Mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM)

Unfinished business
Unfinished Business

• Regulation of use in CCW Amended Protocol II
• Continuing humanitarian and developmental impact.
• Complicates clearance challenges.
• Grave consequences in future conflict if regulation is not addressed.
• Value of accurate information on Mine-IED incidents.
• Possible courses of action on addressing the regulatory gap.
Functions of Anti Vehicle Mine

• Weapon – Disable destroy tanks, other armoured vehicles, other vehicles.

• Obstacle - Combinations of MOTAPM in minefields provide a quick active obstacle

• Force deployment and exposure of En mine clearance assets
Target Emissions

- Infra-red / Heat
- Magnetic field
- Sound/acoustic
- Seismic vibrations
- Ground pressure
Anti-tank Mine Types
AT Mine Types
Off-Route Shaped Charge Mines
KA

Turning
Obstacle

Turn

KA
Fixing
Obstacle

Fix

KA
Block

Blocking Obstacle
Humanitarian concerns

Persistent fuzes
Mines laid outside perimeter marked areas
Sensitivity of fuze systems
  Pressure activated contact mines
  Trip wires, break wires, tilt rods
Detectability of mines
Remotely delivered mines
Scope of Concern

Legacy of previous use

Use in current conflicts

Use in future conflicts, including conflict between major military powers
IHL on AVMs

**General rules** of IHL apply to all weapons including mines.

**Specific rules**

- **CCW Convention.**
  - Protocol II on Landmines, Booby-traps and Other Devices as amended on 03 May 1996 (APII)
- Anti-personnel landmine convention 1997 (Ottawa Convention)
# Developments in CCW framework

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1995-6</td>
<td>1 Rev Con Amended Protocol II</td>
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<td>2002-03</td>
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<td>2004-06</td>
<td>GGE Failed Negotiations</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>3 Rev Con Political Declarations</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>4 Rev Con mandates 3 Day expert meeting in 2012</td>
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<td>2015, 2017</td>
<td>Informal expert meetings</td>
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<td>2018</td>
<td>Mandate to conduct ‘a consultation’</td>
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Restrictions in 2006 Declaration

• Detectability of all mines outside perimeter marked areas
• All mines outside perimeter marked areas to be equipped with SD or SN mechanisms.
• Restrict transfers of all anti-vehicle mines
• Adopted by 27 states.
State of Play 2018

- One state demanded removal of MOTAPM from agenda at 2017 MSP
- Chair mandated to conduct ‘an informal consultation’ on MOTAPM
- Meeting planned for June 2018.
Factors impeding new IHL

Sceptical states

- maintain that existing IHL is adequate.
- argue that there is insufficient evidence of humanitarian harm.
- nervous that any process could lead to pressure for a total ban.

Other states nervous to make an effort that might not succeed.

States maintaining polarised positions from 2006
Desired End State

Agreement on IHL measures to address remaining humanitarian concerns on MOTAPM / AVM

• Outcomes
  – Remain reliant on AP II
  – Adopt legally binding protocol on lines of 2006 declarations
  – Find another solution
Need for more data

AVM or APM or Other Device
Mine type and fuze type
IEDs
  AP or AV
  Victim operated, command detonated, timed
Targets – military, civilian, infrastructure, economic etc.
All IEDs (conventional) covered in AP II
Other MOTPAM / AVM Data

- Mines cleared
- Types of mines and fuze types
- Size of stockpiles
- Quantities of stockpiles destroyed
- Details of new production
- Details of Transfers
Unfinished business