by some missions) and the Peacebuilding Fund. At the same time, missions and country teams often have difficulty operationalizing ISFs because they lack teeth. Both sets of problems can be addressed by linking available funding mechanisms to ISFs.

94. To the extent possible, funding should be pooled and managed in a coherent manner; in addition to the funding sources referenced above, measures to incorporate other sources of funding, including the Peace and Development Trust Fund and the Trust Fund for Human Security, should also be explored. Efforts should also be made to harmonize financial reporting requirements across different sources of funding. Work has already been done by the CEB and UNSDG to establish data standards for system-wide reporting of financial information, but how these standards apply to all funding sources, such as mission budgets, is unclear and the data is not readily available for use by staff. As part of the data strategy, compatibility and accessibility of this data should be prioritized to allow the system to quantify the financial requirements for ISF implementation to support resource mobilization, understand how the various sources of funding are being used towards thematic priorities in each country context and improve the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation tools. This would, for the first time, also allow mission budgets—which are developed with a relatively short 12-month time horizon—to be more clearly linked to longer-term peace sustainment requirements and potentially help prepare for and mitigate the potential impact of funding cliffs that emerge when missions close.



RELATED POLICIES

The Executive Committee should call for the development of FAQs and practical guidance notes to help missions and country teams address common roadblocks to integration

95. The few individuals interviewed who were familiar with the IAP handbook noted that it contained useful information but was too dense to be useful in field environments in which staff members are inundated with documents to read. Moreover, they noted that—while the handbook goes into detail about processes—it does not provide practical guidance on how to overcome common roadblocks, such as linkages with other frameworks or how to address differences in planning and budget cycles, whether and how to pool funds in support of ISF implementation and examples of gender-responsive analysis and planning. As such, a revised IAP policy should be accompanied by regularly updated answers to frequently asked questions, as well as concise guidance and templates to help staff in the field address common integration hurdles. More broadly, policies such as the IAP policy must also be kept up to date and be easily accessible by staff across the United Nations system.

The Executive Committee should update the Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions to reflect the changes stemming from the Secretary-General’s reforms

96. The note of guidance on integrated missions has not been updated in fifteen years; it should be updated to reflect changes stemming from the Secretary-General’s reform agenda, including delegation of authority, the restructuring of the peace and security architecture and the delinking of the resident

coordinator system. The development system reform in particular generated a considerable amount of guidance with regard to country team operations, but is largely silent on how these should be integrated in structurally integrated contexts. The note could clarify how missions are to be included in UNSDCF’s—including whether UNSDCF’s can be used in lieu of ISF’s—and should include standard guidance on subjects such as RC costsharing arrangements in structurally integrated missions.

97. The update should also examine the role of OCHA and the humanitarian coordinator within integrated settings. It was pointed out in several interviews that there is no requirement for a DSRSG/RC to simultaneously serve as a humanitarian coordinator in structurally integrated missions. Interviewees stressed the importance of ensuring that a humanitarian coordinator understands the importance of preserving humanitarian space and can serve as an advocate and ambassador for humanitarian principles.

The Executive Committee should update the Policy on Special Circumstances in Non-Mission Settings

98. The Policy on Special Circumstances is a valuable tool to guide a coordinated United Nations system response in non-mission contexts in crisis situations, but it is not widely-known. The Policy, which establishes a playbook, including Headquarters arrangements to be activated, the potential appointment of a non-resident special envoy or representative and the deployment of surge capacities, should be updated to reflect developments since the policy was issued in 2012, including the changes stemming from the Secretary-General’s reform agenda. It should be seen as part of a standard toolkit of options for systemwide response in crisis situations, alongside mechanisms such as the IASC Emergency Directors Group.



ROLE OF THE INTEGRATION STEERING GROUP

The Integration Steering Group should serve as a forum to advise SRSGs on dispute resolution

99. The absence of effective and amicable dispute resolution mechanisms between various parts of the system was identified by many respondents as an obstacle to integration at the country level. Issues arise, and when they are not resolved tend to fester present series obstacles to joint action. In order to respect the role of the SRSG as senior United Nations representative in the country while acknowledging the operational or legal independence of the various organizations of the United Nations system the Integration Steering Group could formally be given a role to advise SRSGs on how to resolve significant cross-pillar disputes between entities in the field. This function should be activated once the more conventional conflict resolution mechanisms have been exhausted.

The Integration Steering Group should adopt a scorecard to assist it in prioritizing contexts in which additional assistance may be required from Headquarters to address obstacles to integration

100. A scorecard can be a tool to support the Integration Steering Group in monitoring the implementation of integration tools and systems to identify country contexts that may require additional attention. Such a scorecard could include indicators on the four required elements of the integrated assessment and planning policy, the extent of coordination between missions and country teams in thematic areas and the activities in which there is co-operation has been pursued in business operations and logistics.



UNHCR and OCHA colleagues visit a temporary shelter (PASI) for Venezuelans returning from Colombia.



BEHAVIOURAL SOLUTIONS

101. Contextual features in working environments can have outsized effect on the way individuals form intentions, make decisions, and act. To enhance decision-making and action-taking, it is important to examine organizational settings through a behavioral lens—that is, recognizing how the subtleties in individuals’ environment influence behavior, and consequently, creating environments conducive for optimal decision-making and action-taking. Recommendations for doing just that in light of the previously described behavioral barriers are identified below across three major strategies: making better use of the limited focus and attention that staff can allocate to promoting successful integration, resetting false expectations about the benefits and risks of integration, and emphasizing the role of the individual and promoting personal initiative.



STRATEGY 1

Make better use of the limited focus and attention that staff can allocate to making integration work

<p>BARRIER 1: Facilitating successful integration requires focus and attention that UN staff don't always have to dedicate to the task.</p> <p>BARRIER 4: Too many choices and too few guardrails for what to pick inhibit decision-making.</p> <p>BARRIER 7: Operational hurdles at each moment make the nuts and bolts of collaborating prohibitive.</p>	
<p>RECOMMENDATION 1: Minimize unnecessary demands on attention for all staff.</p>	<p>RECOMMENDATION 2: Provide staff with tools for more easily engaging in behaviours critical to successful integration.</p>
<p>SOLUTIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Audit and modify or eliminate forums, frameworks, mechanisms, and tools that are deemed either duplicative or not useful Remove administrative and logistical hurdles to collaboration, consultation and constructive conflict Reduce tasks to the minimum required to accomplish integration-related and other activities 	<p>SOLUTIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create shortcuts in guidance Curate options and provide guardrails to facilitate quick decision-making Embed prompts for collaboration, consultation, and constructive conflict where staff are already used to dedicating their attention



STRATEGY 2

Reset false expectations about the benefits and risks of integration

<p>BARRIER 2: The risks of participating in integration-associated activities appear more forbidding than they are.</p> <p>BARRIER 3: The benefits of engaging in the behaviours appear smaller than they are</p>	
<p>RECOMMENDATION 3: Reduce the perceived risks associated with integration</p>	<p>RECOMMENDATION 4: Identify the successes of integration, large and small.</p>
<p>SOLUTIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> State the facts to dispel harmful perceptions about integration-related behavior Provide tools for senior leadership to use two-way communication when promoting integration Establish opt-in, publicly announced, joint pacts for senior leadership to commit to certain behaviors and/or actions related to successful integration 	<p>SOLUTIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Publicly recognize and reward staff who model good practices and champion integration Showcase operational and programmatic success in action through communication spotlights Show value added of each sub-activity that advances successful integration



STRATEGY 3

Emphasize the role of the individual and promote personal initiative

<p>BARRIER 5: Professional identities, prior experiences and perceptions of the task at hand lead staff to an overreliance on formal protocol.</p> <p>BARRIER 6: Staff erroneously assume bad faith rather than recognize the situation's influence on another individual's behaviour</p>	
<p>RECOMMENDATION 5: Deconstruct siloed identities.</p>	<p>RECOMMENDATION 6: Facilitate the formation of interpersonal relationships.</p>
<p>SOLUTIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create regular opportunities for staff to reflect on common objectives together, interrogate others' point of view, and learn others' "language" Give senior leaders time and space to reconstruct their identity and build muscle memory of behaving in ways critical to successful integration Prime people of their communal identities at key moments 	<p>SOLUTIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build new formal channels for exchanges between individuals at lower levels, explicitly encouraged by senior leadership Create "stop and think" protocols for constructive conflict management, emphasizing deliberative reflection and empathy

Senior leaders and managers should work to minimize unnecessary demands on attention for staff

102. Duplicative burdens and administrative and logistical hurdles are common across the United Nations system—multiple meetings on similar topics, numerous reporting frameworks for the same data, and too many “box-checking” exercises. Many mission staff noted the multiplicity of reporting frameworks they are expected to manage, including the results-based budgeting framework, the new strategic planning, budgeting and performance module in Umoja, the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System and platforms such as the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise, all of which exist in isolation. There is a continuing trend of adding reporting and performance measurement frameworks—and software platforms to support those frameworks—without concerted effort to make them interoperable. These parallel systems are time-consuming to manage and update, and because they do not work together to provide a coherent and comprehensive picture of the situation, they are of limited utility to mission leadership. United Nations entities could minimize unproductive demands on staff attention in a variety of ways, including the following:

- **Modify or eliminate forums, frameworks, mechanisms, and tools that are either duplicative or useless;**
- **Remove administrative and logistical hurdles to collaboration, consultations and constructive conflict; and**
- **Reduce tasks to the minimum required to accomplish an activity.**

The Integration Steering Group should develop tools for staff to more easily engage in behaviours critical to successful integration

103. Integration-related tasks are often attention-draining, difficult, and require intense effort of staff to move beyond existing silos and protocols. The challenge is compounded by the lack of accessible, relevant, and behaviorally informed guidance. For some integration-related behaviors and tasks, there is no guidance. Staff across the system should be provided with a set of tools or “starter kit” for more easily engaging in behaviors critical to successful integration. These should be published in a manner that is easily accessible to staff from across the United Nations system and should include:

- **Creating shortcuts in guidance;**
- **Curating options and providing guardrails to facilitate quick decision-making; and**
- **Embedding prompts for collaboration, consultation and constructive conflict into routine processes.**

Senior leaders in the field and at Headquarters should reduce the perceived risks associated with integration

104. Staff face potential risks when deciding to support and pursue integration. Stepping outside of visible peer norms—such as in settings where most staff remain within their siloed approaches—often bring unwelcome social consequences. Engaging in integration activities without explicit approval or commitment from leadership risks negative career consequences. Choosing integration when donor funding itself is siloed could have negative programmatic outcomes. The senior leadership of United Nations entities can help by clarifying and acting to mitigate the perceived risks associated with engaging in integrated related behaviour, including

- **Stating the facts to dispel harmful perceptions about integration-related behavior;**
- **Providing tools for senior leadership to use two-way communication when promoting integration; and**
- **Establish opt-in, publicly announced, joint pacts for senior leadership to commit to certain behaviors and actions related to successful integration.**

Senior leaders in the field and at Headquarters should identify and highlight the successes of integration, large and small

105. Staff perceptions of integration in many settings are often defined by the amount of work involved rather than the communal benefits achieved. Staff may rarely witness their peers, supervisors or leaders engaging in behaviors critical to successful integration nor do they see those who attempt to do so achieving success and benefiting from such actions. Nonetheless, integrated activities regularly produce positive outcomes which enables the entire system make progress towards its objectives. When success is not easy to discern, heads of entities should proactively identify these outcomes. Examples include:

- **Publicly recognizing and rewarding staff who model good practices and champion integration;**
- **Showcasing operational and programmatic success in action through communication spotlights; and**
- **Highlighting the value added of activities that advance successful integration.**

The Executive Committee should work to deconstruct siloed identities across the United Nations

106. All United Nations staff have multiple identities—for instance, they can simultaneously be an international civil servant, a staff member of a particular entity and a subject-matter expert—and each identity carries different goals and values. The choices of an individual are often made in accordance with the identity that is most salient in the moment of decision. The challenge in integrated settings is that for most staff, their siloed identity is always the most salient. Deconstructing these siloed identities and increasing the prominence of communal identities can encourage more socially beneficial actions critical to successful integration. Heads of entities should therefore work together on measures such as:

Creating regular opportunities for staff across the system to reflect together on common objectives, comprehend other points of view and learn the “language” of others;

-

Providing senior managers with the time and space to develop a broader identity and acquire the habits and behavior critical to successful integration; and

-

Regularly reinforce communal identities at key moments.

Senior leaders and managers should facilitate the formation of interpersonal relationships

107. Situational factors often complicate the ability of staff to coordinate and collaborate. Individuals however, tend to focus on personal characteristics—rather than consider situational factors—when judging the behavior of others. Staff often miss opportunities to resolve differences and expand collaboration, regularly believing that behavior is impossible to change. United Nations entities can counteract this perspective by actively breaking through siloes and helping staff build stronger relationships and situational understanding that move beyond seeing each other as character-flawed acquaintances. Constructive approaches are:

Building new formal channels for exchanges between staff members at lower levels, and

-

Creating “stop and think” protocols for constructive conflict management.



DATA AND INFORMATION-SHARING

The Data Governance Council should prioritize the establishment of common data standards and protocols for sharing of sensitive information across entities

108. Sharing information is generally seen as the lowest common denominator for integration. Despite the broad agreement on the desirability that information should be shared, the extent of sharing is impeded by incompatible systems,³⁰ from mismatched email and collaboration platforms to the lack of interoperability of radio systems. Some staff have misgivings about how shared information might be used by others, and concerns arise about the absence of secure channels for information exchange. Common protocols should be established to facilitate the sharing and use of sensitive information across entities in integrated settings. This should be aligned with broader system-wide efforts to establish modern data and information disclosure policies beginning with agreement on common data standards and general interoperability. Interoperability with other systems, including those of other organizations of the United Nations system, should be prioritized in selecting new information technology platforms.

³⁰ Even when different organizations use the same technology platform, such as Microsoft Teams, the different configurations used also impede interoperability.



PROGRAMMATIC FUNDING

OPPFB should harmonize, to the extent possible, budgetary practices for peacekeeping operations and special political missions, including in the areas of programmatic funding and staffing table management

109. Many differences in budgetary practices between peacekeeping operations and special political missions are rooted in internal Secretariat practice rather than decisions of the General Assembly. These include the exclusion of programmatic activities in special political mission budgets and the use of posts in peacekeeping staffing tables and positions in special political mission budgets. The proposal and subsequent approval by the General Assembly of USD 1 million in programmatic funding for UNITAMS in the 2021 programme budget³¹ is a welcome first step that should be expanded into a standard practice in the future.

DPO, DPPA, DCO and OCHA should collectively review the policy on quick-impact projects

110. Quick-impact projects (QIPs) were originally intended as quick, low-value projects undertaken as confidence-building measures for newly deployed missions. Today, however, they are used, primarily by heads of field office, throughout a mission lifecycle. Unlike funding for programmatic activities, QIPs are not specifically assigned to any mandated task and can therefore be flexibly deployed. QIPs are often an area of friction between missions and humanitarians, who not only see these projects as an area of competition between missions and the country team, but are also concerned at the potential for QIPs to contribute to the politicization and militarization of aid. While the policy on quick-impact projects explicitly requires the participation of the country team in the QIP project review committee, this is not systematically implemented by missions. A review of the use of QIPs involving stakeholders from across the peace and security, development and humanitarian pillars should be undertaken to ensure that QIPs effectively contribute to the aims of missions while not undermining the programmatic activities of country teams.

³¹ General Assembly resolution 75/253, section XVIII



HUMAN RESOURCES

111. Many of the challenges to integration stem from human resources management policy, particularly in the areas of accountability, mobility and training. Nearly all interviewees pointed out the need to have personnel who can “speak” the different languages of peace, development and humanitarian issues. To facilitate this, the system needs to facilitate and incentivize mobility across—and not just within—the pillars.

EOSG, DPPA, DPO, OCHA and DCO should ensure that senior management teams are well-balanced and that there are no gaps in critical skills and expertise

112. Effective leadership in integrated contexts requires a breadth of experience and expertise that is often difficult to find in any one individual and which is increasingly overlooked as selection processes become ever more politicized. As recommended by the High-level Panel on Peace Operations,³² the senior leadership of integrated missions should be considered as teams selected not for their individual qualifications, but on the basis of how their collective diversity and complementarity of talents, experience and skills meet the requirements on the ground. The composition of and division of responsibilities within senior leadership teams should be examined whenever there are vacancies.

113. The role of the DSRSG/RC is particularly significant in integrated contexts. When filling the role of a DSRSG/RC, whether the post is dual-hatted as RC or triple-hatted as RC/HC should be reviewed whenever it is vacant based on the qualifications of individuals under consideration for the position, but should also be kept under regular review on the basis of the requirements on the ground.

EOSG and DMSPC should ensure that credible mechanisms are in place so that senior managers are accountable for facilitating integration

114. A credible accountability system is necessary to ensure that senior managers are doing their part to facilitate integration. The CEB-endorsed United Nations system leadership framework includes eight defining characteristics, many of which speak directly to integration.³³ These need to be meaningfully incorporated into both selection and performance management frameworks for senior leadership. Senior leaders must be held accountable to drive a one-UN approach in complex settings, to navigate issues and challenges across the full spectrum of United Nations activities and to manage conflicts, including by the use of existing forums to facilitate discussion and amicable dispute resolution.

115. Existing tools such as the senior managers compacts require strengthening. Although the compact includes an indicator on implementation of the integrated assessment and planning policy, the present review demonstrated a significant gap between achievement of the indicator on paper and whether the four minimum requirements of the IAP policy were being met, let alone whether implementation was actually contributing to integration in practice. The proposed scorecard could potentially be used to provide a quantitative basis for assessing achievement of an indicator, whether on integration more broadly or on the narrower implementation of the IAP policy.

³² A/70/95-S/2015/446, paragraph 278.

³³ The eight defining characteristics of leadership are that it is norm-based, principled, inclusive, accountable, multi-dimensional (integrated and engaged across pillars and functions), transformational, collaborative (within and beyond the UN system) and self-applied. In his report on shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations, the Secretary-General added a ninth characteristic for leaders in the Secretariat, namely that it should also be pragmatic and action-oriented (see A/72/492, paragraph 17).

116. Moreover, new mechanisms such as 360-degree evaluations are needed to more systematically identify instances where the actions of individual leaders are undercutting efforts to deliver in a coordinated manner. Many respondents identified leaders in the field and at Headquarters whose actions served to undermine integration. In one case, multiple respondents from across the mission, country team and the NGO and donor communities all raised concerns regarding a particular individual and noted that Headquarters had failed to take any corrective action despite issues having been raised about the individual through various ad hoc channels over the course of several years. The lack of repercussions to senior managers whose actions weaken integrated action demoralizes staff and undermines efforts to bridge the gaps across the development, humanitarian and peace and security work of the United Nations system. Consideration should be given to providing the Integration Steering Group with a formal role in advising the Secretary-General on how well senior managers in structurally integrated contexts facilitate successful integration³⁴.

DMSPC should ensure that integration is reflected in the revised competency framework and all entities should ensure that staff contributions to integration are captured in performance evaluation systems

117. Staff members noted that implementation, monitoring and reporting on the ISF does not happen if it is not included as part of someone's job description or workplan. In practice, no one is accountable for integration. Moreover, few staff members are evaluated on how effectively they coordinate with counterparts in other units or organizations. Career-related incentives to working in an integrated manner are weak at best. Indeed, working collaboratively can attract the ire of supervisors who are uncommitted to integration or who feel that joint activities deflect effort from their core deliverables. To compensate, performance evaluation systems need to account for the impact of staff efforts towards common United Nations system objectives, and not just the narrow priorities of individual organizations or entities.

Entities should ensure that personnel are exposed to the work and key concepts of other pillars

118. The importance of training was raised by many staff members. In addition to training on integrated assessment and planning, staff at all levels would benefit from training on the mandates and principles that govern the work of other parts of the system. Numerous interviewees cited the need for dedicated training for military officers on subjects including command and control in United Nations peacekeeping missions, the four humanitarian principles and the basics of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. This is important given the frequency of turnover of uniformed personnel.

Organizations should prioritize cross-pillar mobility in their staff selection and talent management policies, and should make full use of the inter-organization agreement for transfer, secondment and loan

119. A common attribute of the individuals who promote successful integration is that they have worked in several entities of the common system or across different pillars. It also appears to be correlated with pragmatism and experience in the field. Staff members identified as dogmatic and "principled" have tended to have worked entirely for a single entity with much experience at Headquarters. Many interviewees noted, however, that human resources policies make mobility difficult. Career paths are frequently linear, with organizational cultures and staff selection systems favouring staff members who have established themselves

³⁴ Such a role would be separate from, but complementary to, that of the Management Performance Board, which focuses on the performance of senior managers and heads of mission with regard to their management of their respective entities.

within a single entity. Instead, experience across pillars—and the opportunity to gain experience in different pillars—should be prioritized in the design of career paths and in criteria for staff selection. Furthermore, barriers to the use of transfer and secondment should be examined, as these mechanisms serve as valuable means by which staff members can broaden their experience with different organizations within the United Nations system.

120. Differences in benefits and mobility between agencies and mission staff may serve as a disincentive for inter-agency mobility. For example, Secretariat staff receive \$450 for rest and recuperation, while agency staff receive over \$2,000. In addition, agencies have better mobility policies, with staff rotating every two to three years. By contrast many mission staff have been "stuck" for years. Some mission staff felt underappreciated with the differences in benefits and mobility creating an "us-them" dynamic. These factors reduce the motivation of staff to reach out, collaborate and coordinate. The benefits of harmonized conditions of service across the United Nations system should be considered.

Missions and country teams should collaborate on workforce planning

121. Finally, there is major scope for missions and country teams to cooperate more systematically in workforce planning. This can range from the creation of fully integrated teams, where staffing requirements are jointly prepared and selections are made using joint interview panels, to coordinating the forecasting of staffing requirements and the preparation of budgets. The absence of coordinated workforce planning contributes to gaps in capacity during mission downsizing, as in the case of UNAMID, or mandate adjustments, as in the case of Afghanistan. In the latter case, the drawdown of the UNAMA Governance Unit due to the 2017 strategic review without a commensurate increase in capacity in the country team undercut the capacity of the United Nations to act as one when engaging with provincial authorities. In such cases, mission staffing drawdown plans should be developed as early as possible in consultation with the country team so that mission staff can be absorbed where possible and country team agencies can adjust their plans and programming as necessary.



A team of MINUSMA UNPOL officers talk to the population during a daily patrol on the streets of Menaka in the north of Mali

© MINUSMA/Marco Dormino



#UnidosPorLaReconciliación

V. Conclusion

V. Conclusion

122. Properly managed and appropriately implemented, integration adds value and enhances United Nations system performance. The added value is the result of gain in “competence and expertise”³⁵ when United Nations entities exploit their collaborative advantage in pursuing commonly agreed strategic priorities. But integration is not a panacea. When improperly managed and inappropriately implemented it can subtract value.

123. The research reported in this review provides compelling evidence for both points. Integration is an effective instrument in helping advance the goals of integrated United Nations presences when the relevant missions are prudently led, well-resourced, effectively monitored and evaluated, respond to the needs of host country populations, and are regularly readjusted to reflect changes in the mission context. Integration is ineffective (and often toxic) when mission leadership is indifferent or antagonistic to collaboration, the staff have neither the capacity nor incentive to cooperate, the mission is under-resourced, accountability for performance is diffuse or absent, and participating United Nations entities allow mandates, differential funding cycles, inherited protocol, and procedures to block cooperation.

124. With contemporary and emerging challenges such as the climate emergency, multilateral fragmentation, growing inequality, persistent injustice, unraveling social contracts, and the likelihood of future post-COVID pandemics, the need for integration within the United Nations system is as compelling today as it was following the Cold War – maybe more so. To respond, the United Nations requires the human and institutional capacities so that it can adapt its tools, mechanisms, and implementation procedures to the evolving context. When judiciously employed, integration is one of the mechanisms which is critical in enhancing United Nations system performance.

³⁵ A/50/60, paragraph 93

Annex I: List of acronyms and abbreviations

CCA	Common country analysis (pre-2019); common country assessment (2019-present)	QIP	Quick-impact project
COVID	Coronavirus disease	RC	Resident coordinator
CPAS	Comprehensive performance assessment system	RCO	Resident coordinator office
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	SASG	Special Adviser of the Secretary-General
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General	SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
DSS	Department of Safety and Security	SLF	State liaison functions (Sudan)
HC	Humanitarian coordinator	SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
HRP	Humanitarian response plan	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2001-present)
IAP	Integrated assessment and planning	UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (2007-2020)
IASC	Inter-Agency Steering Committee	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework (superseded by UNSDCF)
IMPP	Integrated mission planning process	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ISF	Integrated strategic framework	UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (2014-present)	UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (2013-present)	UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (2019-present)
NGO	Non-governmental organization	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	UNSDCF	United Nations sustainable development coordination framework (replaced UNDAF)
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (part of the Department of Peace Operations)	WPS	Women, peace and security

Annex II: Electoral assistance

1. Throughout the review, electoral assistance was identified as an area in which integration has been successful in bringing the UN system together for effective delivery of support. There are multiple factors that contribute to the successful approach including: clear legislative basis and policies; agreed division of labor; and integrated teams. Many of these factors were validated in a 2013 lessons learned study on integrated electoral assistance commissioned by the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD)/DPPA, DPKO and UNDP. While challenges arose, the review reveals that there is a solid foundation for an effective integrated approach in this area.

Clear legislative basis and policies

2. The importance of a coherent and consistent approach to electoral assistance has been long recognized in General Assembly resolutions, starting in 1991. General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/137 (1991) refers to the need to coordinate and avoid duplication of efforts and requested the Secretary-General to appoint a senior official as a focal point in the UN system. The General Assembly resolutions also highlight the importance of coordinating with non-UN electoral assistance providers to ensure coherent international support.

3. The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs is the designated focal point. The 2019 General Assembly resolution (A/RES/74/158) reaffirmed “the clear leadership role within the United Nations system of the United Nations focal point for electoral assistance matters, including in ensuring system-wide coherence and consistency.”

4. In addition, in 2010, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee (Decision 2010/23) endorsed guidance that spells out the roles and responsibilities in UN electoral assistance declaring that “all electoral assistance in peacekeeping, peacebuilding or special political mission settings will be delivered in a fully integrated manner from the outset, whether or not the mission is

structurally integrated.” This was reiterated in the 2012 Policy Directive on Principles and Types of UN Electoral Assistance, which lists integration as a principle.

5. The Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) has led and coordinated an effort to develop a UN system wide policy on “Integration of UN Electoral Assistance in Mission Settings.” The articulation of the policy framework, planning processes, leadership structure and reporting lines helps to increase a common understanding of what is expected of an integrated approach in electoral assistance.

Division of labor

6. The 2010 Policy Committee decision endorsed the Note of Guidance on Electoral Assistance, in which the roles of the focal point, EAD and UNDP are specified at the strategic level. Subsequently, additional guidelines and policies have articulated that for particular contexts, the roles and responsibilities of various UN entities are to be spelled out through the Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) led by EAD.

7. During the integration review, many interviewees were able to express their understanding of the division of labor between the mission (Secretariat) and UNDP in the provision of electoral assistance. Most colleagues understand the mission’s role to be more focused on the political, while UNDP provides the programmatic operational support.

Team structure and reporting line

8. Integrated electoral units are standard practice in missions. They ensure a coherent and unified approach in the provision of electoral assistance. The head of the unit is usually on a mission contract, supported by a deputy who may have a UNDP contract. The units have both mission and UNDP staff.

9. The 2010 Policy Committee decision also stated that ‘as a norm...electoral components in structurally

integrated missions will report to the SRSG or Head of Mission through the DSRSG who is also Resident Coordinator.”

Time bound nature

10. During interviews and discussions of the Integration Review, some colleagues highlighted another factor that makes electoral assistance a successful area for integration. The activities are timebound, concrete, and tangible. Much like transitions, having fixed timelines and dates concentrate attention with United Nations entities acting to ensure that they remain relevant to the process.

Challenges

11. While there is general agreement that integration works well in electoral assistance, a number of challenges were also identified during the review. The rationale for integration in electoral assistance is assumed but not necessarily well elaborated. Some interviewees noted that the need to integrate in this area is so obvious that it does not need explaining. Though this may be the case, more details should be provided within each country context why and what is being integrated would be appropriate.

12. Related to the above, as is the case across all areas, there is little evidence of monitoring and evaluation of integrated efforts. The 2010 Policy Committee decision confirms the need for integrated delivery of the electoral mandate in mission settings, but there is little evidence that the system tracks and verifies how the integrated approach performs.

13. Some challenges were administrative, for example, the incompatibility of IT systems, or the difficulties in sharing resources (such as vehicles). Others pointed out the incompatibility of performance evaluation mechanisms and platforms, which in turn pose challenges to managing an integrated team.

14. Other colleagues noted that clear policies, division of labor, and reporting lines do not guarantee successful integration if personalities are incompatible, especially at the leadership level. More recent concerns have been raised about the impact and complications

from the ‘de-linking’ of the RC and RR as part of the UN Development System reform. Many noted that having colleagues who have worked in both the mission (Secretariat) and UNDP is helpful, as they tend to take more constructive and flexible approaches to working together. Others pointed to the need for more outreach and training on the policies and guidance.

15. Finally, the 2010 Policy Committee decision calls for an integrated approach ‘from the outset’. The review finds that the decision to integrate a mission or not, or any of its subcomponents, should be driven by strategic priorities, and work back through activities required for progress in those priorities. Electoral assistance may be an area where there is broad agreement for the need for integration ‘from the outset’, but this may not be the case for other areas. Ultimately, the push for integration, including for sub-components, should fit into overall mission priorities and planning.

Annex III: Integration scorecard

AREA 1: STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS

Indicator
Strategic assessments done jointly w/dev, hum and hr
Technical assessments done jointly w/dev, hum and hr

AREA 2: INTEGRATED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Indicator
ISF updated within last two years or since last mandate change
ISF reflects findings of strategic assessments
ISF articulates common UN vision and strategy
ISF articulates business case for integration
ISF articulates areas requiring an integrated approach
ISF includes agreed results, timelines and responsibilities
ISF is aligned with UNSDCF
Mission involvement in UNSDCF development/update
Mission involvement in HRP development/update
Mission concept is aligned with ISF
Mission budget is aligned with ISF
Mission trust fund is aligned with ISF
PBF projects are aligned with ISF
UNCT resource mobilization is aligned with ISF
UNCT involvement in mission concept development
UNCT involvement in mission budget development
Mission has an ISF implementation plan in place
Mission has sub-national ISF implementation plans in place

AREA 3: INTEGRATED MECHANISMS

Indicator
ITF in place at Headquarters
Strategic country-forum exists for decision-making on ISF
Joint mission-UNCT information sharing mechanisms in place
UN-CMCoord mechanism in place
Joint mission-UNCT analysis mechanism in place
Joint mission-UNCT planning mechanism in place

AREA 4: INTEGRATED MONITORING AND REPORTING

Indicator
Ongoing country-level monitoring and reporting on ISF
Ongoing sub-national level monitoring and reporting on ISF
ISF monitoring is aligned with budget performance reporting
ISF monitoring is aligned with other performance reporting
M&E used to regularly update ISF implementation plans

AREA 5: PROGRAMMATIC (AREAS NOT RELEVANT CAN BE EXCLUDED FROM CALCULATION)

Indicator
Electoral assistance
Justice and corrections
SSR
DDR/CVR
Human rights
Protection
SGBV
CRSV
CAAC
Mission coordinates with UNCT on QIPs project plan
UNCT representation on HRDDP task force
Deployment of PDA in RCO
Support from UNMAS
Support from OROLSI/GFP Rule of Law
Support from PMD
Support from PBSO (country is PBF-eligible and/or on PBC agenda)

AREA 6: SUPPORT

Indicator
Mission inclusion in UNCT BOS
Common premises: At mission HQ
Common premises: Outside mission HQ
Human resources: Coordinated workforce planning
Human resources: Use of inter-org agreement
Finance: Budget coordination on QIPs and prgm funding
Finance: Mission contribution to UNCT trust funds
Finance: Common back-office
Supply chain: Operationalization of mutual recognition
Supply chain: Common services
Service delivery: Common life support
Service delivery: Common medical services
Service delivery: Other common services
Service delivery: Coordinated air operations
ICT: Common networks
UNCT participates in drawdown planning
UNCT participates in PADP

AREA 7: OTHER INTEGRATION FACTORS

Indicator
Mandate: Extension of state authority
Mandate: HRDDP-eligible support provided
Mandate: Potential applicability of IHL on mission

